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2022 Michigan Disadvantage

DA - Nuclear Credibility - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR

DA - Nuclear Credibility - Michigan 7 2022 BFHR.docx

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NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA
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No European prolif now. But Ukraine is the brink.
Keating 6/1 (Joshua Keating – Global Security Reporter for GRID, “Will more countries want nuclear weapons after the war in Ukraine?”, GRID, 1 June 2022, https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/06/01/will-more-countries-want-nuclear-weapons-after-the-war-in-ukraine/, MG)
On the one hand, if anything demonstrates the dangers of a world with nuclear weapons, it’s the war in Ukraine. And yet, it’s also a demonstration of why countries want to have them. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is one big reason why it has been able to invade a neighboring country (a relatively rare event in today’s world) without facing an international military response. It also seems far less likely that Russia would have invaded had Ukraine possessed a nuclear arsenal of its own. Compounding the frustration for Ukrainians is the fact that the country did have nuclear weapons on its territory — around 1,900 Soviet warheads at the end of the Cold War in 1991, making it, on paper, the world’s third-largest nuclear power. In 1994, the newly independent nation of Ukraine agreed to give those weapons to Russia in exchange for internationally negotiated security guarantees that turned out to not be so ironclad. While Ukraine never actually had control of the weapons, which were connected to command-and-control systems in Moscow, it’s a powerful narrative nonetheless. As the country’s former defense minister told the New York Times in February, shortly before the invasion, “We gave away the capability for nothing.” Nicholas Miller, a political scientist at Dartmouth College who studies nuclear proliferation, said the current war and recent history underline the advantages of the nuclear capability. “It’s already well understood that nuclear weapons seem to do a pretty good job at deterring outright invasions,” he told Grid, pointing out that North Korean officials regularly invoke the examples of Iraq and Libya, which abandoned their weapons of mass destruction programs and then found themselves targets of U.S.-led regime change operations. “This just kind of reinforces that.” None of which suggests a looming global rush to obtain the bomb. Davenport said the more likely possibility is more states engaging in nuclear “hedging”: developing the capabilities to quickly build a bomb without crossing the red line of actually doing so. Countries have done this as an insurance policy in case security guarantees provided by their partners turn out not to be flawed, or weak. Japan and Germany are often cited as examples of this “hedging” strategy.
Emerging tech coop signals a decline in US nuclear commitments to NATO
Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173, MG)
Constraining assurance: The drawbacks of emerging technology in alliances
While the impact of emerging technologies may yield some positive dividends in strengthening US’s ability to extend deterrence, it may indeed result in a different set of effects in how assured allies actually are. During the Cold War, the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of delivery of nuclear weapons another continent, without requiring forward basing on allied territory, changed the way that allies and the United States viewed their opportunity and willingness to protect allied territory.29 An increasing reliance on mobile ICBMs that did not require the same degree of infrastructure as forward-deployed conventional forces or military personnel raised concerns about how credible the US was in its commitment to defend another territory, potentially at the risk of inadvertently creating vulnerabilities in US national defence.
Despite political rhetoric to the contrary (especially from the current administration), it was challenging to convince allies in Europe and East Asia that the US would be willing to undertake action that could potentially risk the security of the US homeland. This raises an important question: how is this costly trade-off likely to operate in a cross-domain world where an act of aggression, potentially a provocation of war, may begin in a non-kinetic domain? Perhaps the United States may be willing to enter into a conflict in defence of an ally if the dispute begins in cyberspace though the uncertainty in response may produce concerns about the strength of the assurance. While allies are likely to want a generous interpretation of provocation to encourage action from the United States, it is not clear the extent to which the US may be willing to ‘risk New York for Paris’ with the use of conventional or nuclear force if an ally is attacked with a cyber weapon.30 If the threshold or ‘redline’ for a US military response is uncertain in the most traditional of security environment, where known enemies can use physical weapons against a distant US or allied targets, how security umbrellas are likely to manifest in the multi-theatre, cross-capability environment is likely to be even more complex. Though the foundation of NATO and other multilateral institutions is argued to be one of capability aggregation,31 the practice of alliances often reveals the uneven distribution of resources and assurances through ‘pivots’ of attention.32
Indeed, these concerns are likely to be even more prescient with the development and inclusion of new forms of capabilities (mobile and easy to deploy to multiple places simultaneously) that can be easily moved and used elsewhere.33 If this is likely to be a consequence of the positioning of submarines, aircraft carriers, or other mobile but discrete assets, it is difficult to assess how the ‘deployment’ of cyber or drone technology, that is easier to redeploy to different theatres in defence of an ally, will impact their perception of US permanence and commitment to deter foreign aggressors. As with existing military technologies, costly trade-offs may complicate cross-domain strategies of extended deterrence that may perversely destabilise already tense regional environments.
