Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2022 HDC Affirmative

Aff - Cyber Interoperability - Harvard 2022

Aff - Cyber Interoperability - Harvard 2022.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
1AC—Plan + Russia Advantage
The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of cyber, by defining proportional response and increasing interoperability.
Russian cyberattacks are inevitable post-Ukraine, and current policy of strategic ambiguity fails at deterrence. This undermines NATO’s credibility and unity, which imperils the alliance. Refining cyber policy is key.
Erica D. Lonergan & Sara B. Moller 4/27—Assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College. ("NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." March 27, 2022, from POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829)
President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable.
One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.”
But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance.
Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.”
Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.”
This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time.
This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage.
These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.”
NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power.
With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.
NATO needs to present a multilateral front to deter Russia—otherwise, they’ll devastate the grid
Dina Aldanova 5/30—Master’s Candidate at Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies Program. ("Will Russia Launch a New Cyber Attack on America?" May 30, 2022, from National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/will-russia-launch-new-cyber-attack)
Nevertheless, cybersecurity experts speculate on a range of consequences in a worst-case cyber scenario: Russia might attempt to attack U.S. critical infrastructure, turn off the lights, target the operation of ATMs and credit card systems, attack Amazon’s cloud, disrupt the transportation and supply of clean water, and target pharmaceuticals companies’ manufacturing facilities, power grids, and colonial pipelines. But will such a threat manifest?
Not only would a cyberattack against the United States contradict the historically peripheral nature of Russian cyber warfare, but Russia’s cyber capacity would be insufficient for the task. For the past several years, the West has largely overestimated Russian military capabilities in conventional warfare. U.S. intelligence agencies predicted the 2022 war in Ukraine would be the most destructive the European continent has seen since the end of World War II, expecting the fall of Kyiv to come within days. However, the still ongoing, drawn-out war has revealed weaknesses in the Russian armed forces, its military arsenal, and strategic leadership. Russian officials, for their part, underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian resistance and the united position of the international community. Spending slightly more than 4 percent of the country’s GDP on the military, the Russian president mobilizes domestic support for the military budget by articulating the external threat of NATO. In a relatively undigitized society like Russia, lobbying to spend more on the cyber budget would prove less effective. Taking this into account, it seems possible the West could be overestimating Russian cyber competence as well.
Furthermore, Russia is unlikely to wage a cyberattack on the United States due to fear of retaliation on multiple fronts. Russian society is already experiencing the consequences that the war has wrought: an economic crisis and the psychological pressure of being cast as a global pariah. In case of a Russian cyberattack, the consequences of U.S. cyber retaliation would hit the public first. Given current conditions, depriving people of water and electricity could trigger public discontent on an unprecedented scale. Decades of increasingly authoritarian leadership have undoubtedly engendered public grievances hidden deep within society. At some point, this simmering disgruntlement can boil over into outrage. Putin can ill afford to front further domestic unrest now.
Current U.S. cyber capabilities could also contribute to the fear of retaliation. For the past few years, the United States has developed an impressive cyberinfrastructure, restructured its system of governance, and invested in cyber training and education. As Richard Clarke and Robert Knake emphasize in their book, The Fifth Domain, following the Cold War strategy of deterrence and containment, the United States has largely restrained itself from involvement in cyber counter activities. Although for a long time America has focused on defensive cyber policy, today, the U.S. Cyber Command prioritizes offensive measures. As such, in 2019, the United States successfully targeted the Iranian intelligence service and missile launch system as a response to an Iranian strike against an American drone and U.S. oil tankers. Earlier in 2012, the Stuxnet computer worm, designed in cooperation with Israel, successfully infiltrated nuclear facilities in Iran.
In addition to an offensive preference, a more consolidated system of governance and a set of regulations have advanced U.S. cybersecurity. A clear allocation of roles and responsibilities between the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Cyber Command and the relevant leadership improved the system of reporting incidents and information sharing. It facilitated communication within federal agencies and between the government, the private sector, and the public. U.S. private enterprises now spend billions of dollars on cybersecurity, employee training, and encrypted channels. The United States also takes a leading role in collaborating with strategic allies on sharing best practices, detecting flaws in networks, and promoting cyber hygiene.
