Universalism Bad Kritik - GDI 2023
Universalism Bad Kritik - GDI 2023.docx
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Universalism Neg Universalism Bad 1nc Universal social protections obscure the role of historical and contemporary racism in creating wealth inequalities. The alternative is to endorse an ethics of distribution that prioritizes reparative justice. Klein, ANU Canberra Public Policy Lecturer & Fouksman, King’s College Social Justice Lecturer, 22 [Edward & Elizaveta, 11/21/2021, Development and Change, Volume 53, Issue 1, January “Reparations as a Rightful Share: From Universalism to Redress in Distributive Justice] https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12695 07/02/2023, Accessed 7/16/23 RM] Universalism has long been a cornerstone of claims to both resources and rights. Such claims range from the universal in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to more recent interest in universal social protection floors, universal health care and universal basic income within international development and social policy debates. Many of these claims for universalism, such as for human rights, are based on long-standing philosophical conceptions of a fundamental, universal and shared humanness. Others, such as that for universal social protection floors and universal basic income (UBI),1 are based not only on the administrative efficiency and political expediency of universal policy, but also on a long tradition of justice-based arguments around the universal nature of collective and historical wealth creation (Kropotkin, 1892/1955; Paine, 1796; Sloman, 2016). Indeed, though universal social protection in the form of guaranteed income or unconditional direct cash transfers has garnered increasing appeal as a social policy intervention around the globe,2 there has also been a revival of interest in the justice-based and rights-based case for universal and unconditional access to a share of national or global wealth (Fouksman and Klein, 2019). Rights-based and distributory justice-based claims to universal payments have a long history, ranging from Thomas Paine's ‘universal inheritance’ (1796), meant to rectify the unjust distribution of land, through T.H. Marshall's (1950, 1963) writing about the right to economic security as a key part of full social citizenship, and extending to Guy Standing's proposal for a universal basic income framed as a ‘commons dividend’ (Standing, 2019). Within the field of international development, James Ferguson has argued that the rising popularity of cash transfers as a social policy tool in the majority world3 heralds a larger political shift. Ferguson terms this shift ‘a new politics of distribution’ — a politics in which people demand universal basic income as a share of collectively and historically created wealth (Ferguson, 2015), and make such demands on the basis of nothing more than physical presence (rather than contribution, or even citizenship) (Ferguson, 2021). In other words, ‘the entire production apparatus must be treated as a single, common inheritance’ (Ferguson, 2015: 186) — ‘a rightful share’. Such framings all underscore that wealth in society is largely collectively generated, and that as such all residents have a right to a share in that wealth — in particular both the wealth created by previous generations, and the benefit of commons such as natural resources. This socially generated wealth must thus be shared universally. An emphasis on universal demands for a right to a share of collective production underscores the inherent structural injustices of wealth accumulation within capitalism. And though many universal basic income demands are national in scale, some theorists of universal distribution have contended with the global injustices of capitalism (and its history) by envisioning a global universal redistributory system. For instance, Ayelet Shachar (2009) has proposed the birthright privilege levy (a redistributive tax on people lucky enough to be born in rich countries that would aid those born in less affluent nations), and Philippe Van Parijs (2007) has made the case for global distributive justice, such as a global basic income, based on the coercive and restricting effect of national borders. Yet the very universality of rightful share demands can still obscure what Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2009) refers to as the ‘race war of modernity’: the way historical and contemporary racism and coloniality lead to economic inequalities and insecurity. This is what David Harvey (2004), drawing on Marx's primitive accumulation, terms accumulation by dispossession (see also Coulthard, 2013). This relationship is made clear by the scholarship around ‘racial capitalism’ (Robinson, 1983), which shows that a core structural aspect of capitalism is differentiation via racial categories as the basis for exploitation and dispossession. Thus, while grappling with current inequalities, proposals for global universal redistributory systems still do not explicitly address both the