UBI Negative - Emory 2023
UBI Negative - Emory 2023.docx
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NEG Answers to Automation Advantage 1NC AT: Automation Advantage 1---No automation crisis---AI won’t destroy jobs or exacerbate inequality. Wim Naudé 21. RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany and IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany, “Artificial Intelligence: Neither Utopian nor Apocalyptic Impacts Soon,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, vol. 30, no. 1, 01/02/2021, pp. 1–23 5.5. Message from the empirical evidence…so far A fifth point is that the impacts of AI, over the short and medium term, on job losses, inequality and productivity have been overestimated. Early predictions were that AI would lead to massive job losses, large increases in labour productivity, and spiraling inequality. In the meantime, the experience of much advanced economies has been the opposite. Unemployment is at historical lows and productivity growth is stagnating 46; global inequality is down, and where within-country income inequality has increased, for example in Germany, this has been found to be due to too slow, rather than too fast technological innovation, with technology broadly measured by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (Naudé and Nagler 2018). Empirical evidence, still relatively scant but accumulating, has found little evidence of net job destruction as a result of automation in advanced economies. Theoretical economic models have also developed to reflect better with the nature of an automation technology that can both complement and substitute for human labor: these have variously shown that automation can affect tasks within jobs rather than jobs itself, can increase labor demand through (for instance ‘re-institution’ of labor due to labor productivity and wages rising) and moreover that AI progress can be consistent with low wage and productivity growth, relatively high employment, but with economic stagnation, entropy, and a decline in the quality of jobs (Sequeira, Gil, and Afonso 2018; Schiller 2019; Gries and Naudé 2020). The empirical evidence is however subject to two shortcomings. First, most studies have focused on advanced economies. The few studies from emerging economies (e.g. World Bank (2016); Carbonero, Ernst, and Weber (2018)) tend to suggest that the effects of automation may be worse. A second shortcoming is that most studies do not measure the impact of AI directly, but rather via various measures of ‘automation’ of tasks, using various broader indicators such as industrial robots and ‘automation costs’ which may or may not be appropriate proxies. It seems the assumption, still to be rigorously tested, is that AI is an effective automation technology, or similar to previous automation technologies. Given however the comments above on the slow diffusion of AI, and the relatively slow penetration of AI to many emerging economies outside of China, more research is needed to better understand AI as an automation technology, and to understand the potential vulnerabilities of emerging economies to AI. 2---UBI doesn’t solve automation challenges Vivek Wadhwa 17. Distinguished fellow at Carnegie Mellon University’s College of Engineering. Duke Corporate Education, September 2017. "Why universal basic income can't solve the challenges of automation," https://www.dukece.com/insights/why-universal-basic-income-cant-solve-challenges-automation/. Universal basic income (UBI) alone won’t solve the coming sea change in the labor market. To many voters and policymakers in the United States, the concept of a universal basic income (UBI) once seemed completely unhinged. The idea of the government handing out cash to everyone ran counter to ideas of fairness on both sides of the ideological spectrum, and once only saw support among niche left-wing political parties and a few radical capitalist economists who viewed it as the only solution to the apocryphal benefits trap. This trap dictates that those struggling in the economy have a disincentive to work, because doing so threatens their state benefits. The idea was presented that if everyone got a UBI, any work done could be paid in addition to their basic income. Times have moved on, because support for UBI is now mainstream. Tech Moguls such as Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and Bill Gates see it as a secret weapon against rapid and accelerating automation, a method of saving the working class from an economy where all the work is done by machines. As robots march into factories, UBI is colonizing the minds of thinkers everywhere, Bill Gates also suggests an additional tax on robots be levied to pay off those whose jobs they have taken. UBI is certainly one of the things we need to think about and a part of a comprehensive solution to the problems of joblessness that technology is creating. Over the next decade and a half, most jobs will be automated and done by artificial intelligence and robots. But UBI won’t solve the soul-destroying loss of purpose that comes from having your economic raison d’être stolen from you by a ton of animated metal and software. Nor is a UBI even likely to happen, at least in the US. The government is rolling back over healthcare protection; how likely is it to approve