Topicality - CNDI 2023
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Topicality – CNDI 23 Resolution Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by adopting a federal jobs guarantee, expanding Social Security, and/or providing a basic income. United States States and Territories The “United States” is defined as the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii Dictionary.com, No Date (“United States”, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/united-states) United States [ yoo-nahy-tid steyts ] noun(used with a singular verb) Official name United States of America . a federal republic in the northern Western Hemisphere comprising 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Alaska in North America, and Hawaii in the North Pacific, and in some contexts considered along with its five inhabited island territories (Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, North Mariana Islands, American Samoa). Conterminous United States, 3,119,885 square miles (8,080,465 square kilometers); with Alaska and Hawaii, 3,796,742 square miles (9,833,517 square kilometers); all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the island territories, 3,805,927 square miles (9,857,306 square kilometers) Capital: Washington, D.C. Abbreviations: U.S., US Federal Government 3 Branches The federal government is comprised of the three branches. White House, No Date, (“Our Government: The U.S. Federal Government is composed of three distinct branches”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/) The Federal Government is composed of three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial, whose powers are vested by the U.S. Constitution in the Congress, the President, and the Federal courts, respectively. There are hundreds of Federal agencies and commissions charged with handling responsibilities as varied as managing America’s space program, protecting its forests, gathering intelligence, and advancing the general welfare of the American people. For a full listing of Federal Agencies, Departments, and Commissions, visit USA.gov. Should Expresses Obligation “Should” is defined “to express obligation, propriety, or expendiency” Merriam-Webster, no date (“Should.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should.) used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency. 'tis commanded I should do so— William Shakespearethis is as it should be— H. L. Savageyou should brush your teeth after each meal Increase Make Greater “Increase” is defined as to become progressively greater Merriam-Webster, no date (“Increase.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase.) increase 1 of 2 verb in·crease in-ˈkrēs ˈin-ˌkrēs increased; increasing Synonyms of increase intransitive verb 1 : to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity) Fiscal Redistribution 1NC – Taxes and Transfers Interpretation- Fiscal redistribution requires taxes and transfers Malte Luebker, 2015, (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) Dr. rer. Pol, January 2015, Redistribution policies, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298075483_Redistribution_policies) In dictionaries, redistribution is defined as “to alter the distribution of” something. This is a useful starting point: what follows is that income redistribution policies encompass all government interventions that alter the distribution of incomes, including those that affect the primary distribution of incomes. As argued in Part II of this volume, granting collective bargaining rights (or denying them) has consequences for the functional distribution of incomes and for wage inequality, as do minimum wages. However, governments alter the primary distribution of incomes in other, often even less visible ways. For instance, the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s is widely believed to have contributed to a concentration of incomes at the top, and to a shift away from wages and towards profits (see Stiglitz, 2012; ILO, 2012). Likewise, trade liberalization has differential impacts on the incomes of various groups in society (see Jansen and Lee, 2007). Such a broad definition of redistribution underlines the fact that most government action has redistributive consequences. To gain support for unpopular decisions such as the opening of trade, governments sometimes try to compensate the losers and impose a corresponding tax on the winners (ibid.). At this stage, redistribution becomes more apparent since it directly alters the primary distribution of incomes. This direct intervention in the form of taxes and transfers is commonly at the heart of public debates over redistribution, simply because it is more visible, even though the impact can be minuscule when compared the original policy decision. For example, trade compensation schemes are commonly thought to redistribute less than 5 per cent of the gains from trade (ibid.: 75). The concept of fiscal redistribution captures these direct interventions that governments make through taxes and transfers. A key policy concern is often their net effect on income inequality, usually expressed as the change in a summary measure such as the Gini coefficient between the primary and secondary distribution. The impact can be further disaggregated into the direct effect of taxes and mandatory social contributions and the contribution of transfers (see section 6). Tax policies play a crucial role for both aspects: They determine how much resources are at the disposal of governments for social policies, but the structure of the tax code by itself has an impact on inequality. At one extreme, income taxes can be regressive, i.e. the tax rates are lower for those with higher incomes. An example for a tax that widens inequality is the ‘poll tax’, an equal lump sum paid by every resident. However, although the top marginal tax rates have fallen substantially across the industrialized world since the 1970s, modern tax systems are still typically progressive and tax rates increase with incomes. The result is that the rich pay (or are expected to pay) a greater share of their income as taxes, and that inequality after taxes is lower than before taxes. Between these two models lie distribution-neutral regimes with flat tax rates, where everybody pays the same proportion of her or his income in tax. However, the structure of tax rates often given an incomplete picture of their redistributive impact since the rich, in particular, often take advantage of tax exemptions or find other ways to avoid paying taxes in full. This practice, euphemistically known as ‘tax optimization’ or ‘aggressive tax planning’, can undermine the intended redistributive effects of the tax code – and has re-ignited the public debate about the fairness of tax systems in many countries. Another facet of tax codes is that income from capital (be it in the form of interest, dividends or realized capital gains) is often taxed at a different, generally lower rate than income from labour (or is exempt from taxation altogether).5 To the extent that the capital incomes accrue to those at the top of the income pyramid, this further undermines the progressiveness of taxation (see also Atkinson et al., 2011). On the whole, the redistributive impact of direct taxes on income and wealth is relatively well understood, based on the analysis of household survey datasets or national accounts (see section 4 below). 