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2022 Michigan Negative

Neg - Solvency Takeouts - Michigan 7 2022 FMPS

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**Neg Solvency Updates**
France Says No
France is against “humiliating Russia”, they’ll hesitate on anything too harsh
John Haltiwanger, 7-18-2022, "Former NATO chief rips into Macron for his 'disastrous' suggestion Putin shouldn't be humiliated in Ukraine," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/former-nato-chief-rips-into-macron-over-approach-to-ukraine-putin-2022-7, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was secretary-general of NATO from 2009 to 2014, did not pull any punches in his assessment of French President Emmanuel Macron's approach to the Ukraine war and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In a new interview with the Atlantic, Rasmussen was especially critical of Macron's "disastrous" suggestion that the West should avoid humiliating Putin in Ukraine to keep the door open for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, while excoriating France in terms of the military aid its provided to Kyiv in comparison to other Western powers. He also took aim at Macron's "unsuccessful" efforts at "telephone diplomacy with Putin."
Rasmussen, who is also a former prime minister of Denmark, said, "The UK has been an outstanding partner for Ukraine. Next to the US, the UK has been a driving force in helping Ukraine. This should be seen as a contrast to the efforts of another big European country, namely France — partly because of President Emmanuel Macron making those very strange statements about a need to avoid humiliating Putin and because of his telephone diplomacy with Putin: unsuccessful, I would say."
"If you assess the weapons deliveries from different countries to Ukraine, France has delivered almost nothing. The scale of French deliveries is equivalent to what Denmark has offered—valued at $160 million, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy," Rasmussen added. "In comparison, Britain has been outstanding."
Speaking on his opposition to giving Putin what Macron described as an "exit ramp," the former NATO chief said that the West "reacted too mildly and we sent the wrong message" to the Russian leader following Russia's invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.
"He calculated that he could, almost without any cost, grab land from his neighbors," Rasmussen said of Putin, adding, "That is why Macron's statement is so disastrous. It suggests that we are approaching a new world order where it's not the rule of law that matters but the rule of the strongest. If Putin can get away with taking land from Ukraine, that's horrendous—because what next?"
Rasmussen warned that if Putin is able to get what he wants in Ukraine then it would send a "very bad signal" to China regarding Taiwan.
"The Chinese are following the developments in Ukraine very closely because if Putin can get away with taking Crimea, and maybe the Donbas, and that is settled in a peace deal, then China might interpret that as an invitation to take Taiwan by force," he said.
This is why Putin shouldn't be offered an exit ramp in the war, Rasmussen said, and should instead be told that if he wants "to get out of this mess, get out of Ukraine."
During an interview with French media in June, Macron said, "We must not humiliate Russia so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means."
Germany Says No
Russian deterrence fails- Germany’s tendency to appease Russia wrecks NATO consensus or stalls negotiations
Peter Rough, 6-16-2022, "Germany’s New Resolve on Russia Is Already Flagging," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/16/germany-scholz-zeitenwende-russia-ukraine-war-defense-security-bundeswehr-nato-military/, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament in the first days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and announced a Zeitenwende—or turn of an era—in German foreign policy, his country was agog. So were Germany watchers around the world. The country, Scholz announced, would immediately start rebuilding its military, supplying Ukraine with weapons, and eliminating its energy dependence on Russia. In one speech, he overturned not only decades of Russia policy but also German restraint and pacifism in security and defense. Scholz had taken the initiative without consulting anyone other than his finance minister, flooring even senior members of his own Social Democratic Party, which has a long record advocating for appeasing Russia. For a brief moment, a dramatic shift seemed in the offing.
Alas, the shift has not come to pass. In Berlin last week, German officials and observers described the speech to me as a moment in time rather than a shift in course. In a way, this is unsurprising. A former mayor of Hamburg, Scholz led his party to victory in last year’s election by leaning into the Hanseatic reputation for quiet competence, prudence, and composure. In other words, he sold himself as another version of his predecessor, Angela Merkel, who was known for her understated style and technocratic mastery. Lacking experience in geopolitics, Scholz promised little new in foreign policy.
