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2023 MNDI Kritik

K - Rhetoric of Poverty - MNDI 2023 HPA

K - Rhetoric of Poverty - MNDI 2023 HPA.docx

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The Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik criticizes the Affirmative for the way they represent poverty in their rhetoric. You should insert a case/speech act specific link into the shell, depending on the discourse used by the 1AC or CX. Michelle Z, Zachary, Ethan, and Eva all contributed to this diverse and important kritik which will be useful all year – congratulations on your great work!
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik
[Insert Aff specific Link]
The Discourse of Poverty excludes poor people because to talk about solving poverty, we place ourselves in the role of the Hero, never in the role of a poor person.
Olsen, 2010 - Professor of Socio-Economics, Social Statistics at University of Manchester [Wendy “Poverty as a Malaise of Development: A Discourse Analysis in its Global Context”, https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:29857&datastreamId=SUPPLEMENTARY-1.PDF ZR]
Discourse Analysis I will describe three discourses in some detail in this chapter. First it is important to set out what a discourse is. Discourses are combinations of communicative acts that fit together. In society, generally, we have neoliberal discourse, marxist discourse, radical feminist discourse and so on. Focusing concretely on poverty-talk, there are some images to take into account, apart from texts and documents (see Table 1). A detailed breakdown of the components of three discourses is hinted at in Table 2. I will define discourse and then explain (and critique) each of the three. This is great fun but it is best to conclude by constructing an alternative. I can only sketch out that alternative here – which I call a transformationalist analysis of development – but there are plenty of 3 authors working in this area. These authors are generally known as the post-development school. The title refers mainly to being post-neoliberal, post-economism, and post-capitalist in what the authors seek. (You can think these aspects over while) Initially, I will run through the existing, much more reformist, discourses. A discourse is a context-specific local set of rules or norms that kick in when people are interacting or communicating (Fairclough, 2001). The local rules need not always be followed. But discourses do shape how we communicate about poverty. Thus we might label the poor; target the poor; help the poor; eradicate poverty (or try to); or complain about the creation of poverty. According to the discourse being used, you might be able to combine 2-3 of these activities. But you can’t both ‘target’ the poor and ‘be’ poor at the same time! The targeter is implicitly separate from an isolable group called the poor. It is, at this deeper level of semantics, language in use, or ontology, that we say that the discourse is a set of rules. Poor people don’t talk about poverty, as they are (by definition, within poverty discourse) too busy scratching out a living somewhere. The speaker about poverty is constructed as a heroic, non-poor, figure, who is doing something about a problem.
The discourse of poverty stigmatizes and dehumanizes the poor – labels rely on and reinforce stereotypes of the poor.
Lister 2004 - Professor of Social Policy, Loughborough University [Ruth Poverty and Social Justice: recognition and respect https://www.bevanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Ruth-Lister-2004.pdf EV]
Nevertheless, research also shows how resilient many living in poverty are in their struggle to get by – particularly women who are typically the main managers of poverty and who act as shock-absorbers of poverty as they try to protect their children from its worst effects, often to the detriment of their own physical and mental health. Generally the picture painted is one of constant restrictions; doing without; running out of money at the end of the week; limited choice; no room for spontaneity; damaged family relationships; isolation from the wider society. ‘Existing not living’ is a recurrent phrase used by people in poverty to describe its material impact. Bringing up children in poverty is particularly tough. The inability to meet children’s needs and demands makes parents feel guilty and a failure and can lead to family tensions. Research shows that both parents and children place great emphasis on ‘participation’: the right of every child to share in the activities, experiences and lifestyle of the community in which s/he is brought up. Both also fear its negative corollary: exclusion. In a materialistic world the ability for an individual child to participate largely depends on access to goods, services and activities, most of which have a financial cost. 10 A more recent study talked to children themselves. It found that children in poverty often don’t ‘fit in’, particularly with regards to the ‘right’ clothing. The ‘wrong’ clothing can mean bullying and general exclusion. They often can’t ‘join in’ shared social activities with their peers because of the cost. The children spoke of ‘their fears of social difference and stigma’ (Ridge, 2002) In the words of a child in a separate study carried out by Save the Children Wales with children in deprived communities: ‘People think you’re different and treat you different if you’re poor (Crowley and Vulliamy, u.d. p15). Othering ‘the poor’ This brings us to the psychological impact of the way people in poverty are often treated. In a study I was involved in, ‘poverty was associated with loss of self esteem, feelings of powerlessness, anger, depression, anxiety and boredom’ (Beresford et al., 1999). In another report, one woman put it graphically: ‘You’re like an onion and gradually every skin is peeled off of you and there’s nothing left. All your self esteem and how you feel about yourself is gone – you’re left feeling like nothing and then your family feels like that’ (UKCAP, 1997). Stigma, lack of respect and denial of dignity are constant refrains when people in poverty talk about how they are treated by the wider society; the most recent example can be found in the Report of the Child Poverty Task Group (2004) published this week by the Welsh Assembly Government. Two contributions at a national poverty hearing held by Church Action on Poverty (CAP) are typical: ‘The worst blow of all is the contempt of your fellow citizens. I and many families live in that contempt’ and ‘I just feel very angry sometimes that people are ignorant to the fact that we are humans as well and we do need to be respected’ (Russell, 1996). The Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, of which I was a member and half of whose members had direct experience of poverty, reported ‘the lack of respect for people living in poverty was one of the clearest and most heartfelt messages which came across to us as a Commission’ (CoPPP, 2000). Participants in the South Wales Oxfam GB study spoke of their dislike of the stigma they felt attached to their estate. Stigma, lack of respect and denial of dignity are constant refrains What people in poverty are reacting to is a process of what we might call ‘othering’ i.e. they are treated and talked about as people who are ‘other’ to the rest of us. It is a process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and through which social distance is established and maintained. The line is imbued with negative value judgements that construct ‘the poor’ variously as a source of moral contamination, a threat, an ‘undeserving’ economic burden, an object of pity or even as an exotic species. 