Federalism DA - Emory 2023
Federalism DA - Emory 2023.docx
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ENDI 2023 - Federalism Disadvantage 1NC Shell Uniqueness - Fiscal federalism is stable now – the states and federal government have clear roles in fiscal redistribution, and states have a high level of autonomy Yıldız Özkök & İbrahim Çütcü, 21. *Ozkok is an economist and Research Assistant at Hasan Kalyoncu University. Dr. Cutcu is an Associate Professor at Hasan Kalyoncu University. “Does fiscal federalism matter for economic growth? Evidence from the United States,” Applied Economics (2021), 1-15. Taylor & Francis. Following the Great Depression in 1929, there was widespread government intervention into economic life, which prevailed until the 1970s. Accordingly, since the 1970s traditional public administration has weakened and been replaced by a more flexible, decentralized, autonomous, transparent, and accountable organizational structure called the New Public Administration approach. At this point, fiscal federalism became an important concept because it essentially means giving more responsibility and authority to subnational governments for their spending and revenue, namely increasing the autonomy of local governments. Moreover, He (2006) indicates that a degree of distribution in the fiscal responsibilities and tasks between different government levels exists generally for institutions and agencies that have been categorized by centrally-administered and locally-administered classification. These institutions or agencies are financially covered mainly by governments at different levels Although fiscal federalism was initially adopted in the Unites States of America (USA), later on this concept started to gain attention and has been used as a political campaign tool in many countries. It is assumed that fiscal federalism can improve the macroeconomic performance of a country by increasing the efficiency and performance of the public sector owing to the fact that local governments have better knowledge of the regional preferences and needs than the central government. The most fundamental principle of fiscal federalism is that when local governments decide on the type and quantity of local public goods it is better for the whole economy because local government units can be more responsible and accountable than central government while evaluating regional preferences (Aslim and Neyapti 2014). Fiscal federalism essentially means that the power to make fiscal decisions is placed with multi-level government units (Moges 2013). Fiscal federalism involves the transfer of authority from the national government to the states and local government units. Accordingly, fiscal federalism covers two interrelated areas: the distribution of authority for public revenue and spending among different levels of government and how independent subnational governments are in their decision-making (Kesner-Škreb 2009). The core point of this concept is to give the authority for making spending decisions to local governments and accordingly to determine their revenue independently. Fiscal federalism theory focuses on the distribution of public sector functions and fiscal relations among the layers of government (Bird 1999). The literature divides fiscal federalism approaches into two branches: first- and second-generation fiscal federalism. First-generation fiscal federalism is shaped by the view of public finance, which is based on the classical normative economics of the 1950s and 1960s. Oates named the first-generation theory as the traditional theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 2005). Regarding the first-generation fiscal federalism theories, it is seen that the studies in the economics literature belong to Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) who were the first advocates of the idea that fiscal federalism can affect economic efficiency and thus macroeconomic performance. Link – The plan undermines the delicate balance of federalism Ruth Mason, 11. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Associate Professor of Law and Nancy and Bill Trachsel Corporate Law Scholar, University of Connecticut Law School. “Federalism and the Taxing Power,” California Law Review 99.4 (2011): 975-1035, JSTOR. If Congress uses tax expenditures and penalties to regulate areas traditionally or constitutionally reserved to the states, then such tax regulation raises federalism concerns similar to those raised when Congress makes conditional grants to the states.95 Thus, to the extent that we are concerned about the federalism impact of conditional grants, arguably we also should be concerned about the federalism impact of tax expenditures and penalties. Among the values that federalism promotes is horizontal competition among the states for residents who are free to move to any state in the Union. Competition forces state governments to respond to the political preferences of their residents.96 The states’ smaller size compared to that of the nation also may facilitate political participation,97 at least when a single voter’s voice carries more weight in state than federal elections.98 Similarly, the smaller size of states, coupled with uneven distribution of voter preferences across the country, facilitates policy diversity: each state can adopt policies that reflect the preferences of its residents, which may differ from national preferences or from preferences of residents of other states.99 Closely related to this is the idea that states may devise different ways to pursue similar policy goals, thus serving, in Justice Brandeis’ famous words, as “laborator[ies]” for “social and economic experiments.”100 Federalism also promotes vertical competition between the federal and state governments. Although the federal and state governments do not compete for residents, James Madison predicted that they would compete for the affections of the governed.101 For any regulatory area not exclusively assigned to the federal or state governments by the Constitution, Madison envisioned that the people would choose their regulator.102 If they trusted the federal government more, the people would invest more power with the federal government, or vice versa. 