International cooperation to this degree is not an asset that Russia benefits from. With the support of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence’s research and development projects, expertise, and training, U.S. retaliation to a potential Russian cyber attack could be not only detrimental but even more profound as a multilateral response. Based on all this, the fear of retaliation could indeed prevent Putin from engaging in offensive cyber operations against the United States.
Finally, Putin has lost the upper hand in launching an attack by surprise. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia during the Olympics Games in Beijing in 2008, and Ukraine during the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014. When Putin waged war on Ukraine in 2022—incidentally, immediately following the Beijing Winter Olympic Games—the West anticipated it. Putin invaded Ukraine anyway. He is unlikely to act recklessly in this way again, considering the failures the Russian military has experienced since the invasion. Furthermore, knowing that the United States and European allies have shielded up, Putin has no incentive to strike. Nevertheless, would Putin wait for a more favorable moment? Or scale back a potential attack, for instance, by meddling in the U.S. midterm elections in November?
It would be misleading, however, to underestimate Russian cyber capabilities or Putin’s mind games and lose vigilance. In 2020, despite denying its involvement, Russia evidently hacked U.S. software company SolarWinds. By installing malware into the company’s updated Orion software program, the attack affected thousands of customers, a hundred companies such as Microsoft and Intel, and some federal agencies like the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cyber experts acclaimed the code used as phenomenal. More astonishingly, if not for a performance assessment and proper investigation, the attack could have easily gone unnoticed. For over six months, Moscow tracked emails and other traffic of sensitive information. Could there already be a similar malware in U.S. networks?
Now, on the brink of a new Cold War, the United States must keep its guard up on cybersecurity. Although there are significant factors that challenge the probability of an imminent Russian cyber-retaliation, the United States should not disregard the potential for malicious activity in the near future. It needs to keep a sober view and not act hastily. Setting priorities for the long run, the United States needs to continue advancing cyber mechanisms that detect sensitive activity like the Solar Winds hack, and invest more in training and education about cyber hygiene for government agencies, private companies, and the public. It should not neglect to regularly test offline backups, run software updates, report incidents, use multifactor authentication, block unusable domain IP addresses, and assess third-party risks.
Although Putin’s intentions are far from clear, his decision to pursue a cyberattack on the United States’ critical infrastructure that would instantly shut down electricity or disrupt clean water supply, the offense might come unexpectedly, and soon. Cornered with sanctions and burdened by the bitterness of defeat, Putin might act furiously. The United States and Western allies need to be vigilant and maintain strong lines of communication about any malicious activity. With a strong multilateral front in the West, Russia will have fewer incentives to engage in cyber warfare.
But absent cooperation, allies will disagree and lack an effective, uniform response
Jackson 16—Received his juris doctor degree from George Mason University School of Law and is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Infrastructure and Protection at the George Mason University School of Business (Stephen, 8/16/2016, “NATO Article 5 and Cyber Warfare: NATO’s Ambiguous and Outdated Procedure for Determining When Cyber Aggression Qualifies as an Armed Attack”, George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security, https://cip.gmu.edu/2016/08/16/nato-article-5-cyber-warfare-natos-ambiguous-outdated-procedure-determining-cyber-aggression-qualifies-armed-attack/)
Article 5 is useful for assessing state and non-state actions used in traditional warfare. However, the NATO allies drafted Article 5 in light of the technology and tactics of the World War II era. While NATO continued to successfully adapt Article 5 to the evolving challenges post-Soviet Union, it cannot properly invoke the principle of collective self-defense against cyber attacks without at least new definitions for the various forms of cyber events. In particular, without unambiguous guidelines for identifying from where a cyber attack originated, NATO will face difficulty in both locating the origin of a cyber attack and determining whether the cyber attack was sanctioned by the host nation. Also, without proper definitions for the various forms of cyber attacks, NATO will likely encounter unnecessary debate between NATO allies over any cyber attack against a NATO country. Furthermore, without removing ambiguity in identifying cyber events that equate to a traditional armed attack, the North Atlantic Council will face difficulty in deciding upon a proper and proportionate armed response in accord with the principles of jus in bello.
Currently, almost every NATO ally has an individual national security and defense strategy related to cybersecurity.[12] These strategies vary in detail and scope, and lack uniformity in defining the elements of which cyber attacks warrant an aggressive response. Some scholars argue that the International Court of Justice accurately determined that collective self-defense is triggered when an act “inflicts substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state,” even if the attackers used non-traditional weaponry like airplanes or cyber attacks.[13] For instance, this “scale and effects” test does not adequately address the technical dif

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.