Topicality Redistribution - Emory 2023
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Topicality – Redistribution 1NC 1NC – Topicality – Redistribution Interpretation—redistribution requires the transfer of wealth from high to low incomes. André Decoster and Guy Van Camp 98. Decoster has a PhD in economics from KU Leuven. Van Camp works for KU Leuven’s Center for Economic Studies, December 1998. “The Unit of Analysis in Microsimulation Models for Personel Income Taxes: Fiscal Unit or Household?”, Center for Economic Studies Discussion Paper Series DPS 98.33. https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/eteceswps/ces9833.htm If the main objective of the evaluation of a tax reform is to give empirical content to the redistributive effects of different tax systems before and after the reforms, a formal expression of the concept of redistribution is required. Redistribution is defined here as the shift of income which occurs in the post-tax distribution from high to low incomes. Hence, it can be measured by comparing the pre-tax Lorenz curve with the post-tax concentration curve. Our measure of redistributive effect is therefore defined as: ΠRS = 2∫01 [LX-T(p) – LX(p)]dp (2) where the superscript of ΠRS refers to Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) who applied this measure to the US tax system, and LX(p) = ∫0y xf(x)dx/μ 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and p = F(y) (3) LX-T(p) = ∫0y ( x-t(x))f(x)dx/μ(1 – t) 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 = p and p = F(y) (4) are, respectively, the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income (x) and the concentration curve with respect to pre-tax income of after-tax income (x – t(x)), with: p: the population shares of the pre-tax distribution f(x): the density function of x F(x): the distribution function of x μ: mean income (pre tax) t(x): the tax liability corresponding with taxable income x t: the average tax rate. Defining areas by: GX = 1 − 2∫01 LX(p)dp (5) CX-T = 1 − 2∫01 LX-T(p)dp (6) it is easily seen that the measure of redistribution ΠRS, can be rewritten as: ΠRS = GX – CX-T (7) where GX is of course the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and CX-T is the area between the diagonal and the concentration curve of post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income. The difference between the Lorenz curve of post-tax income, and the concentration curve of post-tax income is important, if there is reranking. Only in the absence of reranking, CX-T equals the Gini coefficient of the post-tax income distribution, and ΠRS can be interpreted as the reduction of the Gini coefficient. Violation—UBI results in the transfer of wealth from low- to high-income households. Juan Carlos Conesa et al. 20. Professor in the Department of Economics at Stony Brook University, with Bo Li who is affiliated with Peking University’s School of Economics and Qian Li who works at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics’ Institute for Advanced Research and the Chinese Ministry of Education’s Key Laboratory for Mathematical Economics (SUFE), 1-30-2020. “Universal Basic Income and Progressive Consumption Taxes”, Stony Brook University. https://www.sunysb.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2020/UBI_Ctax_2001.pdf In all these cases, capital shock falls with the exception of alternative 4, in which the elimination of income taxes encourages capital accumulation. All these policies stimulate labor supply, especially for the non-college group. There are two reasons for that. First, under the targeted transfer system of the benchmark these households receive an annual transfer as high as $4, 838, if they fall into the first quintile. However, UBI only pays them $2, 488 per year. This negative income effect drives low educated households to supply more labor. Second, since UBI is not income tested the distortion on labor supply at the bottom of the distribution is eliminated. In contrast, college educated households adjust their labor supply slightly, and in different directions depending on the different policy scenarios. Essentially, switching from targeted transfers to UBI results in a redistribution of income from low income households to high income ones. Non-college educated households experience substantial welfare losses in all policy alternatives (between 7.7 and 10.9 percent).6 College educated households also experience welfare losses in the first three cases. In contrast, eliminating income taxes while introducing substantially progressive consumption taxes generates the lowest welfare losses for non- college households and even some welfare gains for college households. However, these welfare gains are attributable to the elimination of income taxes rather than UBI per se.7 Prefer our interpretation— Limits – including universal policies explodes the topic to include any plan that’s economically beneficial in general rather than redistributive, making it impossible to prepare to be negative or have in-depth debates with clash. Ground – redistribution is key to the negative being able to access specific disadvantages and counterplans while still giving the aff options. UBI means we can’t access any offense based on how the aff determines eligibility and end up debating generics over and over again. Topicality is a voting issue—our standards are key to fairness and education. 2NC/1NR 2NC/1NR – Case list/TVA Our interpretation allows for any basic income program as long as eligibility is somehow connected to lower incomes. Basic income plans that target households based on factors correlated with low income and plans that use means-testing for eligibility are topical under our interpretation. David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le 20. Coady heads the Expenditure Policy division in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Fiscal Affairs Department and Le is an IMF researcher with a Master of Public Policy degree focused on Economic and Data Analysis, 6-26-2020. “Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers”, IMF Working Papers. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/06/26/Designing-Fiscal-Redistribution-The-Role-of-Universal-and-Targeted-Transfers-49502 The distinction between targeted and universal transfers relates to the former’s use of eligibility conditions (or “targeting” criteria) for receiving benefits. It is useful to distinguish between the following concepts: • Universal transfers. These are transfers that are available to everyone without any eligibility conditions (i.e., no targeting). For example, a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is typically defined as a uniform cash transfer, set at a level that covers basic needs, that every person is entitled to regardless of income or other conditions such as age, gender, or location.5 A transfer program under which every person gets a common (or uniform) transfer, not necessarily set to cover basic needs, is also an unconditional universal transfer. • Quasi-universal transfers. These are “categorical” transfers where eligibility is defined according to criteria that are typically viewed as being highly (although not perfectly) correlated with having low income.6 All households in a given “category” would receive a transfer regardless of income. For instance, households with children or elderly may be deemed more likely to be poor. Therefore, basing (“targeting”) eligibility for transfers on such criteria will result in poor households receiving a relatively high share of total transfers and thus have a bigger poverty impact compared to a universal transfer with the same transfer budget. • Means-tested transfers. These are benefits where eligibility is based on income (or “means”). This requires a capacity to define, measure and verify “means”. For instance, General Minimum Income (GMI) programs will typically base “means” on total household income and assets. The benefit for a household is then based on the gap between “means” and “needs”, where the latter reflects family composition and some concept of basic needs, and the transfer partially or fully closes this gap. 2NC/1NR – Ground Existing tests of fiscal redistribution programs have focused on targeted transfer programs, not UBI. This kills our ability to find quality evidence against UBI compared to topical basic income affs. World Bank 20. The World Bank, 2-4-2020. “Exploring Universal Basic Income: A Guide to Navigating Concepts, Evidence, and Practices”. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotection/publication/exploring-universal-basic-income-a-guide-to-navigating-concepts-evidence-and-practices) Currently, no country has a UBI in place, although there have been (and still are) several small-scale pilots and a few larger-scale experiences. Only two countries—Mongolia and the Islamic Republic of Iran—had a national UBI in place for a short period of time. The large majority of UBI pilots are variants of targeted schemes. For example, the proposal by Felman et al. (2019) on a “quasi-universal basic rural income” for India is simply a variant of a traditional guaranteed minimum income program. There are systemwide questions—around financing, inflation, linkages to pensions, relationship to minimum wages, and the political economy—that pilots cannot fully answer. A UBI is a program to be delivered in cash, unconditionally, and to everyone. Its design features—all in cash, no conditions, and no targeting—challenge current practices to varying degrees. 2NC/1NR – AT Reasonability Evaluate this debate based on competing interpretations. Reasonability requires the judge intervene based on their subjective view of the topic instead of evaluating the actual arguments in the round. They should be able to win that their standards are better for debate. They’re not reasonable—UBI is minimally redistributive. Melissa S. Kearney and Magne Mogstad 19. Kearney is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and Director of the Aspen Economic Strategy Group and Mogstad is the Gary Becker Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago, 8-23-2019. “Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a Policy Response to Current Challenges”, Aspen Institute Economic Strategy Group. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/UBI-ESG-Memo-082319.pdf First, on inequality and redistribution, a UBI is by design not ideal for redistributive purposes. For example, a UBI that paid $10,000 to every U.S. adult would cost about $2.5 trillion per year, well more than half the current federal annual budget. Furthermore, by giving money to everyone, there would be far fewer resources available to redistribute money and/or invest in the human capital of those with the most need. In calculations presented below, we show the practical trade-off between giving more money to a more targeted group of low-income individuals and less money to a more diffuse group including less needy individuals. We cite work by Hoynes and Rothstein ( 2019) documenting the loss of progressivity that would come from replacing our current system of transfer programs with a UBI. We further argue that programs that are universal do not accomplish as much in terms of generating social benefits as those that are targeted, citing evidence from examples such as child care and early childhood education programs. 2NC/1NR – AT No In-round Abuse Vote on potential abuse—this isn’t just a debate about whether we could have prepared for this round, but about the model of debate that the aff creates. Every untopical aff justified by their interpretation is a reason to vote neg.