historical and the ongoing injustices of the racialized nature of capitalism. Another set of distributional claims, known as reparations, do seek to directly address the ongoing legacy of racial violence, slavery, genocide and colonialism. There are examples of reparations being made for such acts. For instance, in 2003 the British government made a payment of over £ 20 million in reparations to more than 5,000 survivors of the Mau Mau rebellion (Balint, 2016). After World War II, Germany was ordered to pay reparations for the Holocaust to Polish and Jewish survivors (Kelley, 2002). In 1989, the US was ordered to pay over US$ 1.2 billion to Japanese-American survivors of internment by the US government during World War II (Campbell, 2009). More recently, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal issued a decision that the Canadian federal government pay CA$ 40,000 per child impacted by the country's residential schools, totalling over CA$ 2 billion (Cultural Survival, n.d.).4And in 2021, Germany offered Namibia € 1.1 billion in development aid as a gesture of reconciliation for the Herero-Nama genocide (Oltermann, 2021). While in practice reparations have been largely administered in relation to concrete collective claims for monetary redress recognized by the state and judiciary (as in the examples above), reparations can also be integrated into larger redistributive systems in order to change unjust social and economic structures while providing an avenue for recognition and truth telling (Rubio-Marin, 2009). This is particularly vital because structures put in place during colonialism and slavery continue to pattern local and global societies and economies. For instance, racism which evolved during British colonization, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, slavery and Jim Crow laws, has shaped and continues to shape racist norms, laws and policies underpinning the US economy and society (Darity and Mullen, 2020). In her ethnography of Jamaica, Deborah Thomas (2011) sees reparations as more than monetary or procedural, and calls for a structural framing of distributional claims. This shifts reparations away from purely economic justice, and towards variegated forms of redistribution plus recognition, in line with what Thomas calls a ‘reparations framework for thinking’. Such a reparations framework for thinking compels a refocusing on how ‘the current structural inequalities have emerged and persist as a result of real and codified institutional discrimination rather than because of cultural “deviation” and “dysfunctions”’ (Thomas, 2011: 6). Thomas explores the links between contemporary economic inequality in Jamaica and slavery, for instance in the way provisioning practices by slave owners are linked to contemporary politics, or the way slavery's effects on family structures underpin culturalist views of poverty or violence. The key to a reparations way of thinking is the recognition of the continuity of historical and contemporary structures of oppression. A reparations way of thinking can thus enable demands for both recognition and monetary redistribution alongside structural reform. This article places calls for redistributory and reparatory justice in dialogue, tracing points of overlap and friction. In particular, we juxtapose justice-based claims for the universal distribution of wealth generated by previous generations or via collective resources with claims for redress for the ways in which such wealth creation dispossessed and oppressed certain groups. Placing proposals for a universal rightful share based on claims of distributory justice within a reparations framework leads us to consider whether (re)distribution can be both universal and reparative of specific historical wrongs. In so doing, we also explore whether distributory justice can be rightful without being reparative of specific historical wrongs, asking if historical and ongoing racialized violence can be adequately addressed by focusing purely on class-based economic redistribution, which is often the main concern of distributional claims. This article thus examines reparations as another form of distributive claim making, alongside — and sometimes in tension with — claims to universal redistribution of collective wealth. We do so via case studies of three forms of reparatory claims: reparations for slavery, for colonialism, and for the ongoing harms of settler colonialism. Through these specific cases for reparations, we consider whether reparations must form a part of any claims to what is rightful — and if so, whether universal redistributory schemes, such as basic income, can speak to reparative demands. Within these case studies, we focus on three broad themes: the intersection of race, class and capitalism; the limits of nation state boundaries for redress; and the importance of both symbolic and material recognition. We argue that providing avenues of recognition and redress of historical and ongoing injustice is an essential part of constructing claims to rightful shares of