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2023 CNDI Topicality

T - USFG - CNDI 2023

T - USFG - CNDI 2023.docx

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T – USFG / Framework
1NC
1nc – Interp
The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action
Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
And, “Fiscal” redistribution is done by the government.
Hicks 86, Researcher, Northwestern University (Alexander Hicks, 1986, “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14)//BB
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
They obviously don’t meet any of the topic words – which makes their aff unpredictable and undebatable. Their advocacy also creates moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.
1nc – Fairness Impact
Our impact is fairness—there are two internal links—
1. Limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence and debatability for both sides—absent defined limits, debate’s competitive incentives create a race to the margins that create exhausting research demands and ends with debaters burning out.
2. Ground—a pre-defined controversy ensures a vibrant lit base and in-depth clash —they’re just reading neg arguments on the aff so switch-side debate can solve their offense – all 2AC defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate and locks in an overwhelming aff side bias.
3. Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.
Shively 2K – Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M (Ruth, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-2)
The requirements thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some things. In particular, they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no agreement except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Registers, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.∂ The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.∂ But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.∂ Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements.∂ Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.',∂ Imagine, then, that our two discussants have the following kind of exchange:∂ Mary Cuns don't kill people; people kill people.∂ Tom: Yes, but guns make it a lot easier for people to kill one another.∂ Mary: That's not necessarily true. There are lots of other murder weapons—knives or rat poison, for instance—that may be just as handy and lethal.∂ At this point, the argument reaches an impasse. Tom has presented i claim that Mary does not accept. Thus, if the argument is to continue, Tom must either find a way to convince Mary oi this claim or he must go on to a different line of argument. Let us say that, in this case, lorn backs up his initial claim with further evidence. Perhaps he has some evidence to show that people are less apt to survive a gunshot wound than they are to survive being stabbed or poisoned. Mary then relents on this point:∂ ∂ Mary: All right, I'll grant you that gun shot wounds an? more apt to kill people. But that's exactly the reason I want lo own a gun—so I can effectively protect myself and my family.∂ Tom: Well I sympathize with that motive, but 1 don't think owning a gun is the best way to protect yourself. In fact, I've heard that people who own guns are more apt to get injured or killed them¬selves than to protect themselves against an intruder.∂ Mary: What?! I find that very difficult to believe.∂ Here, again, our discussants reach an impasse. If the argument is to go further, they must either find a way to agree on the disputed claim, or move on to another claim (if there is one). Thus, if Tom has some further evidence that Mary will find convincing, they can continue this line of reasoning; if he does not, then they must move on to something else or give up the argument completely.∂ This is the ordinary ebb and flow of debate. Argument continues .is long as there is some hope of progress in coming to agreement or as long as there are other lines of argument to be explored. But if there∂ ∂ comes a point a I which the two sides run out of new claims or cannot igree about the facts supporting claims already made, the argument is effectively over. The participants may continue to shout at one an¬other, as they often do, but there is no longer anything positive or informative that can come from their interaction. There is nothing more to be learned and nothing that either side will find convincing.∂ The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past one another.∂ At this point, the ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly "necessary" or universal rules of behavior.∂ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny.
1nc – Topic Specific Education
Nuanced debates about tax policy are essential for progressive work BUT require rejecting binary conceptualizations of politics in favor of detailed advocacy and pragmatic coalition building.
Renzo & Lakin 20 [Paolo de Renzio and Jason Lakin. Jason Lakin is a writer, researcher, and teacher. He has been the head of research for the International Budget Partnership (IBP) since 2017. Paolo de Renzio is 2021/22 Policy Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. "A Taxing Journey: How civic actors influence tax policy." https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/tax-synthesis-december-2020.pdf]
Regular citizens and civic actors have historically played a very limited role in the formulation of tax policies. In recent years, however, interest in the role that civil society can play in tax reform has been growing steadily, driven by the domestic resource mobilization (DRM) agenda linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and by recent efforts of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—in collaboration with country-level groups—to reform the rules of international taxation.
