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2023 SDI Disadvantage

Federalism DA - MSDI 2023

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Federalism DA – MSDI 2023
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Federalism high now – Dobbs v. Jackson decision prompted the relevance of state level policymaking, especially in courts
John Dinan, 4-15-2023, "The Constitutional Politics of Abortion Policy After Dobbs: State Courts, Constitutions, and Lawmaking," ScholarWorks at University of Montana, https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol84/iss1/4/ -- MoStateJG
A leading effect of Dobbs is of course to heighten the importance of state governments in determining the level of protection for abortion rights. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, states enjoyed virtually unlimited discretion in regulating abortion. Many states in the pre-Roe era maintained longstanding policies banning nearly all abortions except when necessary to preserve the life of the woman. Some states permitted abortions in additional circumstances, and four states updated their laws in the years just prior to Roe by allowing abortions for any reason during the first several months of pregnancy.3 Even after Roe, states retained a fair amount of discretion in enacting abortion policy. States could decide at what point after fetal viability to ban abortions, with some states choosing to ban abortions as early in a woman’s pregnancy as they were permitted to do so by the Court’s rulings and other states opting to allow abortions through a later point in pregnancy.4 After the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in 1989 in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services5 and in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 6 states were also free to decide whether to enact a wide range of abortion regulations, including parental consent and notification requirements, waiting-period laws, informed consent rules, and restrictions on public funding of abortion.7 However, Dobbs broadened considerably the scope of state policy authority, by holding that the U.S. Constitution provides no barrier against states banning abortion at any point during pregnancy and permitting states to enforce virtually any restrictions they might choose to enact, including a number of restrictions that were unenforceable before Dobbs. 8
Although one effect of Dobbs is therefore to shift more of the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, the ruling has other consequences for the ways that abortion policy is made. In this article, I focus on three main consequences of shifting the focus of abortion policymaking from the federal to the state level, stemming from distinctive features of state courts, constitutions, and lawmaking. In highlighting these distinctive aspects of constitutional politics in the states, I am building on and contributing to recent analyses demonstrating that the approach to protecting rights at the state level differs significantly from that at the federal level.9 Although abortion rights are my focus in this article, the arguments that I advance are also applicable to other rights and cases. One consequence of Dobbs is to redirect from federal to state courts nearly all litigation challenging restrictive abortion policies.10 State supreme courts are just as capable as the U.S. Supreme Court of issuing rulings protecting abortion rights and have in recent decades drawn on state constitutional privacy, liberty, due process, and equality guarantees to strike down restrictive abortion policies.11 However, state courts are structured differently from federal courts in that judges face the electorate on a regular basis in three-quarters of the states and lack life tenure in all but one state. In part, as a result, state supreme court judges are less inclined than their federal counterparts to invalidate policies backed by the public and public officials, whether abortion policies or other policies.12 The relatively quick turnover in the membership of state courts as a result of these selection and retention processes also leads to more rapid change in the ideological composition of state courts compared with the U.S. Supreme Court and creates a greater risk that rights-protective state court rulings will be reversed by a future state court.13
A second distinctive feature of state constitutional politics is that groups and officials seeking to influence the level of protection for abortion rights have another viable option aside from securing favorable court rulings. They can amend the state constitution by making use of amendment processes that are much more accessible at the state level than at the federal level and are employed on a regular basis to adjust levels of protection for rights, whether abortion rights or other rights.14 On one hand, the accessibility of state amendment processes offers another avenue for groups working to expand protection for abortion rights by enabling passage of amendments providing more explicit textual grounding for these rights. On the other hand, the amendment process can also serve as a vehicle for limiting state courts’ ability to interpret state constitutions as protecting abortion rights. The key point is that efforts to influence the level of protection for rights at the state level take place not only by filing lawsuits but also by enacting constitutional amendments in a way that does not occur at the federal level. Lawmaking processes also differ at the state and federal level. Much of abortion policymaking at the state level takes place through legislative action—and in some states through direct democratic devices—in contrast with the relative absence of congressional legislation regarding abortion.15 Congress has enacted some abortion-related statutes, including a number of appropriation riders limiting federal funding of abortion as well as a statute banning a late-term abortion procedure among several other statutes.16 However, Congress is constrained in the policies it can enact regarding abortion, in a way that states are not similarly constrained. Congress can only act pursuant to its delegated powers, and it is uncertain whether these powers are broad enough to authorize a nationwide policy regulating abortion. By contrast state legislatures possess plenary power and do not encounter similar concerns.17 Congressional lawmaking regarding abortion is also limited because the parties are evenly matched at the federal level, frequently resulting in divided control of the presidency and congress. The majority party usually enjoys only a slight advantage, well short of the support needed to overcome the senate’s 60-vote rule for advancing most legislation. By contrast, in most states, one party enjoys such an overwhelming advantage that it can enact policies over the objections of the minority party, especially because most state legislatures operate under majoritarian rules that do not permit minority obstructionism.18 Additionally, nearly half of the states provide for direct democratic institutions that help overcome legislative intransigence.19
