Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2022 Michigan Evidence

Impacts - China War Good Bad - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ

Impacts - China War Good Bad - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
China War Good (and Bad)
Big thank you to Aayan Ali, Sanjith Geevarghese, Mishelle Kamyshnikov, Lenox Leverett, Mike Li, Krish Mysoor, Mahi Shah, Ishan Sharma, Cy Turner
AFF
BMD Fails
2AC – Tests Prove
Even if funding goes into BMD recent testing proves they are ineffective
Lockie, 18 – (Alex Lockie- former news editor and a military and foreign-policy blogger at Business Insider, "US ballistic missile defense just doesn't work — but we keep spending billions and billions on it", 2-2-2018, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-ballistic-missile-defense-doesnt-work-but-we-spend-billions-on-it-2018-2)//mishelle
The US tried and failed to intercept a missile on Wednesday, and also announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on missile defense interceptors. The US has spent more than $40 billion on missile defense projects over the last 15 years, and has no real credible capability to show for it. Ballistic missile defense plays into the complicated game of nuclear deterrence, which some say provides theoretical protection, but nobody can prove that. The US public learned on Wednesday that the US Navy tried and failed for the second time in a year to intercept a missile with an SM-III missile from the defense contractor Raytheon. On the same day, the Pentagon announced it would spend another $6.5 billion on 20 more missile interceptors for the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD), which is meant to protect the US homeland from missile attacks from North Korea or Russia. But the GMD has a bad track record. It recently had a successful test that may have calmed the fears of some in the US amid nuclear tensions with North Korea, but a recent paper on the test shows it was unrealistically generous. Laura Grego and David Wright, leading experts in the field of ballistic missiles, writing for the Union of Concerned Scientists, found that the so-called intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) the GMD knocked down was flown on a favorable trajectory, slower than the real thing, and without any of the tricks or savvy North Korea might use in an actual attack. The paper concludes the US has no reliable ballistic missile defense capability for the homeland. That capability, or lack thereof, comes after the US has spent more than $40 billion over the last decade in a half on ballistic missile defense. During that time, Boeing, Raytehon, and Lockheed Martin, key players in the BMD scene, have all posted record profits — and they continue to get contracts with the Pentagon. To be clear, the US can defend against some, shorter-range missiles. Aegis-equipped ballistic missile destroyers at sea have a good track record of defending themselves, but they're not meant to go after ICBMs. Patriot missiles have saved some lives from short-range missile attacks on the battlefield, though that has been historically over-hyped or just lied about.
2AC – Impossible
An improvement in missile defense still won’t be effective- chances of nuclear weapons hitting are high and outweigh
Grego, 18 – (Laura Grego- Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT's Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, on leave from the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, where she is senior scientist and research director, "US Ground-based midcourse missile defense: Expensive and unreliable", 6-28-2018, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486592)//mishelle
Where dissuasion is concerned, many factors inform a country’s decision making about whether to develop ICBM technology, and at what cost. But a strategic missile defense system would have to be very effective to alter an adversary’s cost-to-benefit calculation. A marginally effective missile defense system, or a system of unknown effectiveness, may well create an incentive to build more, or more sophisticated, missiles than states would otherwise build. No evidence suggests that building or improving the GMD system has had or will have any appreciable effect on potential adversaries’ decisions to develop long-range missiles. The dramatic increase in tempo in North Korea’s missile testing program happened after the GMD’s nominal deployment and development. Similarly, Iran has continued to develop its long-range missile technology, launching four small satellites into orbit between 2009 and 2015 and developing its more capable Simorgh booster. What about deterrence? The primary way a missile defense system helps deter an attack is by creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about whether that attack would succeed in achieving its goals. Under Cold War thinking, if a peer adversary such as the Soviet Union (or Russia) contemplated a carefully planned strike against hardened US military targets, and if effective missile defenses existed, the adversary might be uncertain how much of the US retaliatory force would remain intact after the attack. According to this logic, missile defense would help deter an adversary’s nuclear first strike. The same logic does not apply to an attack that a country such as North Korea, Iran, or even China might consider. These countries’ missile arsenals are too small and inaccurate to mount an effective counterforce strike on hardened US military targets; they would necessarily target cities and civilian infrastructure. Central in deterring North Korea from launching nuclear weapons against the United States is the certainty of a devastating US response. The presence or absence of US missile defense has no meaningful effect on the deterrence already afforded by US offensive nuclear and conventional forces. That brings the discussion to defense against a missile attack. While North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests of the last few years indicate that Pyongyang is within reach of the ability to build a nuclear-armed missile that can reach the United States, these missiles are and will remain relatively inaccurate – whether or not North Korea ceases its test program. North Korean missiles