DA - Natural Gas - MNDI 2023 HPA
DA - Natural Gas - MNDI 2023 HPA.docx
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DA – Natural Gas – MNDI HPA Notes Thanks to Aarin Agarwal, Yuna Hahm, West Kauper, Liora Kalinovskiy, Emma Lee, Emma McGough, Nidhi Pandya, Jane Park, Brooks Patterson, Juan Rosado, Hagen Thompson for their hard work on the file. Special shout out to Kurt Fifelski for contributing input, cites and evidence for the file. You can substitute the Pugliaresi 2023 evidence in the 1nc for a specific link if you have one. The Miles 2022 evidence is not vital for the 1nc because it has a lot of overlap with the Collins 2022 evidence but it is still the best card for the signal / certainty internal link to Russia. I included the link uniqueness evidence from the Rare Earths DA starter packet file about the lack of new clean energy. This *should* be a claim that most climate affirmatives concede to win uniqueness for their advantage but there is a possibility for a trickier advantage about clean energy being inevitable domestically and globally and that the U.S. needs to speed up its development to win a clean energy race with China or other competitors. The renewables link could go one of two ways and I wouldn’t read both in the same debate because there is tension between them. I *think* most teams reading a climate advantage will commit to a “yes renewables, no natural gas” stance so the “competition” link narrative is best. If a team says that natural gas would be required for baseload capacity to address intermittency problems with renewables, then you should frame the link as a different tradeoff – ie that more domestic demand for renewables will make less available to export abroad or increased demand drives up prices that makes it less desirable for others. 1nc DA Natural Gas Strong U.S. natural gas production is keeping prices affordable and a wave of LNG export terminals are coming online Jones, 6/22/2023 - International Banker [Alexander, 22 June 2023, International Banker, “Why Natural-Gas Prices Have Crashed” internationalbanker.com/brokerage/why-natural-gas-prices-have-crashed/ Accessed 25 June 2023, NP] In the United States, meanwhile, booming natural-gas production has been cited as one of the main factors responsible for the price decline. Already the world’s largest natural-gas producer, the US is now pumping out vast quantities of natural gas, with the country’s biggest shale field—the Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico—producing record-high gas volumes for every month this year thus far, according to the U.S. EIA. Much of this supply uptick has come in concert with the rise in crude-oil production off the back of higher oil prices. “About a third of US gas production is associated gas—produced from oil wells,” Jacques Rousseau, a managing director at research firm ClearView Energy Partners, told Reuters in early April. “This production is unlikely to decline given current oil prices.” As such, the amount of gas sitting in storage in the US is around one-fifth higher than is normal for this time of year. One also cannot ignore the outsized impact LNG (liquefied natural gas) is now having on the natural-gas market, with a wave of new export terminals coming online over the next few years likely to weigh heavily on prices. Indeed, with gas supplies from Russia to Europe being severely curtailed, something of a supply frenzy has emerged as LNG exporters step in to replace this shortfall. The US, for one, is set to expand its export capacity significantly, with several LNG projects on the US Gulf of Mexico coast that use Texas shale gas expected to launch soon. Oil and natural gas production sustains the U.S. economy and allows allies to oppose Russian invasion BUT government restrictions will crush the industry Pugliaresi 2023 – President of Energy Policy Research Foundation [Lucian Energy Policy Research Foundation, 29 March United States Senate Committee on the Budget Hearing on "Left Holding the Bag: The Cost of Oil Dependence in a LowCarbon World” Mr. Lucian Pugliaresi - Testimony - Senate Budget Committee, https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mr.%20Lucian%20Pugliaresi%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Senate%20Budget%20Committee1.pdf, EME] Introduction The North American oil and gas production platform is an instrument of national power and wealth creation that can deliver affordable, reliable, and secure energy that sustains our national economy. Today the United States is the world’s largest oil and gas producer and a net exporter of both oil and gas to the world market. This production platform operates at a high level of efficiency and solves a wide range of complex technical and cost challenges starting with the exploration and production of oil and gas, its distribution to processing facilities and export markets, and the production of transportation fuels to American consumers and a wide range of essential products, including fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and plastics. Both natural gas