Neg - Cyber Interoperability - Harvard 2022
Neg - Cyber Interoperability - Harvard 2022.docx
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Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—1NC
Turn: ambiguity is better for preventing cyber escalation
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
Finally, NATO needs to maintain ambiguity on what justifies an Article 5 response. As mentioned previously, ambiguity has served NATO well. A set threshold for when NATO will invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack on a member country is not necessary. This ambiguity has historically served the alliance well, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. If the alliance had said weapons were only include guns, bullets, tanks, and bombs, it would have set a threshold precluding a NATO response to attacks that turned four planes into improvised missiles. The larger issue of ambiguity is that there is no set definition of what constitutes an armed attack and what circumstances dictate a collective response, as per Article 5. Remaining ambiguous on the severity threshold of a cyber-attack allows the alliance to act in cases of future cyber-attacks that cause severe damage, but also allow NATO to refrain from over-reacting, even if an event is a cyber, or kinetic, attack as per a definition. It would be a mistake to set a threshold for attacks that cannot currently be anticipated.
Otherwise, attackers would be more impelled to start cyber wars
Susan Davis 19—General Rapporteur for this report, Congresswoman. ("NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” October 2019, from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf)
NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers to tread lightly. A similar deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War.
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Working Now—1NC/2NC
They have it backwards – the prevalence of grey-zone activities proves deterrence is strong now.
Hal Brands 16, PhD @ Yale, Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone”, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/
In many ways, the prevalence of gray zone approaches is actually a testament to the strength of the liberal international order that America has led since World War II. Gray zone approaches reflect the fact that there are strong international norms against outright aggression and territorial conquest, and that even moderately revisionist powers often hesitate to pay the costs—from moral opprobrium, to economic penalties, to the potential for a military response—associated with flagrantly violating those norms. In the same vein, gray zone conflict actually underscores the fact that U.S. military power, alliances, and security guarantees—the structures that have long served as the backbone of the international order—have generally proven quite effective in deterring or punishing such flagrant military aggression. Indeed, these strengths of the international system have fostered the very ambiguity and incrementalism that characterize gray zone approaches, persuading revisionist powers—usually—to take small steps that sow doubt about what is really happening, and that avoid more dramatic provocations that might cross clearly established “red lines.”[11]
The status quo is working—there’s a conceptual understanding of what invokes Article 5, while maintaining effective ambiguity
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
Since the cyber world is still so new and continues to advance each day with new technologies, NATO is still trying to find the best policies and best course of action to take in response to the new threats to peace and democracy that cyber-attacks pose on the alliance and this new world. NATO welcomes and many experts on cyberspace give it recommendations on how to deal with this new threat. The cyber world is too new for NATO to bind its hands, so to speak, with rigid rules and laws regarding when, how, and why it would invoke Article 5 in the case of a cyber-attack on a member country. In response, at the 2014 summit in Wales, the alliance made it clear that a cyber-attack can and will invoke an Article 5 response. It also made it clear that ambiguity has served the alliance well, and it refused to define the kind of attack that would invoke an Article 5 response.
However, that is not to say that NATO has been irresponsible or lackadaisical in trying to give some understanding on when a cyber-attack becomes an armed attack. With the help of experts in the field of cyberspace, international law, and policymakers, the Tallinn Manual was written and published to provide guidance to NATO and any other international or national alliance or government seeking it. Although the Manual offers guidance on what scale, effects, and attacker motivation would be severe enough to fall into the category of an armed attack, it does not give specific details, only a conceptual idea of what an armed attack might look like in the cyber realm. Then, with the guidance of the Manual, and international law, there could be a better understanding of what would then invoke an Article 5 response. Nevertheless, it is not, and was not intended to be, a complete go-to-guide for how each member country should conduct itself in the cyber world.
