UBI CP - CNDI 2023
UBI CP - CNDI 2023.docx
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UBI CP – CNDI 23 1NC Toolbox 1nc – Top Text: The United States Federal Government should establish a Universal Basic Income. UBI solves the aff – it promotes growth and reduces inequality. Straubhaar ‘17 --- Thomas Straubhaar is a Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg with a research focus on international economic relations. 2017. (“On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”. Intereconomics. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2017/number/2/article/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income.html. Date Accessed: 6-22-2023. Edited for Ableist language.) The UBI is an adequate and effective way to adjust the concept of the social market economy to the age of digitisation, globalisation and the long-term trends that go along with a demographically ageing society. It is an efficient reaction to the increasing polarisation between (human) capital owners and less qualified workers who must finance their lives with labour income stemming from low-paid jobs.18 The social market economy follows a simple principle: it wants to “dissolve a merely imaginary contradiction between liberal and social worldviews in the peaceful way of social irenics”, which means with harmonious reconciliation.19 Freedom and social justice, market efficiency and social equilibrium are not mutually exclusive – indeed, they are mutually dependent. The simplicity of the basic idea makes the concept of the social market economy so powerful. The main focus lies in the separation of allocation and redistribution. “The fundamental meaning of the social market economy is to link the principle of freedom in the markets with the principal of social balance.”20 A free market economy based on the principle of free allocation of production factors and prices that reflect supply and demand in competitive markets creates the greatest possible value added. Generating the highest value added possible is the most powerful precondition for the socially oriented redistribution from the economically strong to the economically weak. While the extent of redistribution requires a (normative) political discussion, the (positive) economic analysis can convincingly demonstrate that a “blind” [random] social policy is the most effective, most efficient and thus the most equitable social policy.21 An efficient social policy should support people, and not specific factors of production or regional or sectoral industries. Furthermore, it should refrain from paternalistic behaviour and simply flow unconditionally. The fundamental aim should be to redistribute some degree of purchasing power from people with higher incomes to those with lower incomes. Direct individual payments to economically weaker people are more targeted, less expensive and more effective than indirect measures which require the fulfilment of specific criteria, particular preconditions or certain behaviours, for example, the requirement of being employed or at least searching for employment, or the attainment of a specified age. It is part of the tragedy of a misunderstood social policy that it attempts to reach a political goal with unsuitable means. Social-politically motivated interventions in the markets’ mechanisms are inappropriate. In many cases, they provoke outcomes that are the opposite of what should be achieved. They lead to unnecessary duplicate structures and an expensive bureaucracy. Many people receive financial support through the current procedure via the social insurance system, only to have that support contradicted through the tax system. The UBI completely replaces today’s social insurance systems. At first glance, this may appear to be a dismantling of social rights and claims. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that such a judgement is based on a fallacy. Using Germany as an example, the country’s current social insurance schemes are neither efficient, nor do they achieve their socio-political objectives with the required precision. Redistribution is a public good and therefore a (normative) political goal that should be financed by taxes. Insurance is a mathematical calculation. It would therefore be sufficient to ensure that insurance works efficiently and to concentrate on the efficient allocation and management of risks (and not to overload the capacities of insurance with redistribution issues). Fairness and goals of justice should be approached with specific instruments for redistribution – not with insurance. The negative income tax aspect of a UBI completely fulfils this basic requirement of the social market economy concept. Insurance payments should therefore be calculated according to purely actuarial rules and should be paid by the insured themselves. It is only after this efficiency requirement is satisfied that the social policy component begins: those who are financially unable to pay the individual insurance contribution should receive state subsidies. Inevitably, these state subsidies would have to be financed not by wage levies but by general taxes. And of course, it is a normative question that is up for political debate regarding the kinds of risks a basic insurance should cover and the degree to which public subsidies should allow poor people to pay private insurance fees to cover basic risks. Even the concept of “equal funding” (meaning that employers and employees are both responsible for similar shares in the financing of social security payments) is misleading. As a technical matter, these payments are indeed split into separate parts – one that goes directly to the worker and another that goes to the social security system. In fact, however, it is always the employee who pays the entire amount, and it is his or her money – and not the employer’s – that flows into the social security systems. From the employer’s point of view, contributions to pension insurance are simply costs, and whether such payments are made directly to the employee in the form of higher wages or into a social security system is immaterial. Without “equal funding”, therefore, the gross income of employees would be correspondingly higher.22 Neither the transparency nor the inefficiency of today’s social insurance is necessary. Social policy measures can be strictly separated into redistribution and insurance instruments. A clear separation into the generation (allocation) and distribution of (market) income would be necessary. It is precisely this separation that makes the social market economy such a successful concept. It is also the core of a UBI. The UBI follows the principle that economic efficiency and