and refined products routinely move through cross-border pipelines in Canada and Mexico and waterborne supplies move in and out of U.S. ports. Efficient operation of this production platform has placed the United States in a unique position, not only to deliver affordable energy to U.S. consumers, but also to provide a secure energy lifeline to our allies. As shown in Figure 1, the U.S. alone provided over 80% of world demand for oil between 2010 and 2020. This production surge kept U.S. gasoline prices affordable for American consumers. More importantly, does anyone think the Europeans would have been able to sustain opposition to the Russian invasion of Ukraine without U.S. LNG? Today, this production platform and its associated assets face two sources of financial risk; (1) an unanticipated, sustained and long-term reduction in consumer demand for petroleum fuels and feedstocks from a rapidly implemented energy transition, and (2) policy initiatives from U.S. and other governments to restrict the use of petroleum and other fossil fuels, i.e., a government mandated transition. As outlined in this testimony, the risk of stranded petroleum assets from a precipitous and permanent decline in demand remains quite low. The most significant risks are directly related to government policies and mandates that seek to halt domestic petroleum investment or restrict its development. Financial institutions responding to environmental, social and governance criteria that restrict investment in fossil fuel can also contribute to the risk of stranded petroleum assets. Only guaranteeing LNG exports to allies prevents Russia and China from weaponizing uncertainty to expand conflicts Miles, et. al, 22 --- fellow in global natural gas for the Center for Energy Studies Steven R. Miles, Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska, Baker Institute, August 18, 2022 “US Needs LNG to Fight a Two-Front Gas War,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-needs-lng-fight-two-front-gas-war, CHC-MHT ☢️] Russia Takes Advantage of Uncertainty As we noted in a working paper from August 4, 2022,[29] the increasing uncertainty over gas supply has been used tactically by Russia in Europe—and now is also being used in Asia. It is hardly a coincidence that on June 30, only days after Freeport’s outage and strikes immobilizing the Prelude, Russia announced the nationalization of the Sakhalin II LNG liquefaction plant.[30] The plant currently supplies LNG to several countries including Japan, for whom it supplies 10% of the country’s LNG needs, and South Korea, where about 6% of total LNG imports come from Russia.[31] At the same time, Russia has declared both countries “unfriendly states” due to their support of sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.[32] Although Japan's Industry Minister Koichi Hagiuda said the decree did not mean that Japan's LNG imports will become “immediately impossible,” he also noted that it would be necessary for Japan “to take all possible measures” to prepare for a possible cutoff of LNG from Russia. Kremlin designations of Japan and South Korea as “unfriendly” fit a pattern of Russian behavior in which molecules and uncertainty surrounding their future availability are conjunctively weaponized to destabilize the economic and political environment in countries seen as allies of the US and NATO. [33] Asia Allies May have to Compete with Europe for Extra Winter Cargoes, Hindering the GasLift Rather than having “stable” LNG supplies as winter is approaching, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are faced with extremely tight markets riddled by uncertainty related to three elements at once: 1) unexpected supply outages in otherwise reliable markets in the US and Australia; 2) Russian nationalization of the Sakhalin II LNG plant, creating uncertainty around its LNG supply this winter; and 3) domestic pressures in some traditional supplier countries for export bans or caps as a result of higher domestic prices for natural gas. The tightness of the markets is exacerbated by Asian buyers’ competition with Europe for additional LNG supplies, because of both the reduction in Russian gas supplies on NS-1 and Europe’s increased demand. That demand is driven by new LNG facilities being built onshore or chartered as floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) and by Europe’s need to accelerate filling its gas storage for the coming winter. It is hardly a surprise that at the recent Quad meeting of Australia, Japan, India, and the United States in Sydney, representatives of Japan and Germany separately met with officials from Australia to press them to make new LNG supply commitments, creating the unusual scenario of Europe and Asia competing for new supplies from a country that is considering reducing them.[34] With conditions of much higher-than-normal uncertainty, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (as well as many others) must now go into the market to either backfill, or at least backstop, potential shortfalls from what it thought were certain long-term supplies.