11 Language is an important part of the process. By and large, the language and labels used to describe ‘the poor’ have been articulated by the more powerful ‘non-poor’ – the media, politicians, academics. It is a language that is rooted in history with its division of the poor into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ groups. The more obviously demeaning examples today are 'underclass' and ‘welfare dependant’ – and the American terms ‘white’ or ‘trailer trash’. But the less value-laden word ‘poor’ is itself problematic. It is an adjective that we ‘apply’ to ‘them’ but people in poverty themselves are often reluctant to wear what they perceive to be a stigmatising label, with its connotations of inferior as in ‘poor quality’. Typically they are not asked how they want to be described.
The impact is mass genocide – the scapegoated party becomes symbolic of all evil and must be destroyed
Colman, 1995 - professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco [Arthur “Up from Scapegoating.” p. 7-11]
Unity is the important concept in all scapegoating activity; the scapegoat represents the group's push toward its own wholeness by excluding its disparate elements. Thus scapegoating can be detected anywhere there is a transfer of negative attribution from one part of the system to another, or from one part of the system to an object outside the system, in order to fulfill what is perceived to be a unifying survival function for the system as a whole. The creation of a scapegoat requires a process akin to the psychological mechanisms of projection and projective identification in that it uses an other to contain aspects of oneself. The scapegoat is created by "projecting" the darker side of group life, the darker side being the reality of evil and sin in society. For the individual, the shadow contains those elements of the psyche that are not accepted as his or her own. As individuals we attempt to project that shadow onto others. Likewise, the group finds common negative ground in the scapegoat. But the scapegoat is not identical to the shadow; the scapegoat is a collective creation, a symbolic compromise for many individuals' negative projections. One can say that the scapegoat is humanity's societal vessel for the shadow - a vessel which is, by definition, innocent of the burden it assumes. The scapegoat is a very ancient archetype and scapegoating an ancient activity, so ancient that there are few societies where evidence of the practice has not been found. We have records of animals used as scapegoats that go back to ancient Hittite and Sanskrit texts. The works of modern authors who have used the scapegoat as a major theme (Dostoyevsky, Jackson, Lessing, for example) all hearken back to ancient days and a collective symbol that incorporates the worst of our projections in a strange, inanimate object. It is an image that taps our most primitive parts even today. An early biblical story, the basis of Yom Kippur and one that underlies the crucifixion of Jesus captures the fundamental Western image of the scapegoat. The story begins with the Israelites fleeing Egypt. Aaron and God soon find that the law and monotheism are not sufficient to colltain the Israelites who, after years ofenf<)rced slavery, have no experience taking responsibility for their own behavior. The priests arc overwhelmed with the sin offerings of a guilty people and begin a return to primitive practices rather than staying within the new laws. After several priests have been killed for violating the law, God takes a new look at what is really possible with his chosen people. First the priests create a Day of Atonement, the current Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, during which individual and collective sins of omission and commission are acknowledged and forgiven. But even this symbolic process is not sufficient, and the scapegoat is added. Hilt the goat, Oil which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall he presented alive be/()re the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. (Lev. 16:10) The power of this biblical scapegoating process is seen in the phenomena of contagion. Referring to the man who takes the scapegoat into the wilderness, the narrative reads: And he that let go the goat, for the scapegoat shall wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward come into the camp. (Lev. 16:26) The process of contagion underlines a frequent functional difference between group projection and the creation of the scapegoat and individual projection and the creation of the external bad object. In scapegoating, the projection is so generalized that there is little possibility of retrieval. A boundary is erected between group members and scapegoat – the wilderness or death itself – which insures what Hitler called "the final solution." Contagion requires this boundary. It is usually not enough for the scapegoat to be exiled. It must be destroyed. Even so, the symbolic vessel of the chosen animal cannot, because of its compromise quality, entirely contain the projected evil. The person who touches the scapegoat runs the risk of becoming the next scapegoat. Most horribly, the inadequacy of this process of containment gradually requires more and more potent symbols: objects or animals become increasingly inadequate and the flesh-and-blood scapegoating of humans and human subgroups becomes an acceptable practice. This has required sophisticated rationalizations based on what Eric Erickson (1972) has called pseudospeciation to describe how a ruling or dominant group can justify locating the scapegoat function in its slaves or any other group cast as different and lower than itself. We have many examples from modern times – Armenians, Amerindians, South