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2023 MNDI Disadvantage

DA - Interest Rates Updates - MNDI 2023 DMP

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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates
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UQ – Interest Rates
Monetary tightening is slowing down – future rate hikes are priced in
Jeanna Smialek, 6/21/23, The New York Times, “Fed Chair Sees ‘Long Way to Go’ on Inflation Fight,” https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/21/business/economy/powell-inflation-federal-reserve.html, mm
Jerome H. Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve, told House lawmakers that the United States remains a “long way” away from low and stable inflation even 15 months into the central bank’s campaign to cool the economy and wrestle down rapid price increases. Mr. Powell testified before the House Financial Services Committee on Wednesday. He told lawmakers that the labor market remained very tight and that inflation — while it has come down notably from its peak last summer — was still too fast. In light of that, the Fed could raise interest rates even higher than their current level of just above 5 percent. “Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year,” Mr. Powell said. “Nonetheless, inflation pressures continue to run high, and the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go.” Fed officials left interest rates unchanged last week following 10 straight increases. But central bankers have been adamant that the decision to hit pause did not amount to a declaration of victory over inflation. Instead, moving more gradually will give policymakers time to assess how well higher rates are working to slow the economy as they try to strike a delicate balance of doing enough to cool growth without doing too much. “Given how far we’ve come, it may make sense to move rates higher, but to do so at a more moderate pace,” Mr. Powell said in response to a lawmaker’s question, explaining that it was like moving from a highway to more local roads. “As you get closer to your destination, as you try to find that destination, you slow down even further.” Central bankers forecast in their fresh economic projections last week that they will probably raise interest rates to around 5.6 percent this year, which would amount to two more quarter-point rate increases. Mr. Powell said during his news conference following the decision last week that the Fed’s July 25-26 meeting will be “live,” meaning that a rate increase is possible at that gathering. “I think that’s a pretty good guess of what will happen if the economy performs as about as expected,” Mr. Powell said Wednesday, referring to Fed officials’ forecast for two more rate moves this year. Mr. Powell’s comments prompted a slight pullback in stock prices, though they ultimately did little to shift market expectations of future rate increases. Investors expect the Fed to raise rates once more this year, less than what most Fed policymakers anticipate.
Current Fed’s policy is sufficient to lower inflation and boost growth – assumes future rate hikes
Howard Schneider and Anna Saphir, 6/22/23, Reuters, “Fed’s Powell says rate hikes will come at a ‘careful pace’ from here,” https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-powell-tells-senate-democrats-inflation-hardest-working-families-2023-06-22/, mm
U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said on Thursday the central bank would move interest rates at a "careful pace" from here as policymakers edge towards a stopping point for their historic round of monetary policy tightening. "We're at least close to where we think our destination is...and it only makes common sense to move...at a careful pace," Powell said at a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee. "The point" of holding rates steady at the Fed's meeting last week, Powell said, was precisely to slow the speed with which the Fed was raising borrowing costs. After having raised rates at 10 straight meetings, sometimes by as much as three quarters of a point at a time, the Fed skipped the June meeting. Investors now expect rate hikes to resume in July, with the Fed perhaps evaluating the need for further increases at every other session - a pace common in prior tightening cycles. "We don't want to do more than we have to...Overwhelmingly people on the (Federal Open Market) Committee do think that there's more rate hikes coming but we want to make them at a pace that allows us to see incoming information." Powell did not specify his own view on when and how high rates should move. Most policymakers see at least two more quarter-point rate increases by the end of this year. But Powell did say he shared the broad economic outlook of his colleagues for modest economic growth, a slight rise in unemployment, and slowly declining inflation over the rest of the year. It's that outlook, Powell said, which led most policymakers to feel that one or two more rate increases would be adequate to finish the Fed's inflation fight.
