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2022 Michigan Counterplan

CP - State Paternership Program - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

CP - State Paternership Program - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP
NOTES
Acronym list:
SPP = State Partnership Program
NG = National Guard
NGB = National Guard Bureau
PN = Partner Nation
FAF = Foreign Affairs Federalism
1NC
1NC---Shell
The 50 states, through the National Guard State Partnership Program [SPP], should increase their security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of <AFF>.
SPP initiatives over emerging tech with NATO solves---ensures U.S influence AND bolsters alliances.
Samir Battiss, 13 (Samir Battiss, Lecturer at the University of Quebec in Montreal, May 2013, accessed on 6-30-2022, NORDIKA Programme, NATO Military Partnerships: The US National Guard State Partnership as the driving force for pre-accession and long-term cooperation,” https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/notes/2013/201310.pdf, HBisevac)
The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) involves establishing a partnership between a State National Guard and other national armed forces of a sovereign country. Initially conceived as military-to-military engagement activities, several of these relationships have developed further and, nowadays include civilian-to-civilian initiatives. As a security assistance provider, it conducts activities and in so doing influences the perceptions and behavior of regional security actors. Due to the specific nature of the U.S. National Guard, the SPP initiatives have been used as dual assets – national and NATO6. In addition to laying the foundation of goodwill, trust, access and influence, they pave the way for allied/allied – allied/partners interactions that go beyond a simple relationship to help increase a partner’s ability to accomplish a particular task or mission7.
Basic to the issue are the answers to the question “when”, and “how” military assistance is to be made available; especially since the number of recipients has steadily increased over the last 20 years, and this trend is likely to continue, in view of the number of States scheduled to be involved in the growing concept of “Air/Sea Battle in Asia -Pacific”, and of the future challenges in Africa and in Central Asia. This unceasing expansion of potential recipients has introduced dynamism into the framework upon which military assistance rests, making it most difficult to establish any set formula, even in general principles.
When military assistance was first launched as an integral component of national foreign policy, such aid was almost exclusively directed against potential or real threats to Europe, Africa or other areas of national – sometimes collective – strategic interests. With the development of crises in several parts of the world, provisions from an/the American perspective were made through several security assistance programs like the SPP, PfP and other NATO Partnerships, which has not only broadened the geographic scope of military aid but also introduced a complex system of governing principles, in order to meet the designed objectives of the expanded policy.
Looking at military considerations, there are apparently ample reasons to positively consider the connection State Partnership Program / NATO Partnerships. In Europe, the basic principles determining employment of military assistance in Europe have been, first, that they serve to improve its relative military, political, and economic strength, thereby keeping at a maximum its ability to contribute to collective security; and to protect/shelter the European NATO area from current and future threats. In accordance with these political objectives, military aid is provided to European allies and partners to assist NATO full members – and aspiring countries – with the modernization and maintenance of their forces, taking into account the latest concepts of warfare; to obtain the greatest possible contribution to common security from non-member countries. These objectives reflect the permanent improvement of military stature of most allies and partners, since the inception of the NATO partnerships and national programs which have enabled a shift in emphasis from individual country defence to continental and global defence of allies’ interests.
At present Europe remains the only area where military assistance is integrated with joint, regional defence planning. This is because the individual problem of internal security in Europe being of a relatively minor nature, emphasis was placed on maintaining joint military “forces in being” capable of deterring outside aggression. Areas of interests of the Alliance such as Africa, the Near East, and Asia-Pacific face somewhat akin situations to each other but, at the same time, immensely different from those in Europe. In addition to creating new partnerships with key countries on these continents, the United States’ and allied strategies may foresee the protection of common interests worldwide known as “securing access to the global commons” by resorting to “newly” trained and equipped European armed forces. Therefore, the latter may be deployed “out of European area” since the Alliance has increased its geographic scopes and the range of missions because of the globalization of threats and risks that could undermine transatlantic security; the former could be at stake several thousand kilometers away from home.
Nordic/Baltic countries, from security beneficiaries to troops providers in multinational operations
The earliest programs of military assistance were grounded in the principle of relieving to the greatest possible extent any rearmament burden on the restructuring of European economies in the early 1990s. Within less than a decade new developments on the international scene caused a major shift. The 1990s and 2000s marked an epochal change in the overall influences of world geography on both European and North American official circles, including generational change alongst political leaders. Besides these geopolitical influences, programs of national or multilateral security assistance program such as the SPP or the PfP and their coincidence over economic relationships could be an established policy put in place by major leading countries. Like the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, NATO/ U.S. Security assistance systems of the early 1990s implied that economic aid for Central/ Eastern European countries – like in other areas closely associated with the Allies – could be used for military production. In the first place, there was the necessity of alleviating the more severe effect of rearmament on the newly achieved levels of economic activity and standards of living in the countries politically connected with NATO members; and although defence support would, to a degree, serve this function, there was no suggestion that U.S. and allied largesse should relieve the beneficiaries of all sacrifices. Moreover, an agreement was implicitly reached as to how the burden of participation in multinational operations. The period since 1990 has seen increasing attention paid to multinational military forces.
