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2022 Michigan Counterplan

AT - DSCA CP - Michigan 7 2022 BEJJ

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2AC – Aid Fails
Military aid fails – won’t deter Russia or affect the outcome of the war – only diplomatic compromises solve the conflict.
Boston and Charap ’22 (Scott Boston, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, received a master’s degree in International Relations from Yale and a bachelor’s degree in military history from West Point. Samuel Charap, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar, received a B.A. in Russian and political science from Amherst College, is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served at the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security and on the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff. “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?” 01/21/22 https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html)
The justification for the aid has varied. Some have made the case that U.S. military assistance to Ukraine can change Russia's calculus now, possibly deterring Moscow from launching an attack. Others claim that aid to the Ukrainian military can have a real impact on a possible fight with the Russians, making it meaningfully more challenging for the Kremlin to achieve victory and ruling out certain military options Russia might be considering. And there are also voices who call for additional capabilities merely to raise costs for Moscow—that is, to kill more Russian soldiers—so as to create political problems for President Vladimir Putin at home, although without much expectation that Ukraine would prevail.
None of these arguments is convincing. That does not mean security cooperation with Kyiv should cease. It does mean that military assistance is not an effective lever for resolving this crisis.
Since 2014, the United States has provided over $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine, following the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of the Donbass. U.S. assistance to Ukraine has included the provision of trainers, selected defensive systems (such as counter-mortar radars), and more recently, Javelin anti-tank missiles. This assistance has principally aimed to improve Ukrainian effectiveness in the relatively static conflict against Russian-backed separatist forces in the Donbass, who are mainly armed with small arms and light weapons, along with some artillery and Soviet-era armor.
Crucially, however, Ukraine has mainly not been fighting Russia's armed forces in the Donbass. Yes, Russia has armed, trained, and led the separatist forces. But even by Kyiv's own estimates, the vast majority of rebel forces consist of locals—not soldiers of the regular Russian military. Indeed, the Russian armed forces engaged directly in the fighting only twice—in August–September 2014 and January–February 2015—and with limited capabilities, although both episodes ended in crushing Ukrainian defeats.
Moscow has sought to retain some veil of deniability about its involvement in the conflict, which meant the Russian military never used more than a tiny fraction of its capabilities against the Ukrainians. It applied just enough force to get the job done while avoiding protracted, overt interventions. A wide variety of signature Russian capabilities—including its air force and ballistic and cruise missiles—have not been involved in the fighting at all, even as they have been repeatedly demonstrated in combat operations in Syria.
The nature of the reported Russian buildup suggests the expanded war, if it happens, will differ fundamentally from the past seven years of simmering stalemate. Russia has the ability to carry out a large-scale joint offensive operation involving tens of thousands of personnel, thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds of combat aircraft. It would likely begin with devastating air and missile strikes from land, air, and naval forces, striking deep into Ukraine to attack headquarters, airfields, and logistics points. Ukrainian forces would begin the conflict nearly surrounded from the very start, with Russian forces arrayed along the eastern border, naval and amphibious forces threatening from the Black Sea in the south, and the potential (increasingly real) for additional Russian forces to deploy into Belarus and threaten from the north, where the border is less than 65 miles from Kyiv itself.
In short, this war will look nothing like the status quo ante of conflict in Ukraine, and that undermines the first justification for U.S. aid: deterring Russia. The Ukrainian military has been shaped to fight the conflict in the Donbass and thus poses little deterrent threat to Russia; provision of U.S. weapons can do nothing to change that. If Moscow is willing to launch a major war, invading the second-largest country in Europe with a population of over 40 million, all while absorbing tremendous economic punishment from the West, then it is unlikely to be deterred by whatever U.S. military assistance can be delivered in the coming weeks. The only weapons systems that could plausibly impose costs that could change Russia's calculus, such as surface-to-air missiles and combat aircraft, are ones that the United States would be highly unlikely to provide the Ukrainians. And, regardless, they could not be procured, delivered, and be made operational—to say nothing of getting the Ukrainian operators trained up to use them—in time to have an impact on this crisis. Large, modern systems require extensive training and material support.
Once deterrence fails and a war begins, the Ukrainian armed forces will find themselves in desperate circumstances almost immediately. Ukraine does not have anywhere near enough forces to credibly defend against all the potential avenues of attack, which means it would have to choose between defending a select set of fixed strong points—ceding control of other areas—or maneuvering to engage Russian forces that outnumber them. The line of conflict in the Donbass will be but one of many fronts. The Ukrainian fortifications there may well look like a modern-day Maginot Line: prepared for a frontal attack that may never come and bypassed by the mobile forces of an adversary with more-advanced aircraft and more-mobile land forces.
