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2023 CNDI Topicality

T - Must Tax - CNDI 2023

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T – Tax Exercise
Neg
1nc – T ‘Tax’
a. “Fiscal redistribution” requires BOTH taxing and spending
Hicks 86, Researcher, Northwestern University (Alexander Hicks, 1986, “CLASS INFLUENCE ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY: THE CASE OF U.S. STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1951-1961,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 14)//BB
The present redistributive policy focus is on a particular type of government redistribution that may be called direct fiscal redistribution to the poor (hereafter DFRP). Fiscal redistribution refers here to redistribution of money and in-kind income among strata of households by means of both government spending and taxing (i.e., fiscal) activities. For example, increased generosity in public assistance payment levels and reliance upon progressive income as opposed to regressive sales taxes can provide positive fiscal redistribution. Direct fiscal redistribution refers to that part of such redistribution that can be accounted for in terms of government's relatively direct and immediate give-and-take of expenditures and taxes to and from income strata of households. Current evidence suggests that such redistribution is considerable in advanced capitalist political democracies, especially vis-à-vis the poor (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Hicks and Swank, 1984b). During the 1970s DFRP apparently augmented the "pre-fisc" income share of poor households in the U.S. by over 100 percent (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977: 74 on the U.S.; and Hicks and Swank, 1984b on advanced capitalism).
b. Violation – MMT deliberately excludes redistributive taxation
Brian P. Hanley 21, Ph.D., founder and chief scientist for Butterfly Sciences, 2021, “Is Modern Monetary Theory’s prescription to spend without reference to tax receipts an invitation to tyranny?,” Acta Oeconomica, 71(3), pp. 431-450
MMT does not currently advocate, nor demand taxation for redistribution of wealth for the purpose of addressing inequality. However, Wray would like to tax the wealthy until they are no longer rich, though this is not a formal part of MMT (Wray 2020). 3 The redistribution of wealth through taxation is a fundamental feature of the neoclassical theory (Samuelson 1956; Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Keen 2011), but such wealth redistribution is absent from MMT (Wray 2014a). Redistribution taxation is no longer practiced as much as it once was, particularly in the USA (FRED 2020d), and despite its foundational position in neoclassical theory, it is rarely mentioned in public discourse today. However, I think that adding redistribution taxation to the MMT system is probably a necessity to stabilize the economy (Weller 2010), and to accomplish political stability (Acemoglu – Robinson 2012). The former reason is that taxation for redistribution lowers Gini, and thus, stabilizes demand growth. While Weller and Rao’s argument is relative to the emerging economies, the same issues appear in the developed ones. Relative to politics, Acemoglu and Robinson’s work shows that the more unequal economic hierarchies produce political instability together with worse economic performance. Barring this kind of taxation, other careful work must be done to prevent rentier gaming of the economy, although Mosler’s concept of eliminating bond sales has a great deal of merit.
c. Voting issue: limits and ground---they expand the topic to any policy that spends money. Only fiscal redistribution calibrates neg ground and enables effective clash.
FR Requires Tax
It requires tax extraction AND social transfer
Altorfer-Ong 7, Ph.D., Economic History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science (Stefan Altorfer-Ong, 2007, “State-Building without Taxation. The Political Economy of Government Finance in the Eighteenth-Century Republic of Bern,” London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Kansas Libraries, ProQuest)
IV Fiscal Redistribution (Structural Analysis)
IV-1 Introduction and Chapter Contents
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the structure of Bernese state finance for two sample years and complements the overview of long-term trends discussed in the previous chapter (III). The remainder of this section defines the term fiscal redistribution and outlines the analytical framework used, as far as it differs from the one featured in the previous chapter. I will subsequently explain the data, selection criteria and conversion of transactions in kind into monetary values (Section IV-2). The body of the chapter represents an empirical analysis of fiscal redistribution by nature of transaction (Section IV-3), as well as by state function, economic sector and region (Section IV-4). The fiscal burden, including extraction through the militia system, will be covered in a separate Section (IV-5). A conclusion will consolidate the most important findings.
