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2023 GDI Topicality

Topicality Shells and Blocks - GDI 2023

Topicality Shells and Blocks - GDI 2023.docx

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Fiscal Redistribution Must Be Progressive
1NC — T “Fiscal Redistribution Must Be Progressive (General)
The [first/next] off is T Fiscal Redistribution.
Interpretation — “Redistribution” must reduce inequality.
Brewer et al 12 — Mike, Monica Costa Dias, Research Fellow Institute for Fiscal Studies, and Jonathan Shaw, Research Fellow Institute for Fiscal Studies “Lifetime inequality and redistribution ,” October 2012, https://ifs.org.uk/sites/default/files/output_url_files/wp1223.pdf Accessed 6/29/23 S.A.M
Throughout, we use the term redistribution applied to tax and benefits systems to signify inequality reducing policies, which is achieved when the relative position of individuals at the bottom of the earned income distribution is improved by the tax and benefits system. Thus, for example, a pure flat tax rate would not be redistributive; instead, it is the progressivity of the tax system that makes it redistributive. A progressive tax system is one where the average tax rate (ATR) is increasing in earned equivalised income, where the ATR is the ratio of total family tax liability (net of benefits) to earned income.
Violation — the plan doesn’t reduce economic inequality [explain.]
Voting Issue — the core question of fiscal redistribution is how to reduce economic inequality — allowing anti-redistribution affs doubles the size of the topic and destroys neg ground — bidirectional topics ruin all disad and kritik links.
1NC — T “Fiscal Redistribution” vs. BIG with Welfare Cuts
The [first/next] off is T Fiscal Redistribution.
Interpretation — “Redistribution” must reduce inequality.
Brewer et al 12 — Mike, Monica Costa Dias, Research Fellow Institute for Fiscal Studies, and Jonathan Shaw, Research Fellow Institute for Fiscal Studies “Lifetime inequality and redistribution ,” October 2012, https://ifs.org.uk/sites/default/files/output_url_files/wp1223.pdf Accessed 6/29/23 S.A.M
Throughout, we use the term redistribution applied to tax and benefits systems to signify inequality reducing policies, which is achieved when the relative position of individuals at the bottom of the earned income distribution is improved by the tax and benefits system. Thus, for example, a pure flat tax rate would not be redistributive; instead, it is the progressivity of the tax system that makes it redistributive. A progressive tax system is one where the average tax rate (ATR) is increasing in earned equivalised income, where the ATR is the ratio of total family tax liability (net of benefits) to earned income.
Violation — UBI funded from preexisting resources is anti-topical — it distributes UPWARD.
Conesa et al 20 — JUAN CARLOS CONESA, BO LI AND QIAN LI January, 2020. “Universal Basic Income and Progressive Consumption Taxes,” WORKING PAPER 2020-01, STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY, https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2020/UBI_Ctax_2001.pdf
We first consider the long-run impact of distributing equally among all working-age households the average amount of targeted transfers in the benchmark economy. A key question regarding the implementation of UBI is how the rest of the tax system adjusts. In Table 6 we report the macroeconomic and welfare implications of introducing UBI under four different policy scenarios: 1. Adjusting upward capital income taxes, 2. Adjusting upward labor income taxes, 3. Introducing consumption taxes keeping income taxes fixed, and 4. Removing income taxes and switching to a consumption-based tax system. In alternatives 3 and 4 we obtain the combination of taxes on basic and non-basic goods that maximizes the ex-ante expected welfare of a newborn. Keeping income taxes unchanged, adjusting consumption tax rates to balance the government budget (alternative 3) yields a long run optimal combination of τc1 = −0.20 and τc2 = 0.13, introducing consumption tax progressivity. Eliminating income taxes (alternative 4) results in an optimal combination of consumption taxes that is also very progressive, with τc1 = 0.10 and τc2 = 0.49.
In all these cases, capital shock falls with the exception of alternative 4, in which the elimination of income taxes encourages capital accumulation. All these policies stimulate labor supply, espe- cially for the non-college group. There are two reasons for that. First, under the targeted transfer system of the benchmark these households receive an annual transfer as high as $4,838, if they fall into the first quintile. However, UBI only pays them $2,488 per year. This negative income effect drives low educated households to supply more labor. Second, since UBI is not income tested the distortion on labor supply at the bottom of the distribution is eliminated. In contrast, college educated households adjust their labor supply slightly, and in different directions depending on the different policy scenarios.
Essentially, switching from targeted transfers to UBI results in a redistribution of income from low income households to high income ones. Non-college educated households experience substantial welfare losses in all policy alternatives (between7.7and10.9percent).6 College educated households also experience welfare losses in the first three cases. In contrast, eliminating income taxes while introducing substantially progressive consumption taxes generates the lowest welfare losses for non- college households and even some welfare gains for college households. However, these welfare gains are attributable to the elimination of income taxes rather than UBI per se. 7
Voting Issue — the core question of fiscal redistribution is how to reduce economic inequality — allowing anti-redistribution affs doubles the size of the topic and destroys neg ground — bidirectional topics ruin all disad and kritik links.