[35] These countries will likely find the cupboard bare if they are asked to contribute LNG cargoes to Europe this winter. Instead, US producers may have to step in to ensure supplies to Asian allies and trading partners and fill any gaps, even as US producers are pushing utilization limits to supply a GasLift to Europe this winter. As Figures 3 and 4 from the US Energy Information Administration illustrate, however, to supply Europe in the run-up to and throughout the invasion, the US LNG industry and its customers have been “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul” by diverting cargoes from Asia to Europe. With the US LNG industry running above 100% of baseload and close to 100% of peak capacity during this past winter’s GasLift, there was not much if any extra capacity to call upon. If Europe and Asia are both in extremis this winter—whether because of unusually cold weather or due to conflict or other unforeseen events—then US suppliers and their customers will be forced to do their best to allocate available LNG cargoes across both the European and Asian fronts. Some circumstances may make this even more challenging. Enter China: Live Fire in the Taiwan Strait For Taiwan in particular, recent events have elevated this risk to a new level. On August 4, 2022, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army began “live-fire” military exercises in six zones immediately surrounding Taiwan. China warned airlines to avoid the area,[38] but LNG tanker owners took immediate notice too. LNG tanker traffic immediately diverted away from the Taiwan Strait, though in practice the only destination (other than China itself) that was affected was Taiwan. Of 136 laden LNG tankers that crossed the Taiwan Strait from January 1 to August 3, 2022, 76 were headed to Taiwan.[39] Qatar Energy uses this shipping lane to deliver LNG cargoes to the Taichung terminal; Taiwan also receives LNG cargoes at the Yung-An terminal in Kaohsiung.[40] The live-fire exercises are planned to end soon and hopefully will. But they plant the seed that Taiwan’s energy supplies are not secure. Taiwan claims that the exercises are effectively a blockade of its major ports, and a map of the live-fire zones supports that concern. The Yung-An facility is completely blanketed by China’s military exercises, while Taichung is limited by its access to the Taiwan Strait, which, as noted, becomes shut to LNG tanker traffic in a potential conflict. But the actions are much more significant than they appear. Consistent with the Russia-China “partnership without limits,” China’s action in the Taiwan Strait enhances Russia’s ability to use its LNG supply as an energy weapon in the region. Taiwan announced on February 25, 2022, that it would join the international sanctions against Russia and that it would not renew a five-year LNG sales agreement for deliveries from Sakhalin II when the contract expired in March.[41] Taiwan has replaced those volumes with LNG from several sources, including Cheniere Marketing, with whom they signed a 25-year LNG sales agreement for 2 mtpa on a delivered ex-ship basis.[42] The country is also in the process of expanding the Taichung regasification terminal to 10 mtpa[43] and ordering a new fleet of 16 LNG carriers to meet its growing energy needs.[44] China’s blockade calls into question the energy security that these investments would otherwise provide Taiwan and—regardless of whether it was part of China’s goal this time—helps Russia extend its gas geopolitical game to challenge US allies and trading partners in Asia. Russia and China working in tandem is likely to become a more systemic feature of the international environment, with the two countries acknowledging cooperation in some instances and possibly denying it in others. Their ability to affect energy markets, particularly as part of a coordinated military or diplomatic strategy, should not be underestimated. The US and its allies will need to address this challenge as soon as this winter and possibly for many winters to come. It’s best to start right away. Where do the US and its Allies Go From Here? The Good News: More LNG Capacity, Mostly in the US, is Coming Online While cold weather, further conflict, or unanticipated outages could each strain the ability of LNG producers and customers to supply allies and trading partners in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, there is good news. First, as noted, PHSMA has reached a preliminary agreement to allow the Freeport LNG terminal to restart all three trains at close to full capacity in early October, bringing some 15.0 mtpa back onto the market. That project was a leading supplier to Europe during the first few months of the invasion this year. Second, additional supply is scheduled to start production in 2022 and 2023. Cheniere began commercial operations of train 6 at its Sabine Pass terminal in late February 2022, adding some 4.5 mtpa of baseload capacity and 5.76 mtpa of peak capacity. Venture Global’s Calcasieu Pass LNG project commissioned trains 1-12 by May of 2022, and trains 13-18 are anticipated to be commissioned by September of this year. Together, they will add 10.0 mtpa of baseload capacity and 12.0 of peak capacity. Golden Pass is anticipated to commission its first train in 2023, adding 5.2 mtpa of baseload capacity and 6.0 of peak capacity. An additional 22-25 mtpa is under construction at Golden Pass and Venture Global’s Plaquemines facilities. Both are planned to start up in 2024. Together, US LNG export capacity, based upon facilities already under construction, is expected to grow 20% this year (not including another 20% for the restoration of Freeport LNG) and more than 50% over three years.