Capitalism K Supplement - CNDI 2023
Capitalism K Supplement - CNDI 2023.docx
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Link – UBI
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UBI is a Trojan Horse which serves as a supplement and continuation as capitalist movements in the status quo.
Hogg ’23 [David James, “‘The Left will find that it has bought a Trojan Horse’: The dialectics of universal basic income”; February 2023, Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/02610183221092151; JFan]
A ‘Trojan Horse’?
Throughout British political history, UBI has primarily been an interest of the ‘free-market right’ and the ‘pragmatic centre’ rather than the Left (Sloman, 2015: 9). Despite the idealism of the Enlightenment thinkers who first introduced the concept, the most influential of basic income proposals have been regressive, seeking to resist or weaken the welfare state. For example, Rhys-Williams’ scheme, emerging as it did amidst the post-war consensus, ‘might plausibly be read as an attempt to resist the growth of progressive taxation and the rising bargaining power of the organised working class’ (Sloman, 2018: 629). Such an impression is reinforced by her ‘ambivalence’ regarding the sum that would constitute a basic income and her concerns about ‘conditionality’ (Sloman, 2018: 629).
There is a moralising of work within the Right’s support of UBI, one of the key components that make it antithetical to any Leftist variation. Following the publication of the Beveridge Report which made the key recommendations on which the British welfare state was based Beveridge’s ideas, and the Labour government’s willingness to implement them, inspired an anxiety in Rhys-Williams and her fellow conservatives that ‘[n]ot only will the idle get as much from the State as will the industrious workers, they will get a great deal more’, which would result in an ‘undermining [of] the will to work’ (Rhys-Williams, 2004: 164). In order to combat this, Rhys-Williams argued for a “new social contract”, ‘expressed by the actual signature of a contract between the individual [...] and the State’, in which the recipient of a basic income would be obliged to ‘devote his best efforts’ to societal wealth creation in exchange for a basic safety net (2004: 167). A UBI on these terms would essentially be a form of workfare, and a comparatively timid solution when contrasted with what actually emerged as the post-war consensus.
This concern for protecting “the will to work” is implicit within the UBI pilot scheme carried out in Finland in 2017–2018. The pilot consisted of 2000 unemployed people being given a mere 560 euros a month to live on throughout the trial period, indicative of the moderate sum likely to be introduced (Kela, 2020). In simulating UBI models before the actual trial began, the academics involved found that such a low sum, despite offering more disposable income for social groups such as students and lower paid workers, would mean that ‘individuals with unemployment benefits would be the largest group of losers’, as ‘the basic income would only partially replace their existing benefits’ (Kangas et al., 2017: 90). These benefits would of course be abolished to make way for a UBI, as ‘[d]istributing a basic income to all beneficiaries on top of their current benefits would not be economically sustainable’ (Simanainen and Kangas, 2018: n.p.). Such a narrow conception of UBI should not be surprising, given Finland’s Centre-Right coalition government at the time which included the Right-wing populist Finns Party hoped the trial would help ‘diminish disincentives to working, [...] reduce bureaucracy and [...] simplify the overly complex tax-benefit system’, rather than provide more security for its poorest citizens (Kangas et al., 2017: 87).
Such concerns with efficiency and bureaucracy are central to many conservative interpretations of UBI. Many of its supporters on the Right are ‘attracted to the idea as a pragmatic solution to the failings of the existing safety-net or as a free-market alternative to wage regulation and state welfare provision’ (Sloman, 2018: 627). In other words, this version of UBI represents little more than a continuation of the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state and its attack on workers’ security. American economists Milton and Rose Friedman were key architects of this neoliberal revolution of course, and in Capitalism and Freedom advocated a basic income in order to ‘reduce the need for the social safety net and [...] its expensive, inefficient bureaucracy’ (Friedman and Friedman, 2002; Stern and Kravitz, 2016: 174). The Friedmans saw their “negative income tax” as the most efficient way of ‘dismantling [...] government interferences with the market’, typically positing this anti-welfare stance as one concerned with ‘individual liberty’ (Friedman, 2013: n.p.). Under this system, all state benefits would be abolished and replaced by a mechanism whereby above a certain threshold ‘you pay tax to the Inland Revenue; below it, they pay you’ (Gorz, 1985: 41). This would enable governments to cut off all support for those earning above an arbitrary figure which would ‘bring substantial savings’ and streamline welfare provision in the way the Friedmans and their fellow ideologues wished (Gorz, 1985: 41). The system would also tax those above the threshold at a flat rate rather than through progressive taxation, meaning the plans would also allow inequality to increase.