6 However, countries have increasingly shifted towards indirect taxes such as a general sales tax (GST) or a value added tax (VAT).7 By taxing general consumption, these taxes have a bigger relative impact on those who consume a larger part of their incomes – generally the poor – and are hence often regressive (see Emran and Stiglitz, 2007). However, while households effectively pay these taxes, they affect prices (and not income) and their impact on income inequality is more difficult to assess than in the case of direct taxes. While the conventional analysis of fiscal redistribution has important insights to offer, it has some conceptual shortcomings. One important concern is that a snapshot taken at a single point in time (usually for a given year) focuses only on inter-personal redistribution, ignoring life-cycle redistribution. For instance, old-age pensions appear as if they were a transfer from the young (who pay contributions and/or taxes to fund them) to the old (who receive pensions). In reality, the young and the old are not two distinct groups, but young workers will grow old over time so that today’s contributors are tomorrow’s beneficiaries. There is of course no guarantee that an individual’s benefits will be equal to her or his contributions (those who die young will not receive anything in return, and those who are blessed with longevity will generally gain more). Pension systems therefore remain redistributive – albeit to different degrees, depending on their design (see Chapter 9 by C. Behrendt and J. Woodall). Violation- the aff only implements transfers Voting issue: Ground- neg disads to taxes and the counterplan to transfer without taxes are core ground Limits- allowing any social transfer explodes the topic, makes neg prep impossible Taxes and Transfers Fiscal redistribution involves taxes and transfers from higher to lower income households IMF in 2020 International Monetary Fund; IMF Working Paper Fiscal Affairs Department Designing Fiscal Redistribution: The Role of Universal and Targeted Transfers Prepared by David Coady and Nghia-Piotr Le; https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2020/English/wpiea2020105-print-pdf Although increasing income inequality has been observed in many countries, the varying experiences across countries, with inequality even decreasing in a sizeable share of countries, suggests that public policy and institutions play and important role in determining such outcomes.2 In this respect, fiscal redistribution (i.e., the transfer of income from higher to lower income households via tax and transfer schemes) has a key role to play in addressing income inequality. For instance, evidence from studies of fiscal redistribution shows that over threequarters of the difference in average disposable income inequality between advanced and Latin American countries (with the lowest and highest average disposable income inequality, respectively) is accounted for by differences in the extent of fiscal redistribution rather than by differences in market incomes (Bastagli, Coady and Gupta, 2015). This paper focuses on the design of fiscal redistribution through income taxes and transfers in advanced and developing countries.3 In particular, it focuses on the growing debate on the relative merits of universal and targeted social assistance transfers in achieving income redistribution objectives (Atkinson, 2015; Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle, 2017; Gentilini et al., 2020). It argues that the fixation of the policy debate on the narrow targeting of transfers to lower-income groups (i.e., avoiding leakage of transfers to higher-income groups) in large part reflects an unbalanced framing of the issue with an undesirably narrow focus on the transfer side of fiscal redistribution neglecting the potential redistributive role of taxes. It also reflects an overly narrow focus on incentive (or efficiency) costs with insufficient attention to the administrative, social and political costs of targeting that in practice affect the feasible set of redistributive taxes and transfers available to governments and which need to be balanced against efficiency costs. Redistribution requires a combination of taxes and transfers- policies like education and healthcare are pre-distributive Bozio et al in 2020 Antoine Bozio, Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Malka Guillot, Thomas Piketty; Predistribution vs. Redistribution: Evidence from France and the U.S.; World Inequality Lab; https://wid.world/document/predistribution-vs-redistribution-evidence-from-france-and-the-u-s/ Public policies aiming to reduce inequalities can be classified into two categories. First, for a given level of pretax inequality, taxes, transfers and other public spending can reduce post-tax income inequality. This is what is usually called redistribution policies. The public economics literature has largely been influenced by an approach which treats pre-tax inequalities as given, and where the policy options for reducing inequalities largely rest on various combination of tax-and-transfers, with the constraints imposed by the behavioral responses to the tax and transfer system (e.g., this is the generic logic of optimal taxation literature).1 However, public policies can also affect the pretax distribution of income (what we will call “predistribution”). For instance, the legal and social system contributes to determine the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis firm owners and managers, via wage-setting rules, corporate laws, trade regimes or labor market regulations. Similarly, educational and health care policies impact the access to skills and jobs, and therefore the overall inequality of labor earnings. Trade and technological changes can also influence the relative earnings of different skills or occupation, as well as a range of market