collective wealth — and thus that reparative justice is a key part of distributive justice. Links Universalism Bad- Exclusive Citizenship Rights Universal social policies are based in limited notions of citizenship that exclude the undocumented and formerly incarcerated. Klein, ANU Canberra Public Policy Lecturer & Fouksman, King’s College Social Justice Lecturer, 22 [Edward & Elizaveta, 11/21/2021, Development and Change, Volume 53, Issue 1, January “Reparations as a Rightful Share: From Universalism to Redress in Distributive Justice] https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12695 Accessed 7/2/2023, PE] However, Warren goes on to acknowledge the limitations of the universality of basic income when understood as reparations. He points out that all too often, nominally universal policies exclude minorities, for instance by excluding formerly incarcerated populations. Yet even if a universal basic income were to be designed to be truly universal, Warren wonders if a UBI is simultaneously too broad and too narrow to address issues of racial injustice in a post-slavery society. It might be too broad in its universality — its net beneficiaries would be anyone below a set income level,8 which would include those that might be economically disadvantaged, but do not face racial discrimination and the injustices of living in a post-slavery society. Warren also worries that a universal basic income would allow the US to evade the question of direct investment in Black communities. In many ways, this point mirrors the feminist debates around basic income. While some feminist UBI advocates argue that a UBI would disproportionately benefit women and those engaged in unpaid care, others point out that it would also support men who chose to ignore or evade care work responsibilities, and make the case that there should be either special or additional support for carers.9 At the same time, Warren argues that a UBI's benefits could be too narrow because of its typical focus on citizenship rights. As he points out, many UBI models propose that the income goes to all of a country's citizens. However, what happens to immigrants who are not citizens, including immigrants who face racial discrimination? And what about incarcerated populations, who are frequently deprived of some citizenship benefits (such as voting rights)? Yet while Warren is correct that many UBI proposals have traditionally focused on citizens, this has recently shifted. James Ferguson's work on rightful shares has made the case that a universal payment should be disbursed not on the basis of citizenship, but rather on presence (or, to put it more practically, residence) within a nation state (Ferguson, 2021). Yang’s campaign proves- demands for universalism are easily coopted for racist ends- UBI attracts white nationalist support by excluding non-citizens. Breland, Internet disinformation reporter, 19 [Ali, writing on technology, race, politics, etc, appeared in The Guardian, Vice and on NPR and CNN’s websites. “Here’s Why Andrew Yang’s Alt-Right Supporters Think He’s the 2020 Candidate for White Nationalists” Mother Jones, April 10, www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/04/andrew-yang-4chan-alt-right/ Accessed 7-16-23 ]-grh Yang has also attracted a diverse and sometimes chaotic group of adherents. Beyond the centrist Democrats and Silicon Valley liberals Yang has wooed through traditional campaigning, he’s garnered support among white nationalists, self-described white identitarians, and white supremacists. The groups either mildly disagree with the others or outright hate them. “Messy is an understatement,” said Louis, pointing to one 4chan thread where white supremacists and white nationalists viciously debated whether Yang’s politics had the potential to start a “white revolution.” The dynamics are convoluted and have left many observers and potential Yang allies confused. In a video about Yang supporters, for example, Infowars’ Millie Weaver inaccurately described a Yang Gang Discord as a “leftist troll farm,” despite the members of the group politically aligning much closer to Infowars‘ own Alex Jones and his right-wing brand of conspiracy politics. For all the infighting, there seem to be two areas where Yang’s fringe internet supporters align—in what they see as his nods to white identity politics, which they interpret as his openness to white nationalism, and his plan for universal basic income, which they frame as a tool for white nationalism. To Louis and other alt-right Yang supporters, his UBI plan would not only help people who are suffering economically, but since it would only go to citizens, they excitedly claim it could create a “digital border wall.” Critics of Yang’s UBI plan have noted it could increase inflation, but to Louis and others, that’s another bonus: If everything costs more and only American citizens have access to UBI, then undocumented immigrants will have less economic incentive to come to the United States. UBI support decreases when applied to immigrants – backlash and