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2023 GDI Affirmative

Green New Deal Affirmative - GDI 2023

Green New Deal Affirmative - GDI 2023.docx

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AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023
1AC
Plan
Option 1: GND job guarantee
The United States federal government should substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by adopting the Green New Deal’s federal jobs guarantee.
Option 2: job guarantee language of the GND
The United States federal government should substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States.
Advantage 1: Labor
Low pay, attacks on unionization, and insecure positions situate half of the workforce on the brink of poverty.
Institute for Policy Studies ‘20
[staff, “Green Jobs and a Just Transition for Workers and Communities,” Institute for Policy Studies, 6—20, https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/No-Warming-No-War_06-Green-Jobs-and-Just-Transition.pdf, accessed 4-9-23]
While official estimates are known to be too low, the Bureau of Labor Statistics counted about six million people as unemployed and actively seeking work in 2019—a figure now rendered obsolete by the coronavirus crisis, but indicative of our economy under “good” circumstances.96 This figure does not include all working age people who are unemployed and more comprehensive methods of calculating unemployment often double the standard unemployment rate.
Even in the best of times, unemployment rates also vary drastically by geography, race, and age; rural workers, Black workers, Latinx workers, and young people all have higher than average rates of unemployment. In normal times, forty percent of the U.S. workforce is employed in insecure positions, such as temporary, part-time, and “on-call” workers, contractors, and the self-employed. 97 While employment statistics can help illustrate the economic crisis, they can also minimize the lived-realities for the tens of millions of people living in poverty in the United States. In the richest country in the world, even prior to the coronavirus pandemic and its associated economic implosion, there were 140 million poor and low-wealth people. That’s over 43% of the population of the United States. Low pay, job scarcity or inaccessibility, and attacks on unionization work together to keep people in poverty.
Unemployment is a deadly policy choice – impacts cascade across communities and create inescapable cycles of inequality.
Tcherneva, Bard Economics Associate professor, ‘20
[Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Associate Professor, Economics, Bard College, THE CASE FOR A JOB GUARANTEE, Polity Press, Medford MA, 2020, epub]
Unemployment is Expensive
Just like we do not talk about the “optimal level” of homelessness or illiteracy, the notion of “optimal unemployment” would not survive long if economists took full account of its social and economic costs. A wealth of research from psychology, the cognitive sciences, and public health indicates that the costs of unemployment, poorly paid employment, unstable and erratic employment, and involuntary part-time employment are simply staggering. This suggests that we should think of unemployment and precarious employment as a disease – at once vicious, chronic, and deadly.
What one will not see by looking at the official numbers is that unemployment spreads like a virus. To get a sense of how it moves, it is useful to observe an animated geographical map of unemployment over time.17 The first thing one notices is that persistent joblessness (often in the double digits even during economic booms) does not just plague the Rust Belt and the Appalachian Mountains, but also affects countless communities from the Sierra Nevada to the Colorado Plains, the Coast Ranges, and the Deep South.
The second notable feature is that unemployment presents an unmistakable contagion effect. Imagine throwing a pebble into water – the initial shock creates ripples that move further and further away. This is what happens with unemployment. When recessions hit, mass layoffs in distressed areas spread and multiply like a disease from community to community. The loss of income and jobs causes those who have been laid off to drastically reduce their spending, which impacts neighboring businesses, who respond in turn by laying off other workers. And on and on it goes. In a sense, one unemployed person throws another one out of work. Unemployment spreads like a disease in recessions, while in expansions it lingers in the epicenters of these outbreaks, creating chronic economic distress. Figure 4 gives a snapshot of the situation after the Great Recession, showing double-digit unemployment rates across the country well into the recovery, something one cannot see by looking only at the official aggregate unemployment statistics.
The metaphor of a deadly epidemic is apt. Without slipping into hyperbole, unemployment is literally deadly. Widely cited research by Case and Deaton18 found that increased mortality among working-class white men has been driven by “deaths of despair” resulting from the pain, distress, and social dysfunction following the loss of stable bluecollar work that began in the 1970s and continued well after the Great Recession. Economic insecurity and unemployment in particular have produced complex socioeconomic and health problems that have contributed to the rise in mortality, but the link between unemployment and dying is even more direct.
A metadata analysis of sixty-three countries found that one in five suicides are due to unemployment – an impact that is nine times higher than previously believed.19 Another panel study of twenty-five OECD countries supports these findings.20 Stuckler and Basu similarly find that, since the Great Recession, areas with higher unemployment rates experience higher suicide rates.21 Other research reports that long-term unemployment is associated with higher mortality twenty years after the spell of unemployment.22 For survivors and their families, unemployment is extremely costly. But it brings large costs to the wider economy as well.
