Aff - Black Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB
Aff - Black Disability - Michigan 7 2022 K LAB.docx
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Aff --- Disability --- K lab Special thank you to: Ayush Potdar (Northview) Bridget Chmiel (Lane Tech) Buck Arney aka Barney (Head Royce) Eshkar Kaidar-Heafetz (Chattahoochee/Wenatchee) Peter Zinober (Berkeley Prep) Sameer Varkantham (Berkeley Prep) Rose Bilicki (Niles West) If you have any questions, feel free to email Joshua Harrington at joshharr@umich.edu 1AC 1AC --- Definitions Definition of mad blackness :: black madness Pickens 19 [Therí Alyce Pickens, Professor of English, specializing in African American, Arab America and disability literatures and theories at Bates University, June 7, 2019 “Black Madness :: Mad Blackness”, Duke University Press, Durham and London, pgs. 4-5, JMH] Despite my academic and personal proclivity for politesse and rigorous specificity, I choose to rest in the vagueness and insult mad brings.8 I mobilize this word as part of my critical armature because this discussion requires a direct engagement with slippery and insulting language.9 Mad carries a lexical range that includes (in)sanity, cognitive disability, anger, and, for anyone who remembers the slang of the 1990s, excess (usually synonymous with too or really). In common parlance, it is used pejoratively and remains rather vague. However, mad studies takes up madness to “represent a critical alternative to ‘mental illness’ or ‘disorder’ as a way of naming and responding to emotional, spiritual, and neuro-diversity.”10 Mad studies perspectives mobilize activist and scholastic impulses in their refusal of the historical definitions of madness as “irrationality, a condition involving decline or even disappearance of the role of rational factor in the organization of human conduct and experience” and the equation of madness with lack or inability.11 In this field, the biopsychiatric definitions of madness that proceed from this historical definition—wedded to inability and irrationality—no longer hold since they disenfranchise the perspectives of those harmed by psy-disciplines. In this study, I take seriously the critical impulses of mad studies: I keep a tension between psychosocial definitions of madness (without attributing causality) and biomedical definitions (without attributing authority), while resisting an uncritical celebration of madness as experience or as metaphor. Even though this project focuses on those who would be labeled mad or embrace being mad, I also do not veer too far away from the critical possibilities of madness as a “slippery and unruly object.”12 When madness does not solely refer to the experience of a mad person but rather pans outward as a larger discourse, it challenges how “the psychic, cognitive, and affective dimensions of experience are parceled out into categories . . . all under the supposedly ‘empirical’ authority of medical science and psychiatric expertise as much as through the exercise of legal and juridical power.”13 In other words, it is everywhere and affects everything. Maddeningly so. In Black Madness :: Mad Blackness, Black functions as a racial category, cultural affiliation, and social position. I use Black for its lexical and sociocultural range. It includes a wide variety of people and experiences within the diaspora and does not limit the discussion to a specific geopolitical imaginative space. Unfortunately, my discussion is limited in scope to the parts of the diaspora that share an intellectual inheritance with North America and Europe. As Julie Livingston’s Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (2005) and Nirmala Erevelles’s Disability and Difference in Global Contexts (2011) make clear, definitions of Blackness and disability cannot and should not be moved carelessly across transnational borders.14 Yet, given the vastness of colonial and imperial projects where race determines life and death, the study of Blackness emerges as a fecund space to think through how material consequences manifest. As I have claimed elsewhere, a turn to Blackness “authorizes a reconceptualization of history, culture, and politics” if the field is understood as “a set of traditions, reading practices, and valuation systems operating alongside, intertwined with, but also independent from those of whiteness.”15 Like madness, Blackness is also everywhere and affects everything. It is my hope that despite the necessary geopolitical limitations of my project, it later proves useful for those studying other Blacknesses. I choose to nominalize Black and mad by adding the suffix “ness” to attend to the two words as both description and category. I bring them together grammatically to theorize about the constellation of relationships that comprise the two. Nirmala Erevelles, in writing about the Middle Passage, rereads Hortense Spillers’s work to point out that the simplified causal relationship—slavery produces disability—does not fully encompass the way disability and Blackness function. Rather, “disability/impairment and race are neither merely biological nor wholly discursive, but rather are historical material constructs imbricated within the exploitative conditions of transnational capitalism.”16 My staged grammatical intervention in the title calls attention to how a revision of this sort works. It is at once a ref erence to the material conditions and consequences as well as a discursive attending to the categories’ imbrication. Nominalizing the two also staves off what Rachel Gorman argues is “the mad subject . . . constituted as the white subject at the horizon of whiteness”17: that is, the mad white subject who can be embraced by whiteness through a discourse of universality. In this formulation, Blackness modifies (and I use the grammatical term deliberately) who and what is mad. Madness as noun calls attention to what Sami Schalk insists is a useful slippage between materiality and metaphor in Black studies. She argues that within Black literature, disability takes on “concrete and metaphorical meanings” such that disability can “symbolize something other than disability while still being about disability.” In so doing, “disability metaphors therefore allow us to explore the historical and material connections between disability and other social systems of privilege and oppression.”18 As with Erevelles’s formulation, the two categories do not exist in a simple causal or analogic relationship; they inform each other such that madness modifies how we understand Blackness.19 