I will begin with a definition of fiscal redistribution to avoid misunderstandings about the scope of my analysis. In modern-day economics, fiscal redistribution is normally understood as the amount of money that is taxed from the rich and used for social transfer payments to the poor by comparing a pre-tax income distribution with the post-tax situation. For my analysis of eighteenth-century Bernese state finance, I understand fiscal redistribution in a broader sense as the way in which a state extracts revenue and spends it as expenditure. The pattern which ensues determines how resources that would have been used for different purposes in the absence of a fisc end up being redirected by the state. Other than many studies of fiscal history that focus on revenue and taxation in particular, my definition explicitly includes expenditure as well. In short, I define fiscal redistribution as the effect of accumulated revenue and expenditure by the government.
Corroborating evidence
Pelke 21, M.A., dissertation in fulfillment of Ph.D. in economics, University of Heidelberg (Lars Pelke, 2021, “Rethinking Inequality under Autocracy. Parties, Citizens, and Preferences,” Chapter 1: Introduction, https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/30270/1/Pelke_Dissertation_2021.pdf)
The third central concept is (income) redistribution. As Tullock argues, ‘‘redistribution is probably the most important function of most modern governments’’ (Tullock, 2013, p. 1). However, the level of redistribution and its cross-sectional variation cannot be modeled using only purely economic explanations, such as the level of inequality in a given society (see McCarty & Pontusson, 2009). Therefore, I focus on the question of how political processes and institutions, such as autocratic ruling strategies and the degree of incumbent party institutionalization, determine the level of redistribution and inequality. In this dissertation, redistribution is broadly defined as the transfer of resources from one person or group to another person or group (see also Albertus, 2015; Boadway & Keen, 2000; Solt, 2020; Tullock, 2013). More precisely, income or fiscal redistribution is defined as the transfer of resources via taxes and fiscal transfer policies from one person or group to another. By contrast, land redistribution —a second influential type of redistribution (Albertus, 2015) —is defined as land reform measures that lead to a reallocation of land properties from landed elites to the landed poor.10 In addition, income redistribution is also often conceptualized as the transfer of resources to the poor.
It's state collection through taxes
Lustig and Higgins 18, *Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution, **Reporter Writer (*Lora Lustig, **Sean Higgins, 2018, “Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty,” Brookings Institution, ISBN: 978-0-8157-3221-1, Chapter 1: THE CEQ ASSESSMENT Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty, University of Kansas Libraries, Springer)
1 The Theory of Fiscal Redistribution: Key Analytical Insights
In this Handbook, “fiscal redistribution” refers to the process by which the state collects revenues from individuals and households (primarily through taxes) and spends these revenues on benefits (for example, cash transfers, price subsidies, and in-kind benefits such as education and health) intended for specific individuals and households. In so doing, the state changes the postfiscal income distribution and poverty rates that would have prevailed in the absence of fiscal policy. Because of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects, fiscal policy can also change the prefiscal income distribution and poverty rates. While at this point the CEQ Assessments do not estimate the counterfactual prefiscal income with these second-round effects in place, it is important to note that the analytical insights presented here and in chapters 2 (Enami, Lustig, and Aranda), 3 (Enami), 4 (Higgins and Lustig), and 5 (Enami) apply to fiscally included income redistribution regardless of the method used to estimate its extent. That is, regardless of whether fiscal redistribution is calculated using run-of-the-mill fiscal incidence analysis, microsimulation methods, or partial or general equilibrium modeling, the theoretical results discussed below and in the next four chapters apply.
