Single Payer Aff - CNDI 2023
Single Payer Aff - CNDI 2023.docx
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AFF 1AC Plan Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by expanding Social Security to include Medicare for All. Advantage 1 – Health Care U.S. public health is a patchwork system-lack of consistency between state and local levels. Wallace and Sharfstein ‘22 Megan Wallace and Joshua M. Sharfstein, 2022, Dr.P.H. and M.D, “The Patchwork U.S. Public Health System,” New England Journal of Medicine, 6 January 2022, https://www.afdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/patchwork-US-public-health-system.pdf, @KK The response to foodborne illness — a quintessential public health activity — is a microcosm of the uneven patchwork that characterizes all of U.S. public health. In the shadow of a pandemic, understanding this haphazard architecture is a step toward appreciating the U.S. paradox of enormous health expenditures but poor outcomes for population health. To begin with, there is no clear administrative structure that organizes the many federal agencies involved in public health (see table). Twenty-one major federal agencies have a role in pandemic preparedness and response, for example, and more than 100 federal offices have been engaged in work during the Covid-19 pandemic. At the state and local levels, variation is the rule, not the exception. Twenty-nine state health departments stand alone, and the others are part of larger health and human services agencies. About half of states have a board of health to provide guidance for public health activities; in the other half, no such board exists. About two thirds of state health officials are appointed by the governor, and the other third are appointed by the secretary of the larger human services agency, a state public health board, or some other entity. Similarly, there is little consistency in the relationships between state and local health departments. In 7 states, the state health department operates all local health offices; in 30 states, local health departments operate largely without state control; and in the remainder, various amounts of collaboration occur. A 2012 review noted the challenge of classification: “Even in states that are considered centralized, it is not uncommon for local government entities to exhibit some authority; likewise, in some decentralized states, state government has some powers regarding the local health unit.”2 There are about 2800 local health departments in the United States, most of which serve fewer than 50,000 people. About half of local health departments report to a local board of health, which may be an elected body such as a county council or an independently appointed group. Another 20% work with the local board of health in an advisory capacity. The activities undertaken by health departments also vary. In 1994, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services convened the Core Public Health Functions Steering Committee to define the 10 Essential Public Health Services, a list that was recently updated by a coalition of public health groups (see box) to center equity and include addressing structural causes of poor health, including poverty, racism, and gender discrimination. The federal agencies and state health departments have broad responsibilities, but typically, local health departments perform less than half of vital public health activities. The lack of universal insurance makes a bioterror attack increasingly likely. Kahn 17 – Laura H Kahn, physician and research scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, M.D. from Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, a Master of Public Health from Columbia University and a Master of Public Policy from Princeton University, formerly managing physician for the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, a medical officer for the Food and Drug Administration in Rockville, Maryland, an attending physician/educator at Prince George’s Hospital in Cheverly, Maryland and a staff physician at Gouverneur Hospital (“Why access to health care is a national security issue,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 5th, http://thebulletin.org/why-access-health-care-national-security-issue10819) As the Congressional Budget Office report suggests, the American Health Care Act would make healthcare essentially unaffordable for people with pre-existing conditions, because it would allow insurance companies to dramatically increase their premiums. Ten years ago, I wrote about the security impact of the uninsured during the George W. Bush presidency. In 2005, almost 47 million people (about 16 percent of the total US population) were uninsured. Thanks to the Affordable Care Act passed under the Obama administration, that number dropped to a low of 11 percent, according to a Gallup poll taken during the first quarter of 2016. The Affordable Care Act was a big step in the right direction, but it didn’t close the gap, and the national security and public health challenges of having a large fraction of the population uninsured remain as relevant today as they were a decade ago. Uninsured people delay seeking health care. Once they seek it, often in a busy emergency room, they are typically given less attention than people with insurance. This failure to get care becomes a danger not only for the individual but for the public at large when the problem is a deadly infectious disease. We saw this scenario play out in Dallas during the Ebola crisis of 2014 and 2015. A poor Liberian man, infected with the virus, presented himself to Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital with severe abdominal pain and a high fever. He was examined and sent home with a bottle of antibiotics. Amazingly, he did not set off an Ebola outbreak in his community, though the risk that he could have was significant and the wider public shouldn’t count on being so lucky next time. Before dying, he infected two nurses who had received inadequate training and equipment to protect themselves. During the anthrax crisis of 2001, in which spores of the deadly disease were sent through the US mail, many people infected were federal employees with health insurance. If these postal workers hadn’t had easy access to health care, the death toll might have been higher than only five; 17 more were infected but survived thanks to timely medical attention. Anthrax spores do not spread from person to person, but it’s no stretch to imagine a different scenario: Suppose a future attack involves smallpox, a highly communicable virus, and that the initial