UQ – Inflation
The Fed is reaching the end of its monetary tightening cycle, but it will take until 2025 for inflation to fully stabilize
Elisabeth Buchwald, 6/27/23, CNN, “Bank of America CEO: Inflation could hit Fed’s 2% target by 2025,” https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/27/business/bank-of-america-ceo-federal-reserve-inflation/index.html, mm
US inflation could hit the Federal Reserve’s 2% target in 2025, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan told CNN in an exclusive interview Tuesday. “We think it will take [Fed officials] all of this year and all of next year and into 2025 before they get inflation in line with their long term target,” Moynihan told CNN’s Poppy Harlow on “CNN This Morning.” The Fed is currently projecting an inflation rate of 2.1% that year, down from the current level of 4.4%. Already, consumers are cutting back on spending to a level that is consistent with 2% inflation, Moynihan said, citing Bank of America customer data. That’s both “good and bad,” he added. “Good in that’s what the Fed needs to see inflation under control. Not so good because it does mean we have a higher probability of a mild recession coming true.” Moynihan said he thinks the Fed could raise rates “a couple more times this year” to get inflation closer to its target. He also predicts the Fed will then hold rates steady until May of next year before cutting. That’s in line with traders’ forecasts, according to the CME FedWatch Tool. But around a fifth of traders think a rate cut could come in March 2024.
Inflation is cooling – but the gains can be reversed
Peter Hannam, 6/26/23, The Guardian, “Why the last mile on the road to low inflation may yet prove to be the toughest,” https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jun/27/why-the-last-mile-on-the-road-to-low-inflation-may-yet-prove-to-be-the-toughest, mm
The world’s rich economies have only completed the easy part of restraining inflation and it will be the “last mile” that could be the hardest to travel, the Bank for International Settlements said in its annual economic statement. Known colloquially as the central banks’ central bank, the BIS detailed why inflation may be stickier than expected – particularly if authorities don’t stay the course. Inflation appears to have peaked in 2022 in most nations and has been “falling quite notably in most cases”. About 95% of central banks have responded by hiking interest rates since early 2021 in “the most synchronised and intense monetary policy tightening in decades”, the BIS said. The ratio exceeded the 80% proportion of coordinated action during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. And in dealing with risks of bank collapses – such as Silicon Valley Bank in the US and Credit Suisse in the Switzerland – authorities had “responded forcefully to contain contagion and deployed a number of crisis management tools to curb systemic risks”. Despite the positive results so far, the BIS warns that “even stronger headwinds may lie ahead”, with “a material risk of further financial stress” as economies slow. While inflation may have moderated, it remained too high, the BIS said in language that has peppered the Reserve Bank’s statements for months. Indeed, the “last mile” to cover on the disinflation journey may prove to be much tougher than the distance travelled so far. Goods and services that soared in price because of supply shocks (such as Covid and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) mostly haven’t come down, with impacts spilling over into other sectors. And the longer inflation stays high, the more we all become inured to it, slowing its decline. “Households and firms may adjust to persistently higher inflation by trying to recoup previous losses and then seeking to avoid future expected ones through their wage- and price-setting decisions,” the BIS said.