The current state of US extended deterrence commitments to NATO/Western Europe has been significantly impacted by a new set of costly challenges (namely recent Russia behaviour) and the US conventional and nuclear ‘pivot to East Asia’. 34 While several studies have pointed again to Japan and South Korea as examples of protégé states seeking and receiving renewed assurances from the US against possible North Korean and Chinese nuclear and conventional threats, whether the evolving geo-strategic environment in which emerging technology plays a prominent role yields the same set of outcomes is uncertain.35 Given these challenges, the US has had increasing difficulty assuring its NATO allies (and subsequently its allies in East Asia) about its capacity to adequately defend both regions from their respective adversaries.36 These competing demands for the US to project hard military power in two distinct regions simultaneously have only prompted both sets of allies to become less persuaded of US’s capacity to actually defend them in the event of external aggression (sometimes opting to take matters into their own hands by pursuing indigenous advances in military power). Furthermore, adversaries themselves may be less convinced of US’s commitment to defend its allies – motivating some aggressors to use this opportunity to provoke allies into disputes when the extent of the US ability to provide adequate defence is uncertain.37
Some states may begin to mirror investment in similar, new types of technology to counteract the emergence of cross-domain capabilities that can be used between patrons and their client states. By pinpointing weaknesses in defensive alliance commitments, some major powers, such as China, have started to develop ‘puncture’ capabilities that are low cost, high technology and highly effective means of countering advances in extended deterrent capabilities. In the case of China, for example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is beginning to establish ‘new-type combat forces’ that merge naval aviation, cyber and special forces to adapt to changing demands for combat readiness and military doctrine.38 Additionally, China has begun to use ‘lowintensity coercion’ to advance its maritime objectives in the East and South China Seas – often threatening US allies in the region, including the Philippines and Japan. While these moves are made to increase China’s presence and control over disputed islands in the region, their strategy regarding escalation – and avoiding conflict with the US – remains unknown.
These discussions yield several important implications, especially when we consider how they impact allied decision-making. This uncertainty may result in a variety of other second and third-order effects. First, potential allies may seek commitments from other patrons seen to be more reliable – new patrons that still rely on hard military power. Other the other hand, allies may seek other forms of assurance or seek to challenge adversaries on their own – engaging in moral hazard. Allies may even begin to develop counter-balancing technology that allows them independence from their patrons and as a means to challenge adversaries. Without the benefits of capability aggregation in alliances or enhanced security through substitution, this could impact the value of alliances for allies (or their patrons). In aggregate, such consideration raises important concerns about how emerging technologies will influence the allied side of the strategic interaction.
