UBI Affirmative and Negative - Wave 1 - GDI 2023
UBI Affirmative and Negative - Wave 1 - GDI 2023.docx
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*** UBI *** AFF ***1AC Core*** 1AC Advantage – Inequality Rapid widespread labor automation is inevitable – basic income key to a smooth transition for anyone who depends on their job Kelly, RMIT University in Melbourne, ‘22 Kelly, Lauren. School of Media and Communication, RMIT University, Melbourne Australia, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism.” Journal of Sociology, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833221128999. October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR. Predicting the technological future of work is back on the academic agenda, exemplified by the swathe of influential literature published on the subject since the mid-2010s (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Kaplan, 2015; Schwab, 2016; Susskind & Susskind, 2015). While history has often been punctuated by concerns of technological job loss (Gorz, 1999; Keynes, 1930; Leontief & Duchin, 1986; Rifkin, 1995), it is now argued that this time it’s different due to advances in particular technologies – namely robotics, big data, and artificial intelligence. The rise of smart machines and automated decision-making technologies now threatens non-routine, professional, and even creative occupations that were, until recently, considered immune to automation. Assumptions of inevitable job loss are widespread and reproduced through the policy recommendations of international organisations, influential consultancy firms, and government white papers. Adherents of this view span the political spectrum – from Silicon Valley self-proclaimed futurists to the radical left. Where these perspectives differ is on the political question of what this means for labour. Techno-pessimists predict a dystopian future of technological unemployment, while techno-optimists argue that full automation can emancipate workers from the drudgery of work and create new possibilities for a post-work, or post-capitalist future. Regardless of political inclination, it is typically agreed that something akin to a UBI will be necessary to smooth the transition from wage-earning to incomes by other means. The techno-pessimist view declares a new era characterised by the ‘rise of the robots’, a ‘second machine age’, and ‘fourth industrial revolution’ is upon us. Here I do not attempt another review of this well-discussed literature (see Wajcman, 2017) but instead seek to emphasise the extent to which popular automation discourse rests upon one highly influential 2013 report by Frey and Osborne. Using a predictive algorithm, the authors claim as many as 47% of jobs in the United States are ‘at risk’ of automation in the next ten to twenty years (Frey & Osborne, 2013). The methodology has been criticised for conflating tasks with occupations (Arntz et al., 2016) and overlooking the capacity for automation to change occupations rather than eliminate them (Autor, 2015; Huws, 2014; Moore & Woodcock, 2021). Despite this, the report has become the cornerstone of evidence for much of the contemporary automation discourse (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). Wajcman argues that the endless citation of this study alongside the uncritical proliferation of its findings ‘is further proof of the pleasure – even pride – we take in the idea that a man-made, robot-worked utopia/dystopia is on its way’ (2017, p. 121). What is perhaps most striking about Frey and Osborne's methodology, and by extension much automation discourse, are the ‘additional factors which were left unaccounted for’ (Frey & Osborne, 2013, p. 42). These factors include the broader political economic context within which technology is implemented, the cost and availability of labour, levels of unionisation, regulatory constraints and, indeed, any social or political consequences of implementation (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). For these authors the effects of technological change are political, but the causes are not (Wajcman, 2017). The radical left's treatment of workplace automation follows much the same logic. Like the techno-pessimists, these theorists also tend to reify technology as a driver of history, but one that can usher in emancipatory potentials for a post-work, post-capitalist future. They agree this time it's different, but this holds a different political consequence for labour. These authors encourage more automation or even full automation coupled with a UBI to emancipate workers from the drudgery of work (Bastani, 2019; Srnicek & Williams, 2015). This vision includes shorter working weeks, the uncoupling of basic security from employment status, an end to the coercive wage labour relation, and a reconfiguration of the position of reproductive and social labour – often conceived of as ‘women's work’ – in society. UBI increases labor diversification Matt Zwolinski, associate professor of philosophy at the University of San Diego, September 28, 2015, “Our welfare system insults the poor. Basic income could do better.”The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/09/28/our-welfare-system-insults-the-poorbasic-income-could-do-better/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.21e916c5befc. Accessed 05/14/23. AR A basic income program that replaces in-kind transfers like food stamps or Medicaid with a simple, universal cash grant would not only provide more effective aid to the poor, it would provide that aid in a manner more consistent with the values of human dignity and responsibility. The efficiency argument on behalf of cash grants is straightforward: unlike in-kind benefits, people can use cash on whatever they need the most. If what they need is food, they can use the cash they’re given on groceries—and they’re no worse off than if they had received food stamps. But if what they need is something else—to pay their rent, or an overdue utility bill, or maybe even to save a little for the future—then cash is much better. As long as we assume that people know more (and care more) about their own needs than the government does, the case for cash over in-kind benefits is powerful. Cash is flexible. Cash is freedom. This isn’t just theory. There is a growing body of empirical evidence showing that the poor use the freedom cash provides to make real improvements in their lives. From the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil, to cash grants in Uganda and Mexico, we’ve seen that poor people who are given cash grants typically use the money responsibly: purchasing basic necessities and trying to generate sustainable streams of revenue. Those benefits often add up to real, long-term improvements in health and educational outcomes. Must adjust for automation or inequality will continue to rise Peter Dizikes- writer at the MIT News Office, ‘23 MIT Technology Review. Automation drives income inequality. https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/02/21/1067563/automation-drives-income-inequality/#:~:text=They%20concluded%20that%20since%201980,risen%20substantially%20during%20that%20period. February 21, 2023. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR. When you use self-checkout machines in supermarkets and drugstores, you are probably not—with all due respect—doing a better job of bagging your purchases than checkout clerks once did. But such automation lets employers cut spending on labor in a way that has contributed significantly to income inequality in the US. A new study coauthored by MIT economist Daron Acemoglu estimates just how much: replacing workers with technology “explains 50 to 70%” of the increase in inequality from 1980 to about 2016. Acemoglu and coauthor Pascual Restrepo, PhD ’16, looked at US Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics on the extent to which human labor was used in 49 industries from 1987 to 2016—as well as data on machinery and software adopted in that time—alongside Census Bureau metrics on worker outcomes for roughly 500 demographic subgroups, broken out by gender, education, age, race and ethnicity, and immigration status. They concluded that since 1980, automation has reduced the wages of men without a high school degree by 8.8% and women without a high school degree by 2.3%, adjusted for inflation. Incomes for people with college and postgraduate degrees have risen substantially during that period. Moreover, they say that although these specific innovations have been good for the corporate bottom line, they have not yielded much in the way of productivity gains that would improve overall quality of life. “These are controversial findings in the sense that they imply a much bigger effect for automation than anyone else has thought,” Acemoglu says. Automation driven inequality uniquely spurs techno-populism Hiebert, researcher @Center for International Governance Innovation, ‘22 Kyle Hiebert- professional researcher, editor and analyst with a Master's in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights from the University of Nottingham. Center for International Governance Innovation. Tech-Fuelled Inequality Could Catalyze Populism 2.0. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/tech-fuelled-inequality-could-catalyze-populism-20/. October 19, 2022. AR. Similar circumstances across the democratic world have provoked severe political consequences over the past decade. Disaffected populations caught on the wrong side of economic transformations and alienated by the accompanying social changes spurred by globalization have aligned themselves with populists pitching simplistic solutions to complex problems. Polarization has skyrocketed; international cooperation has frayed. As the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution accelerates in coming years, upending how economies and societies operate, a new form of populism rooted in tech-fuelled disparities may eventually consume democratic nations. To avoid this outcome, governments must get serious about harnessing new technologies to make the democratic process more agile and responsive to voters’ frustrations. The Coming Age of Disruptive Automation Since researchers at Oxford University published a landmark study in 2013 estimating that some 47 percent of total US employment was at risk of automation, fears over the prospect of mass displacements of human labour by new technologies have grown. They have also become more urgent in the wake of the pandemic. According to one assessment, the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 fast-tracked four years’ worth of digital adoption in business operations and supply chains, and seven years’ worth of investment into digital-based products. American academic Erik Brynjolfsson has noted that when it comes to technology’s job-creating potential, past trends are not necessarily guaranteed to play out in the future. “Improvements in technology can improve productivity. For most of the 20th century, those productivity increases were associated with job growth and growing wages. But there is no economic law saying that always has to be the case.” That seems to hold true when looking at the six largest tech companies in the world — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Tesla and Meta. As of early October, with a combined market valuation of nearly $8 trillion — a bit less than half the GDP of China, the world’s second-largest economy — they collectively employed just 2.25 million people, significantly less than the US federal government. And at least 1.5 million of that total comes from Amazon, which launched an ill-fated pandemic hiring binge and has routinely come under fire for poor working conditions for its staff. When it comes to digital products being created by tech companies, Beijing-based venture capitalist Kai-Fu Lee predicted in 2017 that AI would replace half of all human labour before 2030. That same year, a report by the McKinsey Global Institute appeared to corroborate Lee’s ominous forecast. After analyzing 2,000 different work responsibilities across 800 different job roles, McKinsey suggested “about half the activities people are paid almost US$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology.” While only five percent of the occupations analyzed by McKinsey could, in theory, disappear entirely, technological progress has accelerated. Clearly, some jobs are in greater jeopardy than others. The positions most susceptible to automation are based on physical activities in highly structured and predictable environments, or the collection and processing of data, say the report’s authors. Among those most vulnerable are low-skilled positions in manufacturing, hospitality and retail commerce. The report claims that “technical, economic and social factors will determine the pace and extent of automation,” but that half of contemporary work activity could be automated by 2055, possibly even as soon as 2035. Others offer a more upbeat assessment, saying AI and automation will create more jobs than they threaten by producing future occupations yet to be imagined. Analysis published in October 2020 by the World Economic Forum — several months after the pandemic was declared, once