racist implementations -- empirics Bay and Pederson 2006 [Ann-Helén and Axel W, December 2006, Acta Sociologica, “The Limits of Social Solidarity: Basic Income, Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State https://www.jstor.org/stable/20459958, July 3 2023, ah] The application of our persuasion experiment suggests, however, that part of this coalition is rather frail. By simply pointing out that an unconditional basic income will include non citizens living in Norway, many initial supporters are persuaded to change their mind. In addition, a group of initial opponents of basic income are willing to consider such a scheme if it can be withheld from non-citizens. In other words, the high degree of social solidarity that could motivate support for a basic income scheme does not necessarily encompass newly arrived immigrants and/or ethnic minority groups. Our study cannot give an answer as to why support for a basic income crumbles when respondents are presented with arguments of including immigrants. The literature on popular support for the welfare state suggests that at least two alternative mechanisms could be at work: (1) People distrust foreigners and suspect that they misuse generous welfare benefits. (2) Solidarity is undermined simply because the 'haves' will not share their resources with the 'have-nots' among the immigrants. It is up to future research to try and disentangle the relative importance of these alternative explanations. In any case, the analysis of the positions taken by the respondents after the persuasion experiment shows that the mobilization of immigration issues opens up a new front in the ideological battle over basic income. Proponents of a universal basic income scheme face a 432 two-front war, with one front against an individualistic, anti-egalitarian camp (the traditional right) and another against a more collectivistic, anti-immigration camp (a new populist right). We suspect that this is also a relevant scenario for political conflicts over the future of the Scandinavian welfare states. One possible strategy by which to adjust the Scandinavian welfare state to the harsh realities of mass immigration and ethnic heterogeneity would be to try to reduce the demand on social solidarity by abandoning redistributive universalism in favour of a stronger emphasis on income replacement and insurance principles. Another - very different strategy - would be to severely restrict immigration and move towards a two tier welfare state where the most accessible and generous benefits are withheld from newly arrived immigrants. While Swedish welfare policies can be seen to conform to the first strategy, the second is currently being actively pursued in Denmark (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2005). Of course, these need not be the only available alternatives. The point we want to make is merely that the conditions for mobilizing popular support for universalistic welfare policies have become more difficult than they were with relatively stable and homogeneous popu lations during the 'golden era' of welfare state expansion. Universalism Bad- Economic Nationalism Universalism abstracts notions of citizenship and the “common good” from particular histories of racial violence. We can only resist right-wing economic nationalism via an explicitly anti-racist politics. Casey, American Federation of Teachers Albert Shanker Institute Executive Director, 18 [Leo, Winter 2018, Dissent Magazine, “The Perils of Universalism” https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/perils-of-universalism-race-class-democracy-defense-identity-politics/ Accessed 7/03/2023, RM] Authoritarian efforts to diminish and degrade democratic citizenship are a central dimension of the crisis of democracy sweeping the globe. Such efforts include both the abrogation of particular rights of citizenship and the denial of citizenship itself to entire classes of people. Yet few on the left are approaching the current crisis in that way. Attention has been paid to attacks on particular rights of citizenship, such as voter suppression in the United States. But there is a failure to grapple with the broad dimensions and underlying logic of the offensive against democratic citizenship. Given the centrality of citizenship to the rule of the people, this failure ill prepares us to defend democracy. This offensive is not limited to attacks on citizenship in a general, undifferentiated way; it takes particular aim at the rights of “racialized” others. In the United States, these attacks target not only groups historically subjected to racial oppression, such as African Americans, but others who fall outside a narrowly circumscribed notion of what it is considered “American”—immigrants and refugees, ethnic groups such as Latinos, and those adhering to minority religious faiths such as Muslims. The machinery of racial oppression is now increasingly applied to all of these groups, citizens and non-citizens alike, with respect to th
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