Vitaltiy politics explanation Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3achttp://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB) Dōgen The term “vitality politics” in the chapters to follow, thus, identifies a post-Reconstruction politicization of biological health as an instrument for insisting on a racial state of exception in which African Americans’ own unhealthy habits and disease susceptibility justified their legitimate suspension from full rights to social justice, economic opportunity, political equality, and freedom. I use the term “vitality” deliberately because of its layered meanings: first to invoke the language widely cited in early twentieth-century discussions about racial destiny that debated the private bodily practices and life processes of African Americans to determine (allegedly on an objective scientific basis) the developmental tendencies of freedmen and women and to medicalize economic, social, and political discriminations (see chapter 1). But, second, vitality politics also registers the focus of African American reformers on hygienic behaviors and environments to rehabilitate African Americans into “vital” citizens practicing self-care and private risk management promoted within modern liberal (and now neoliberal) multicultural racial capitalism.14 Vitality Politics synthesizes multiple strands within the broad field of what is collectively identified as biopolitics, including theories of vulnerability, medicalization, disability studies, slow death, necropolitics, mad studies, and vital materialism to get at the complicated, and not always consistent, ways that both the literal physical and mental health—the matter of Black lives— and the semiotic meanings and larger discursive narratives attached to them functioned as key tactics shaping and controlling African Americans’ place as part of the shift toward modern liberal governmentality. These practices of vitality politics, as a consequence, require an attention to a complex notion of Black personhood, one which necessitates us as literary and cultural critics to avoid privileging representations over physicality or culture over biology, and to acknowledge how post-Reconstruction material Black personhood and its representation were being mutually transformed.15 1AC --- Mad Blackness Emerging technologies create disinformation campaigns, expanding state influence to justify its mistreatment of racialized and disabled subjects through the weaponization of cognitive dissonance in algorithmic fashion Zach Naqvi 21 [Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Madness, Migration and Media in the Modern Digital Age, April 14th 2021, pg.2-7, -ekh-] Citizenship, migration and international relations informing how we conceptualize policy get inextricably tied to sovereign states that determine the fate of refugees. The framework that facilitates this process has followed a chaotic trajectory in recent years. Understanding the rise of populist rhetoric emerging in North America and Europe, among others, points to recent developments in international relations requiring greater scrutiny, with specific practices necessitating a closer look by communities at home and abroad. I argue that we have fallen short of our collective humanitarian promise of dignity and fundamental human rights for everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, class, or country of origin. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of the state and a universal humanitarian aim have had difficulties getting reconciled. In theory and practice, pragmatism and utopia and things related to realist necessity versus a more utopian idealism – international relations are plagued with a disconnect between what ought to be and what is. The reason is that states, unlike individuals, families and communities are not concerned primarily with such lofty ideals as human dignity, fraternity, equality, and the like. Instead, they get inseparably linked with the fundamental objective of consolidating, maintaining, and executing powers that we as individuals upon the grounds of elections, citizenship and birth or connection have authorized the state to have. Furthermore, many view frameworks of citizenship and migration from a privileged standpoint, concerned with realist undertones of security, sovereignty, and the success of their state above all else. The dire question here is whether those immigrating, seeking asylum or even completely stateless can reasonably expect to be accommodated by sovereign states. First, alternative facts or the designation by some that we are entering a post-truth world, amplified by improvements in technology moving us collectively towards increasingly interconnected existence, lay bare for all to see a new power dynamic playing out over the past decade. The aim of alternative facts is “to establish power: they are lying to flaunt power. They are saying to us: ‘we know that you know that this is a lie, and we don’t care, because there is absolutely nothing you can do about it’ … over years, ceaseless propaganda and spectacle, exacerbated by corrections and retractions, can destroy your sense of reality. Time spirals forward and lurches backwards.” (Kendzior, 2020, p.18) Take Franz Fanon, for example. Despite his death decades ago, his lived experience then provides critical insight now. Fanon was a doctor and the acclaimed author of Black Skin, White Masks. Despite his subjective personhood being complex and multifaceted, not constrained simply to role or race, when practicing medicine, it is a mistake made as a black doctor if he made a mistake. Similarly, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers are broadly categorized as if the totality of their being constitutes race – and nothing more. Other times, we simply view things based on monetary or pragmatic conditionality. As Fanon notes, it is society, unlike biochemical processes, that do not escape human influence. Yet, it is us that brings society into being. (Fanon, 2008, p. XV) We saw this media makeover take place in society with the portrayal of Muslims, migrants and more recently with the Chinese during COVID-19, among a myriad of other examples through the ages. Kendzior notes how, “a media makeover is a peculiar wound. It is a terrible feeling to be in pain and ignored – as a place, as a person. It is worse to be given a mask and told it’s your face.