Their increasing number of mission types continually requires more and more contributing forces. Operating in multinational forces is nothing new for the armed forces at NATO’s disposal. Experiences inter alia in the former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean have demonstrated the substantial strategic advantages to be gained through coalition and alliance operations. The National Guard SPPs and the PfP activities have made it possible for partnering nations to contribute for NATO-led or ad hoc military operations. Regarded as an integral device to the U.S combatant commands’ theatre engagement plans, their activities have pursued and achieved several defence and military goals, such as: Assuring dominant coalitions; Achieving and enhancing influence; Contributing to the execution of stated policy; Gaining regional access and access to decision makers; Building relationships and military-to-military contacts; Acquiring the right systems for allies and friends; Developing a broad portfolio of coalition military capabilities; Capitalizing on rapid technological developments; Preventing proliferation of technologies and weapons into the wrong hands; Aligning goals and resources to carry out the job efficiently; Using a performance-based management system to make resource decisions.
But, although they take the form of peacekeeping, peace-support, or/and humanitarian operations, there is evidence to suggest that subtle differences in the organizational and national cultures of the countries that contribute personnel to missions can have an impact on the overall operational effectiveness of the multinational force. There is thus a requirement to consider and integrate the intercultural issues and factors that surround and influence multinational military collaboration, particularly at the strategic and operational level of command.
Because the United States and their Allies share common security interests and common values and face common challenges (threats, risks), they rely on other partnering nations. All major NATO nations’ strategies recognize and emphasize the importance of multinational operations; each country reaffirms its will to act with others when it can, giving priority to “regional” or “ideological” allies and friends. Multinational operations are often analyzed as a compromise between military capability and political constraints, usually include a wide spectrum of missions; the intensity ranges from war to long-term tasks with a civilian nature in which the military apparatus plays a minor but necessary role. Multilateral actions of war are the extreme circumstance for conducting operations whose goal is to quickly achieve the multinational collective objectives with as little cost as possible. Peacetime engagement activities involving the military help to shape the security strategic environment by sharing experience in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, promotion of human rights, and strengthening democratic reforms. Although they are theoretically based on individual State requests and needs, bilateral military relations with “neutral” States and the State Partnership Program / PfP seek means to achieve rationalization, standardization, and interoperability that will significantly enhance the probability of operational success in multinational missions. For commanders as for political actors, the key is to build relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion at all military levels, while overcoming language and cultural barriers and relevantly applying common procedures or norms.
These accomplishments display U.S. commitment in relevant security areas, and are designed to lend credibility to its alliances by enhancing regional stability and providing a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Four significant paths have been followed by the SPP/PfP since the beginning of the 21st century. Several countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, correlatively the number of SPP/ PfP participating countries. NATO has also multiplied several instruments (Individual Partnership Program; Planning and Review Process; Operational Capabilities Concept) which deepen this program by allowing partners to adapt their participation through additional opportunities based upon their national objectives and capacities and perspective (Individual Partnership Action Plan ; Annual National Program; Membership Action Plan). A third dimension of NATO partnership is directly linked to the allied military presence in Afghanistan. At tactical and operational levels, the SPP innovative activities combined with PfP low-tech and low-cost solutions appears to be a way for the United States to avoid technological shortfalls and to bypass incapability to integrate their cutting edge technologies with most of NATO and non- NATO partners. The second aspect here is the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia that come out as the existence of PfP countries/SPP participants in the region and the perspective of the future Afghan participation in NATO partnership initiatives. Finally, the PfP is increasingly used to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region by regionalizing the treatment of security and stabilization missions.
1NC---INB---FAF
The counterplan linearly increases state involvement in foreign affairs.