The unemployed suffer a permanent loss of lifetime earnings23 and incur significant health costs – they are sicker, make more trips to the doctor, and spend more on medication. They have higher rates of alcoholism, physical illness, depression, and anxiety.24 This is the case around the world as well, according to a metadata study that examined several variables of mental health, including mixed symptoms of distress, depression, anxiety, psychosomatic symptoms, subjective wellbeing, and self esteem.25 All of these combined and complex health effects create a vicious cycle that makes it harder for unemployed people to reenter the labor market.26
Joblessness, it turns out, is its own catch-22 – creating the difficult personal and health conditions that prevent a person from escaping it. This paradox is made worse by the fact that unemployment drastically and permanently reduces a person’s social capital and participation,27 cutting them off from social networks and relations that are, for many, the bridge to re-employment. The isolation that unemployment brings is compounded by other well-documented scarring effects, such as a permanent decline in wellbeing, which linger even after a person has been reemployed. One study found that, of the total costs of unemployment, the nonmonetary costs are between 85 and 93 percent, overwhelming the costs of a permanent loss of income.28 This suggests that policies which mainly focus on providing income to the unemployed would be inadequate.
It should not come as a surprise – though it is altogether ignored by the research on the “natural rate” – that unemployment harms not just those who have lost their jobs but also their families. Unemployment is among the causes of malnutrition, growth stunting, mental health problems, poor educational and labor market outcomes, and reduced social mobility of spouses and children.29 In the US, children experience the highest poverty rate and 80 percent of poor children live in a family without a working adult.
Unemployment contributes to the entrenched urban blight and economic destitution in many communities and is a factor in violent and property crimes.30 Youth unemployment, crime, and right-wing extremism are strongly correlated.31 Globally, many countries are experiencing obstinate depression levels of youth unemployment – a ticking time bomb of social problems.32 In the US, unemployment among formerly incarcerated individuals is more than five times the national rate, higher than in the worst years of the Great
Depression, while unemployment is a major factor in recidivism.33
Beyond the personal costs, there are also broader macroeconomic impacts of unemployment. It increases the general level of income inequality in most countries,34 and produces social exclusion that exacerbates interracial and interethnic tensions.35 It has a negative impact on technological change, innovation, and output, and is a contributing factor to financial crises and economic instability,36 as well as to social and political instability, human trafficking, forced and child labor, exploitation, and slavery.
As if that were not enough, unemployment also depresses economic growth. In the midst of the Great Recession, according to one estimate, the US economy lost $10 billion of output each day as a result of high levels of unemployment.37 (For comparison purposes, this amount is equivalent to the annual budget of the Environmental Protection Agency for 2016.) Even at the peak of the expansion in 2007, when unemployment was relatively low, the daily GDP loss from unemployment was around $500 million.
In other words, we give up millions of dollars of goods and services every day, while carrying the enormous personal, social, and economic costs of unemployment, because we have accepted it as natural, unavoidable, and necessary.
Unemployment is already paid for. We forfeit the social and economic value we could generate by eradicating it, while carrying its real and financial costs. It is a global problem with global implications. It is a cancer – linked to the gradual ruin of communities, the collapse of the social fabric, the opioid epidemic, poor child health and education outcomes, overcrowded prisons, mental and health deterioration, to name just a few of its overwhelming effects. These are unnecessary costs. Most of them could be avoided with a program that guarantees a basic living-wage job to all.
Economic inequality erodes institutional capacity---causes extinction.
Andreas T. Schmidt & Daan Juijn 21. Associate Professor of Political Theory at the Faculty of Philosophy and the PPE Centre at the University of Groningen. Researcher/consultant within the Economics department at CE Delft, an independent research and consultancy organization. “Economic inequality and the long-term future.” May 2021. GPI Working Paper. https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf
It is often argued that a country’s long-term performance depends to a significant extent on the quality of its institutions, including its political and legal institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). Economic research mostly focuses on explaining long-term differences in growth rates. As seen above, some researchers argue that high inequality will reduce growth rates, among other things, because it can worsen institutional quality. However, besides facilitating economic growth, public institutions have other functions that matter from a long-term perspective. For example, disaster preparedness, education, public health, foreign policy, science policy, and many other areas could influence long-term trajectories. If such things go badly, they could increase existential risk. Conversely, good institutions will help reduce existential risk. For many existential risk reduction strategies likely require public goods and collective action, which in turn require good public institutions (among other reasons, because some such public goods are unlikely to be provided by markets). So, it seems reasonable to assume that, with most other societal goals, good institutions can help deliver existential risk reduction. Here is a cheesy analogy: targeted actions like washing your hands regularly or getting a flu shot can reduce your risk of dying from an infection. But you will also do well investing in a strong immune system, as that is an ‘all-purpose goods’ in lowering your risk of dying from any bacterium or virus. Investing in good institutions might similarly be an all-purpose-good: rather than tackling individual sources of existential risk directly, we improve conditions for tackling whatever existential risks may come our way. There are at least two reasons why higher inequality could decrease institutional capacities for longtermist public goods. First, there is some direct evidence that, whatever the causal pathway, inequality reduces institutional quality (which in turn typically leads to more