Although Rhys-Williams’ proposals are probably the most well-known in Britain, Sloman sees those put forward by Arthur Cockfield in the 1970s as ‘the closest any British government has come to introducing UBI’ (2018: 632). Cockfield’s proposals drew heavily on the work of the Friedmans, and like his predecessors he ‘explicitly rejected the notion of welfare rights’, wishing to be selective and exclude from the allowances those he labeled ‘the vagrants, the drifters, the drop-outs, [and] the petty criminals’ (Sloman, 2018: 632; Cockfield, 1971: cited in Sloman). Such plans to streamline welfare and the tax system were popular within the Conservative Party, which would allow them to reduce administrative costs by abolishing the PAYE method of taxation in favour of the flat rate. However, Cockfield’s plans were unable to command the bipartisan support needed to be introduced, and were later abandoned by the subsequent Labour government (Sloman, 2016).
Such emphases on reducing bureaucracy, ‘streamlining’ the welfare state and instilling a “will to work” in lower earners betray the major difference between Left- and Right-wing interpretations of basic income. However, by arguing for a version of the same reform, Leftist advocates risk masking the huge differences between these interpretations, serving as enablers for the introduction of a more regressive variation. This is a particular possibility given how policy-making processes function, and how certain stakeholders within this process are able to shape policy outcomes, which will be explored later in more detail. Milton Friedman himself was aware of this, taking great delight in warning that ‘[t]he Left, if it accepts the programme, will find that it has bought a Trojan Horse’ (2013: n.p.).
Bourgeois support for UBI is not just historic however. In the modern age, support is strong among those Zizek terms the ‘socially conscious billionaire’ (2015: 39). In his estimation, such figures ‘stand for global capital at its most seductive and “progressive” – in short, at its most dangerous’ (Zizek, 2015: 39). This most advanced faction of capital ‘ha[s] embraced UBI as a way of defusing political resistance to automation and technological change’ (Benanav, 2019a: 7). Techno-capitalists like Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk view such changes as both desirable and inevitable, and indeed both have publicly shared their support for UBI at one time or another.
Marxist political economy shows the importance of technological advances to the accumulation of capital. Marx demonstrates that capitalist growth relies fundamentally on the ‘surplus labour’ of its workers, which is the value produced beyond that which is covered by the worker’s wages. The rate at which this occurs is ‘therefore an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labour power by capital’ (Marx, 2013: 151). But capital’s endless search for further growth makes the invention of labour-saving technology vital to the increase in the rate of surplus value relative to the value the worker is paid for. This increase in ‘the productiveness of labour’ therefore means a decrease in the ‘labour-time required for the production of an article’, meaning capital is able to shorten the “necessary labour time” for which the worker is remunerated, and in turn ‘lengthen the other part of the day, during which he [sic] is at liberty to work gratis for the capitalist’ (Marx, 2013: 21; 222).
Just as working hours are not limited to those of necessary labour time, the fact that the labourer is able to produce their “means of subsistence” – the value equivalent to their wages in a shorter space of time as a result of a particular advancement in production does not then lead to a reduction in hours, but rather the opposite. Capital is able to use this new technology to squeeze the wages of those who remain in post following its introduction, as the threat of unemployment now looms large for those ‘rendered superfluous’ by this innovation (Marx, 2013: 297). The work in which this technology is employed is therefore de-valued as “unskilled” for much of it is completed by machinery with human supervision – which again spells wage cuts. In this way, even the very threat of technology – regardless of whether it is actually deployed in production ensures the employer is able to reduce wage costs, while any workplace radicalism is quelled by the insecurity such innovation inspires. For those whose jobs are lost to automation, they either ‘flood[...] all the more easily accessible branches of industry’ or join the ranks of the jobless; what Marx terms the ‘reserve army of labour’. Either way, the result ‘sinks the price of labour below its value’ (Marx, 2013: 297).
