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2022 Michigan Topicality

T - Framework - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

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Framework Core—Wave 1—FMPS
Notes
The 1NC is modular; you can pick and choose which (if any) cards you want to read. Along those lines, if you would prefer different 1NC interpretations, by all means switch them out! I would recommend reading interpretations which say that the resolutional wording implies action by the federal government, but any interpretation that the aff in question doesn’t meet works—this is a topicality argument at its core.
1NC Modules
1NC Core
The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action.
Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
Security cooperation refers exclusively to inter-military cooperation authorized explicitly by US Code.
Tankel ’20 [Stephen and Tommy; October 28; associate professor at American University, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid; War on the Rocks, “Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition]
The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.
Over the last several years, the national security enterprise has, with a great many fits and starts, endeavored to shift its broader focus — from weapons systems to diplomacy — away from counter-terrorism and toward strategic competition with state actors. As part of this shift, policymakers have attempted to realign security assistance to contribute more directly to strategic competition, primarily by creating new resources for security assistance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The European Deterrence Initiative, launched in 2014, has allocated around $6 billion annually to enhance America’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia. It has been supplemented by the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 to provide $250 million in security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s security. Congress also created the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative in 2014, later re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, and funded it as a five-year, $425 million security assistance effort, which it has since extended through FY2025. This program is intended to improve the ability of Southeast and East Asian nations to address growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the FY2021 defense bill currently being finalized, Congress is set to authorize a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, modeled on the European Deterrence Initiative, with as much as $6 billion annually to improve U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region, reportedly with a significant security assistance component.
These efforts have been laudable, but far from sufficient. The European Deterrence Initiative has largely been used to shift enduring costs for U.S. military presence in Europe into the Overseas Contingency Operations portion of the defense budget. It has also dedicated the vast majority of funds to posture and equipment pre-positioning, with little attention to security assistance beyond combined exercises — a significant missed opportunity. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has been managed insularly by the U.S. Europe Command, which has bypassed synchronization with other Defense Department and U.S. government stakeholders, leading to a focus on the provision of “training and equipment at the expense of developing a long-term strategic vision and implementation of meaningful defense reform.” In the Asia-Pacific, the Maritime Security Initiative has shown promise, but its relatively limited funding has failed to significantly contribute to a rebalance of assistance toward the region, and it has largely funded projects with little deterrent value. Incoming U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Philip Davidson declared, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Moreover, none of these initiatives have prioritized partner security sector governance — a vital element of any strategy that seeks to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners. As Congress considers the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it is essential that these mistakes — failure to integrate security assistance with other instruments of national power, overemphasis on posture at the expense of cooperation, and too little ambition for assistance initiatives — are not repeated. Even avoiding them, however, will go only so far in terms of optimizing security sector assistance for the challenges ahead. The U.S. government should also address broader challenges with the way security sector assistance is prioritized and executed.
Still an Outmoded Instrument
To increase the effectiveness of security sector assistance for strategic competition, the United States should address deficiencies related to where and how it uses this assistance. Currently, assistance is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities. Assistance remains over-directed toward countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia, rather than to those in Europe and Southeast Asia where the main competition with Russia and China occurs. There are several reasons for this disparity.
First, annual commitments to Israel and Egypt — totaling $3.3 billion and $1.3 billion, respectively — eat up a large portion of the Foreign Military Financing budget. The origins of U.S. munificence to both countries is linked to the “payoff for peace,” that is, the U.S. commitment to Israel and Egypt after they signed the 1979 Camp David Accords. Distinct from the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the State Department brokers purchases of U.S.-made defense articles and defense services by foreign partners, the Foreign Military Financing program provides grants and loans to help partners, generally lower-income countries, purchase those articles and services. It is intended to be the premier program for building the capabilities of frontline allies and partners. Given its purpose, one would think that the United States would be steering more Foreign Military Financing toward Europe and Asia.
Second, the 9/11 attacks brought new requirements: promoting counter-terrorism cooperation and rapidly building the capacity of local part­ner forces, especially the creation or enhancement of tactical units, to address “urgent and emergent threats.” This naturally led to a focus on countries where terrorists operated or might take root, which reinforced the geographic focus on the Middle East, and expanded it to include countries in Central and South Asia. This focus was especially marked at the Defense Department. The amount of assistance it administers climbed significantly since 9/11, and totaled just over $7.5 billion in the FY2021 budget request. Approximately $6.5 billion comes from contingency funds for capacity building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones. Supporting these conflicts created additional security assistance cost centers among partners that played critical roles supporting counter-terrorism operations and U.S. logistics footprints. For example, Pakistan received over $23 billion in security assistance and military reimbursements as a result of its importance to the United States as a counter-terrorism partner after 9/11. Jordan has also experienced a marked increase in assistance over the same period, receiving close to $10 billion.
Overall, the United States spends about $20 billion annually on security sector assistance, of which only approximately 8 percent is allotted to Europe, East Asia, and the Pacific, according to Security Assistance Monitor. Addressing this imbalance will require the departments of State and Defense to reprioritize their budget requests, and Congress to cease earmarking security sector assistance dollars based on outmoded objectives.