[45] Current and pending volumes highlight the influence of US firms in LNG markets in the near and medium terms. No other country has added significant LNG liquefaction capacity in 2022 to date. Also, the capacity added by the US and that the US plans to add through 2024 is more than capacity additions in 2022-24 by all other countries combined. The only two non-US operations slated to begin production in 2022 are Indonesia’s Tangguh LNG T3 (3.8 mtpa) and Coral-Sul FLNG (3.4 mtpa) in Mozambique. And in 2023, only one facility, Congo-Brazzaville, is supposed to begin producing LNG (1.4 mtpa). The fate of Russia’s Portovaya Luga (1.5 mtpa), initially slated for a 2022 start, is now uncertain. It has been experiencing difficulties due to sanctions imposed on Russia and likely will need to move its expected commissioning beyond the initial 2022 goal. No new LNG liquefaction addition has been planned outside of the US in 2024. And while many final investment decisions are expected to take place in 2022 and 2023, given the time that is needed to build an LNG export terminal, they will not be able to add to the world’s liquefaction capacity for several years to come. US leadership in new liquefaction capacity addition is probably best illustrated by Figure 6. But This and Future Winters Could be Challenging. The US and its Allies Must be Ready to Fight the Gas War on both the European and Asian Fronts Even with increased supply, relying on last year’s US playbook is not likely to be enough. What our allies and trading partners seek—and what Russia (and perhaps China) seek to eliminate—are not only methane molecules but, even more importantly, the certainty that we will stand by our allies and trading partners even during difficult times. Energy security is a critical part of this certainty, and our adversaries illuminate our vacillations when they occur. To this end, it is imperative that government officials avoid giving credence to calls for export bans and trade embargoes. Energy supplies are tight and will likely remain so, in part (but not fully) because of the geopolitical tensions created on both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts. Prices will continue to be high, and there will be calls from some quarters—as there have been already from some in the US, Europe, and Australia—to placate domestic audiences by backing away from the commitments and difficult decisions necessary to confront totalitarian adversaries. Only by showing resolve to meet our trading commitments and providing energy to support our allies will the democratic nations of the world see this and other coming winters through as a united group. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted for Europe that energy security is inseparable from national security. Now a second front is opening, highlighting once again that energy security is crucial to national security, as Russia—with help from China—starts to play its gas geopolitical game in Asia. This is not a time to be timid or uncertain. We must reaffirm our resolve to meet our energy commitments and support our trading partners. We must also demand that our trading partners and allies apply similarly uncompromising logic. Winter will shortly be upon our allies in Europe and north Asia, and storage tanks need to be filled. Our adversaries know this and are counting down the days. Wielding gas geoeconomics is necessary for Ukraine to win and prevent war in Asia. Collins, et. al, 22 --- Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs (August 4, 2022, Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska - Fellow in Energy Studies & Baker Institutes, Steven R. Miles - Fellow in Global Natural Gas & Baker Institute, “Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/winning-long-war-ukraine-requires-gas-geoeconomics) Gas Geoeconomics in Europe Would Help Contain a Global Axis of Autocracy Europe has aggregate economic output approximately 10 times larger than Russia’s and should, in theory, be able to generate enough military capacity to thwart Russian attempt to establish hegemony. Yet the macro balance obscure three harsh realities. First, European solidarity is an illusion and those in Eastern Europe with the will to confront Russia lack the industrial heft found further west. Second, the political will to translate economic and industrial heft into hard
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