victims are uninsured childcare workers or food handlers. The initial signs of smallpox include fever, chills, and headache. Uninsured victims would likely delay trying to get care, hoping for the symptoms to pass. By waiting they would certainly expose others to the virus, potentially setting of a pandemic. Countries like Canada, which has universal health coverage and a well-funded public health infrastructure, are much better prepared to handle deadly epidemics. In 2003, Canada confronted Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which originated in China. A physician from Guangdong province inadvertently infected a number of tourists with the SARS virus, setting off a global pandemic after everyone returned to their home countries. Among the infected travelers was an elderly Canadian woman who returned to Toronto after a 10-day vacation in Hong Kong. Over the course of about four months, the Canadian health system worked hard to contain the virus, treating 400 people who became ill and quarantining 25,000 Toronto residents who may have been exposed. Ultimately, 44 people died from the disease in Canada, but the result would have been much worse without a quick and well-organized response. The Canadian government’s response had its glitches—primarily in the form of poor political leadership. Mel Lastman, the mayor of Toronto and a former furniture salesman, became angry when the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a travel advisory against his city. He railed against the WHO’s decision on television, revealing his complete lack of knowledge about either the organization or public health in general. As a result of Lastman’s poor leadership, he was ultimately relegated to a secondary role as the deputy mayor took his place. Lastman’s credibility and legitimacy never recovered from the SARS outbreak. Likewise, US leaders will be judged by how they handle a bioterrorist attack or pandemic. Unlike Canada, America’s piecemeal healthcare and public health systems are inherently less able to handle such crises. The Affordable Care Act helped fill in the gaps, but really, the only way to prepare for the eventuality of pandemics or bioterrorist attacks is with a single-payer government-run system that covers everyone. The United States might consider modeling its health care system after the one in Israel, a country that, given longstanding threats, takes every terrorist risk very seriously. In 1994, it established universal health coverage for all citizens. The country’s Ministry of Health monitors and promotes public health, oversees the operations of the nation’s hospitals, and sets healthcare priorities. As a result, Israel’s public health, emergency response, and hospital systems are state-of-the-art, highly efficient, and coordinated—a necessity when responding to terrorist attacks. The preamble to the US Constitution states the goals to “provide for the common defense” and “promote the general Welfare.” The US government won’t fulfill either of these duties if it fails to protect its citizens against pandemics and bioterrorism. The mandate requires a robust public health infrastructure and a universal healthcare system that covers all Americans. The Trump Administration and Congressional Republicans threaten to undermine this essential function of government, unnecessarily jeopardizing American lives. Advances in biotechnology over the past couple years have created capabilities for a major bioterror attack soon. Hummel and Burpo et al ‘22 [Stephen and F. John, Combatting Terrorism Center, “A New Age of Bioterror: Anticipating Exploitation of Tunable Viral Agents”, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/F-John-Burpo-2/publication/360264660_A_New_Age_of_Bioterror_Anticipating_Exploitation_of_Tunable_Viral_Agents/links/626c54eb0df856128f87c609/A-New-Age-of-Bioterror-Anticipating-Exploitation-of-Tunable-Viral-Agents.pdf] @SL Advances in technology, particularly biotechnology, over the past decade have dramatically changed the world. Scientists are employing gene editing tools to cure genetic diseases, reduce the effects of climate change, and generate sustainable food sources. These same tools, however, can be used to modify pathogens to develop and deploy novel biological weapons. The nature of these tools and our understanding of specific viral genomes makes this process tunable. Components of a disease such as transmissibility, lethality, and the infectious window can potentially be modified for desired tactical, operational, or strategic effects. While this capability is currently beyond the skills and knowledge of the biology enthusiast, a trained individual would possess such skills and knowledge, though they may lack the necessary material and infrastructure support. Hence, it is necessary to develop and maintain capabilities that can respond to a variety of pathogens and possible effects. The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Wuhan, China, in November 2019 and its subsequent worldwide spread has had tremendously destabilizing effects, which are still being felt more than two years later. Lessons from COVID variants include immediate impacts at the local level (initial variant), global pandemic effects from the Delta variant to include significant and protracted economic impact, and the more sub-lethal, sustained economic, political, and healthcare impacts of the Omicron strain. The global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has also highlighted the ongoing biological revolution that has resulted in the rapid development and employment of new diagnostic tests, vaccines, and other targeted treatments including monoclonal antibodies and antiviral drugs. Over the past decade, the intersection of technology (e.g., computer science, automation, DNA sequencing) and biology has expanded exponentially, becoming embedded in economies and society. This intersection, along with the demonstrated impacts of SARS-CoV-2, is fraught with opportunities and risks. The tools for curing genetic diseases, reducing the effects of climate change, and generating sustainable food sources are now being developed and tested. Yet, these same gene editing tools could be employed to generate and modify biological weapons, making it important for both the counterterrorism community and scientific community to anticipate how the scientific advances may change the bioterrorism threat landscape. Bioterrorism limits U.S. military response options and forces nuclear war Pifer et al. ’10, Steven Pifer, Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf, @BC It is such a prospect that led University of Maryland scholar John Steinbruner to note “One can imagine killing more people with an advanced pathogen than with the current nuclear weapons arsenals.” The state developing this BW agent might simultaneously develop a vaccine against the new disease and use that vaccine to inoculate its own people. It might then use the biological pathogen as a weapon, or a threat, against another country. That could be a country it was interested in conquering; it could also threaten use against the United States and broader international community, to deter other countries from coming to the rescue of another state being attacked directly by the aggressor (analogous to how Saddam Hussein would have liked to deter the U.S.