Peter Howard, 4 (Peter Howard is the economics director at Policy Integrity, and a former economic fellow, May 2004, accessed on 7-2-2022, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, “The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44218880?seq=1, HBisevac)
As the preceding case illustrates, states can play a significant role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has given states a critical role in U.S. engagement programs. The networks of opportunity created by the number of SPP funding sources and potential programs have allowed entrepreneurial state actors to shape a unique course for each partnership. Some innovative state coordinators have, on their own initiative, tapped other funds, such as cooperative threat reduction programs or environmental programs to further the reach of their state partnership. The participating state National Guards are uniquely positioned in this respect—they are connected to both the state and federal governments through their dual mission and contain vast experience including military duties, support to civilians, and regular civilian jobs. This gives an enterprising state a chance to make a significant impact in the content of U.S. foreign policy. The meaning attached to that policy is created, in part, by the actions undertaken in the name of that policy. Through their implementation of the SPP, states have shaped the meaning of U.S. foreign policy of engaging the former communist states of Eastern Europe and NATO enlargement. This is not to say that all National Guards and Partnerships are equally forward-leaning, but some can be, and in a way not directed or anticipated by the federal government.
Early criticisms that military engagement programs lacked direction (Ulrich, 1999) have receded as programs such as the SPP evolve into more sophisticated enterprise. Recent analyses of the SPP have revealed that all of the program’s “stakeholders,” including the governors, the National Guard, the U.S. Defense Department, and the partner countries, are enamored with the program’s success.”° With ten years of experience, the National Guard has developed a “life cycle” approach to each state partnership. Early in the life of the partnership, mil-mil exchanges dominate. After a certain point, however, the marginal utility of additional military familiarization exchanges declines, and mil-civ and civ—civ exchanges rise to take their place. As the partnerships mature and are dominated by the civilian exchanges, state governments take an even greater role in initiating and implementing international relationships.
An implementation perspective on the analysis of foreign policy makes this insight possible. Analyses of foreign policy that rely solely on a decision-making perspective miss the important role that states are playing in U.S. foreign and national security policy. While most of the primary decisions are still made by the president, his administration, and Congress, states are gaining an ever-increasing role in implementing those decisions. The SPP is but one example. Guard units are also taking a greater role in peacekeeping activities in the Balkans, and may do so in a postwar Iraq. The intense focus on homeland security is yet another policy area where states will implement most policy decisions. The guard has already been active in domestic security operations, flying combat air patrols and providing airport security, and several studies and senators have advocated an even larger role for the guard in homeland security (Miller, 2002). Emergency response and law enforcement are still state and local responsibilities, and these areas are the new front lines in homeland security and the war on terrorism. The states, which perform these duties, have a vital say in how they will be done. As independent and entrepreneurial implementers, the states are carving out a larger role in shaping the environment in which federal decision makers act.
Policy decisions are important, but many of those decisions lack meaning unless they create content and action. In the long run, policy implementation—the practice of what states and countries do with each other—produces the substance that give rules and identities their meaning. It is this meaning that ultimately forms the environment to which future decision makers respond. It is here that the federal government’s monopoly in international affairs begins to erode and it is here that states are finding an ever-growing role in U.S. foreign policy.
That creates scope for states to mitigate warming.
Jean Galbraith 17, Assistant Professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, JD from the University of California-Berkeley School of Law, Order of the Coif, BA in Social Studies and the Comparative Study of Religion from Harvard University, “Book Review: Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity”, Harvard Law Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2131, Lexis
D. Climate Policy
Mitigating climate change is a challenge for all levels of government -- international, national, state, and local. As Glennon and Sloane note, some states and cities have embraced climate change mitigation measures (pp. 62-63). In doing so, states have often coordinated with each other and with foreign counterparts in both practical and [*2149] expressivist ways (pp. 62-63). California's efforts are exceptionally notable. State legislation requires sweeping emissions reductions; California and Quebec have sought to integrate their cap-and-trade programs; and California has spearheaded a coalition of state and local governments around the world who have committed to climate policy. California even sent a large and high-profile delegation to the United Nations conference on climate change in Paris in 2015.
The issue of climate policy is a rebuttal to all three of the "myths" identified by Glennon and Sloane. It is self-evidently a matter of both domestic and foreign affairs; states and local governments are acting in this space; and some states and local governments are doing so in progressive ways. The actions of state and local governments in this space invite constitutional inquiry. Can California constitutionally regulate carbon emissions, enter into a highly formalized agreement with Quebec and softer agreements with other subnational governments, and send delegations to international negotiating conferences?
Yet focusing exclusively on these questions would lead to a highly incomplete sense of the legal scope of California's power to act. For although Glennon and Sloane do not mention it, California is acting amidst a welter of federal laws, regulations, and other executive branch actions applicable to climate change. In 2007, in a lawsuit brought by liberal states against the EPA, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air Act applies to greenhouse gas emissions. This Act explicitly delegates authority to California to pursue stronger emissions [*2150] measures for new motor vehicles than are undertaken at the federal level and in general involves states in the Act's enforcement through cooperative federalism.
During the Obama Administration, state and local government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were not only congruent with the aims of the Clean Air Act (as interpreted to apply to gre

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