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2023 CNDI Disadvantage

REMs DA - CNDI 2023

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REMs DA – CNDI 23
Most of these cards came out of the GND Aff/Neg files, but now they’re in one place.
Read the full DA against the affs that don’t read the competitiveness advantages but you can just read the case turn if the aff has already spotted you that China is bad and Taiwan war goes boom.
1NCs
1nc – Case Turn
*Read vs Competitiveness Adv
Turn: The plan would force greater dependence on China AND trigger tradeoffs with military weapons development that rely on rare earth elements
Ernst, 22 --- U.S. Senator from Iowa (5-4-2022, Joni, “DEMOCRATS' GREEN AGENDA RISKS NATIONAL SECURITY,” https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/democrats-green-agenda-risks-national-security, SRB)
Democrats have spent the past year pursuing their radical Green New Deal energy agenda. Now the left is using Russia’s war in Ukraine to try to justify a massive transition to electric vehicles and renewable energy. If enacted, this would significantly increase our dependence on China for certain “critical minerals” and other materials needed for these energy sources. If the left successfully implements its flawed agenda without strengthening supply chains, the United States could become significantly dependent on China for its energy needs. China could use its commanding influence over green energy technology to get its way in the future, just as Russia used its energy to influence Europe not to act prior to the invasion of Ukraine. GROWING DEMAND FOR CRITICAL MINERALS Critical minerals are specific substances identified as being vital to a range of industries including energy, electronics, and the military. Electric vehicles and renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, require significant amounts of critical minerals. One analysis by several professors from the United Kingdom found that to swap the UK’s 32 million cars with EVs would demand about double the world’s annual output of cobalt, almost all the neodymium, and 75% of the lithium. Comparatively, about eight times as much would be required to convert the entire U.S. fleet of 260 million cars. A 2021 report by the International Energy Agency found that by 2040, anticipated global green energy commitments could increase demand for “rare earth elements,” a subset of critical minerals, by as much as 700%. Demand for nickel could grow by 1,900%, cobalt by 2,100%, and lithium by a staggering 4,200%. These minerals are needed for the development of wind turbines and solar panels, as well as for electric vehicles. These substances also play a key part in our national defense. Construction of each F-35 combat aircraft requires more than 900 pounds of critical minerals. Copper, lead, cobalt, uranium, and a significant amount of other minerals are needed for munitions, armor, and communications gear. Ships, vehicles, and aircraft will continue to require these materials to keep up with advanced technological needs. The problem is acute; the DoD is facing a critical shortage of munitions and the defense industry is having trouble meeting the demand for more advanced weapons. The U.S. military’s stockpile of critical minerals is already shrinking and increased demand will continue to stress those reserves. If we add to the demand for these minerals to make more electric vehicles and solar panels, while not increasing domestic production, we would only make it tougher to meet the need for military applications. In a recent Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing, one defense industry executive discussed how competition from other products has affected his ability to get parts needed to make advanced weapon systems. DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN MINERAL SUPPLIES The problem is not just that Democrats’ plans will increase the demand for these elements. It is also a question of where the materials come from. The pandemic made us all aware of how dependent we are on the global supply chain and what happens in one link of that chain breaks. The supply of critical minerals is no different. The batteries for a typical electric car require 19.6 pounds of lithium, and 58% of the world’s lithium is processed in China. Batteries also require high-quality nickel; almost 20% of global supply is produced by Russia. Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate what can happen when one country controls a large share of the global energy market. European countries have grown dependent on the Russians for much of their oil, natural gas, coal, and other energy supplies. Now they are scrambling to find alternative sources of fuel to heat their homes and fuel their economies. For many of these countries, their dependence was fueled by radical climate policies such as phasing out nuclear power and limiting fracking. Democrats, through their anti-fossil-fuel agenda, have been trying to eliminate America’s ability to produce domestic oil and gas that could help us respond to this kind of shock to the energy markets. Furthermore, the Biden administration’s sanctions provide loopholes to allow for energy transactions until June 24. Democrats have a way to relieve the pressure Russia places on energy markets, mainly by increasing domestic production, but so far they have seemed more interested in pursuing a progressive campaign against energy. Instead of learning a lesson about the danger of depending on other, often antagonistic, countries for critical materials, the Biden administration and Democrats in Congress are pushing an agenda to make things worse. Democrats are actually trying to use Russia’s war in Ukraine to justify their climate goals, while disregarding the fact that we do not have enough of the raw materials necessary to support their pipe dreams and will therefore be forced to rely more on China. Just as the Russians have used energy to influence Europe, the Chinese have already used their command over the critical minerals market to advance their political agenda. In 2010, the Chinese government temporarily stopped all exports of critical minerals to Japan over a diplomatic dispute around a collision at sea, foreshadowing what is to come if the world depends on China for the majority of its energy-related mineral needs.
1nc – DA
The US is diversifying supply chains now but needs time to break overdependence – the plan pushes us back to China to meet renewable demands.