inequality) (Chong and Gradstein 2007; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Second, high inequality can lead to elite capture. Empirical work on studying political and de facto legal power is difficult, yet there is a growing consensus that high levels of inequality can lead to elite capture and thereby reduce the long-term quality of legal and political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; 2013; Bartels 2018; Bavel 2016; Chong and Gradstein 2007; Cummins and Rodriguez 2010; Savoia, Easaw, and McKay 2010). Further, if institutions are disproportionately geared towards elite interests, then they might be less likely to be geared towards positive longterm trajectories. We might see more rent-seeking and less investment in public goods. Moreover, if elite capture is strong enough, such capture, and the potential inequality that comes with it, can intensify going forward (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Now, one might object and wonder whether elite interests and longtermist interests will necessarily be misaligned. Could an enlightened elite not even be more longtermist than a more democratic system? Here are two potential arguments. First, wealthy donors fund a significant part of research and direct action on existential risk and longtermism (the Open Philanthropy Project, for example). Indirectly, inequality might thus reduce existential risk through such funding. Second, rich people might have a lower rate of pure time preference than less well-off people, which would make them more naturally aligned with investing in long-term causes. In response to the first argument, remember we here focus on income inequality reductions. Private funding only requires ‘enough’ wealth inequality going forward, it need not require elite capture. And reducing income inequality is unlikely to eradicate the required wealth inequality and the existence of big donors. In response to the second argument, we are somewhat sceptical that elite capture would translate a lower impatience rate into longtermist strategies in policy. A successful 14 transmission would require influence to be systematic and well-coordinated across time and, probably, across different elite actors. Yet lobbying and elite influence must often capitalise on shorter windows of opportunities, which makes well-coordinated intertemporal, and positive longtermist, policy capture less likely. Of course, such considerations are speculative. But, in any case, we think that, on balance, there are stronger reasons to believe elite capture would increase – rather than decrease – existential risk. First, elite capture often comes with rent seeking, which lowers institutional quality (Chong and Gradstein 2007). Second, industries like oil, gas, weapons and others are often concentrated and well organised in exerting influence in law and legislation. Their interests and influence overall are likely to be more short-term than longtermist. Third, recent decades have seen a shift towards a stronger shareholder value orientation in corporate governance. A common criticism of this shift is that it incentivises more short-term decisions. Accordingly, corporate influence into public institutions will likely display short-termist bias too. Finally, we can of course imagine that ‘prolongtermist elite capture’ could happen and gamble on that possibility. However, if strong democratic and legal oversight and the power to check elite influence is lost, we might struggle to reverse our gamble. Second, high inequality is likely to reduce social capital and trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Social capital and trust in public institutions in turn are important for effective public goods provision (Knack and Keefer 1997; Beugelsdijk, Groot, and Schaik 2004). Effective public goods provision, in turn, is important for (some) effective measures to reduce existential risk (and, more generally, to coordinate towards more valuable long-term trajectories). Therefore, high inequality could reduce societies’ capacities to effectively respond to large-scale challenges like existential risk. Finally, some limited direct evidence suggests societies with higher social capital and lower inequality exhibit better preventive and adaptive outcomes for environmental risks and can show greater resilience to external shocks (Bavel and Curtis 2019; Kahn 2005). For example, Matthew Kahn provides some evidence that more equal countries, when controlled for GDP, have significantly lower death rates in natural catastrophes (Kahn 2005). While smaller natural catastrophes are different from global catastrophic risk scenarios, resilience in such events might be somewhat indicative of societies’ resilience to catastrophic risks. So, good social and institutional conditions could help reduce existential risk. Consider next how, conversely, bad conditions might increase existential risk. A key driver of existential risk is conflict, both between and within nation-states (or what (Ord 2020, 175–79) calls a ‘risk factor’). Conflicts and arms races raise human-induced existential risks such as nuclear war, the outbreak of a bioengineered virus or the launch of misaligned artificial intelligence. Note that an existential catastrophe could be set in motion either purposefully or accidentally. Both are more likely during conflict. Nuclear warheads, cyberweapons, and bioweapons could all be used purposefully to attack enemy states, leading to potential global escalation. But as past nuclear incidents and close calls during the Cold War show, arms races also increase the probability of accidental catastrophes (Schlosser 2013). Esteban and Schneider find that formal and empirical evidence suggests that political and social polarization increases the risk of violent conflict, both intra-nationally and internationally (Esteban and Schneider 2008). If income inequality increases polarization, inequality may indirectly drive existential risk. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that income inequality can increase the degree of polarization between groups of citizens. Bonica et al. find that the degree of polarization within the US House of Representatives, for example, is accurately tracked by domestic income inequality, with correlation coefficients rising up to 0.95 depending on the chosen time-period (Bonica et al. 2013, 105–8). Of course, correlation does not imply causation and the correlation is likely at least partially the result of reverse causation or a confounding variable. That said, we should assign a non-negligible credence to inequality partially causing polarization. Moreover, inequality and polarisation might also play some role in getting polarising and populist candidates elected (Piketty 2018). In a preliminary analysis of US election data, Darvas and Efstathiou find that more unequal states were mo

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