African Blacks, European Jews, Palestinians – all used as scapegoats in order to serve the hoped-for but specious unity of nationhood, much as individuals use shadow projections to serve the hoped-for but conscious individuation of the person. And here we see a critical connection between the growth processes in individuals and in groups, for scapegoats not only deter group development but also hamper integration of shadow projections, a necessary step in the individuation process. As long as there are scapegoats – unintegrated shadow figures for the group – integration of the shadow within the individual is an illusion. One might even say that, for the individual, the process of individuation will always be held hostage to the presence of the scapegoat in the larger community. Perhaps this feels like too heavy a burden for the individual to accept-to take on the responsibility for the scapegoats of the world as part and parcel of one's own attempts to integrate the personal shadow. Religious traditions have encountered this dilemma in the personage of Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition, for example, and in the modern-day "neutrality" of the Pope and other religious leaders during the Holocaust. As we have seen, Jung's definition of individuation does not emphasize this connection between individual shadow and group scapegoat. His model, including the way it has been interpreted, tends to deemphasize the need to burden ourselves with the suffering of others as part of our own growth processes. To imagine the individuation process this way, however, is to accept that man is an island, that the suffering in the world is someone else's responsibility and does not grow from us or affect us. I for one reject this possibility. Individuation is an awesome burden precisely because it requires a connected, integrated outlook. Individuation demands that our bonds with other humans be included in the equation of our own development. We are all part of the scapegoating process. We are all a part of others' suffering. By our silence, we give it passive support and supply our shadows with more energy, defeating each of our attempts at integrating the archetype. We must not only accept our responsibility for the scapegoat, we must do something about it. Individuation under any other terms can be just narcissistic play.
When confronted with the rhetoric of poverty, we have an ethical obligation to Identify it and stand against its assumptions. Our silence endorses them. Our speech act against them is the only ethical response.
Ross, 1991 Prof. of Law at the University of Pittsburgh [Thomas, June Georgetown Law Review “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness”, https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/glj79&id=1517&type=text&collection=journals, MZ]
B. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE READER When we read an opinion dealing with the constitutional status of poverty we are engaged in an activity with moral connotations. After reading the opinion, no morally neutral position is available to us. If we speak about the case, we take on the role and responsibility of the critic. The discourse of the critic is the discourse of normative analysis. In one way or another, we speak of what ought to be. Our membership within the community of law makes even silence a morally charged position. When a member of our community reads, for example, the Wyman case, and is silent, she has chosen not to speak, not to act as a critic, not to engage in explicit normative discourse. She makes this choice after reading an opinion that requires a mother receiving AFDC benefits either to allow the government access to her home, without a warrant and without notice, or to go without the benefits that are essential to feed and care for herself and her child. 208 What reaction to this case is without moral connotation? The very act of reading the Court's poverty cases imposes a responsibility on the reader. We know this responsibility in its other manifestations. If we were members of a church community and read a text from the governing body setting forth the church's position on the ordination of women, we would not imagine that we could read and be silent without moral connotation. If our City Council passed a resolution regarding the rights of gay men and women in the community, we would not suppose that we could read the document and have no responsibility whatsoever for its message. It is the responsibility of a reader within a community to choose a position on the texts that express the community's position on important matters. What, then, is the ethic of reader responsibility? It is to read with the largest measure of care, imagination, and knowledge we can muster. We should recognize the nature and consequences of the choices set forth in the text. We should seek to listen to the arguments of the text, yet break past the confines of those arguments, using our imagination and our knowledge of the world in which these decisions will be played out. We must become the most skillful readers we can be, because the process of reading is always followed by the necessity of our own choice in the matter. A description of poetic metaphor provides a way of thinking about how our responsibility as readers of the Court's poverty cases might be discharged. Max Black, a poetry scholar, created a description of the process whereby a poetic metaphor provides meaning.2°9 Imagine looking at the starry night sky through a piece of painted glass on which several lines have been etched. You would see a night sky through the glass with some stars revealed and others obscured. Experiencing a poetic metaphor is like looking through the etched glass. The metaphor reveals and obscures various parts of its subject, creating a new vision of the subject. 210 The Court's rhetoric is our etched glass and the night sky is the context and legal issues of poverty presented in each case. The reader's responsibility is to look past the night sky as composed by the etched glass of the Court's rhetoric and to see the context and legal issues of poverty as completely as possible. The essential flaw of this allegory as a description of either reading poems or reading the Court's rhetoric of poverty is its suggestion that the subject is a fixed thing, external to the observer. When we encounter a poetic metaphor, our own sense of its subject, whether it is an abstraction like love or a tangible thing like a tree, becomes part of the reading and part of the meaning.211 We face a similar problem in reading the poverty cases. We bring to the reading some idea of poverty. The rhetoric not 

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