Ukraine's great size means that the land forces operating there will be required to move to cover large areas of rural terrain. Mobile engagements would benefit Russian forces, which are far better trained and equipped to conduct coordinated air and land maneuver warfare than their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian military has repeatedly practiced the use of long-range strike and tactical fires cued by drones as well as other means of reconnaissance, both in training and in combat operations in Syria. Russia's combat aircraft and strategic air defenses give Moscow many more options to control the air and to strike Ukrainian forces, and most Russian pilots have recent real-world experience in Syria. The Ukrainian military also largely operates legacy Soviet weapons; Russian forces have a deep familiarity with the limitations of these systems and know what tactics to employ to further reduce their effectiveness.
In short, the military balance between Russia and Ukraine is so lopsided in Moscow's favor that any assistance Washington might provide in coming weeks would be largely irrelevant in determining the outcome of a conflict should it begin. Russia's advantages in capacity, capability, and geography combine to pose insurmountable challenges for Ukrainian forces tasked with defending their country. The second argument for aid—changing the course of the war—thus does not hold water.
The third argument for aid is to provide assistance to enable a Ukrainian insurgency to impose costs on a Russian occupying force. Many have in mind the historical analogy here of U.S. aid to the mujahideen in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion in 1979. Indeed, some are even recommending providing the same Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles that plagued the Soviet air force at the time.
If Russia attempts a long-term occupation of areas with lots of hostile Ukrainians, these forms of support could, on the margins, complicate matters for Moscow. But U.S. support to a Ukrainian insurgency should be a matter of last resort during an extended conflict, not a centerpiece of policy before it has even started. The prospect of a marginally more costly occupation is unlikely to make a difference to Moscow if it gets to that stage; it will have already absorbed far more significant costs. Russian planners are aware that a lot can go wrong in a large-scale operation, especially an occupation. If Putin takes the decision to occupy large parts of Ukraine, it will not be because he believes it will be easy or inexpensive to Russia.
We should also keep in mind that the costs of a war that lasts to the point of an insurgency campaign in Ukraine will be disproportionately borne by Ukrainians. At that stage of conflict, thousands—or, more likely, tens of thousands—of Ukrainians will have died. For any successes they achieve against the Russian occupiers, Ukrainian insurgents will be made to pay dearly; the experience of the Syrian opposition or the Chechen insurgents is not one Americans should wish on a close partner like Ukraine.
In normal times, there are many good reasons for the United States to provide military support to Ukraine. But these are not normal times. Military assistance now will at best be marginal in affecting the outcome of the crisis. It might be morally justified to help a U.S. partner at risk of aggression. But given the scale of the potential threat to Ukraine and its forces, the most effective way Washington can help is to work on finding a diplomatic solution.
2AC – Aid Bad – War
Military aid to Ukraine escalates conflict and backs Putin into a corner – only political settlement avoids nuclear war.
Hirsh ’22 (Michael Hirsh, senior correspondent at Foreign Policy, co-winner of the Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 for "prescience in identifying the al Qaeda threat half a year before the September 11 attacks" and for his coverage of the global war on terrorism, which also won two National Magazine Awards for General Excellence. “Biden’s Dangerous New Ukraine Endgame: No Endgame” 04/29/22 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-biden-endgame/)
In a dramatic series of shifts this week, U.S. President Joe Biden and his NATO allies have escalated their policy of helping to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression into a policy of undermining the power and influence of Russia itself. In so doing, some observers fear, they are leaving Russian President Vladimir Putin little choice but to surrender or double down militarily, raising the possibility of widening his war beyond Ukraine.
On Thursday, Biden urged Congress to provide $33 billion in additional military, economic, and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine—more than double the previous amount—and said he was sending a clear message to Putin: “You will never succeed in dominating Ukraine.” Beyond that, Biden said in remarks at the White House, the new policy was intended “to punish Russian aggression, to lessen the risk of future conflicts.”
That followed an equally clear declaration this week from U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who after a meeting in Kyiv with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the U.S. objective is now to curtail Russia’s power over the long term so it does not have the “capability to reproduce” its military assault on Ukraine. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin said in a stopover in Poland.
The shift may have been what prompted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to declare afterward that Washington and the West had entered a “proxy” war with Russia, risking another world war that, Lavrov warned, could go nuclear. “The danger is serious, real. And we must not underestimate it,” Lavrov said. Putin also again suggested this week, as he has since the beginning of his invasion on Feb. 24, that he still had the option of using nuclear weapons against NATO, saying, “We have all the instruments for this [to respond to a direct threat to Russia]—ones nobody else can boast of. And we will use them, if we have to.”
The newly aggressive U.S. approach won plaudits from many quarters—in particular from current and former NATO officials who insist the Russian nuclear counterthreats are only empty rhetoric.
“It’s the only way to go forward,” said former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in an interview. “In Putin’s thinking it doesn’t make any difference, because he would only claim that the Western policy is to weaken Russia anyway. So why not speak openly about it? The mistake we made in the past was to underestimate the ambitions of Vladimir Putin, to underestimate his brutality. At the same time, we overestimated the strength of the Russian military.”