a universal system of welfare that – by definition – hands payments to billionaires as well as down-and-outs? There are ways of moving forward that are less susceptible to political climate change. In a paper titled A New Deal for the Twenty-First Century, Edward Alden and Bob Litan argue that, as traditional working-class jobs disappear, jobs in the tech and caring professions will boom. Technology is taking over the world, and the global population is aging — so follow the money. The key, say Alden and Litan, is to furnish the young with the core skills necessary to adapt to fundamental labour-market changes so rapid that governments and educational institutions struggle to keep up with them. Older workers who become displaced should receive assistance in finding new jobs and retraining. Governments should offer tax incentives for that training. Career loan accounts could be established to encourage employees to gain new skills, with repayment of the loans linked to future earnings. The authors advocate a generous wage-insurance scheme that tops up earnings; direct wage subsidies; and minimum wage increments. They suggest that a voluntary military and civilian national-service programme for young people could mitigate social disruption and teach important new skills. In towns and cities, the extra labour generated by national service could tend to public spaces, parks and playgrounds. The danger is that the public will think this new thinking is addressing a problem coming tomorrow. A peek inside Amazon’s warehouse reveals that it is a challenge to be addressed today. Machines do all of the product storage and retrieval – the bulk of the hard work. Within five years, robots will likely take over the loading of self-driving trucks bound for distribution centres. From there, drones will fly the goods the last mile. Most of the jobs that require human labour will be eliminated. In other fields, millions of new jobs – specification not yet known – will be born, but these roles will not suit unemployed warehouse workers, because they won’t have the skills to take them. 3---UBI doesn’t solve trust or democracy Daron Acemoglu 19. Institute Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 6-19-2019. "Why Universal Basic Income is a bad idea," https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-universal-basic-income-is-a-bad-idea-2019-06-19. Equally important, these solutions leverage democratic politics. The same cannot be said for a UBI, which is parachuted from above as a way of placating the discontented masses. It neither empowers nor even consults the people it aims to help. (Do workers who have lost their middle-class jobs want government transfers or an opportunity to get another job?) As such, UBI proposals have all the hallmarks of the “bread and circuses” used by the Roman and Byzantine Empires — handouts to defuse discontent and mollify the masses, rather than providing them with economic opportunities and political agency. By contrast, the modern social welfare state that has served developed countries so well was not handed down by tycoons and politicians. It aimed to provide both social insurance and opportunities to people. And it was the result of democratic politics. Ordinary people made demands, complained, protested, and got involved in policy making, and the political system responded. The founding document of the British welfare state, the World War II-era Beveridge Report, was as much a response to political demands as to economic hardship. It sought to protect the disadvantaged and create opportunities, while encouraging civic engagement. Many current social problems are rooted in our neglect of the democratic process. The solution isn’t to dribble out enough crumbs to keep people at home, distracted, and otherwise pacified. 4---No impact to populism Luís de Sousa et al., 21. Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, with Daniel Fernandes and Florian Weiler, March 2021. “Is Populism Bad For Business? Assessing The Reputational Effect Of Populist Incumbents.” Swiss Political Science Review Volume 27, Issue 1. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12411 We expect that populist incumbencies, for the various reasons invoked in the literature and discussed above, generate negative perceptions of the country’s political stability and business climate among economic stakeholders. To test these hypotheses, we organize the remainder of this article as follows. First, we discuss the reputational effect of populist incumbency. We argue that governments with populist party(ies) are more likely to generate political uncertainty and have a negative effect on the country’s business climate/reputation. We then employ statistical analysis to test these hypotheses by using maximum likelihood estimation and include two random effects. Our findings suggest that populist incumbencies have no clear impact on the stability of the political system (with a few known exceptions) and the attractiveness of the business climate, despite the discursive and ideological dimensions. 5---Democracy is resilient but doesn’t solve anything Renske Doorenspleet 19. Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243. The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8 ---
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