cannot be used to credibly threaten hardened targets such as US nuclear command and control or missile silos, and would instead be targeted on larger, less protected sites, such as cities. For this reason, the GMD system would need to be very effective if it were to influence US decision making, as even one nuclear-armed missile could devastate a city. Reliably defending against an all-out assault is not feasible. While President Trump stated on television17 last October that “We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97 percent of the time,” testing data show there is no basis for expecting interceptors to work more than 40 to 50 percent of the time, even under the easiest and most generous conditions.18 Using multiple interceptors against each target can improve these odds, but this approach does not fundamentally change the situation; the chance of a nuclear weapon getting through would still be dangerously high. Consider an attack with five missiles.19 Using four interceptors against each target, each with a kill probability of 50 percent, the odds that one warhead would get through are 28 percent – or higher, if the failure modes are not independent of each other (for example, if the guidance systems of all the interceptors are faulty in the same way). The odds may yet be worse if the adversary uses numerous credible decoys that the GMD system cannot distinguish from legitimate targets, and so must engage. Thus, while the GMD system may provide some defense against the simplest threats, it cannot provide the type of robust defense necessary to substantially change decision making calculus.20
Chinese Retaliation
Yes nuc retal !
Michael O’Hanlon ‘19, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, specializing in defense and foreign policy issues. The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, p. 49-50 //GBS
This somewhat sanguine conclusion is far from certain, however. It hinges in part on a willingness in Washington to accept many thousands of American battlefield dead and at least some risk of nuclear escalation. Even though U.S. nuclear forces far exceed those of the PLA, China might conclude that its disproportionate interests in the Taiwan issue warranted nuclear brinkmanship, especially if China had already possibly lost thousands of its own people in conventional combat, which would heighten the stakes as well as the reputational importance of the outcome of the conflict. These concerns could be amplified if the United States, intentionally or not, began to strike the nuclear assets of the PLA in the course of conventional fighting near Taiwan. If that happened, China might face a “use them or lose them” dilemma.101 Nuclear attack against a carrier, or a high-altitude nuclear airburst over a base like Kadena (designed to destroy people and equipment immediately below, without generating lots of fallout), might seem particularly attractive options to Beijing.
First strike causes retal – “use it or lose it” dilemma, and planners favor offensive action
Joshua Rovner ’17, Political scientist specializing in intelligence, strategy, and U.S. foreign policy. “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia”, Journal of strategic studies Vol. 40, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 696-730 // gbs
Finally, inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk. Under these conditions, the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent, the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation, planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14
Laundry list of psychological factors.
Joshua Rovner ’17, Political scientist specializing in intelligence, strategy, and U.S. foreign policy. “Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia”, Journal of strategic studies Vol. 40, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 696-730 // gbs
The first is psychological. Cognitive biases may cause leaders to misperceive rival intentions, mistaking signals of restraint for signs of danger. Prewar expectations strongly influence how individuals interpret new information, and they will ignore or reframe dissonant information so it fits into their existing beliefs. Misperceptions intensify after the shooting starts, when information is ambiguous and incomplete. Carl von Clausewitz dwelt on the problem in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, noting that intelligence reports were often contradictory and unreliable “in the thick of fighting.” Despite advances in intelligence and communications, the fog of war remains an enduring problem. Organized violence is an iterative process, and each side has incentives to hide its actions and deceive its adversary. Violence also unleashes intense emotions that obscure the material effects of battle. Commanders may not understand whether they are winning or losing, and in lieu of reliable intelligence they are likely to let passion overtake good judgment. “In short,” Clausewitz concluded, “most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies.” 9
Wartime leaders are prone to attribution bias, or the belief that their counterparts are inherently evil. Leaders in conflict are likely to assume the worst about their rivals or else they would not have picked a fight in the first place. Attribution bias causes them disregard the notion that their enemies have limited goals and are willing to accept partial victories. They are also prone to reject peace overtures as meaningless gestures at best, or as efforts to lull them into passivity before escalating the conflict.10 Finally, prospect theory tells us that individuals will fight harder to avoid losing a possession than they will to gain something new. If leaders equate settling with losing, then they will be tempted to risk escalation. All of these psychological pressures are exacerbated under stress and tight time constraints.11
Counterforce Fails
2AC – General
The US has fundamentally misunderstood Chinese nuclear strategy – they have centered resources on establishing a survivable nuclear arsenal rather than quantitative increases – and they’ve succeeded