Fiscal = Tax
Fiscal means taxation
Beezer 88, Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Robert R. Beezer, 1988, “United States v. Cuevas,” United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 87-5007, University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis)
The term "fiscal aspects" is not defined anywhere in the Swiss order. Other passages, however, shed light [**30] on the Swiss court's intent. On page one of the (29-page) order, the Swiss court observed that Zurich authorities had opened two cases against Cuevas, one "because of financing illegal activities in narcotics trading," a second "for collection of wrongfully obtained capital gains."
The second prosecution, relating to taxes, provides the most obvious referent for the term "fiscal aspects." Such a construction of "fiscal aspects" (relating to taxes or financial penalties) is supported by the following central, but ambiguous passage of the extradition order:
In order to obviate any misunderstanding whatsoever, it should be reiterated here nevertheless, that the prosecution of complainant remains admissible to the full extent of the indictment because of his activity in connection with drugs, so that, in any event, the money hauls effected by couriers acting under his orders would - - from this visual angle -- not have to remain without consideration. The order will have to state only that with regard to these hauls, no taxes or fees or any fiscal penalties shall be imposed as well as that if there is any penalty for the non-fiscal delict conduct, same shall not be increased [**31] in consideration of the fiscal set of facts.
From this passage, we cautiously extract the following conclusions: First, the Swiss do not oppose "prosecution . . . to the full extent of the [fifteen count] indictment." Second, the "money hauls" or transactions of currency derived from narcotics should not "remain without consideration;" that is, they should be considered. Third, prosecution for the "hauls" themselves should not lead to the payment of "taxes or fees or any fiscal penalties"; nor should "taxes, fees, or fiscal penalties" relating to the "money hauls" be imposed surreptitiously through narcotics conspiracy penalties. Such a reading is consistent with the definition of "fiscal aspects" as tax-related. 26
Redistribution = Tax
“Redistribution” requires both take (tax) and give (spend)
Dyreng and Hoopes 22, both professors of accounting (Scott Dyreng, Professor of Accounting at Duke, and Jeff Hoopes, Professor of Accounting at UNC, “Progressive Taxation: What is it? Why would we want it? Do we have it?,” transcribed by Youtube, edits by Brett Bricker, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vN7uzCGPd6I)
I like that explanation and I use that in my class as a justification for what sometimes we call income redistribution. And basically the idea is this, can take something away from, I’m going to keep picking on tim cook today, i can take 100 away from tim cook and he doesn't hardly even notice and i can give it to somebody who's a starving student and they are just thrilled to have that extra hundred dollars and so Tim cook's not any sadder and the other person is much happier and collectively in society then we are happier overall. So and i think it's a good i think it's a good i think it's reasonable it certainly has limits but it's a reasonable way to think about the world. So you said you use that to explain income redistribution what's the difference what's the connection between income redistribution and progressivity? Well one connection is this so what you were talking about was just one side of the equation which is the government taking the income. The other side of the equation is…you have to you have to make the evil voice taking the income yeah okay so the government's gonna take your income and by the way um it took my income uh well i filed my taxes jeff was saying he filed his on saturday night i'm doing them saturday filed them today like half an hour ago okay so i i'm almost worse than you i started on saturday night i could not bear to finish i finished on sunday night fearing that something would come up that i would have to resolve on monday it turned out it was fine so i did file on late sunday night electronically. So the the government took all my money but they're not going to just take that money and burn it they're going to take that money and do something with it including possibly directly giving it to someone who doesn't have very much money and so that's where the redistribution part of it comes in. The government doesn't literally take only take from rich people they give, sometimes, to poor people. I would say they're pretty i mean as long as when you said it literally you said as long as they don't burn it as long as they don't burn it and as long as they're not taking rich people to just like shuffle things around and give back to rich people then they're the same thing, progressive, yeah.