Lu, 23 (APRIL 14, 2023, Christina Lu is a reporter at Foreign Policy. Prior to joining FP, she worked at Foreign Affairs and the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research in Lusaka, Zambia. She is a graduate of Cornell University, The Critical Minerals Club, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/14/us-china-critical-mineral-security-europe-rare-earth-energy-transition / SRB)
U.S. lawmakers are scrambling to weaken China’s grip on the critical mineral supply chains that are key to the global energy transition, as escalating tensions stoke fears of strategic vulnerabilities and potential geopolitical disruptions.
While decades of investments have allowed Beijing to dominate the processing and refining of key critical minerals, worsening U.S.-China relations have sparked a new push to redraw the map. Desperate to disentangle from China, Washington has been joining forces with allies to secure new supplies, part of a broader realignment as countries increasingly forge new trade ties alongside geopolitical lines, rather than the bottom line.
“The globalization 1.0 of the last 50 years was about finding economic value through distributed production and sourcing at best cost from overseas,” said Kevin Book, the managing director of ClearView Energy Partners, a consultancy. “The 2.0 version is about values-driven economics, and that is a very big change, one that we cannot underscore enough—but it’s also a change that’s slow to happen.”
This shift is apparent in the rush for critical minerals, which are essential to the lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles (EVs) and other green technology. Global demand is primed to explode: By 2050, clean energy technology could require billions of tons of these minerals as inputs, according to the World Bank. Other critical minerals include cobalt, used in jet engines, and the rare earth elements that are used in everything from wind turbines to missile guidance systems. China overwhelmingly commands these minerals’ processing and refining markets and controls some 77 percent of the world’s EV battery manufacturing capacity.
[image of chart omitted]
To reduce its reliance on Beijing in the coming decades, Washington is focusing on aligning with allies, including through the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), an initiative that is designed to bolster supply chain security with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and other members. Outside of the MSP, the Biden administration is also pursuing new trade deals and is reportedly in discussions with the European Union for a new critical minerals club.
“This is a major move away from a fundamental faith in the ability of market mechanisms to adequately supply the raw materials and the manufactured goods that are necessary for energy transitions,” said Cullen Hendrix, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “This is obviously a much more interventionist kind of stance than had been pursued in the past.”
In the United States, one of the most concerted pushes came from the Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration’s sweeping climate, health, and tax bill designed to accelerate the shift away from fossil fuels. The act offers tax credits if a sizable proportion of the EV batteries’ mineral inputs are sourced from the United States or a free trade partner. The guidelines sparked fierce pushback after excluding governments that have not signed free trade deals with Washington—including Japan, the European Union, and top critical mineral producers such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Washington is now working to bring these countries into the fold. It appears to have found a way to circumvent the trade challenge, recently inking a critical mineral trade agreement with Tokyo that would allow Japanese companies to qualify under Inflation Reduction Act provisions. That deal could serve as a model for other partnerships: British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is reportedly pushing for a similar agreement, while nickel-rich Indonesia has proposed signing an agreement that mirrors Washington’s pact with Japan.
Rattled by the Inflation Reduction Act, Brussels and Washington are also negotiating a similar trade deal that could later pave the way for the wider critical minerals buyers club that European officials have championed. Separately, Brussels is also reportedly planning to form a central buying agency for critical minerals.
China has manipulated the trade in rare earths in the past, such as when it cut off exports to Japan in 2010, and is reportedly mulling a new export ban for specific kinds of rare earth magnet technology. But a big part of the reason why European countries are eager to diversify away from China is their experience with Russia. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow weaponized Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian natural gas imports—offering a stark lesson on the risks of overdependence.
“In Europe, we have learned very hard the lesson of being too dependent on energy from Russia and see how that could be weaponized,” said Cecilia Malmstrom, a former European commissioner for trade currently at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “Now everybody’s very keen to avoid that situation.”
Beyond Europe, the United States has focused on deepening relationships with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, which are rich in cobalt and copper, respectively, with the three countries signing a memorandum of understanding on electric vehicle battery value chains last December. In Tanzania, Washington is also involved in the development of a critical minerals processing facility.
Still, even as momentum builds, there are more questions than answers about how these efforts will pan out. As lawmakers continue to hammer out new agreements behind closed doors, it remains unclear how they align with global trading rules and what this momentum means for countries that lack free trade agreements with the United States. Engineering supply chains isn’t as simple as finding new mines, either; it involves an entire ecosystem of processing, refining, and manufacturing capabilities.
“It’s not at all clear how you go about changing dramatically a global supply chain in practice,” said Morgan Bazilian, the director of the Payne Institute at the Colorado School of Mines and a former lead energy specialist at the World Bank. While diplomacy and initiatives like the MSP are deeply useful, he said, such action “does not overnight or even within the course of a decade change these things dramatically.”
China spent decades building out its industry, and experts warn that wrestling new supply chains will be an expensive and arduous uphill battle that the United States is only just beginning. But U.S. lawmakers appear to be gearing up for the long haul.