2NC/1NR — Overview
Affs that redistribute existing welfare or social service funds are anti-topical — the net effect is to transfer funds from lower income groups to higher ones.
Destroys limits — immediately doubles the size of the topic and requires entirely separate case negs. They’d allow the flat tax, eliminating the income tax, and ending social service programs like food stamps or welfare — those are all entire topics in their own right.
Destroys ground — anti-redistribution affs avoid core topic arguments like spending, inflation, politics, elections, and core counterplans like deficit spending.
Extend Our Interpretation
Redistribution must pursue egalitarian goals — zero-sum transfers don’t meet.
Oxford Dictionary of the Social Sciences 2 [Ed. Craig Calhoun, Dictionary of the Social Sciences, 2002, eISBN: 9780199891184 Accessed 7/10/23 GAL]
redistribution
A shift in the distribution of income or wealth, generally as a means of pursuing egalitarian goals or of assisting disadvantaged sections of the population. The most common tools of redistribution are taxes on income, wealth, and commodities; transfer payments, such as pension and social security; and the provision of public goods, such as public services and national defense. Other measures include price controls, rent controls, minimum-wage legislation, and the rationing of goods and services. At the societal level, the challenge is not merely to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth, but to increase wealth so that redistribution is not simply a zero-sum game in which one person's gain is another's loss. For this reason, equity considerations cannot be divorced from issues of how income and wealth are generated. Government action can also privilege the redistribution of “opportunity,” as in the case of subsidies for education. See also fundamental theorems of welfare; growth theory; and justice.
Regressive transfers like the plan aren’t fiscal redistribution.
Hicks 86 — [Alexander Northwestern University; 1986; “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961*”; Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14; University of Kansas Libraries, JSTOR]
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
“Redistribution” is intended to achieve greater social equality.
Lindberg 23 — [Christine, The Oxford Pocket Dictionary of Current English managing editor, 5-28-2023, The Oxford Pocket Dictionary of Current English, “Redistribute”, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/redistribute, Accessed 6-25-2023, RT]
re·dis·tri·bute / ˌrēdəˈstribˌyoōt/• v. [tr.] distribute (something) differently or again, typically to achieve greater social equality: their primary concern was to redistribute income from rich to poor.
Fiscal redistribution must go from higher-income folks to lower-income folks.
Mulle 18 — Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Reasercher, 18 — [Emmanuel Dalle, 2018; “The Nationalism of the Rich: Discourses and Strategies of Separatist Parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Scotland”; Routledge, ISBN: 978-1-315-15895-2, Chapter 2: Catalonia Fiscal plundering and the end of federalism; University of Kansas Libraries, Taylor & Francis]
The formation of ERC’s claims of fiscal exploitation and their degree of credibility also depend on other factors than just the existence of a fiscal deficit with the central administration. While the ‘adequate’ level of social redistribution is a political question that does not concern us here, what can be discussed from a technical perspective is whether there are major flaws in the system that might nourish discontent with concrete forms of social redistribution. Ways of looking at this include the evaluation of: overcompensation effects, considerations of efficiency and regional economic convergence, trends in taxation and public finances, and the overall evolution of the economy. A minimal definition of fiscal redistribution entails that regions should contribute in accordance with their income but receive equal per capita spending. Hence, those with a higher than average income should be net contributors and those with a lower one net recipients. Uriel and Barberan (2007, p. 412) show that, in the period 1991–2005, Catalonia’s position was in line with this assumption. Yet, there also are some overcompensation effects,6 although their precise size is unclear. Using data for 2005, Espasa and Bosch (2010) argued that Catalonia received between 12 per cent and 14 per cent less than the Spanish average. Yet, De la Fuente (2005) calculated the same amount at 6 per cent below the average for the period 1990–97. Furthermore, this has affected other contributory regions and not exclusively Catalonia (Tortella 2016, pp. 441–443). What, instead, seems to be uncontroversial is the disproportionately low amount of infrastructural investment received by Catalonia. De la Fuente – who has otherwise provided very conservative estimates of the fiscal deficit (e.g. De la Fuente 2001) – has pointed out that the Generalitat received less investment than all other autonomous communities during the 1990s. Such spending represents a small share of the deficit claimed by ERC, but it probably had a sizable negative impact on the development of the Catalan economy in recent years.
Prefer Narrow Interpretation
Broad definitions of redistribution include nearly all government action. “Fiscal redistribution” means only direct government interventions via taxes and transfers to reduce income inequality.