Brown 21 — (Gerald C., [Gerald C. Brown is an analyst with Valiant Integrated Services focusing on nuclear deterrence and East Asian security.], “Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces“, Arms Control Association, 06-2021, Available Online at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-06/features/understanding-risks-realities-chinas-nuclear-forces, mysoor)
In its recent annual threat assessment, the U.S. intelligence community described how China is pursuing “the most rapid expansion and platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history” and is intending to “at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade.” Although deeply concerning, this description should be put in context. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China’s deployed nuclear forces to number in the low 200s. Even if doubled, this is substantially lower than the approximately 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear forces the United States maintains on alert daily under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Despite the rising numbers, China seems unlikely to quantitatively outpace U.S. nuclear forces in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, China’s capabilities represent a substantial threat that must not be ignored. Quantitative comparisons of nuclear arsenals are a relatively crude manner of understanding nuclear risks and, in the case of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, wholly insufficient. More than ever, U.S. policymakers need to understand Chinese nuclear strategy. In the U.S.-Chinese context, policymakers should be more focused on how conventional weapons and related strategies could impact the nuclear calculus between the two countries. Chinese Nuclear Strategy Unlike Russia and the United States, China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent, with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.1 Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility, while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.2 In that sense, China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen, China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”3 Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns, China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest, secure, and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate, even with only a few warheads, Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit. Since China’s first nuclear test in 1964, it has consistently maintained a public, declaratory no-first-use policy, adhering to what it describes as a “self-defensive nuclear strategy” that would anticipate using nuclear weapons only as a “counterattack in self-defense.”4 Western analysts have rightfully pointed out that a no-first-use pledge may not be entirely credible on its own. Although the pledge may be sincerely held, during a crisis, escalation could be unpredictable. Additionally, a small number of Chinese analysts have suggested that what China defines as a counterattack may be ambiguous under certain, limited conditions, such as conventional attacks seeking to neutralize China’s nuclear forces.5 Despite Western doubts, the fact remains that Chinese strategists believe that the pledge holds true. An unambiguous no-first-use stance remains the official stance of the Chinese government, and China’s nuclear strategy is built around this concept. Authoritative texts on Chinese military thinking have described three major missions for Chinese nuclear forces. In peacetime, they seek to deter enemies from launching a nuclear war with China. In wartime, they constrain the scope of war, preventing a conventional conflict from escalating to a nuclear exchange. If war does escalate to nuclear conflict, they serve to conduct nuclear counterattacks.6 The texts consistently describe only one envisioned use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear counterattack operation, in response to a nuclear strike.7 Operational practices have reinforced this. Beijing maintains a highly centralized nuclear warhead storage and handling system, with warheads typically thought to be stored unmated from their delivery vehicles rather than loaded and ready for launch.8 Further, training for nuclear brigades reflects the practice of counterattacking under nuclear conditions. Yet, there are indications of evolution. Recent U.S. government reports have suggested that some People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) brigades may spend time on higher alert and may seek to shift to a launch-on-warning posture in the future in order to increase survivability under nuclear attack. China has been developing a space-based early-warning system with assistance from Russia that could support this.9 Nuclear Force Projections As the U.S. annual threat assessment noted, there are signs of recent substantial changes in Chinese nuclear forces. The most important changes have been primarily qualitative, but notable quantitative changes are also occurring. These are understandably alarming to U.S. policymakers. Although the size of Chinese nuclear forces may still be dwarfed by the U.S. arsenal, its growth represents a substantial complication for the United States. Further, although the United States and Russia are modernizing their arsenals, they have been reducing their stockpiles over the past few decades slowly but significantly. China’s nuclear expansion represents a concerning shift away from its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to reduce its arsenal, and that is likely to impact U.S. and Russian decision-making. Yet, understanding these changes in the context of China’s nuclear strategy is important. Instead of trying to reach parity with or exceed the U.S. nuclear arsenal, China seems intent on ensuring that it has an assured retaliatory capability following U.S. strikes. Given U.S. nuclear and technological superiority, China likely has never had a sufficiently survivable nuclear deterrent against the United States, a goal that was more aspirational than anything else. Revolutions in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons, have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force, further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability. For the first time in history, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of execu

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.