To document successful examples of civic tax advocacy and generate useful lessons for other organizations interested in this work, we commissioned in-depth case studies of the Yellow Vests movement in France, tax administration reforms in Guatemala, the invalidation of a double taxation agreement between Kenya and Mauritius, the fight against opacity of tax amnesties in Mexico, the increasing of “sin taxes” and oil excise taxes in the Philippines, opposition to new taxes on mobile money transfers and social media in Uganda, and advocacy of higher income taxes on wealthy individuals in three US states. Evidence from these case studies also help fill a gap in the existing literature on the political economy of tax reform, which does not cover the role of civic actors in any level of detail.
The cases show that civil society engagement in tax reform can play a role in making tax systems fairer and more equitable while generating revenues to finance important public services. More importantly, they help us to understand the types of strategies and tactics that very different organizations and movements use to engage with very different types of tax reform. Not all our cases are unqualified successes: what they demonstrate, rather, is that tax reform is a longer-term process defined by a mix of failures and partial successes, as well as more resounding victories. These cases help us to think about tax reform over time, rather than as a single moment, and therefore nuance our understanding of the role of civil society and the meaning of successful tax advocacy.
How did civil society groups across these cases engage with tax reform? The evidence we gathered highlights five themes, which also point to useful lessons for other tax advocacy initiatives:
Narratives, messaging and media. Tax reform is a battle of ideas. It requires tax advocates to craft narratives about the need for changes in tax policy and to be able to communicate them effectively by using different media in a strategic way. These narratives need to be powerful and convincing enough to counter and neutralize those used by opposing actors, such as the argument that low taxes are vital for economic growth. The first narrative that was used in the campaigns we cover is about promoting fairness and equity, arguing that the burden of taxation should be distributed fairly and that those that have more should pay more (or at least pay everything that they owe). The second narrative is related to the idea that governments need sufficient resources to adequately fund public services, either through direct earmarking or through an increase in general revenue collection. A third narrative—used by a smaller number of groups—is linked to the need for more transparency and for clear anti-corruption measures in tax administration. These narratives helped CSOs frame issues to win the policy argument and galvanize supporters and were more often used conjointly as complementary arguments, rather than in isolation. Beyond crafting narratives, though, civic actors need to be able to disseminate and amplify their messages through different types of media to make sure they reach their intended audience.
Choosing the right strategy. Our case studies find civic actors exploiting a wide array of avenues for advocacy, from working directly with the executive, to lobbying legislators, to trying to influence public opinion through organizing events and working with the media, to taking governments to court. The most successful organizations use multiple strategies, rather than rely on just one. Successful cases seem to deploy a mix of “insider” and “outsider” strategies, supporting and lobbying governments directly on reforms, but also applying external pressure on them through mobilization, protest, lawsuits, and media campaigns. Not all strategies are available in all contexts, of course, but civic actors should start with the assumption that they must diversify their strategies and pursue multiple approaches, knowing that only some of them may eventually succeed.
Building effective coalitions. A critical strategic consideration in tax reform is to identify both allies and opponents. The key to success is building coalitions with allies that are powerful enough to overcome resistance from opponents. To confront reform resistance—coming mostly from governments and the business sector—civic actors in our cases built coalitions with a wide range of actors. Some built relationships with parts of government or business, taking advantage of splits within these actors. Others appealed to civic actors or movements that were not specifically interested in tax policy but were mobilized around a broader vision of government and public services. In some cases, civic actors were able to galvanize support from both these directions.
Capacity, capacity, capacity. Engaging in tax reform debates often requires high levels of technical capacity—both in the economic and legal spheres. However, technical capacity is only one of three different types of capacity that are important for successful tax advocacy. Based on our case studies, civil society groups also use political capacity to engage with various actors both within and outside government, and communications capacity to effectively disseminate research findings and reform proposals, and to craft forceful narratives and relay key messages to target audiences. In cases where not all types of capacities are available within a single organization, as will very often be the case, partnerships and coalitions can help address important gaps. Most of our cases indicate that successful organizations engage in long-term advocacy agendas involving significant learning and capacity augmentation over time. At any given moment, therefore, a capacity to learn and adapt may be as important as other kinds of capacity.
Political opportunitie

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