AT - IR Ks - Realism Good - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR
AT - IR Ks - Realism Good - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx
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IR IR — AT: Empirics “Empirical evidence” can’t prove the internal psyche of states. Abulof ’15 — Uriel; associate professor at Tel-Aviv University's School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs. He is a LISD research fellow at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School and at the Truman Institute. July 16, 2015; “The Malpractice of “Rationality” in International Relations”; Rationality and Society, Volume 25, Issue 3; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang What is the purpose (or scholarly function) of ascribing rationality? Two aims are plain: describing/explaining or prescribing (wherein the actor or act either is, or ought to be, rational). Stein (1999) observes a curious shift: “What started as a normative enterprise has become a positive one. Tools once created to improve the quality of otherwise imperfect human decision making are now being used to explain choice” (p. 212). But this trend is more intricate. In principle, many contemporary RCT scholars agree that “rational-choice theory is first and foremost normative. It tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible” (Elster, 1989: 3). Still, in practice, RCT scholarship abounds in descriptive and explanatory analyses (Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010; Lovett, 2006). The descriptive-prescriptive schism should not obfuscate rationality’s third purpose: rationality “as if” it were real. I refer to this as subjunctive rationality. It is pervasive in RCT, especially in formal modeling (Morton, 1999). Accordingly, actors “behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns,” much like “the density of leaves around a tree” is determined “as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the physical laws …” — this subjunctive “formula is accepted because it works,” not because it is a truthful account of reality (Friedman, 1953: 21,19,18; cf. Nagel, 1963). On a larger scale, decisions may then be aggregated in order to understand collective actions as if they were decided by rational individuals, even when it is not so (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994: 75). Subjunctive rationality is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, neither objective nor subjective. Depending on its specific actual usage, it may be false, probable, indeterminate, or true. Subjunctive rationality offers important benefits. It fosters creative puzzles and theorization, otherwise hard to conceive. Its employment may moreover be predictive and, if correlative to desired goals, make for prescriptive claims. But these potential benefits of subjunctive rationality do not change the fact that it is not descriptive, let alone explanatory: “‘As-if’ explanations do not actually explain anything” (Elster, 2007: 25; see also Macdonald, 2003). Postulating subjunctive rationality as explanatory may commit the argumentum ad consequentiam logical fallacy: deriving an argument from desirable or undesirable consequences. Fall, however desirable, is not caused by the leaves’ rationality. This fallacy lurks in FPA, for while the rational actor model implicitly follows RCT’s clear preference for either subjunctive or prescriptive rationalities (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 3, 24), FPA’s explanandum is usually very real and concrete, enticing the use of descriptive (and explanatory) rationality. However, as game theorist Herbert Gintis (2009) rightly insists, “rational actor model applies to choice situations where ambiguities are absent, the choice set is clearly delineated, and the payoffs are unmediated,” and not to complex “deliberative choices,” which forms the crux of FPA (p. 237). IR — AT: Conflict Data Conflict data is a joke. Crammer & Desmarais ’17 — Skyler J. Cranmer; The Ohio State University, Department of Political Science. Bruce A. Desmarais; Pennsylvania State University, Department of Political Science. April 24, 2017; “What Can We Learn from Predictive Modeling?”; Political Analysis, Volume 25; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang Illustrative Application: Predicting International Conflict We now endeavor to demonstrate as many of the advantages of predictive models discussed above as possible within the confines of a single example. We attempt the prediction of violent international conflict, something notoriously hard to predict, and consider what predictive modeling can teach us about this process. 