His skills served Scholz well in the campaign, but they have proved a liability during a major European war. As a former finance minister, Scholz’s initial reflex after learning of the Russian invasion was to flood the zone with money, including a 100 billion euro ($108 billion) fund to bolster Germany’s armed forces. As a Social Democrat, his inclination since his uncharacteristically bold speech has been to try to manage, rather than confront, Russia. In effect, Scholz has attempted to substitute spending for leadership. The implications for Ukraine are dire: Russian President Vladimir Putin may not have won the war, but he may yet win the peace—especially if Scholz teams up with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been pushing for an end to the war at terms favorable enough to Putin that he is spared any “humiliation.” To that end, Scholz and Macron will travel to Kyiv this week with Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis.
Putin has long viewed Germany as ripe for exploitation. For far too long, the German political class prided itself for its supposedly patient, even-keeled approach toward Moscow that rose above what it saw as the unrefined fears and passions of its Eastern European allies. Over the years, Berlin forged a number of agreements, formulas, and formats it believed would appease and satiate Putin. Unable to imagine a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany either opposed deterrence as a hurdle for dialogue or ignored the balance of power altogether.
This posture—lukewarm support for Ukraine, eagerness to strike a deal with Putin, the hope to get back to business as usual—will set Europe back by years.
To be sure, Russia’s invasion has rattled German society. The German press has described it as a “9/11 moment,” with polls suggesting a significant shift in public attitudes. For example, 52 percent of Germans now support the continued basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany, up from only 14 percent last year.
When key voices such as German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, a member of the Greens, and the parliamentarian Norbert Röttgen of the opposition Christian Democrats offer robust defenses of Ukraine, they are channeling a significant cross-section of society. Many Germans do not believe that a sustainable peace in Europe is possible without a serious setback for Russia and its imperialist aims.
Yet little of this finds expression in German policy, as set by Scholz. To be sure, he has not gone as far as Macron, who has suggested Ukraine surrender territory and warned the West against “humiliating” Putin. But the German reflex to answer Putin’s escalation by building diplomatic offramps is already reasserting itself. Scholz has initiated several calls with Putin, most recently a joint call with Macron that lasted 80 minutes and prioritized a cease-fire and solving the global commodity crisis. He is also reportedly reversing an earlier promise to station extra troops in Lithuania as part of NATO deterrence of any Russian attack on the Baltic states. Putin almost certainly interprets such moves as expressions of flagging Western resolve. In the days after the Scholz-Macron call, for example, he doubled down on attacking Ukrainian grain facilities.
At the same time, German military assistance to Ukraine remains paltry. Berlin reportedly failed to meaningfully supply Ukraine with any weapons in April and May and has yet to deliver a single heavy weapon since the start of the war. Although a few major systems are expected to reach Ukraine later this summer, the real prize—an advanced anti-aircraft system—won’t deploy until this fall, at which point German intelligence assesses Russia may have already completed its conquest of the Donbas. The scuttlebutt in Berlin is that this is intentional: Scholz does not want footage of German equipment engaging Russian forces to be published. (That Russian weapons manufactured with German machine tools and software are killing Ukrainians doesn’t seem to be of much concern in Berlin.)
The push for diplomacy and neglect of hard power are endemic to German foreign policy, but in the case of Ukraine, there is an additional complication in play. Since the end of the Cold War, Berlin has treated Ukraine as a mere plank of its Russia policy. When former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, now deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said in the days before the war that the West would stand down because it believes “Russia is more important than Ukraine,” he could easily have been describing Germany. It has become sport among the Berlin media to press Scholz and his defense minister, Christine Lambrecht, on their support for a Ukrainian victory, a goal that both refuse to endorse.
The fact that Berlin is awash in rumors of secret negotiations with Russia suggests Germany would prefer to disappoint Ukraine than humiliate Russia—whatever that may mean. For example, if Putin offers to lift the blockade of Odesa in return for sanctions relief or pause hostilities in recognition of a new line of contact, voices for accommodation will only grow.