Lack of confidence in the US nuclear commitment enables nuclear proliferation
Pelopidas 15 (Benoit Pelopidas - CISAC affiliate and lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, “Chapter 3: The Nuclear Straitjacket”, The Future of Extended Deterrence, Pages 73-74, Georgetown University Press, 2015, MG)
In international relations theory, the most famous proponents of structural realism, area studies specialists inspired by it, and even critical voices have formulated forecasts and policy recommendations based on the nuclear straitjacket, even if their analytical assessments are often formulated in probabilistic terms.8 Major proponents of structural realism argued that the protection offered by the two superpowers during the Cold War was the essential cause of nuclear nonproliferation during that period. This led to a series of proliferation forecasts about the post– Cold War period.9 Benjamin Frankel offers the clearest formulation of this alternative when he writes that “there is an inherent contradiction between welcoming the end of bipolarity and deploring the spread of nuclear weapons” and “it is precisely the large size and sophistication of the superpowers’ nuclear forces, and the avowed willingness of the superpowers to threaten to use them on behalf of their clients, . . . that have prevented a more pervasive weapons proliferation.”10 Most recently, Michael Horowitz phrases the nuclear straitjacket in terms of likelihood when he writes that “[i]n a world where progress towards arms reductions reverses, some states with civilian nuclear power might begin to prepare quietly for a world where they need to build their own small nuclear arsenal. Such an outcome might become likely if the economic struggles in the United States lead the country to pull back significantly from its international obligations, including its extended deterrence umbrella.”11
A similar tendency can be identified in works of area studies specialists inspired by structural realism. Beyond the works of John Mearsheimer on the necessity of an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent in Ukraine, Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett can be mentioned.12 A few months before Kiev decided to give its weapons back to Russia, it insisted on the protection that these weapons would offer against a Russia depicted as expansionist, notably because of the remaining Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine.13 Similarly, Yair Evron accepts the idea that the end of bipolarity created additional incentives to get nuclear weapons.14 Some interpretations of the German case and, more broadly, of nuclear abstinence inside the Eu ro pean community tend to rely on the nuclear straitjacket.15 Most recently, Andrew Kennedy argued that “implicit nuclear umbrellas” and disarmament diplomacy were key drivers of Indian nuclear restraint until 1998.16
Even critical voices like Glenn Chafetz, who intends to build an “alternative to the neo- realist perspective” for the post– Cold War world, ends up transposing the argument of the nuclear straitjacket at the level of perceptions. In his view, what matters for forecasting proliferation is not whether the protector will maintain its security guarantee but if the protégé believes the protector will do so.17 This approach leaves room for the possibility that the protégé could misinterpret the intentions of the protector and decide not to go for the bomb even though the protector has not made a sincere credible pledge. Thus, the protégé in this instance would not go nuclear because it believes that the protector’s defective pledge of extended nuclear deterrence is valid. The fact that the protégé makes a mistake should not mask that its supposed reasoning remains the same.18 Most recently, Francis Gavin argues that the resolve to strike as a foundation of a credible nuclear security guarantee might have created incentives to go for the bomb for countries to which the deterrent pledge is not extended, but he does not criticize the effi - cacy of extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation tool.19
Allied prolif causes nuke war, Asian nuclear arms races, and collapses alliances
Gerzhoy and Miller 16 (Gene Gerzhoy - Former Research Fellow Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program and now a Congressional Fellow at the American Political Science Association, Nicholas Miller - Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Donald Trump thinks more countries should have nuclear weapons. Here’s what the research says”, The Washington Post, 6 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/, MG)
Research does not support the idea that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. But isolationist “America First” policies could prompt that spread. Defining U.S. strategic interests primarily in terms of monetary gain, and curtailing U.S. global engagement toward that end, would boost the probability that our allies would respond by going nuclear.
Would nuclear proliferation be good for U.S. interests?
What about Trump’s second proposition: that proliferation by our allies would be good for U.S. interests? This argument is based on the idea that nuclear-armed allies could help contain U.S. adversaries and enable the United States to save money. As Trump told Cooper, “I would rather see Japan having some form of defense, and maybe even offense, against North Korea.” And as he suggested, the United States can’t afford to protect Japan and South Korea — and therefore, “they have to pay us or we have to let them protect themselves.”
Reducing military commitments and letting allies build their own nuclear weapons might save money for the United States. But international relations scholarship suggests that allied proliferation would have broader negative repercussions. Among these would be declining U.S. influence. When nations gain their own military capabilities, they rely less on their allies and become less subject to their sway. And that can undermine a senior partner’s ability to hold its junior allies back from risky military actions.
In other words, allowing or encouraging proliferation would worsen the “American weakness” that Trump decries.
Recent nonproliferation research underscores this proposition. Mark Bell shows that nuclear allies are likely to become more independent of their patrons and in some cases can develop more assertive foreign policies. And Francis Gavin and Matthew Kroenig show that the fear of declining influence was one reason why most American administrations vigorously opposed the spread of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India.
Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear.
Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis.
And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal.
Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before?
Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals.
Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best.
Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely. More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes.
So what’s the takeaway?
A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker than it is today.
Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear pro

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