regulations. Finally, taxation and transfers can also affect pre-tax income either via changes in bargaining incentives or through different dynamics of capital accumulation. Although these channels are known to impact inequalities, the lack of adequate data series with sufficient historical and comparative breadth has limited the ability to evaluate and compare the long-term impact of various public policy options on inequality. At: Taxes and Transfers Taxes and transfers can be distinct- social transfer alone is also topical David K. Jesuit & Vincent A. Mahler 17, Jesuit is with the Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Central Michigan University; Mahler is with the Department of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago, “Fiscal Redistribution in Comparative Perspective: Recent Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Datacenter,” LIS Working Paper Series, No. 717, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/717.pdf Disaggregating Taxes and Transfers Fiscal redistribution by the state is, of course, not of one piece. In particular, it is possible that different trends will be in evidence for the two main modes of direct redistribution, taxes and social transfers. To explore this, we have partitioned the total Gini reduction accomplished by the state into two components, the part achieved by direct taxes and the part achieved by social transfers. We have further disaggregated the Gini reduction as a result of transfers into programs aimed primarily at the elderly and those aimed primarily at persons of working age. We begin with taxes. Unfortunately, there is a limitation in using LIS data to explore tax redistribution. The problem is that the national income surveys from which the LIS derives its data do not measure indirect taxes, such as sales, value added and excise taxes, whose precise amount is rarely known even by those paying them and whose incidence is thus very difficult to determine. Because of this limitation, we consider Gini reduction by way only of direct taxes, the primary components of which are income taxes and mandatory employee social insurance contributions. The omission of indirect taxes is an important one because the countries we examine vary greatly in the share of revenue such taxes raise, from a low in 2011 of 4.4 percent of GDP in the United States to a high of 15.2 percent in Denmark. Moreover, a number of scholars have argued that, even though indirect taxes are not themselves redistributive—in fact, are commonly regressive—they nonetheless play a critical role in raising the revenue that funds redistributive social benefits.12 Is there empirical evidence for such a relationship? One way of exploring this, at least in a preliminary way, is to relate the share of indirect taxes in a country’s GDP to the extent to which inequality of private sector income there is reduced by social transfers.13 When these variables are related we find that the magnitude of indirect taxes is indeed strongly positively related to the degree to which public social transfers reduce private sector inequality; the bivariate correlation is +0.62, a relationship that is statistically significant at the p<.001 level. This is not to say that consumption taxes directly finance social transfers in a manner similar to social security contributions; with that exception, taxes are fungible. It does, however, offer evidence that indirect taxes on consumption represent a powerful revenue-raising vehicle that supports an array of social transfers that in turn substantially ameliorate market inequality. With this qualification, we report the shares of total redistribution accounted for by direct taxes and social transfers in the first column of Table 1’s Section B. In describing the results, we begin with the observation that overall government redistribution in our countries is much more a product of the redistributive effect of social transfers than of direct taxes: across our 20 countries the average share of Gini reduction accomplished by taxes is 22.9 percent while that accomplished by transfers is 77.1 percent. There is, however, considerable variation about these averages. In particular, the United States and Australia top the list of our countries in the share of fiscal redistribution accomplished by taxes: in these countries 36.7 and 32.0 percent respectively of all redistribution is achieved by direct taxes, well above the 20-country average. Because total redistribution in these countries is below average, they do not rank quite as high in absolute tax redistribution (see column 3 of section B), although both are in the upper third of that spectrum as well. Other countries are lower on the absolute-redistribution list, with Spain, Japan and Switzerland at the bottom. We now turn to redistribution by way of social transfers. We start with Gini reduction as a result of social transfers as a whole. As can be seen in the final column of section B of Table 1, our countries vary considerably on this measure. At the top of the scale are Finland and Greece, whose pre-tax and –transfer Gini coefficient is reduced by 181 Gini points by transfers alone. The Nordic countries are mostly in the upper third of the list, as are the Netherlands and Belgium. The large transfer reduction value for Greece was somewhat unexpected. Recall, however, that this country began with a much more inegalitarian distribution of pre-tax and – transfer income than our other countries; even after extensive redistribution it remained among the most inegalitarian of our 20 countries. At the low end in terms of transfer reduction are Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Iceland, the United States and Japan. These countries differ greatly in the pre-tax and –transfer “starting point”; in particular, Switzerland, Iceland and Japan have relatively low levels of private sector inequality. Total fiscal redistribution by way of public social transfers encompasses a number of distinct programs. The most basic breakdown is between pensions, which are aimed primarily at the elderly, and transfers aimed mainly at the working-age population—a category that includes a wide variety of individual programs, including unemployment benefits, child allowances, and means-tested social assistance.14 We begin with pensions, which not only constitute the largest social benefit program in the developed world but also produce the most redistribution, at least in absolute terms. These figures are reported in Table 1, section C. On average, across our 20 countries, pensions alone reduced private sector inequalit
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