The accommodationists are emboldened by an unlikely ally: the United States. Just like Scholz and Lambrecht, U.S. officials have lately shied away from endorsing a Ukrainian victory. In private with their German counterparts, senior Biden administration officials have gone a step further, stating explicitly that Washington is not aiming for victory, either. When the Biden administration embraces Germany, it is less a tactic to flatter Berlin into taking a stronger line and more a reflection of general agreement between the two governments.
This posture—lukewarm support for Ukraine, eagerness to strike a deal with Putin, the hope to get back to business as usual—will set Europe back by years, perhaps even decades. The initial goodwill bought by Germany for suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia is fleeting, especially if any deal over Ukraine includes sanctions relief and the return to full oil and gas deliveries. Any such deal is sure to kill any remaining solidarity and trust underpinning the European Union. Even if they are not outright destabilized by the war, Eastern European states such as Poland and the Baltics will, in the future, see an EU led by France and Germany less as a community of values and more as an economic arrangement held together by euros and cents. The war in Ukraine may have badly mauled the Russian military, but if Putin appears confident, it is because Scholz—along with Macron—may yet help him snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. If so, it will be even clearer that the Zeitenwende was no such thing.
Germany’s reluctance to punish Russia will stall any cooperation with NATO
Judy Dempsey, 1-24-2022, "Why Germany Is Undermining NATO Unity on Russia," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/01/26/why-germany-is-undermining-nato-unity-on-russia-pub-86279, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
As Russia continues its military buildup along Ukraine’s borders, NATO and the EU are trying to project a strong, united front on these extraordinary and dangerous developments. But Germany is undermining that unity, leaving the West weaker and more divided. Below, Strategic Europe editor-in-chief Judy Dempsey digs into what’s driving Germany’s actions on this latest crisis.
WHY IS GERMANY RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW NATO ALLIES ON UKRAINE?
Publicly, Berlin toes the NATO line on sending troops and equipment to the Baltic states and Romania in order to boost the alliance’s eastern flank. In practice, it does not want to send any defensive weapons to Ukraine. It blocked Estonia from sending such equipment, which had been made in Germany, and a UK aircraft carrying military equipment to Ukraine detoured around German airspace. The German political establishment believes such moves will destabilize Europe and make it more difficult to have a dialogue with Russia.
BUT ISN’T RUSSIA TRYING TO DESTABILIZE UKRAINE?
Germany doesn’t see it that way. There is a part of the German establishment that sees Ukraine through the prism of Russia. For historical reasons, this group views Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia as a cordon sanitaire between Europe and Russia. There’s a legacy of both centuries-old rivalry and cooperation between Russia and Germany. And there’s the immense historical guilt of Germany’s role in World War II. Ukraine and Belarus suffered horribly under Adolf Hitler’s occupation, but somehow, these facts don’t enter into the public discourse. The historical guilt is centered on Russia, and German politicians often refer to this legacy.
DON’T BELARUS, GEORGIA, AND UKRAINE ONE DAY WANT TO JOIN BOTH NATO AND THE EU?
Yes. Joining the EU is a long way off, but that is their goal. That is what drives the reformers when it comes to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary. That’s what scares Russia: truly independent, democratic countries on its border. And NATO is its red line. Putin does not want any Eastern European countries joining this Western security alliance. If they did, the United States would, from the security and military points of view, dominate not only Western Europe but also Eastern Europe. Russia would lose any leverage to influence events among its immediate western neighbors. NATO would defend these countries if they were threatened or attacked.
That is why Putin is threatening Ukraine and demanding a water-tight commitment from NATO that Ukraine will not join. He does not want Ukraine integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO or the EU, nor does he want a secure and democratic Ukraine on his doorstep. The fear of contagion would be too big.
HOW ARE NATO ALLIES REACTING TO GERMANY’S RELUCTANCE?
With anger. The Baltic states and Central European countries believe Germany doesn’t understand their security concerns or Russia’s intentions. They believe the German political and business establishments are so close to Russia that they don’t want to upset those decades-long ties.