The new U.S. and NATO strategy is partly based on Ukraine’s continuing battlefield success against Putin, who has been forced to scale down his ambitions from a full takeover of Ukraine to a major new assault in its eastern and southern parts. NATO allies including Germany, which until this week had equivocated on sending heavy offensive weaponry to Ukraine, have ratcheted up their aid in response. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, under political pressure at home and abroad, announced earlier this week that his country would provide 50 anti-aircraft tanks to Ukraine.
Yet other Russia experts expressed worry that the United States and its Western allies are, in effect, crossing the very redlines they have avoided until now. For most of the two-month conflict, Biden has refused to authorize any military support, such as major offensive weapons or a no-fly zone, that might be perceived as putting U.S. or NATO forces in direct conflict with Russia. Now, some observers worry that with the additional aid and tougher economic sanctions, the U.S. president is forcing Putin into a corner in which he can only fight on or surrender. The latter course would mean relinquishing Putin’s career-long aim of strengthening Russia against the West. Yet Putin, who has long said the West’s goal was to weaken or contain Russia, has never been known to surrender during his decade and a half of aggressive moves against neighboring countries, mainly Ukraine and Georgia.
“In the Kremlin’s eyes the West is out to get Russia. It was unspoken before. Now it’s spoken,” said Sean Monaghan, an expert on Europe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “If you combine this with Biden’s comments, at his summit in Poland last month, that ‘this man [Putin] cannot remain in power,’ all that turns this a territorial war into a wider confrontation and might make negotiating a settlement to end the war in Ukraine far more difficult or even impossible at the present.” (Biden officials later said that the president was not seeking regime change in Russia.)
George Beebe, a former chief of Russia analysis for the CIA, said that the Biden administration may be in danger of forgetting that the “the most important national interest that the United States has is avoiding a nuclear conflict with Russia.” He added that “the Russians have the ability to make sure everyone else loses if they lose too. And that may be where we’re heading. It’s a dangerous corner to turn.”
Perhaps the most worrisome turn of events is that there no longer appears to be any possibility of a negotiated way out of the war—despite Putin’s statement to visiting United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres that he still hopes for such a solution.
“It’s one thing to pursue a policy of weakening Putin, quite another to say it out loud. We have to find a way for Putin to achieve a political solution, so perhaps it is not wise to state this,” said one senior European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“It’s getting more dangerous,” said Charles Kupchan, a former senior U.S. official and now a scholar of international relations at Georgetown University. “We need to start moving beyond Javelins and anti-tank missiles and talk about a political endgame.” Or, as Beebe put it, “We need to find a way of somehow discreetly conveying to the Russians that we would be willing to ease sanctions in the context of an international settlement.
Ukrainian arms sales are the biggest lapses in oversight in recent history- that independently causes escalation.
Desiderio et al ’22 [Andrew; 2 June; Studied journalism @ GW; POLITICO, “Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid,” https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463]
The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.
Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.
Some lawmakers are already warning the Biden administration that a future aid package could lose the overwhelming congressional support that has been a hallmark of the previous efforts. A key barometer will be the Pentagon’s handling and complete accounting of the funds, which has lagged in other areas, sparking scrutiny from congressional committees.
Sen. Warren (D-Mass.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said in an email that a full accounting of the already-appropriated funding will be “critically important for both past and future funding requests.”
“The U.S. government is sending billions in humanitarian, economic, and military assistance to help the Ukrainian people overcome Putin’s brutal war, and the American people expect strong oversight by Congress and full accounting from the Department of Defense,” she added.
Pentagon spokesperson Marine Corps Lt. Col. Anton Semelroth said the department is “committed” to transparency with the public and with Congress about the security assistance funds. But he stressed that war involves risk, and called on Russia to end the conflict.
“Risk of diversion is one of many considerations that we routinely assess when evaluating any potential arms transfer,” Semelroth said. “In this case, risk would be considerably minimized by the full withdrawal from Ukraine by Russian forces.”
While all Democrats and most Republicans voted for the aid package in May, it’s unclear whether that coalition can stick together if President Joe Biden asks Congress for more money before the end of the fiscal year, as many on the Hill predict will be the case. The Pentagon already owes Congress a backlog of reports on its spending for European security, and progressives and conservatives alike have said they’ll be looking for more cooperation before approving another cash infusion.
Amid the Pentagon-Hill squabbling, Biden announced on Wednesday the first tranche of military assistance from the massive funding bill that cleared both chambers last month. And oversight concerns are at the forefront, as the newly announced $700 million package for the first time includes a more advanced, precision-guided rocket system that will allow Ukraine to strike targets even further away — potentially in Russia.
The Biden administration deliberated for weeks over whether to send the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, known as HIMARS, and medium or long-range munitions. Of

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