Link – Fiscal Redistribution/Taxes
Fiscal redistribution is inflationary – this ensures a corresponding tightening in monetary policy
Florin Bilbiie, Tommaso Monacelli, and Roberto Perotti, May 2021, (Bilbiie is an economics researcher at the University of Lausanne while Monacelli and Perotti are economics researchers at Bocconi University). “Stabilization vs. Redistribution: the Optimal Monetary-Fiscal Mix,” Center for Economic Policy Research, https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP15199.pdf, mm
In the public discourse on macroeconomic policy monetary and fiscal policy are typically described as two different entities. With few important exceptions discussed below, this holds for the academic debate as well. For instance, the standard representative-agent New Keynesian framework (henceforth RANK, Woodford 2003, Galí 2008) assumes a stark separation between monetary and fiscal policy.1 In this paper we show that, in a setting with heterogenous agents and imperfect insurance, monetary and fiscal policy are instead inextricably linked in their optimal design for stabilization and redistribution purposes. The core argument of our analysis is that, with imperfect insurance, movements in inequality - induced for instance by transfers across agents - are inherently inefficient. A transfer to financially constrained agents reduces inequality, and viceversa. However those variations in inequality generate an inefficiency even under flexible prices, i.e., even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. In order to offset fluctuations in inequality so as to attempt restoring perfect insurance requires using the central bank’s leverage over real activity through inflation variations. There is therefore a inherent tension between stabilizing real activity so as to minimize supply-side, price-stickiness distortions and demand-side, imperfect-insurance distortions. The tax-financing of government spending is a natural setting in which a distributional channel is activated. When government spending is financed by taxation with an asymmetric incidence on the distribution of income (i.e., either progressive or regressive taxation) it creates inefficient fluctuations in income inequality (away from the first-best benchmark of full insurance) even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. To understand this point, suppose that government spending evolves exogenously and is financed with taxes that fall disproportionately more on the share of the population that is unconstrained (i.e., progressive taxation). In that case a rise in government spending generates an implicit transfer to constrained agents, who have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The result is a fall in inequality but in fact an inefficient (i.e., too high) redistribution of income from unconstrained to constrained agents, and a too large aggregate demand expansion, which is tackled by the policymaker via a monetary contraction (aka a deflation). A symmetric result applies in the case in which higher government spending is financed via regressive taxation. In that case, inequality inefficiently rises and the policy authority needs to engineer the optimal degree of monetary accommodation, i.e., to strike a balance between higher inflation and a negative output gap. In other words, and because they give rise to inefficient fluctuations in inequality, exogenous variations in government spending generate a tradeoff between insurance—i.e., minimizing the fluctuations in inequality—and the typical goal of stabilizing aggregate demand and inflation. To be clear, and in the well-known New Keynesian jargon, government spending disturbances act either as "cost-pull" or "cost-push" depending on the degree of progressivity/regressivity in the tax system. In these cases, unless a symmetric distribution of taxes exactly preserves full insurance, the policymaker cannot simultaneously stabilize inflation, the output gap and inequality at their respective efficient levels.
Link – Expansionary Fiscal Policy
Fiscal austerity is key to stabilize the economy – expansionary policy will drive inflation
Gaspar, et. al 4/3 (Vitor Gaspar, Carlos Eduardo Goncalves, Paolo Mauro, and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro; April 3, 2023; Vitor Gaspar is the Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF since 2014. He was also Portuguese Minister of State and Finance from 2011–13 and holds a PhD from Universidade Nova de Lisboa in economics, Carlos Eduardo Goncalves is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Paolo Mauro is a Deputy Director in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro is a Deputy Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Policy and Surveillance Division of the Fiscal Affairs Department and holds a PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/03/fiscal-policy-can-help-tame-inflation-and-protect-the-most-vulnerable)//NTG