social justice are not opposites. They can be harmoniously combined and, moreover, they complement one another. “The unconditional basic income unites the social with the liberal: it is liberal because it is unconditional, and social because it is for everyone. It is equal for everyone – and at the same time allows everyone to be different.”23 Like the social market economy, the UBI consistently separates the allocation of income and the distribution of income. It frees the labour market from social-political redistribution tasks. But it also corrects the distribution effects of the labour market. It takes something away from the better-off to give it to those who earn little or nothing. Freedom, personal responsibility and competition should enable an efficient allocation of production factors. In a first step, a free market economy would allow the maximising of the value added. In a second step, goals of justice, fairness and the guarantee of equal opportunities provide good reasons for a complementary social policy. However, to achieve and to secure social aims is a duty for all and not just a task for the payrolls of lower-paid workers. Therefore, equity and distribution intentions ought to be financed through taxation levied on all kinds of income – i.e. stemming from all different forms of labour and capital income. The UBI wants to create the best possible (pre-)conditions for people willing to work. If as many people as possible are working in (well-paid) jobs, there are also more funds available for the support of the economically weak. That is why everything must be done to enable people to work and earn their own incomes. The UBI empowers people, irrespective of gender, age and preconditions. It makes it easier for people to live according to their own ideas, wishes and norms. Not everyone will take advantage of these opportunities, but at least the options are open to everybody. The UBI would empower people to more readily take on some risks of daily life. If people are assured that a failure will not lead to a bottomless case of destitution and poverty, and that their subsistence minimum is secured, they will assess future challenges as opportunities rather than threats. This applies to all people, and not just to those who behave in accordance with social norms and traditional values or behaviours. On the contrary, nonconformists often help to see the world through different eyes and from novel perspectives. New ideas and innovative solutions can emerge from the new thinking of outsiders. The economics of insurance behaviour can convincingly show that insured people are willing to accept more risks.24 And a larger share of risk-takers within the total population correlates positively with the macroeconomic performance of a society. This empirical observation is the justification for compulsory insurance, for example motor vehicle liability insurance or health and accident insurance. However, the positive correlation between being insured and taking more risks also contains sound economic reasons for a state social policy which serves the purpose of securing the subsistence minimum for everybody. A UBI is comparatively better – the CP alone avoids bureaucratic inefficiency, private sector crowd-out, and alienation. Standing ’19 (Guy, Professorial Research Associate, PhD Prof at University of London, and a council member of the Progressive Economy Forum. “Basic Income as Common Dividends: Piloting a Transformative Policy,” 2019, http://www.revistaprimerapiedra.cl/PDF/documentos/PEF_Piloting_Basic_Income_Guy_Standing2019.pdf)-mikee The claim made in this report is that a basic income would promote social justice, freedom and basic security while combating the eight giants, in ways that other possible policies would not. But some other proposals have been made as alternatives. One deserves scrutiny, given the widespread advocacy of it. From time to time, there is a surge in advocacy of a job guarantee for everyone, or for everyone ‘able to work’. It is happening again, from a slew of politicians and social scientists positioning themselves on the centre left, as social democrats. In the USA, several prominent Democrat senators and possible candidates for the next presidential election have said they support the idea, including Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, Kamala Harris and Kirsten Gillibrand. In Britain The Guardian has endorsed it unequivocally as ‘a welcome return to a politics of work’.130 The Guardian claimed a job guarantee policy ‘would secure a basic human right to engage in productive employment’. Throughout history, the vast majority of people would have found that a very strange ‘human right’.131 Having a job is to be in a position of subordination, reporting to and obeying a boss in return for payment. Indeed, historically the words ‘job’, ‘jobbing’ and ‘jobholder’ were terms of regret and even pity, referring to someone with a bits-and-pieces existence. Subordination and alienation have also been at the heart of labour law, which is based on the master-servant model. The newspaper added that the job guarantee ‘would only offer employment undersupplied by the private sector’, singling out ‘environmental clean-up’ and ‘social care’. These may sound appealing on paper but represent a narrow and unattractive range of jobs to be offered. They also bear more than a passing resemblance to the menial jobs convicted offenders are obliged to undertake under ‘community payback’ schemes. The practical objections become evident as soon as the details are considered: what jobs, who would be responsible for providing them, who would qualify to be offered them, what would the jobs pay and for how many hours, who would pay, how much would it cost to supervise participants and to police compliance with the job’s requirements, and what would be the effects on other workers and on the wider economy? To start with, identifying jobs to be provided and administering the process would be a bureaucratic nightmare (witness the shambles of many ‘community payback’ schemes, even though they are on a small scale and the labour they offer is ‘free’). And, when asked what type of job would be guaranteed, proponents never suggest the guaranteed jobs would match people’s skills and qualifications, instead falling back on low-skill, low-wage jobs they would not dream of for themselves or their children. Then other questions arise. If guaranteed jobs are providing desired services or goods, and are subsidised, there must be substitution effects – guaranteeing jobs now taken by others - and deadweight effects - putting people in jobs that would have been created anyhow. If somebody is given a