The overriding focus on counter-terrorism in U.S. security sector assistance programs and national security strategy more broadly over the past two decades has not only contributed to its orientation toward the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia. It also compounded challenges related to how the United States uses assistance, specifically America’s emphasis on countering urgent threats and on capacity building for counter-terrorism or special operations units. Where the State Department provides assistance to civilian security sector forces and institutions in other countries, it overemphasizes building tactical capabilities for law enforcement (that is, training small operational units on narrow capabilities like interdicting narcotraffickers or conducting counterterrorism raids) at the expense of the administrative capacity and professionalism of these forces and institutions. Defense Department assistance has similarly focused on building the tactical capabilities of partner militaries. Such tactical assistance — which often includes status-signaling weapons systems and resources to supplement partner personnel training budgets — is often prioritized by partners as well, particularly in the absence of effective U.S. messaging on the importance of broader reforms.
The U.S. emphasis on counter-terrorism led to a buildup of Special Operations Command and the services’ special operations forces components as well, and a commensurate focus on building the capacity of their special operations counterparts in other countries. Although the services dispense assistance, they don’t invest much in terms of the planning necessary to tie the execution of this assistance to either specific objectives or longer-term engagements. Other than the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades, the services don’t organize for the security sector assistance mission. Even in the Asia-Pacific, the main focus of assistance prior to the Maritime Security Initiative was the special operations forces capacity-building mission in the Philippines. This focus on special operations force has left the services, and U.S. partners’ conventional forces, out of the equation in many places. Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable exception, but even in these countries the United States has focused on building specific types of military units with a heavy emphasis on partner special operations capacity.
While the United States has directed security sector assistance toward the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and focused more on building partners’ tactical capacity for counter-terrorism, Russia and China are using aggressive military pressure to coerce neighbors and compete in new domains, such as cyber and space. They are also using instruments of statecraft outside the traditional security arena, such as economic pressure, lawfare, and even technical standards-setting. For example, China has used commercially flagged fishing vessels to perform militia-like functions in support of its activities around South China Sea features. Russia has used its cyber capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, interfere in elections, undermine political leaders, and spread disinformation throughout NATO-aligned Eastern Europe. The United States has failed to keep pace — either on its own in terms of its use of all instruments of national power, or in terms of the security assistance it provides partners to enhance their capabilities to mount effective responses and build resilience.
Optimizing Security Sector Assistance
If security assistance is to be an effective tool in strategic competition, then the U.S. government needs to step up its game. Washington should develop a sophisticated, integrated planning process at the State Department and Department of Defense for security assistance; significantly increase the Foreign Military Financing budget, or redirect spending from the Middle East and North Africa to Asia and Eastern Europe; use security assistance to convey strategic messages to both rivals and partners; and feature human rights considerations more prominently when engaging in arms sales. This would require the United States to address underlying deficiencies in planning, prioritization, and execution in ways that account for the unique challenges that Russian and Chinese approaches to competition bring: the use of disinformation, private security contractors, cyber tools, and civilian and commercial actors such as commercial fishing fleets. This is not to suggest that Washington should look to security sector assistance as the solution to all of its national security challenges — far from it. Rather, assistance should be better integrated with other instruments of national power. The following recommendations are intended to close the gap between where the United States currently is regarding its use of security sector assistance and where it needs to be to compete effectively. Some of these recommendations are focused more squarely on China and Russia, whereas others relate to broader reforms to the security sector assistance enterprise.
First, it is essential to create coordinated, department-wide planning processes at the departments of State and Defense. The U.S. government is hamstrung by inefficient and incoherent planning and coordination processes that do not allocate assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities, country prioritization, availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions. Congressional earmarks make prioritization more difficult, but getting rid of them won’t solve the problem. Policymakers should recognize the fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of many aspects of strategic competition and begin to break down stovepipes both within and between key agencies involved in the planning and execution of security assistance. Interagency coordination should move beyond mere deconfliction and concurrence toward a truly collaborative real-time planning and response. Lack of coordination also exists within departments, which should reform their assistance planning processes. Of equal importance, security sector assistance planning and prioritization should account for the fact that China and Russia are mounting sustained challenges to governance and rule of law at the regional, national, and multinational levels. Advancing governance and rule of law therefore should be a key aim of assistance.
The State Department has a wider mandate for security assistance, encompassing both military aid and assistance for civilians. It is also supposed to use security assistance to advance broader, more long-term objectives like trade and investment, efforts to help allies and partners develop an innovation base, and major diplomatic initiatives. To fulfill this mission, the State Department should develop a planning process that elevates common interagency objectives for assistance, deconflicts competing objectives where necessary, identifies security assistance resources projected to be available for the period of time necessary to achieve such objectives, and recommends the allocation of assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities. Those priorities should be derived from the next administration’s national security strategy and informed by the availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions. State also needs to create a framework to guide the use of assistance as dictated by the above planning process in alignment with other instruments of national power, and a framework for factoring in how arms sales — both Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales — might affect U.S. security assistance planning and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Last year, the House of Representatives passed a State Authorization Act that required these and other reforms, but it has languished in the Senate since then.
Defense Department assistance should focus narrowly on four inherently military objectives: supporting State Department-coordinated efforts to build long-term capacity so that an ally or partner can manage its own security challenges; achieving a fundamental improvement in U.S. posture to prevail (including via coalitions) in a potential contingency, for example by assisting a partner to build a deep-water port or develop the capability to contribute in a specific role to potential coalition operations; generating short-term capacity when deemed necessary to achieve strategic objectives or improving interoperability for a specific goal; and responding to real-time developments, such as deterrent signaling, personnel recovery, or humanitarian response. Defense Department planners should be required to identify the objective(s) they’re serving and justify their plans on that basis. They also should be c

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