High inflation can impose serious and lasting costs on the economy and people. But the distributive effects of inflation—the way it transfers money from some individuals to others—are complex. To respond effectively to the sharpest upsurge in inflation in three decades and to address the damage done to households, policymakers should have a better understanding of how inflation affects various segments of society in different places. In our April 2023 Fiscal Monitor, we study the effects of (unexpected) inflation on people’s well-being from mid-2021 to mid-2022—a period when food and energy prices rose earlier and faster than other prices. The chapter offers several lessons for policymakers on the impact of inflation on households’ budgets and how fiscal policy can help curb inflation while supporting the vulnerable. Impact on public finances Analyzing how inflation affects public finances, our main finding is that unexpected inflation—such as in the recent episode—erodes the real value of government debt at the expense of bondholders. For countries with debt exceeding 50 percent of GDP, each percentage point of unexpected (“surprise”) increase in inflation reduces public debt by 0.6 percentage points of GDP, with the effect lasting for several years. As inflation becomes persistent and better anticipated, however, it stops contributing to declining debt ratios. Likewise, deficit-to-GDP ratios initially decline as spending fails to keep pace with the rise in the monetary value of the economy’s output. But such effects fade even quicker. Impact on households Based on public surveys of thousands of households in six economies (Colombia, Finland, France, Kenya, Mexico, and Senegal), we find that inflation from mid-2021 to mid-2022 impacted people through three main channels: their consumption patterns; their income from wages, pensions, or transfers; and their assets and liabilities. The below chart displays the estimated effects of these channels to a developing economy (Kenya) and to an advanced economy (France), prior to any new government intervention in support of households. Although the impact varies across countries (and across income groups), the surveys reveal that: The faster rise in food prices compared to other prices hurt poor families disproportionately because food represents a higher share of their total consumption. This effect was most pronounced in low-income countries. Inflation eroded real incomes in commodity-importing countries, as wages across all income groups did not keep pace with prices. As inflation eroded the monetary value of assets and liabilities, families with negative net worth benefitted at the expense of creditors, particularly in countries with developed financial and credit markets. Redistributive wealth effects of inflation were also influenced by the age of the head of household: young families, which tend to be net borrowers, experienced gains through the wealth channels, whereas old households saw their wealth eroded. Curbing inflation while protecting the vulnerable Fiscal policy can support monetary policy in dealing with inflation because it also affects aggregate demand. Our statistical evidence suggests that fiscal policy’s impact on inflation has changed over the decades. For advanced economies we find that, since 1985, reducing public expenditure by 1 percentage point of GDP lowers inflation by half a percentage point. In addition, fiscal policy can also help protect the vulnerable. The economic model used in the chapter incorporates inequality in incomes, consumption, and asset holdings. It shows that when central banks act alone—without the support of fiscal policy—they need to hike interest rates substantially to fight inflation. Fiscal tightening makes it possible to increase interest rates by less to contain inflation.
Fiscal stimulus will increase inflation – boosts demand without expanding supply
Soyres, et. al 22 (Francois M. de Soyres, Ana Maria Santacreu, and Henry Young; July 15, 2022; Francois M. de Soyres holds a PhD in economics from Toulouse School of Economics and is the Principal Economist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ana Maria Santacreu holds a PhD from NYU and a Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, Henry Young is a PhD student in economics at the University of Michigan, “Fiscal policy and excess inflation during Covid-19: a cross-country view,” FEDS Notes – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/fiscal-policy-and-excess-inflation-during-covid-19-a-cross-country-view-20220715.html )//NTG
The recent surge in inflation in many countries around the world and the fiscal stimulus provided in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic has renewed interest in analyzing the potential role of large fiscal spending as a driver of price increases. In this note, we examine how fiscal support impacted the balance between supply and demand across countries during the COVID-19 crisis. Our findings suggest that fiscal stimulus boosted the consumption of goods without any noticeable impact on production, increasing excess demand pressures in good markets. As a result, fiscal support contributed to price tensions. Indeed, focusing on inflation through February 2022 which does not capture many disruptions associated with the war in Ukraine, we show that countries with large fiscal stimulus, or with high exposure to foreign stimulus through international trade, experienced stronger inflation outbursts. Our back-of-the-envelope illustrative calculations suggest that U.S. fiscal stimulus during the pandemic contributed to an increase in inflation of about 2.5 percentage points (ppt) in the U.S and 0.5 ppt in the United Kingdom. 1. The Covid Crisis and fiscal policy responses around the world The COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted economic activity all over the world. Due to a mix of government-imposed restrictions and voluntary personal decisions, mobility levels, as measured by Google's geo-location tracking data from smartphones, collapsed in March 2020. Since then, mobility has improved, although with some volatility that tracked closely the successive waves of the pandemic (see figure 1). Figure 1. Mobility Note: Mobility is a simple average of Google's grocery, workplace, retail, recreation, and transportation mobility. Series are smoothed using a 7−day moving average and aggregates

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