103 In this way, Madison believed that the federal and state governments would check each other, so that neither would become oppressive.104 It is not necessary to repeat at length here the well-known claim that conditional federal spending jeopardizes federalism values.105 Instead, it should suffice to draw the analogy between federal grant spending and federal tax spending. When it conditions grants upon states’ implementation of particular policies, the federal government thereby reduces the scope for state policy experimentation and competition. Similarly, when the federal government uses federal tax law to reach past the states to regulate private taxpayer behavior though tax expenditures and penalties, it may leave less room for states to implement different or contrary policies. Where federal tax incentives reward taxpayers for engaging in particular activities, such as education,106 home ownership,107 and the purchase of private health insurance,108 those tax incentives may displace the expression of local values and local political preferences. Similarly, to at least some extent the federal government may override local political decisions when it uses tax penalties to discourage certain activities, such as smoking, gambling, and driving. If, in order to secure federal subsidies or avoid federal penalties, taxpayers strive to meet federal (rather than local) standards, then the taxing power raises concerns similar to those raised by the spending power.109 Specifically, if the federal government uses its taxing power to enlarge the scope of its regulatory influence beyond its constitutionally enumerated powers, it reduces the areas in which the states can compete with the federal government and with each other. Thus, just as commentators have accused Congress of using conditional federal grants to crowd out state regulation,110 so too may Congress use federal taxes to crowd out state regulation. Ultimately, the extent of this problem depends on unanswered empirical questions regarding the extent to which federal taxing and spending displaces state and local regulation in similar substantive areas. The impact of federal taxes on state legislative choices also depends on legal questions, such as whether the federal government may use taxes to achieve ends that lie beyond its other constitutionally enumerated powers, and whether such regulation can preempt state taxes and regulations. Parts II and III consider these legal issues. Internal link and impact - American federalism is modeled---it solves global wars. Steven G. Calabresi, 95. Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale. "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez.” Michigan Law Review, 94.3 (1995): 752-831. JSTOR. The bitter harvest of the nationalist revolution was gathered in this century with the slaughter of the First and Second World Wars and with the fifty-year Cold War that then followed. These events finally made clear to the great-great-grandchildren of the Enlight- enment that celebration of the nation state could lead to Nazism and Stalinism, to war and genocide, and to totalitarianism and the most complete loss of freedom humankind ever experienced. By 1945, the democratic revolution was still in full flow, but the nationalist revolution was not. World leaders scrambled to replace the still collapsing colonial, imperial transnational structures with new federal and confederal transnational structures. The fifty years since then have seen the birth of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, the British Commonwealth, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the GATT, the NAFTA, and countless other transnational "federal" entities of varying degrees of importance.24 Many of these were openly inspired by the success story of American federalism, which, for example, led many Europeans to want to build a Common Market that could become a "United States of Europe." While many of these new democratic transnational entities are very weak, they nonetheless have developed important powers: they have helped to keep the peace, and in some instances, as with the European Union, they show real potential for some day attaining essentially all the attributes of sovereignty commonly associated with a federal nation-state, like the United States. The growth and success of transnational confederal forms since 1945 is truly aston- ishing and rightly is viewed by many - either with alarm or with hope - as holding out the eventual prospect of a future global fed- eral government or at least the prospect of several continental-sized federal governments. At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting consti- tutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they re- placed.25 Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their fed- eral structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Can- ada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation- states like Great Britain,26 France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or devolutionary crises.27 Other highly centralized nation- states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a demo- cratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face serious pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has hap- pened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. All of this still could be threatened, of course, by a resurgence of nationalism in Russia or elsewhere, but the long-term antinational- ist trend seems fairly secure. There is no serious intellectual sup- port for nationalism anywhere in the world today, whereas everywhere people seem interested in exploring new transnational and devolutionary federal forms.28 The democratic revolution that was launched in Philadelphia in 1776 has won, and now it seems that democrats everywhere join Madison in "cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists."29 2NC/1NR - Uniqueness – Fiscal Federalism Decentralized fiscal federalism is dominant now Rory Gillis, 23. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University, London, ON, Canada. “RETHINKING THE DIVISION OF TAX ROOM AND REVENUE IN FISCAL FEDERALISM.” University of Toronto Law Journal (April 2023), Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4011369 2 Expenditure decentralization The case for revenue centralization is commonly paired with arguments for expenditure decentralization. The predominant economic justification for expansive sub-national jurisdiction over expenditures is Wallace Oates’s decentralization theorem: if residents of different regions have different preferences for government goods and services, decentralization enables government goods and services to be customized to local preferences.47 There are at least two reasons why sub-national governments may be better able to customize expenditures than national governments. First, national governments are often unable to vary their policies from region to region due to legal48 and political constraints.49 Second, even if national governments can vary policies by region, sub-national governments may have greater information about local preferences, which makes them better positioned to engage in customization.50 In addition to the decentralization theorem, there are a number of other common welfare justifications for decentralizing expenditure responsibility. Two are most prominent. First, sub-national jurisdictions can serve as “laboratories of democracy’ by experimenting with novel policies.51 Since sub-national jurisdictions are smaller, it may be less risky for them to pilot new ideas. Decentralization also increases the number of decision makers with the power to implement policies, which may make it easier for novel policies to gain an audience. Second, decentralization of expenditures may enable socially useful competition between governments for residents. In his influential theory of local public goods, Charles Tiebout observes that, when local governments are free to set their own expenditure and tax policies, individuals can choose to reside in the community that best fits their preferences for expenditures and tax rates.52 The immediate benefit of this approach is that it solves a preference revelation problem: by moving to the community with their preferred bundle of public goods and tax rates, individuals reveal their preferences for public goods.53 There are two additional benefits, however, that are relevant to the case for decentralization more generally. The first is that the Tiebout model enables individuals to sort themselves into communities where all residents have similar demands for public goods. This sorting process enhances the benefits of customizing policies to local preferences. The second is that decentralization creates incentives for communities to compete for residents by offering more attractive bundles of public goods and tax rates. This competition may make government more responsive to preferences. While Tiebout’s theory has been criticized on a number of normative and positive grounds,54 the central implications complement the two other justifications for expenditure decentralization. Fiscal federalism is expanding post-Covid CRS, 20. Congressional Research Service. “Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Practice.” June 3, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46382 Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Practice The field of fiscal federalism studies how to divide responsibilities (including finances) among federal, state, and local governments to improve economic efficiency and achieve various public policy objectives. Determining the optimal division of responsibilities is difficult because of varying subjective views about what the role of government should be. As a result, fiscal federalism research generally renders no judgment on the proper level of total government intervention or what types of services governments should provide. The research focuses instead on how responsibilities are assigned across multiple layers of government once policymakers have decided to implement a given policy, and what trade-offs may be involved in administering it. For example, a more prominent federal government role may improve efficiency when taxpayers can easily move among localities and states to minimize taxes, or when there are substantial spillover effects from providing goods and services. A more active state and local role may be beneficial in other cases, such as when there is a high level of variation among constituents in the desired amount of government-provided services, or when obtaining enough information to effectively administer a program is difficult (e.g., public education or local housing initiatives). Theories of fiscal federalism can be useful to policymakers when analyzing policies that could involve several layers of government. General interest in fiscal federalism has increased following the economic downturn accompanying the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis. Early evidence suggests there has been a significant shift in how fiscal responsibilities are divvied up among the federal government, and state and local governments. This shift has included $150 billion in direct federal assistance to state and local governments and the Federal Reserve’s support of up to $500 billion in state and local debt issuances. Shift to fiscal federalism and devolution to state power on fiscal redistribution now Elaine Orr, 81. Director of GAO’s Office of Foreign Visitor and International Audit Organization. “Evolution of U.S. Fiscal Federalism.” October 1, 1981. https://www.gao.gov/products/117388 When the United States was formed, the power to raise revenue was given to the States, with the National Government assigning certain expenses to each one. Under the Constitution, Congress received the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, and excises to pay debts, and provide for the common defense and the general welfare of the United States. Thus the Federal Government had concurrent jurisdiction with the States in nearly all fields of taxation. The Civil War had the effect of weakening the role of State governments and restricting the powers of State legislatures and governors. The structure of the tax system changed radically during the first quarter of the 20th century. By 1927, income taxes comprised 64 percent of Federal and 10 percent of State tax revenues. In addition, consumption taxes had declined markedly as a share of total Federal tax revenue but were increasing at the State level. Property taxes provided almost all local tax revenue. The New Deal created a complex combination of public works projects, work relief, financial assistance, and a social security system under which the States
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