A UBI in conjunction with technological advancement is therefore entirely consistent with the demands of capital, which often repurposes reforms for its own development. In assessing the impact of the post-war welfare state, John Saville writes that it emerged not only through ‘the struggle of the working class against their exploitation’, but also as a result of ‘the requirements of industrial capitalism [...] for a more efficient environment’, in other words a healthier and more educated workforce (1957: n.p.). Similarly, UBI serves to create this “more efficient environment” through a liberating of employers from the constraints of paying full wages. Not only does the policy force the state or rather the tax payer to top-up these wages, but it continues to maintain the labour force for a comparatively lower rate. This combination of UBI and automation could well allow capital to continue increasing its profit margins while throwing at least some of its workers now guaranteed a basic income on the scrapheap.
A Universal Basic Income sustains the neoliberal order while increasing child, pension, and worker poverty and rolling back social programs
O’Boyle 21 – [Brian O'Boyle, lecturer at St. Angela’s College, "A Socialist Case Against Universal Basic Income," REBEL, 7-5-2021, http://www.rebelnews.ie/2021/07/05/universal-basic-income-socialist-case-against/] /jsam
The Left Case Against Basic Income The most striking feature of the UBI literature is the gap between its abstract promise of social improvement and the amount of money typically proposed as a payment. To allow people to avoid unsafe and degrading work a progressive UBI would presumably have to ensure a living wage. According to the Low Pay Commission in Ireland, this would mean €12.30 per hour or €460 for an average working week. With 3.5 million adults in the country this would cost €83 billion annually or more than the total amount of public spending in a normal year. To put this in context, the social protection budget for 2021 was just €25 billion meaning at least a threefold increase that would have to be paid for by taxing the rich. A progressive UBI would also have to protect the current level of service provision, meaning at least a doubling of public spending overall. Even if the rate was reduced dramatically to €1,000 per month for every citizen, it would cost €42 billion annually – far more than the current system could sustain without an enormous transformation in power relations. Faced with these realities, progressives typically capitulate to neoliberal common sense, arguing for a UBI set at a fraction of these figures. In his report to the British Labour Party for example, Professor Standing references several potential models, each of which would give people a tiny fraction of what they require to live with dignity – between £50 – £100 per week. He also references a pilot scheme advocated by the think-tank, Compass, which would give people £292 per month and simultaneously take away their existing entitlements. Even the authors of the Compass Report admit that, set at such a low level, UBI would be catastrophic, with child poverty estimated to increase by 10%, pension poverty by 4% and poverty among the working poor by 3%. When contrasted with these proposals, Social Justice Ireland’s seems more appealing, proposing a UBI of €650 per month. This would cost €40 billion annually, however, requiring a universal flat income tax rate of 40% and the loss of all core social welfare payments, except illness and disability benefits. Once again, the idea of living with dignity would be replaced with the dystopian reality of less money for welfare recipients and regressive taxes on the rest of us. Despite coming from progressive sources, each of these schemes inadvertently reproduces Milton Friedman’s vision of a UBI, replacing hard won social gains with a minimal weekly payment. Far from supporting a progressive challenge to neoliberalism, this would be a capitulation to it for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, it would be a step towards a purer form of market society as the cash nexus becomes more prominent and privatisation becomes more likely. Over the last 40 years neoliberals have attempted to wedge the market ever further into our lives, while dismantling key parts of the public sector. Once a UBI became generally acceptable, it is likely that a neoliberal state would put major pressure on the provision of public services, in favour of opening up spaces for capital to profit. In a society that has already commodified much of the housing stock it would potentially be a trojan horse for the private sector in healthcare and education. Thus, rather than de-commodifying our lives, this would extend the logic of capitalism instead of reducing it. Secondly, it would encourage employers to reduce their wage bill, safe in the knowledge that workers already had a minimal payment and no alternative welfare to fall back on. Viewed in this light, a UBI could very well represent a transfer from workers to unscrupulous employers who already have a track record of paying low wages topped up by the welfare state.