Luebker 17 — Institute of Economic and Social Research 17 [Matle, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwisswnschaftliches institut (WSI), May 18, 2017, ResearchGate, “Redistribution policies”, accessed 6/27/2023, ero, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Malte-Luebker-2/publication/298075483_Redistribution_policies/links/591d93c60f7e9b642817b774/Redistribution-policies.pdf, italics in original]
In dictionaries, redistribution is defined as “to alter the distribution of” something.2 This is a useful starting point: what follows is that income redistribution policies encompass all government interventions that alter the distribution of incomes, including those that affect the primary distribution of incomes. As argued in Part II of this volume, granting collective bargaining rights (or denying them) has consequences for the functional distribution of incomes and for wage inequality, as do minimum wages. However, governments alter the primary distribution of incomes in other, often even less visible ways. For instance, the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s is widely believed to have contributed to a concentration of incomes at the top, and to a shift away from wages and towards profits (see Stiglitz, 2012; ILO, 2012). Likewise, trade liberalization has differential impacts on the incomes of various groups in society (see Jansen and Lee, 2007).
Such a broad definition of redistribution underlines the fact that most government action has redistributive consequences. To gain support for unpopular decisions such as the opening of trade, governments sometimes try to compensate the losers and impose a corresponding tax on the winners (ibid.). At this stage, redistribution becomes more apparent since it directly alters the primary distribution of incomes. This direct intervention in the form of taxes and transfers is commonly at the heart of public debates over redistribution, simply because it is more visible, even though the impact can be minuscule when compared the original policy decision. For example, trade compensation schemes are commonly thought to redistribute less than 5 per cent of the gains from trade (ibid.: 75).
The concept of fiscal redistribution captures these direct interventions that governments make through taxes and transfers. A key policy concern is often their net effect on income inequality, usually expressed as the change in a summary measure such as the Gini coefficient between the primary and secondary distribution. The impact can be further disaggregated into the direct effect of taxes and mandatory social contributions and the contribution of transfers (see section 6).
They Say: “Plan Text in a Vaccuum” (“We Include FR in the Plan”)
1. Reject Planicality — it’s an independent voting issue for fairness — it allows any action to be topical if it includes resolutional wording — that destroys neg ground and clash. Examples include “fiscally redistribute by giving international food aid” or “by supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia.”
2. Justifies Extra T — voting issue because teams add planks to escape neg ground.
3. Causes Aff Conditionality — teams reclarify the mechanism after we read topicality, making being neg impossible. Neg can never get links to disads or competition for counterplans in the 1NC.
4. Default to Solvency Advocates — that’s a clear and predictable standard. No Offense — they get complete editorial control of their 1AC.
5. Vote Neg on Presumption — they’ve haven’t read a solvency advocate for funding BIG — their only evidence says redistribute welfare, which is anti-topical.
They Say: “Our Transfer Meets — Ignore the Funding”
Taxed and transfers are intertwined – otherwise not possible to assess the effects of a transfer.
N. Gregory Mankiw ’19, October 18, “How to Increase Taxes on the Rich (If You Must)” Essay for Combating Inequality, edited by Olivier Blanchard and Dani Rodrik, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/how_to_increase_taxes_on_the_rich_amended_feb2020.pdf
The second lesson from this example is how misleading it can be to focus on taxes and transfers separately. It is accurate to say that Plan A has lower taxes, more progressive taxes, and more progressive transfers. But so what? Those facts do not stop it from being precisely equivalent to plan B. The equivalence is clear only when taxes and transfers are considered together.
Must consider the net effect — Fiscal Redistribution requires that transfers be more progressive than taxes.
Coady and D’Angelo 19 — Coady IMF, fiscal affairs department, head of expenditure policy division et al., 19 (David, Devin D’Angelo, IMF, Research Analyst, Brooks Evans, IMF, Senior Economist, February 2019, International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Redistribution and Social Welfare”, https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2019/WPIEA2019051.ashx, accessed 6-29-23, ED)
Fiscal progressivity is affected by both the progressivity of taxes (lower λT) and transfers (higher λM). Fiscal redistribution requires that transfers are more progressive than taxes, i.e. the social cost of transfers needs to be less than the social benefit of transfers. Figure 4 shows the variation in tax and transfer progressivity across countries. While, on average, taxes reduce fiscal redistribution by around 56 percent (the ratio of the social cost of taxes, λT, to the social cost of transfers, λM), there is very little systematic relationship between the two. In some countries, such as Ireland and Belgium, high transfer progressivity is reinforced by high tax progressivity. In others, such as Hungary and Poland, low transfer progressivity is reinforced by low tax progressivity. In the Netherlands and Belgium, high transfer progressivity is offset by low tax progressivity, whereas in Portugal and Cyprus low transfer progressivity is offset by high tax progressivity.
Fiscal Redistribution Means Taxes AND Transfers
1NC — T “Fiscal Redistribution” Means Taxes AND Transfers
The [first/next] off is T Fiscal Redistribution.
Interpretation — Fiscal redistribution requires BOTH taxing and spending.
Hicks 86 — Researcher, Northwestern University (Alexander Hicks, 1986, “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14)
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984

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