-led coalition from coming to Kuwait’s aid in 1990-1991). If the United States faced the prospect of millions of its own citizens, or hundreds of thousands of its own troops, becoming sick as it considered a response to aggression, and its only recourse was conventional retaliation, its range of options could be limited. Indeed, the very troops called on to carry out the retaliation might become vulnerable to the disease, jeopardizing their physical capacity to execute the conventional operation. Perhaps they could be well protected on the battlefield, once suited up, but they could be vulnerable before deployment, along with the rest of the American population. A potential adversary, seeing these possibilities, might find the concept of such an advanced pathogen very appealing. Would there be a clear and definitive policy or moral argument against the use of a nuclear weapon in retaliation for a BW attack that killed hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of Americans? If the origin of the attack could be identified, as it might well be under numerous scenarios like the one sketched above, and if huge numbers of American civilians had been targeted, the case for restraint would be hard to make. At the least, it might be no stronger than the case for absorbing a nuclear weapons strike and choosing not to retaliate. What if the United States thought a biological attack by an aggressor imminent? Or what if it had already suffered one attack and others seemed possible? In such circumstances, there could be potential value in a nuclear retaliatory threat against the belligerent state, warning that any future use of biological attacks against the American people or U.S. allies might produce a nuclear response. A strong national health system prepares us against bioterrorism. Houser 22 [Ryan Scott Houser has a Master of Science in Biohazardous Threat Agents and Emerging Infectious Diseases and an Executive Master of Professional Studies in Emergency and Disaster Management from Georgetown University among other graduate and professional degrees. His research critically examines health security, biological threats, emergency preparedness, law, and medicine, “The Role of Public Health Emergency Management in Biodefense: A COVID-19 Case Study,” Cambridge University Press, 05/02/2022, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9253437/] WC Promote strong, effective leadership and coordination: The United States must commit to a collaborative framework that integrated public health and its preparedness domains into the biodefense infrastructure that is currently heavily focused in law enforcement entities focused on preventing terrorism. Public health emergencies that are a result of an infectious disease outbreak or even a bioweapon, require national coordination since biological agents are not easily isolated. Effective coordination of response by state, local, tribal and territorial authorities are crucial to a successful response and mitigation of devastating impacts. Clear and effective leadership can assist with promoting all-hazard preparedness and operation response coordination during public health emergencies. This coordination must also focus on federal efforts an infectious disease outbreaks and bioweapons have the potential to span the nation. ASPR must integrate with FEMA to ensure coordination through the emergency management cycle, including the pre-incident phases. ASPR has a crucial role in coordinating the important resources of the Department of Health and Human Services along with other federal medical and public health expertise that will be necessary to support local and state departments. Coordination will allow for the adequate distribution of the right care to those in need, a major gap of the COVID-19 pandemic. Strengthen public-private-government partnerships: Biothreats require a lot of government response in order to be successful. Expanding, strengthening, and sustaining partnerships between government agencies, the private sector, and academia will be critical for preparing and responding to the next threat. Operation Warp Speed and partnerships through the National Emerging Special Pathogen Training and Education Center and Regional Disaster Health Response System were vital to the expansion and mobilization of medical capacities and capabilities needed to address the gaps during the pandemic. Steady state agreements and cooperation can better improve our capabilities, capacities, and resources to prevent, mitigate, and respond to any biothreat no matter the source. These partnerships will help ensure a collaborative approach to response that does not place the federal government, state governments, and private entities in competition for the resources necessary to save lives. Universal healthcare is uniquely key – it allows for rapid and efficient detection programs that minimize the harm of disease in the United States. Galvania et al 20 – Professor of Epidemiology at the Yale School of Public Health and the Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Modeling and Analysis. Alison Galvania, Alyssa Parpia, Abhishek Padney, Charlotte Zimmer, James Kahn, and Meagam Fitzpatrick, June 2020, “The imperative for universal healthcare to curtail the COVID-19 outbreak in the USA,” The Lancet, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/eclinm/article/PIIS2589-5370(20)30124-3/fulltext The COVID-19 outbreak in the United States is growing steeply and spreading widely. As of March 26, national incidence surpassed every other country, and as of April 28 has reported over a million cases. The COVID-19 crisis is exposing the systemic frailties in our healthcare system. More than 78 million people in America do not have access to adequate health insurance [[1]]. Given that health insurance in the US is typically provi
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