“If you look at where supply chains are, where they’re growing fastest [is] still China,” said Joseph Majkut, the director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There’s a lot to be done to match that growth and to develop not just the factories, but the human capital, the intellectual property, [and] the long-standing political and economic relationships that let that supply chain grow.”
“You can’t build Rome in a day,” he added, “and you can’t build a critical minerals supply chain six months after you pass a big climate bill.”
That ruins the domestic supply chain and wrecks combat readiness – increased dependence on China triggers military aggression in Taiwan.
Foss & Koelsch, 22 --- *Fellow in Energy, Minerals and Materials at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, AND **Research Associate, J.A. Green & Company and Former Research Intern, Center for Energy Studies (December 19, 2022, Michelle Michot Foss, Jacob Koelsch, “Of Chinese Behemoths: What China’s Rare Earths Dominance Means for the US,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/chinese-behemoths-what-chinas-rare-earths-dominance-means-us, SRB+JMP))
The U.S. government, of course, has its own part to play. First, strategic planners must honestly distinguish rare earth demand for defense and other strategic purposes from non-strategic demand. While both strategic and non-strategic demand must be balanced in order to stabilize supply, delivery delays for defense purposes carry significant implications for combat readiness, especially in an era of heightened major-power tension. It is also crucial that the U.S. government ensure its strategic stockpiles of REE are filled to aid in these efforts.
Conclusion
The recent merger that created the China Rare Earth Group is a major development for the global rare earth industry. It is the most recent chapter in the Chinese government’s efforts to quell an industry that has been unruly at times. Given that Chinese efforts to directly control exports have been blocked by bodies like the WTO, officials are now opting for domestically oriented policies to manage the industry. The merger of China’s largest rare earths operators is the most recent iteration of decades of forced industrial consolidation meant to cut down on inefficiencies and increase central oversight. These internally facing policies, which carry significant consequences for global REE industries, are more difficult to challenge in international dispute systems than their externally-facing precursors.
Through the reorganization, Chinese regulators can better enforce central policies and mitigate friction with local officials who often encourage and permit rare earth production counter to central regulations. From China’s perspective, consolidation is a means to produce rare earths in a more sustainable fashion by deploying more uniform production and environmental practices, as well as reducing speculative capital flows that increase domestic rare earth prices in China. Greater oversight from the SASAC over the China Rare Earth Group creates more leverage for Beijing’s officials to influence prices by further bifurcating the domestic and international prices of rare earth products and stabilizing the former. It is also likely that demand will increase, propelled by China’s goals to increase alternative energy and defense capacity. Thus, we anticipate this merger will not be the last and that China’s leaders will eventually fold the remaining three northern rare earth SOEs into their own mega-conglomerate, absent any significant deviations in industrial ideology.
Two geopolitical dynamics properly contextualize the risks associated with China’s REE dominance: 1) Chinese tensions with the U.S. and its allies over trade and 2) Chinese positioning on Taiwan.[81] Given China’s REE dominance as a stable global supplier, would Chinese officials self-sabotage during periods of relative peace, pushing Western countries to develop alternatives proactively? Indeed, despite aggressive posturing and threats from Chinese officials and tabloids, China has yet to restrict REE exports as leverage in its trade war with the United States. Aggression toward Taiwan would likely be a completely different story, especially if the U.S. provides military equipment or combat support to Taiwan. With more centralized state oversight and a leadership structure more amenable to central coordination, the China Rare Earth Group increases the state’s ability to influence and possibly even restrict rare earth exports for political reasons.
Whether China would weaponize their leverage over rare earth supply chains in direct conflicts with the U.S. and/or its allies is a matter of speculation and debate. However, one thing is for sure: In such an event, the U.S. must minimize China’s ability to limit sanctions and other collective global responses against potential coercive action. Taking the invasion of Ukraine as an example, Russia’s VSMPO-Avisma’s strong positioning as the leading global aerospace-grade titanium supplier caused several EU member states to oppose sanctions on the company, despite its role in maintaining Moscow’s force posture.[82] In order to respond adequately to Chinese military belligerence, the U.S. must ensure that China’s consolidated rare earth industry does not grant Beijing undue influence over an international response. The U.S. and its allies must act accordingly to divorce their strategic industries from Chinese rare earths.
As a result of these dynamics, U.S. government officials are under pressure to take significant steps. They must mitigate short- and medium-term supply risks from potential disruptions in Chinese supply and simultaneously take a long-term approach to developing a domestic rare earths ecosystem. The former relies more on filling strategic stockpiles, securing alternative supplies from allied countries like Australia and decreasing product reliance on rare earths from an engineering standpoint where possible. The latter involves a more holistic approach of bolstering several nodes along rare earths value chains simultaneously (so they can be connected once fully operational) and involving foreign capital in these efforts when the opportunities present. Private-sector and government funding from allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea can be used to develop “friendly” rare earth supply chains with more secure supply. However, the United States’ sole reliance on allies to correct domestic industrial deficiencies in rare earths would not provide the more robust REE supply chains that are envisioned.
Through congressional authority and executive branch vehicles, the U.S. government can continue to focus on commerc

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