companies had had time to evaluate the need and opportunities for increased automation — predicted that by 2025, “a shift in the division of labour between humans and machines” might eliminate 85 million jobs, while also creating 97 million new ones. Such positions would see work functions split more evenly between humans, machines and algorithms; machines would handle more physical tasks while algorithms could simplify and augment human-based inputs and decision-making processes. However, while 12 million net new jobs sounds positive, context is important. Ensuring that workers displaced by technology can avoid joblessness by transitioning to new roles will require re-skilling on an enormous scale, at a considerable cost and in an ever-shrinking window of time. For comparison, governments have so far mostly failed in producing credible plans for a “just transition” for a much smaller and more predictable number of fossil fuel workers poised to lose out as the world shifts to alternative energy sources. A decrease in human labour’s share of work responsibilities could also suppress wage growth. Another sector ripe for disruption by automation is transportation, which accounts for approximately 29 workers per 1,000 people in the European Union. Trucking could be hit particularly hard, affecting more than 2.2 million drivers in the United States and hundreds of thousands of workers in Canada. Self-driving vehicles in the freight industry are already being road-tested, with proponents saying autonomous trucks will not only be safer but also reduce shipping operator costs by 40 percent due to not having to hire a human driver. The vast majority of those human drivers, according to labour market research company Zippia, are white males over 48 years old with lower levels of education. Truck-driving is also the highest-paid “low-skilled” large labour segment remaining in the North American economy. Elsewhere, large AI language models, systems that understand and generate text, will eventually compete for millions of low-skilled jobs involving a range of customer support services. Existing models can already provide strikingly accurate and original responses to human interaction — so much so that Google researcher Blake Lemoine caused widespread alarm this past June by claiming that a chatbot based on Google’s LaMDA model had become sentient. Lemoine was later let go by the company. The capabilities of LaMDA and its rivals, such as OpenAI’s GPT-3 — which wrote an op-ed for The Guardian in September 2020 — and Meta’s free version, OPT-175B, will expand exponentially as they incorporate audiovisual material into their data training sets. Right now, these training sets consist only of huge troves of text scoured from across the internet. Moreover, user-friendly machine-learning models such as OpenAI’s Dall-E and those from Midjourney AI are producing increasingly sophisticated computer-generated art and illustrations, while others are generating music. Both will likely eliminate career opportunities in the creative industries. The impacts of technology will also upset social relations in other ways that can exacerbate culture wars and grievance politics. For example, cloud computing and better virtual reality for use in business meetings will provide white-collar workers with ever-greater job flexibility, just as climate change renders blue-collar jobs much more dangerous. This may entrench the sort of contentious digital divide and risk imbalance experienced between office staff and front-line workers during the pandemic. Meanwhile, consumer biotechnology will enable the well-educated and wealthy to live longer, healthier lives that will extend their working careers, possibly narrowing opportunities for young people and new graduates. At the same time, wider adoption of pre-crime and predictive policing tools could aggravate the discrimination and stigmatization already felt within disadvantaged communities. Policies that successfully attract tens of thousands of skilled immigrants to plug labour gaps in the tech sector could inflate local housing prices. Many thinkers are also already confronting questions about when and how — not if — intelligent machines could be granted some equivalent to human rights. In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari extrapolates even further. He posits that if this century’s technological advances — and the quasi-religious zeal attached to those gains — mean citizens in liberal democracies eventually cede much of their military and economic usefulness to robots and algorithms, the political system “will stop attaching much value to them.” The result, according to Harari, would be an erosion of the core liberal belief that each human, as an individual, holds intrinsic value and deserves to exercise choice through democratic elections and free markets. Should these scenarios come true, they are likely to worsen the already growing bifurcation within democratic politics — a split between those who believe in open economies and societies, and those seeking primacy for their chosen social and political tribes. The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Populism Reinvented The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Everywhere, their base of support is comprised of voters demanding retribution against an undefined set of “elites” perceived as clinging unfairly to the top of the socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, the meritocracy and promise of social mobility that have historically underpinned liberal democracies seem to be faltering. In 2017, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Peter Temin laid out an argument that escaping poverty in America takes 20 years of effort combined with uninterrupted good luck. Income inequality among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development prior to the pandemic was already at its highest levels in five decades, much of it due to the disappearance of middle-class job opportunities. More recently, a report from the UN Development Programme released in September warned that “in a stunning first,” cascading global crises had so impacted life expectancies, education levels and quality of life worldwide that its Human Development Index — a broad country-by-country measurement of human progress — had declined for two years in a row, a change equivalent to “erasing the gains of the preceding five years.” The latest annual World Inequality Report, produced by the Paris-based World Inequality Lab, sheds light on where these losses are being felt (and perceived)
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