It requires “taking”
Paul 91, Professor of Law (Jeremy, “THE HIDDEN STRUCTURE OF TAKINGS LAW,” Southern California Law Review)//BB
But it is nonsense to find talismanic significance in the idea of taking money from the public as a whole. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 146-49 (arguing that within the liberal tradition Scalia's concession that general redistribution is permissible commits him to principles that justify affirmative welfare rights). Progressive taxes take money from some, high income earners, and transfer it through public assistance to others, low or no income earners. Indeed, the very definition of redistribution is to take from some to give to others. Taxes may be a good mechanism for redistribution because legislators may encounter difficulty in singling out one group for adverse, perhaps unfair, treatment. Justice Scalia is unconvincing, however, in his effort to demonstrate that the entire class of landlords is less likely to be unfairly singled out than, for example, the class of high income earners. See Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 464 (1988) (challenging the claim that tax policy is more democratic than regulatory policy). In short, once redistribution becomes a permissible goal of government, the standard for unfair redistribution cannot be derived from mere allegations that the purpose of a statute is redistributional. See generally Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) (characterizing the ambivalence of takings clause jurisprudence toward redistribution as the inevitable result of the tension within the American tradition between property as wealth and property as virtue).
Taxes and Transfers
Fiscal redistribution requires taxes and transfers
Malte Luebker, 2015, (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) Dr. rer. Pol, January 2015, Redistribution policies, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298075483_Redistribution_policies)
In dictionaries, redistribution is defined as “to alter the distribution of” something. This is a useful starting point: what follows is that income redistribution policies encompass all government interventions that alter the distribution of incomes, including those that affect the primary distribution of incomes. As argued in Part II of this volume, granting collective bargaining rights (or denying them) has consequences for the functional distribution of incomes and for wage inequality, as do minimum wages. However, governments alter the primary distribution of incomes in other, often even less visible ways. For instance, the liberalization of financial markets since the 1980s is widely believed to have contributed to a concentration of incomes at the top, and to a shift away from wages and towards profits (see Stiglitz, 2012; ILO, 2012). Likewise, trade liberalization has differential impacts on the incomes of various groups in society (see Jansen and Lee, 2007). Such a broad definition of redistribution underlines the fact that most government action has redistributive consequences. To gain support for unpopular decisions such as the opening of trade, governments sometimes try to compensate the losers and impose a corresponding tax on the winners (ibid.). At this stage, redistribution becomes more apparent since it directly alters the primary distribution of incomes. This direct intervention in the form of taxes and transfers is commonly at the heart of public debates over redistribution, simply because it is more visible, even though the impact can be minuscule when compared the original policy decision. For example, trade compensation schemes are commonly thought to redistribute less than 5 per cent of the gains from trade (ibid.: 75). The concept of fiscal redistribution captures these direct interventions that governments make through taxes and transfers. A key policy concern is often their net effect on income inequality, usually expressed as the change in a summary measure such as the Gini coefficient between the primary and secondary distribution. The impact can be further disaggregated into the direct effect of taxes and mandatory social contributions and the contribution of transfers (see section 6). Tax policies play a crucial role for both aspects: They determine how much resources are at the disposal of governments for social policies, but the structure of the tax code by itself has an impact on inequality. At one extreme, income taxes can be regressive, i.e. the tax rates are lower for those with higher incomes. An example for a tax that widens inequality is the ‘poll tax’, an equal lump sum paid by every resident. However, although the top marginal tax rates have fallen substantially across the industrialized world since the 1970s, modern tax systems are still typically progressive and tax rates increase with incomes. The result is that the rich pay (or are expected to pay) a greater share of their income as taxes, and that inequality after taxes is lower than before taxes. Between these two models lie distribution-neutral regimes with flat tax rates, where everybody pays the same proportion of her or his income in tax. However, the structure of tax rates often given an incomplete picture of their redistributive impact since the rich, in particular, often take advantage of tax exemptions or find other ways to avoid paying taxes in full. This practice, euphemistically known as ‘tax optimization’ or ‘aggressive tax planning’, can undermine the intended redistributive effects of the tax code – and has re-ignited the public debate about the fairness of tax systems in many countries. Another facet of tax codes is that i

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