Basic income is a policy for the capitalist. It only worsens existing wealth inequalities between the capitalists and working class. We need a reorganization of our labor system to truly address these inequities.
Esteban Mercatante ‘18 {Esteban is an economist from Buenos Aires and a member of the PTS.} - ("Universal Basic Income: A Capitalist Fix to the Evils of Capitalism?," Left Voice, published 8-7-2018, accessed 7-11-2023, https://www.leftvoice.org/universal-basic-income-a-capitalist-solution-to-the-evils-of-capitalism/)//marlborough-am/
This basic income thus aims to be nothing more than a palliative measure. In the United States, for example, there is the SNAP program (“food stamps”) to provide food to people who cannot afford it. Payments such as this ameliorate the situation of the poorest sectors, but they do nothing to reduce income inequality between capitalists and workers, which has particularly exploded in the US since the 1980s. This type of program just allows this unequal income distribution to continue but with a bit less tension. Such a basic income that comes “from above” as a public social security policy will hardly be universal. Capitalist production is dependent on not only an active labor force, but also a pool of unemployed and underemployed that are ready to take up any vacancy. This “reserve army of labor” exerts a constant downward pressure on wages and has a disciplining effect on the employed sector of the working class. A government-provided allowance that enables workers to fully withdraw themselves from the labor market would dismantle this key mechanism of any capitalist system. For this reason, it will be focused only on very low-income sectors and will not even amount to a basic income, but be set at levels below the poverty line. This is the only way that a basic income can be compatible with the continued exploitation of labor in the conditions that modern capitalism in decline requires, especially in backward and dependent countries, but also in the richest imperialist economies. Basic income is a long way from being a progressive reform that ensures a decent income for all citizens. Public policies are caught between the demand for fiscal austerity and the need to contain discontent and make capitalism’s continued social degradation somehow bearable. As Michel Husson states, “Progressive partisans of an income of 1,000 euros per month may well serve as ‘useful idiots’ for the establishment of a universal income of 400 euros, for a final settlement that also advantageously reduces the operating costs of the welfare state.” 6 UBI or the Redistribution of Working Hours?Tens years after the Great Recession, some have proclaimed that the world has turned a corner, even if the turbulence of more the last couple years discredits such claims. The capitalist class is preparing new attacks on the living standards of the working class, which it must do in order to increase accumulation. A key part of this are the labor and pension (counter)-reforms being imposed around the world (from France to Brazil and Argentina). But UBI also has its part to play. The proposal for a UBI shifts debate from the terrain of class conflict to that of public policy and citizenry. This could be of great service to the capitalist class as it continues its attacks on the working class. After all, a dispute about the primary distribution of income always entails the danger that the exploited will question who controls social production and begin to organize. But if the debate is shifted to UBI, it becomes a question of secondary distribution, of income management and social security expenses. Some on the left defend UBI because it will supposedly “empower” the working class in its confrontation with capital. The logic is that an income that can cover the basic cost of living would give the working class greater bargaining power, since all workers would have a credible “exit” strategy. This position is defended by, for example, David Calnitsky in Catalyst. 7 However, this argument has some major weaknesses. All efforts by capital in recent decades have aimed at creating job insecurity, flexibility and fragmentation of the workforce. Calnitsky is right that working class power is today at a historic low. So, can we really expect the government to come up with a proposal for UBI that gets any closer to a livable income? Doing so would be naïve. Then, what we need to focus on is not a policy proposal that shifts the attention away from class struggle, but the task of organizing at workplaces, in the unions, for the working class to become again a force that needs to be reckoned with. Of course, the argument of those who propose a “dignified” basic income is
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