DOES GERMANY’S STANCE HAVE ANY SUPPORT?
Yes, from France, but for different reasons. President Emmanuel Macron wants a European, not a U.S-led, response to this crisis. He wants Europe to have its own security and defense policy that would create a kind of “strategic autonomy.” In Macron’s view, the global geostrategic context has changed so much that Europe has to develop its own instruments to defend itself and shape policy. But Germany has no strategic compass. Because of World War II, it is locked into a pacifist way of thinking. This explains why it is uncomfortable with Macron’s idea, as are the Baltic states, Poland, and other Central European countries.
WHY IS THAT?
The Ukraine crisis has made Central Europe even more pro-NATO and pro-American because of Germany’s closeness to Russia and Macron’s ambitions to have a militarily and strategically capable Europe. These countries will likely put a brake on any future EU integration, especially when it comes to security, defense, and foreign policy, where consensus would give way to simple majority voting under proposed reforms. They don’t trust France’s intentions, which they see as weakening Europe’s relationship with NATO. They don’t trust Berlin because it is seen as too pro-Russia. This is bad news for the EU.
Turkey Says No
Turkey uses NATO negotiations as leverage- Finland and Sweden proves he will use the aff as a tradeoff for political gains and stall negotiations- IF they say yes.
Jonathan Lemire, 6-28-2022, "There’s a strongman holding NATO hostage. And it’s not Putin.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/28/nato-kremlin-turkey-00042756, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd
Erdogan has often been the problem child within the alliance.
Despite objections from Washington, Erdogan has purchased S-400 air systems from Russia, helped Iran evade some sanctions and is accused of letting Hamas and ISIS fighters safely transverse his nation’s territory. He stands for reelection next summer after two decades in power, during which he has strengthened his rule through constitutional changes, imprisoning many of his alleged critics and cracking down on the media. Some analysts believe he decided that strong-arming NATO would make for good domestic politics.
“Erdogan is NATO’s weakest link,” said Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “But Biden has quite a lot on his plate. Too much, in fact. Whatever Erdogan thinks he’s going to get, he may find that he will need to get in line. He might gain a concession, but at what cost? Turkey is the reason that several NATO states have explored an ejection mechanism, which NATO currently lacks.”
Erdogan had cozied up with Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, who declared in 2019 that he was a “big fan” of Turkey’s strongman leader even though Ankara had just purchased weapons systems from Russia over the howls of a bipartisan group of lawmakers. Many in Washington condemned Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, which led to a Turkish onslaught of the Kurds, who fought alongside Americans against Islamic State fighters — but whom Erdogan has deemed “terrorists.”
Erdogan and Biden met along the sidelines of the G-20 summit last fall in Rome but did not cross paths at the extraordinary NATO summit in Brussels this spring, soon after Russia’s invasion. Erdogan has raised concerns about Swedish support for Kurdish militias and appears intent on creating a precedent to prevent any NATO ally from backing the group.
“[Erdogan] is very good in converting what is good for Turkey into what is good for Erdogan,” said Soner Cagaptay, a Turkey expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “I believe that Erdogan is going to use this to boost his popularity before elections in Turkey.”
Many officials believe that Erdogan’s concern about the Kurdish militants is also a convenient fig leaf to disguise his real hopes — to get the Americans to approve a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.
“The argument is the ‘tell’ that the Turks are actually negotiating with Biden,” said Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. “President Erdogan calculates that NATO expansion is more important to Biden than congressional concerns about sending F-16s to Turkey.”
If Erdogan signs off on any deal, the agreement would, in many ways, underscore just how badly Putin’s invasion has backfired.
Among the Russian leader’s justifications for crossing into Ukraine was to prevent it, or any other Eastern European nation, from joining NATO, which was formed in the aftermath of World War II as a bulwark to aggression from the then-Soviet Union. The organization’s founding principle is known as Article Five: that if any one member is attacked, the rest of the alliance is obligated to come to its defense.
Putin wagered that, when faced with

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