guaranteed job at the minimum wage, what happens to others already doing such jobs? Would the job guarantee agency guarantee their jobs as well, with no decline in wages if they happened to be higher? If the unemployed were offered a job at a minimum wage subsidised by the state, this would increase the vulnerability of others, either displacing them or lowering their income. Ro Khanna, a California Democrat congressman, has said firms would not be allowed to hire subsidised workers if they were substitutes for previous employees.132 Clever employers could find ways round that. However, it would also be unfair. Why should a firm coming into a market be subsidised relative to one that has been in it for a while, giving the newcomer an unfair advantage? The Guardian further claimed, without citing evidence, that a job guarantee scheme would not be inflationary because ‘any restructuring of relative wages would be a oneoff event’. This contradicts generations of research. If all were guaranteed a job, what would stop wage-push inflation? The only restraining factors would be fear of automation and more offshoring. But it would hardly be fear, as a job would be guaranteed anyhow! The gross cost of a job guarantee might outweigh the net gain. If the government guaranteed the minimum wage in guaranteed jobs, those in jobs paying less (or working fewer than the guaranteed hours) might quit or find ways to be made redundant, so they could have a guaranteed job instead. Social democrats might like that, as it would mean better-paying jobs for more of the underemployed and precariat. But the fiscal cost would be daunting. For example, in the UK, over 60% of those regarded as poor are in jobs or have someone in their household who is.133 Would they all become eligible for a guaranteed good job? At its unlikely best, a job guarantee would be paternalistic. It presumes the government knows what is best for individuals, who would be offered a necessarily limited range of jobs at its disposal. Suppose someone was pressed to take a guaranteed job on a construction site (‘infrastructure’, a favoured area for guaranteed jobs) and that person proved incompetent and was injured. Would the job guarantee agency be held responsible and pay compensation? It should, since it put the person in that position. How would that be factored into the costing of a job guarantee scheme? Similarly, if a person put into a ‘social care’ job was negligent and caused harm or distress to the care recipient, would the latter be able to sue the job guarantee agency for compensation? In addition, a job-guarantee scheme would spring a familiar trap – the phoney distinction between those who ‘can work’ and would thus be eligible for a guaranteed job and those ‘who cannot work’.134 In Britain, this has led to demeaning and stigmatising ‘capacity-to-work’ and ‘availability-for-work’ tests, resulting in discriminatory action against disabled and vulnerable people, and those with care responsibilities. Another failing of the job guarantee route is the mapping of a path to ‘workfare’. What would happen to somebody who declined to accept the guaranteed job? They would be labelled ‘lazy’ or ‘choosy’ and thus ‘ungrateful’ and ‘socially irresponsible’. Yet there are many reasons for refusing a job. Studies show that accepting a job below a person’s qualifications can lower their income and social status for the long term. As what is happening in the current UK benefit system attests, those not taking jobs allocated to them would face benefit sanctions, and be directed into jobs, whether they liked them or not. Jobs done in resentment or under duress are unlikely to be done well. A job guarantee would be a recipe for perpetuating low productivity. What would happen if a person in a guaranteed job performed poorly, perhaps because of limited ability or simply because they knew it was ‘guaranteed’? If you are guaranteed a job, why bother to work hard? If you are an employer and are given a subsidy to pay employees guaranteed a job, why bother to try to use labour efficiently? If subsidised through tax credits or a wage subsidy, a worker would need to produce only a little more value than the cost to the employer to make it profitable to retain him or her. This would cheapen low-productivity jobs relative to others and inhibit the higher productivity arising from labour-displacing technological change. If a job of a certain type is guaranteed, what happens if an employer wishes to invest in technology that would remove the need for such jobs? Those calling for a job guarantee also ignore the fact that any market economy requires some unemployment, as people need time to search for jobs they are prepared to accept, and firms must sift applicants for jobs they want to have done. To adopt a job guarantee policy would risk putting the economy in gridlock. Job guarantee advocates, such as Larry Summers, President Clinton’s former Treasury Secretary, argue that people without jobs ‘are much more likely to be dissatisfied with their lives’ and are more likely to be drug addicts and abusive than those with even low-wage jobs.135 This is bogus. I suggest there would be no correlation between life satisfaction and having a job if the comparison was made between those in lousy jobs and those with no job but an adequate income on which to live. Somebody facing a choice between penury and a lousy job will prefer the job. But that does not mean they like or want it for itself. The polling company Gallup conducts regular State of the Global Workplace surveys in over 150 countries. In 2017, it found that globally only 15% of workers were engaged by their job, and in no country did the figure exceed 40%. One recent UK survey found that 37% of jobholders did not think their job made any significant contribution. Summers ends his article by equivocating – ‘the idea of a jobs guarantee should be taken seriously but not literally’. He seems to mean government should try to promote more employment, through ‘wage subsidies, targeted government spending, support for workers with dependants, and more training and job-matching programmes’. In other words, he reverts to the standard social democratic package that has not done very well in the past three decades. Besides being a recipe for labour inefficiency and labour market distortions, tending to displace workers employed in the ‘free’ labour market and to depress their wages, the job guarantee proposal fails to recognise that today’s crisis is structural and requires transformative policies. Tax credits, job guarantees and statutory minimum wages would barely touch the precariat’s ex
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