The whole point of hybrid war is that it doesn’t escalate by design. Russia will take actions approaching redlines but won’t actually trigger them – solves conflict
Alexander Lanoszka 20, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, “Thank goodness for NATO enlargement”, Int Polit (2020) 57:451-470
The defensibility of NATO’s northeastern flank NATO enlargement has provided a key source of insurance by raising the costs of direct Russian aggression against alliance members. This is true even in arguably the weakest part of the alliance, the Baltic littoral region. Conventional wisdom holds that the defense of this region against Russian aggression is especially costly for the USA and NATO to undertake. The countries located there are exceptionally vulnerable. Whereas most benefciaries of NATO enlargement are at least largely separated from Russia thanks to Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic countries are directly contiguous and have only a short land connection to continental NATO by way of the Polish–Lithuanian border. According to this perspective, a rebalancing of alliance commitments in Europe is necessary because the local military balance favors Russia too much and the political will to defend the Baltic states is too low. The USA will never ‘trade Toledo for Tallinn’ (Shifrinson 2017, 111). Note the contradiction: According to critics, enlarging NATO simultaneously provokes Russia and weakens the alliance. But what rational cause would Russia have to be dismayed when a potentially adversarial military alliance willingly takes on major liabilities? The alliance security dilemma—whereby the strengthening of one coalition may inadvertently create insecurity for another—suggests that Russia would be justifiably concerned if NATO either incorporated states that meaningfully aggregate capabilities or increased military ties with such powerful states (Snyder 1984, 477). By NATO enlargement critics’ own admission, the Baltic countries subtract from, rather than add to, what the alliance can do. Russian might have reasons to protest enlargement, but these reasons likely concern the perceived slight to its honor when former Soviet states became formal defense partners of the USA (Götz 2017, 236–239).4 NATO enlargement has not been responsible for Russian authoritarianism or international revisionism because it never threatened Russia. Pessimism regarding the defensibility of NATO’s so-called northeastern flank is also unwarranted. To begin with, much of the policy literature on this region concentrates on Russia’s strengths while ignoring its key weaknesses. The Baltic countries would almost surely lose set piece battles against Russia, but deterrence ultimately hinges less on being victorious in a potential war than on imposing unacceptable costs on the adversary. The Baltic states have already begun embracing unconventional strategies intended to boost national resiliency and make occupation difficult (Collins and Beehner 2019). Guerrilla tactics and territorial defense serve to augment their denial capabilities that in turn would complicate Russian efforts to hold territory and pacify the local population. Moreover, Russia may have local escalation dominance, but it does not have global escalation dominance, given the forces that NATO members possess. A large-scale land grab made at the expense of any of the Baltic countries might precipitate escalatory dynamics that it could not control. Nuclear war may be a remote possibility, but it cannot be discounted altogether. One reason why Russia has resorted to so-called hybrid tactics against the Baltic countries—such as political subversion and eforts to foment unrest—is that it does not wish to provoke a reaction that it cannot handle (Lanoszka 2016). Put simply, Russia may believe in NATO’s Article Five collective defense commitment more than NATO members themselves do.
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Deterrence Turn—2NC
Redlines embolden aggression more than clarity AND jeopardize NATO’s credibility
Z’hra M. Ghavam 16—Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, B.S., United States Naval Academy. ("NATO’s Preparedness for Cyberwar," September 2016, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/50552)
NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments.
Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines:
Our policy also recognizes that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm, therefore, that cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.209
However, an invocation of Article 5 does not necessarily mean that a NATO response would include force. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states the following:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.210
Thus, as long as each Alliance member takes “such action as it deems necessary,” it cannot be found in violation of the collective defense principle.211 In the case of a major act of cyberwar against one of its members, NATO could invoke Article 5 as a show of solidarity but opt to refrain from employing kinetic military force; instead, the Alliance could use purely cybernetic means or a hybrid alternative that combined cybernetic tools with military force to fulfill its objectives.
In all, NATO’s establishment, organization, and employment of its sophisticated cyber response agencies and IT resources like the NCIRC, NCIO, NCIA, and RRT are indicative of how seriously the Alliance has implemented its cyber defense policies at the operational level. NATO’s cyber policy, standard operating procedures, and ambiguous thresholds for the use of military force make the Alliance highly prepared to respond effectively to major acts of cyber aggression against one or more of its members. If an act of cyberwar met the threshold of an armed attack, NATO would probably be prepared to manage, counter, and resolve the issue in cyberspace; still, one cannot exclude the possible need to take kinetic measures. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance earned a preparedness score of 3 in cyber strategy.