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 22) In other words, alongside ordinary people behaving rationally according to human psychology, some behave pathologically according to inhuman psychology. (Fanon, 2008, p. 15) We have forgotten sense from nonsense and implemented it ubiquitously as if it held any semblance of truth. Take Wiener’s (1960) framing of the coming difficulties of technological advancement. It still proves influential because he generalized it beyond literal human–machine cooperation to any situation in which two systems work together at different temporal and perceptual scales. Because choices made today with limited information can have terrible long-term consequences that we cannot foresee, Wiener warns that “the purpose put into the machine — be it a literal machine like a Twitter algorithm, or a metaphorical one like the corporation that runs it — should be the purpose that we ‘really desire’ and not a colourful imitation.” (Wiener, 1960; Prier, 2017) That colourful imitation has become the norm with associations of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers based not on dignity but premised on race and identity politics masquerading as genuine discourse. In terms of how to meaningfully address this inversion, I believe it necessary to borrow from the very tactics we aim to illuminate. In a manner reminiscent of Darko Maver, where “the borders between reality and false, if they exist at all, are so thin that often the roles exchange and reality copies imitation,” Deseriis (2010) theorizes their method as a form of ‘media homeopathy.’ Where “the idea was to inject into the media bloodstream stories whose patent falsity would eventually induce the media immune system into a reaction of its own.” This example brings us to the most suggestive connection to the present. The QAnon conspiracy, from the beginning, fixated on the lurid idea of hidden child molestation rings. However, historically this is nothing new. The middle ages were plagued with conspiracies concerning Jewish cabals and children. (Spence, 2019) Recently, Swami (2012) noted a positive relationship between right wing authoritarianism and beliefs in anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, but a negative relationship with general beliefs in conspiracy theories. It points to how individuals may well pick and choose theories that fit with a particular political view or belief system. Moreover, the 90s saw Italy face its version of “Satanic Panic” around child sex abuse. Feeling that people were baselessly targeted, Luther Blissett activists responded in an unconventional way — with a multiyear campaign of interconnected, multi-city media pranks.” (Davis, 2018) As Q-Anon has gotten ‘unmasked’ recently in the HBO (2021) documentary Q, Into the Storm, and used to get hosted on a site whose slogan is ‘embrace infamy’, it would appear history has repeated itself through the injection of blatantly false narratives, except this time – it led to a clear and definitive mass mobilization. Furthermore, states profoundly benefit from this obfuscation, and I believe, as was the case with Trump in 2016, can have real success from dividing people into distinct categories and subsequently pitting these separate groups against each other. Rhetoric based on this divisive and obfuscated nature is the link I explore that differentiates arguments about justice, human rights, and dignity on the one hand and the actual telos of institutions on the other. Migration, immigration, and asylum frameworks have particularly gotten affected by this developing phenomenon detaching its purpose from actions. What I mean is instead of being concerned with the framework on which migration gets premised, we have forgotten that the framework’s telos or point in favour of the outcomes that result from it. As a means to an end, the frameworks are politicized in a Machiavellian manner, not ends in themselves. Likewise, social media is not free as one would like to believe. It follows a similar path as it is us who are the product, which is done by commodifying our data. Additionally, migratory narratives are often not concerned with promoting virtue but instead are concerned with outcomes. Kantian autonomy and human dignity help one to discern how this plays out; as is the case with varied frameworks, we treat people as a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The result: utilization of polarization for populist ends that often scapegoat’s foreigners, migrants, and refugees – among other fashionable outgroups, dependent on time, place, and circumstance. (Muslims after 9/11, Turkish with BREXIT, Chinese during COVID,) Unfortunately, as much as we have never been more connected, we are also divided and polarized by the very tools that promote this connectivity. Similarly, the problem with Trump’s rhetoric, as with big tech, is that the purpose or telos gets obfuscated, and as a result, many lack the ability or context necessary to discern fundamental conceptions such as the difference between a migrant, internally displaced person, and refugee from broader conversations on what migratory regimes ought to look like. A clear example of this was illustrated during Hurricane Katrina, where many government representatives mistakenly referred to the displaced persons as refugees. Additionally, “the U.S. government did not adequately protect the rights of Gulf Coast residents during displacement, failing in many cases to prevent discrimination against the poor, immigrants, and people of colour, and allowing children, the elderly, disabled persons and other vulnerable populations to be put in life-threatening situations.” (Brookings, 2008, p. 5) If this occurred to those already in the US, it is unsurprising to see this outcome on a more pervasive scale for those with no citizenship or legal standing. On a more positive note, despite state powers, we also have the power to articulate concerns and voice expectations – albeit without a monopoly on violence like the state. (Weber, 1965) As Kendzior points out, “There is a difference between expecting autocracy and accepting autocracy. It is necessary to expect it so that you can plan how you will fight. But the battle lines change, and you often end up changing with them.” (Kendzior, 2020, p. 15) The sentiment as mentioned above is echoed in Nietzche’s quip how “he who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.” (Nietzsche & Zimmern, 1997, p. 52) Building on Nietzsche, I surmise the reason for our collective spiral into distrust, fueling anti-immigrant populist rhetoric, reflects how misinformation embodies the tale of the mythological hydra. What I m
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