5.1 The paucity of predictive models of interstate conflict Empirical analysis in conflict processes research relies almost exclusively on explanatory modeling, typically using regression. Predictive models, which do not necessarily aim to operationalize a causal theory, are then often seen as the tools of applied scientists or policy analysts rather than of the basic, explanatory science in which we typically engage (Schneider, Gleditsch, and Carey 2010, 2011). It is perhaps not surprising then that there is little predictive work in this field and what does exist is relatively recent. Beck, King, and Zeng (2000) touched off the contemporary debate on predictive models for conflict with a study that uses a neural network approach, which predicts 17% of conflicts, compared to 0% by a conventional logistic regression. This study led to much debate over the utility of restricting samples to only dyads that had a reasonable chance of conflict in the first place, and even sparked some interest in neural networks (which we discuss further below), but failed to produce a substantial literature on predictive models for conflict. In one of the few studies of conflict prediction that followed Beck, King, and Zeng (2000), Ward, Siverson, and Cao (2007) use a Bayesian, Hierarchical, Bilinear, Mixed-Effects model stratified by time to gain an improvement in out-of-sample prediction, again over a fairly standard logistic regression; in this case, the one originally proposed by Oneal and Russett (1999). The model offers a substantial improvement in predictive ability over logit, but does not compare the performance of its method directly to that used by Beck, King, and Zeng (2000). One reason the predictive literature on international conflict is so sparse may be that the structure of the conflict data is such that predictive modeling is difficult with existing technology. For example, time-series approaches to prediction, well established in both economics and political science, are difficult to apply to data that span every possible conflictual relationship in the world over time. None-the-less, there has been a recent increase in predictive work on other conflict processes, including civil wars (Rost, Schneider, and Kleibl 2009; Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010), transnational terrorism (Desmarais and Cranmer 2011), and single-conflict timeseries analyses (Pevenhouse and Goldstein 1999; Schrodt and Gerner 2000; Brandt, Freeman, and Schrodt 2011; Schneider 2012). IR — AT: Science IR is not a science. Kavalski ’12 — Emilian; Associate Professor of Global Studies at the Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic University (Sydney). 2012; “Waking IR Up from its ‘Deep Newtonian Slumber’”; Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 41, Issue 1; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries Is the discipline of International Relations (IR) a ‘science’? Its ‘scientific’ credentials have long concerned proponents and detractors. As Ronald Rogowski’s claim in the epigraph suggests, the hankering after an ‘elegant science of international politics’ has virtually become a ‘dream’ to which his and subsequent generations of IR scholars have succumbed. Belying this dreaming is a question whether IR’s social-scientific inquiry can ever approximate that of the natural sciences. Perceiving the natural sciences to be an ‘exact science’, cohorts of IR students have been developing ‘powerful’ and ‘parsimonious’ models for the explanation and understanding of international politics. Take the ‘balance of power’, for instance. Its aim is to ascertain the existence of a particular regularity in world affairs – parity between adversaries. Borrowing the notion of equilibrium from the natural sciences, the balance of power explains international order as a regulating mechanism motivated by the natural desire of states for survival. In this way, IR has tended to propound explanations premised on assumptions of predictability rooted in the conviction that international life is a closed system, changing in a gradual manner and following linear trajectories, which can be elicited through discrete assessments of dependent and independent variables. What IR intends to produce in this way is a nearly mechanistic model of international politics that is perceived to be as rigorous and robust as the one of the natural sciences. In recent years, the simplification and reductionism underpinning this ‘dream’ of a scientific IR have come under severe criticism from different quarters. In fact, some – such as John G. Ruggie – have made the point that the discipline needs to wake up from this ‘deep Newtonian slumber’, if it is to have any bearing on the real world of international politics. The three books under review actively contribute to this decentring project by advancing the ‘complexification’ of IR. The notion of complexification entails different things for different authors, but what all of them share is some form of engagement with the complexity paradigm of the philosophy of science.3 Originating in the natural sciences, the complexity paradigm challenges the Newtonian view of an orderly world and suggests that global interactions occur in a non-linear fashion. Consequently, the outcomes of such interactions are difficult to infer, let alone to predict. In this respect, the proponents of the complexification of IR have noted that while the ‘hard’ sciences have become increasingly ‘soft’ as a result of their acceptance of the uncertainty and randomness of reality, IR has ‘hardened’ as a result of its suppression of ambiguity, disregard for surprises and over-investment in its capacity to forecast international developments. Richard Ned Lebow explains this search for (and commitment to) a predictable worldview of regularities as a ‘need for psychological closure’, reflecting a desire for definitive conclusions in support of preferred theoretical assumptions.4 It is in this context that Damian Popolo asks the pertinent question whether ‘scientific IR’ is not premised on ‘fundamentally misleading notions about science’.5 In other words, the question that emerges is whether things appear perplexing because the ken of the mainstream is askew. In its response to this query, the complexity paradigm reveals that Newtonian IR tends to operate on very little information (usually a few variables); yet, this does not prevent it from jumping to conclusions as if it had knowledge about the whole picture. Such lack of sensitivity to what IR does not know then underpins a model of the world that is rarely stumped. As a result, when the accepted framework for explanation and understanding fails – that is, it faces a question that it cannot answer (for instance, ‘Why IR failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War?’) – IR comes up with a question that it can answer (for instance, ‘Why the Cold War ended?’, answer: ‘Because the Soviet Union could no longer maintain the balance of power and, therefore, without such capability it could no longer survive in the international system and had to implode’). The complexified IR suggests that by answering the wrong questions, Newtonian IR enacts a theatre of validity to generate explanations far more coherent than reality. Therefore, the ‘incredible rate of failure’ of the very frameworks asserting the ‘law-like regularities’ of international politics to anticipate any of the major events of the past 25 years should not be surprising.6 The irony of this situation is not lost on Lebow, who notes that it is the ‘commitment to science and scientific methods by international relations scholars’ that provides ‘a major impediment to their practice of science’.7 Thus, this review article assesses the three books under review in the context of the current state of the art in the emerging complexity paradigm of IR. Since this paradigm intends a complete rethinking of the discipline, the article will focus on the complexification of the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of IR. It has to be stressed at the outset that while IR students will find all three books under review of immense interest, their authors reach out to much wider and interdisciplinary audiences – thus, the collection edited by Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight will be of immense relevance to any of the subfields of political science, especially international political economy; Lebow’s work has historians, literary theorists and psychologists in mind; while Popolo’s book addresses political theorists and philosophers. The Complex Ontology of IR When he urged IR to come out of its ‘degenerating’ Newtonian repose, Ruggie specifically beckoned that the discipline re-engage with the reality of international life. As he pointed out with chagrin and frustration, ‘the term “ontology” typically draws either blank stares or bemused smiles’ from the IR community.8 The contention is that IR is plagued by attention blindness – that is, because of its preoccupation with ‘reductive theories about “the logic of anarchy”’,9 it cannot discern the vast and heterogeneous reality of global affairs. Owing to its Newtonian commitments, mainstream IR views reality ‘not as a continuous flux … but as a series of instantaneous “snapshots” extracted from this flux’.10 Thus, as Lebow suggests, the dominant accounts of interstate relations miss the ‘open-ended, nonlinear nature of the social world’.11 He insists that the ‘confluence and consequences [of international politics] are best envisaged as a complex, nonlinear system’,12 ‘in which multiple interrelated chains of causation have unanticipated interactions and unpredictable consequences’.13 The ontology of complexity therefore provokes a reckoning with the multiple possibilities of becoming and becoming-other inherent in the pervasive ambiguity of global life.14 As Popolo demonstrates, such commitment reflects the philosophical engagement of Gilles Deleuze and his insistence on ‘the continuous precipitation of new life and new meaning’.15 Of the three books under review, the volume edited by Joseph and Wight engages with the issue of ontology most explicitly. A unique feature of this collection is that it offers the first comprehensive account of Scientific Realism (SR) – one of the strands in the complexification of IR. SR originates in Roy Bhaskar’s work on the philosophy of science. Its application to IR is described explicitly as a ‘shift from epistemology to ontology’.16 