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2023 CNDI Disadvantage

Military Readiness DA - CNDI 2023

Military Readiness DA - CNDI 2023.docx

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Military recruiting is on the brink—numbers are low, but not catastrophic
AP 6/11
Associated Press. “Uncle Sam wants migrants. Facing shortages, military recruiters trade citizenship for service.” Business Insider. 6/11/2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-recruitment-shortage-target-immigrants-migrants-citizenship-army-navy-2023-6 LJS
Struggling to overcome recruiting shortfalls, the Army and the Air Force have bolstered their marketing to entice legal residents to enlist, putting out pamphlets, working social media and broadening their outreach, particularly in inner cities. One key element is the use of recruiters with similar backgrounds to these potential recruits. "It is one thing to hear about the military from locals here, but it is something else when it's from your fellow brother, from the country you're from," said Bidari, who was contacted by Army Staff Sgt. Kalden Lama, the Dallas recruiter, on a Facebook group that helps Nepalese people in America connect with one another. "That brother was in the group and he was recruiting and he told me about the military." The military has had success in recruiting legal immigrants, particularly among those seeking a job, education benefits and training as well as a quick route to becoming an American citizen. But they also require additional security screening and more help filling out forms, particularly those who are less proficient in English. Both the Army and the Air Force say they will not meet their recruiting goals this year, and the Navy also expects to fall short. Pulling more from the legal immigrant population may not provide large numbers, but any small boosts will help. The Marine Corp is the only service on pace to meet its goal. The shortfalls have led to a wide range of new recruiting programs, ad campaigns and other incentives to help the services compete with often higher-paying, less risky jobs in the private sector. Defense leaders say young people are less familiar with the military, are drawn more to corporate jobs that provide similar education and other benefits, and want to avoid the risk of injury and death that service in defense of the United States could bring. In addition, they say that little more than 20% meet the physical, mental and character requirements to join.
A job guarantee wrecks enlistment—high vs low unemployment trends
Crow 19
Mark J., Academy Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York and the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. “Economic and Social Determinants of Military Labor Supply: Essays on the Effects of Local Labor Market Conditions and the Opioid Crisis and Service in the U.S. Army.” University of Michigan. 2019. Pp 103-105. LJS
Overall, my results suggest that the employment-to-population ratio is strongly related to the number of individuals expressing interest in enlisting in the military. Specifically, my findings show a decreasing employment-to-population ratio results in more individuals applying to the military which directly results in more individuals entering onto active duty (accessions). However, there is also a concomitant increase in the rate of those disqualified. This implies the individuals being influenced to apply for military service by worsening labor market conditions are relatively less qualified to serve on active duty. When examining my results by applicant quality, the differential impact of the employment-to-population ratio on enlistment behavior becomes clearer: the overall increase in applicants and accessions is driven by increases in both high and low-quality individuals with low-quality responding at higher rates. These results suggest that the sensitivity of low-quality individuals to labor market conditions, previously uninvestigated, is larger than for high quality individuals. Specifically, decreases in the employment-to-population ratio increase the rate of low-quality applicants and accessions more than the rate of high-quality applicants and accessions by factors of six and two, respectively. This is consistent with the notion that low-quality individuals might be the most vulnerable in periods of increasing unemployment and likely have the fewest civilian labor market options. This, however, does not comport with a “crowding out” story where the ability of low-quality recruits to enlist during periods of economic contraction is impacted by the number of high-quality individuals expressing interest in the military (Ellwood and Wise 1987).84 The causal estimates in my findings, while similar in sign, are larger than the OLS estimates I report and that have been found in previous studies. This indicates that existing literature that neglected the correlation between changes in labor supply and economic conditions likely underestimated the effect of labor demand shocks on the enlistment response of both high and low-quality individuals.
Enlistment key to US military readiness—modern warfare and great power competition
Tiron 22
Roxana, staff writer. “US Military Faces Biggest Recruiting Hurdles in 50 Years (1).” Bloomberg Government. 9/21/2023. https://about.bgov.com/news/us-military-services-face-biggest-recruiting-hurdles-in-50-years/ LJS
The US military is facing the greatest recruiting challenge in almost half a century, since the inception of the volunteer service, Pentagon leaders are warning Congress. “The Department anticipates we will collectively miss our recruiting mission despite accessing more than 170,000 remarkable young men and women” in the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, Stephanie Miller, deputy assistant secretary of defense for military personnel policy, said Wednesday in prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee. “This constitutes an unprecedented mission gap and is reason for concern.” While all the military services struggle to attract new recruits, the Army’s hurdles in particular paint a troubling picture for Pentagon leaders. Despite reducing its recruiting goals, the largest military service is falling more than 10,000 soldiers short this year, and is projecting a gap of at least 21,000 active-duty troops in 2023. The US depends on strong, all-volunteer forces to carry out its foreign policy and defend strategic interests. Military leaders often say their services are only as good as their people. With operations shifting to the realms of cyber, artificial intelligence, and hypersonic weapons, and China and Russia challenging US leadership globally, the lack of qualified recruits could become a fundamental national security handicap [impediment]. Military services have had to contend with recruiting hurdles such as mental and physical health posed by the coronavirus pandemic, and now must compete in a tight labor market against private companies that often offer more alluring benefits. “There is no sunlight on the horizon,” said Sen. Thom Tillis (N.C.), the panel’s top Republican. “It’s becoming clear the all-volunteer force that has served our country well over the last 50 years is at an inflection point.”
Readiness key to block revisionist powers, prevent terrorism, and deter great power war
Kagan 2017 - Senior Fellow @ Brookings Robert, "Backing Into World War III," Feb 6, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/
Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident. In recent years, both pillars have been shaken. The democratic order has weakened and fractured at its core. Difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, and a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism have together produced a crisis of confidence not only in the democracies but in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project elevated universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and to the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and facilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism, an increasing focus on the Other in all societies, and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We are witnessing the opposite of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” History is returning with a vengeance and with it all the darker aspects of the human soul, including, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of confusion and incoherence. The Dark Ages 2.0 This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable, a recurring phenomenon produced by inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy. In the 1930s, economic crisis and rising nationalism led many to doubt whether either democracy or capitalism was preferable to alternatives such as fascism and communism. And it is no coincidence that the crisis of confidence in liberalism accompanied a simultaneous breakdown of the strategic order. Then, the question was whether the United States as the outside power would step in and save or remake an order that Britain and France were no longer able or willing to sustain. Now, the question is whether the United States is willing to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power or whether Americans are prepared to take the risk — if they even understand the risk — of letting the order collapse into chaos and conflict. That willingness has been in doubt for some time, well before the election of Trump and even before the election of Barack Obama. Increasingly in the quarter century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always clearly served — and when the United States seems to be making all the sacrifices while others benefit. Few remember the reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century. The millennial generation born after the end of the Cold War can hardly be expected to understand the lasting significance of the political, economic, and security structures established after World War II. Nor are they likely to learn much about it in

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