Retaining flexibility is key for appropriate response
Lt. Ken M. Jones 15—United States Navy, MA student at Naval Postgraduate School in Science of Cyber Systems and Operations, B.A.S., Wayland Baptist University. (“Cyber War: The Next Frontier for NATO,” March 2015, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA620763.pdf)
In light of the recent developments of NATO, it would seem to be in NATO’s best interest to remain ambiguous and allow the organization to approach its response to a cyber-attack on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the attacks on Estonia might require intervention on behalf of the Estonian people due to the fact they are a smaller, lesser defensible state. Estonia would not be successful standing up against Russia, and as Russia becomes more aggressive in the former-Soviet bloc region, small states like Estonia are at risk. If another attack were to occur against Estonia, the attacks would have to be more severe to invoke an Article 5 response. Such a response would enable NATO states to act as if they too have been attacked as per the mutual defense announcement against cyber-attacks at the Wales Summit. Yet, if the United States is attacked in a similar manner, there likely does not need to be the same scale of defense taken, because the United States has more resources and capabilities to respond on its own. Remaining ambiguous allows NATO to choose the best opportunities for supporting and defending member states.
Before it could decide on a response, NATO would first need to consider the severity of the attack to determine the appropriate level of response, whether it be sanctions, cutting off financial aid to the offending country, or a boots on the ground campaign. However, even while retaining flexibility in its response to a cyber-attack, NATO understands the importance of cyber defense. It aims to deter cyber-attacks against its networks and member country’s networks through strong cyber defenses, although NATO has yet to fully seek what Cold War theorists have called “deterrence by denial,” and which could be an effective mechanism.161 With such a posture, the enemy need not be convinced that a cyber-attack will be followed by retaliation or punishment; instead, it is only necessary to convince the enemy that the initial attack will have no effect.16
Ambiguity produces better tailored responses to re-establish deterrence
Susan Davis 19—General Rapporteur for this report, Congresswoman. ("NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” October 2019, from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf)
NATO’s ambiguity also extends to the type of punishment it threatens were it to suffer a cyber attack. The Alliance has made clear that it neither limits punishment to similar cyber attacks nor excludes them. Instead, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter cyber attacks. Once again, this introduces useful doubt in an opponent’s mind. A more technical reason for the difficulty of restricting retaliation to cyber attacks is that it is hard to credibly threaten the assets of the attacker in a similar fashion. If an attacker shuts down a power plant, would the Alliance have cyber options to attack an opponent’s power plants or similar infrastructure? Would NATO even want to if it could, as it complies with the principle of proportionality and international law in all its activities? NATO’s ambiguity on the type of retaliation serves a convincing purpose. It produces doubts in the would-be attacker’s mind and presents more options to tailor and scale a response to re-establish deterrence.
Neg—AT: Cyber Aff—Impact Defense—1NC
No large-scale Russian cyberattacks
Baezner 17 (Marie and Patrice Robin; Feb; Cyber Defense Project (CDP) Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich, “Cyber-Conflict Between the United States of America and Russia” https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/184547/Cyber-Reports-2017-02.pdf?sequence=1)
On the other hand, both states might not desire further escalation, preferring to restrain the conflict to cyberspace. Each would follow the “tit-for-tat” logic and accuse each other while never reaching a tipping point where the conflict spills over to a conventional war. Such a tipping point would be linked to the intensity of the attack or the nature of the targets. Both nations would keep the cyberattacks small enough not to trigger a bigger reaction. The same would be observed on the choice of targets, with both avoiding certain critical or sensitive targets, for instance critical infrastructures. In order to contain the conflict in cyberspace, both states would have to demonstrate their restraint by selecting options with low risk of miscalculation (Lin, 2012, pp. 64–66). In the future, it might also be possible to see a deescalation in the form of the emergence of an international treaty or at least further bilateral treaties between the USA and Russia on cyberattacks. For example, during the last few years, businesses in the USA were often hacked and spied on by the Chinese military. These intr
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