The reason for this shift is the understanding of reality as ‘stratified’ between the actual, the empirical and the real.17 This stratification addresses three of the key ontological claims animating the complexification of IR: (i) that the international is emergent; (ii) that the international is irreducible to and much more than its constituent parts; and (iii) that the international is subject to unexpected and (often) radical transformations – that is, small alterations in initial conditions can lead to profound changes in outcomes.18 In this setting, SR asserts that the world with which IR engages, self-organises in complex and contingent ways. This observation is also confirmed by the other two books under review. For instance, Lebow frames world politics as ‘an open system whose outcomes are sensitive to – if not always the result of – chance, agency, and confluence’,19 while Popolo depicts international life as an ‘irreversible’ process that ‘grows out of complex systems to determine its own rules of development’.20 Yet, what distinguishes the collection edited by Joseph and Wight is the confrontation with the ‘ontological issue of the different layering of the social (and natural) world’.21 Conventionally, IR has tended to ignore that international politics both inhabit and are embedded in complex spaces. In this respect, SR infers one of the greatest ontological boons of complexified IR – the recognition of the ‘totality’22 of human and non-human interactions in global life. Newtonian IR has been exclusively anthropocentric and inspired by the ‘Enlightenment belief in a “makeable world”’, according to which human/socio-political systems (such as civil society, states, international organisations, etc.) are both detached from (not only conceptually, but in practice) and in control of the ‘non-human’ environment in which they occur.23 It is worth pointing out that such diverse and profound considerations of the complex ontology of international politics are intended not merely as a criticism of Newtonian IR, but also as a provocation for re-engaging with the ongoing and overlapping interconnections animating global life. In fact, the radical totality of human and non-human interactions has recently been framed as ‘posthuman IR’. Following SR’s recognition of the qualitative and quantitative difference between human and nonhuman systems, the ‘complex ecologism’ of ‘posthuman IR’ uncovers that the ‘world is not divided into territories in which bounded societies of humans live under singular political authority and in the context of discrete natural environments’;24 instead, global life is ‘a complex interweave of numerous systems nested, intersected and embedded in each other, all undergoing processes of co-evolution and linked by innumerable feedback loops’.25 SR echoes this ontological commitment by describing world affairs as complex interactions ‘between people and each other, their products, their activities, nature and themselves’.26 An Epistemology for the Complexity of IR As it can be expected, the inclusive ontological purview of the complexity paradigm presents a number of analytical challenges. Yet, as the proponents of SR indicate, assertions about the appropriate ways of describing the world emerge from the ontological assumptions of what the world is like.27 Thus, on a meta-theoretical level, the problem stems from the realisation that we can never be fully cognisant of the underlying mechanisms and processes of global life, because this will imply ‘knowing the not knowable’.28 Lebow explains that the contingency of our knowledge reflects ‘the critical importance of non-observables and non-systematic factors’. This should not, however, be taken as an indication of the impossibility to provide robust IR interpretation ‘rooted in non-linearity and confluence’.29 In this respect, the acknowledgement of the limits of our knowledge can become a very productive analytical point of departure. While all three books under review pay attention to epistemological concerns, Popolo’s endeavour specifically addresses this aspect of complexified IR. In fact, he ventures that the complexity paradigm provides a ‘genuine Epistemic Revolution’, which renders the Newtonian paradigm ‘obsolete’.30 What is revolutionary about this approach is not only its debunking of the common wisdoms of ‘scientific IR’, but also its dedication to ‘“uncertain knowledge”, where uncertainty is regarded and accepted as an intrinsic quality of nature and not as a result of imperfect knowledge’.31 The suggestion is that by focusing mainly on stable, equilibrium configurations, the study of IR has remained consciously ignorant of a whole ‘new species’ of discontinuous intuition.32 Thus, by painting itself in to the Newtonian corner, the disciplinary mainstream has, on the one hand, evaded the need to recognise that there are dynamics which are not only unknown, but probably cannot ever be meaningfully rendered comprehensible, and, on the other hand, st
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