The ultimate benefit of this analysis is to take stock of the consequences of Dobbs for the institutional forums where abortion policymaking takes place and to show that the effects are greater than simply shifting the focus from the federal to the state level. In addition to affecting federalism, by shifting policy authority from the federal government to the 50 state governments, the Court’s ruling also affects the separation of powers, by expanding the range of governing institutions where groups and officials can shape abortion policy in meaningful ways.20 At the federal level, efforts to shape abortion policy focus primarily on influencing selection of judges. Groups focus on gaining control of the presidency and senate with an eye to filling vacancies on the Court with favorably disposed Justices and then generating cases that give the Justices an opportunity to produce precedentshifting rulings.21 When policy authority shifts to the state level, additional opportunities emerge for shaping abortion policy—not only influencing judicial selection and decision-making but also determining whether to retain judges, adopting constitutional amendments, and enacting statutes, whether via the legislature or initiative and referenda. Shifting policy authority to the states and channeling political activity to these institutional venues also results in policy generally being made in a more majoritarian fashion, because the public has more direct opportunities to participate directly in state judicial processes, constitutional amendment processes, and lawmaking processes and because these processes are less likely than at the federal level to rely on super-majoritarian rules or produce counter-majoritarian outcomes.22
Federal intrusion includes expansive grants and funding obligations, overburdening states and shifting power
Diane Katz, 11-30-2021, Former Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy, "Federalism in Crisis: Urgent Action Required to Preserve Self-Government," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/report/federalism-crisis-urgent-action-required-preserve-self-government -- MoState JG
Federal intrusion in states’ affairs has taken a variety of forms, including mandates, funding obligations, pre-emptions, and regulation.40 Federal Intergovernmental Mandates. The term “federal intergovernmental mandate” refers to a provision in statute or regulation, or federal court ruling that imposes an “enforceable duty” on state, local, or tribal governments (excluding a condition of federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary federal program).41
Growth in the number and scope of federal mandates is largely a modern phenomenon. Researchers have documented one instance of Congress enacting a major mandate in 1931, one in 1940, none in the 1950s, nine in the 1960s, 25 in the 1970s, and 27 in the 1980s.42 Since 2000, Congress and various Presidents have approved more than 190 statutes43 with intergovernmental mandates, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Collectively, the laws have imposed more than 1,000 separate directives.
Even that figure is artificially low because the definition of “mandate” applied by the CBO is exceedingly narrow. For example, many of the costly obligations linked to entitlements are not categorized as mandates because the funding is considered “voluntary.” That rationale may have seemed plausible when federal support for Medicaid and other entitlements constituted a relatively small portion of state and local revenues, but that is certainly no longer the case.44 State reliance on federal funds has vastly increased. As noted by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, “Many grant conditions have become more integral to state and local activities—and far less subject to voluntary forbearance—than originally suggested by the contractual model.”45
There is no official tracking of federal mandate costs, nor is there any accounting of the cumulative effects.46 States have been protesting the burden for more than two decades. During a 2007 summit, for example, legislators from 50 states boarded a schooner to re-enact the Boston Tea Party in opposition to an estimated $100 billion in unfunded mandates imposed over four fiscal years.47 In some instances, Congress has appropriated funds to states to cover mandate costs, but state officials insist that most mandates are either inadequately funded or wholly unfunded. Then-Governor of Tennessee Bill Haslam (R), for example, informed the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that his state received only 8 percent of the $32 million it cost to implement programs under the Clean Water Act.48
Even when states support federal policy goals, mandate overreach makes a mess of federalism. The centralization of federal power inhibits the policy innovation and local expertise that state autonomy provides. There is no way that federal mandates can accommodate the multitude of conditions in a nation of 320 million people located across 3.8 million square miles of urban, rural, and frontier areas. As explained by New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez, “What works in South Carolina may not work in Virginia. And what works in New Mexico may not work even for our neighbors in Utah, which is precisely why it is imperative the federal government recognize the sovereignty of states.”49
Testifying on behalf of the Council of State Governments, Utah Senate President Wayne Niederhauser told the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: “Goals behind federal mandates are often admirable, but we have our own local goals which are just as admirable, more important to local citizens, more likely to be effective and less expensive.”50 For example, the Endangered Species Act authorizes the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to write management plans, designate critical habitat, and impose land-use restrictions. But former Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert (R) points out that “Utah’s Division of Wildlife Resources is staffed with some of the best biologists in the field who have a profound knowledge of Utah’s ecology and wildlife. There is no good reason states shouldn’t take the lead in species recovery.”51
The concentration of policymaking in Washington also undermines opportunities for citizen involvement—which is the essence of self-government. Individual voters wield greater influence at the local level, where their preferences are far less diluted than at the federal level. As noted by Gregory Gleason and Viktor Rudenko, “Distant rule-making bureaucracies are immune from local pressure; Congress is overrun with powerful and well-heeled interest groups; and enormous coalitions of citizens are required to get even rudimentary attention from Washington.”52
Grants-in-Aid. From 132 programs in 1960, to 387 in 1968, and 664 in 1998, the number of grant programs funded by federal dollars now totals a whopping 1,274.53 Grants-in-aid were relatively rare until the 1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson employed them for his War on Poverty. Medicaid, instituted in 1966, is the single largest federal grants-in-aid program.54 The three types of federal grants—categorical grants, block grants, and general-revenue-sharing—vary in the degree of spending discretion.55 Virtually all require state expenditures or legislative action to fulfill the federal conditions of funding. The various conditions attached to the grants are set by Congress in statute (unless lawmakers delegate the task to agency regulators), and inject federal involvement in virtually every type of public policy. The volume of red tape is massive. To obtain or retain funding for social welfare programs, state and local governments must submit to 979 federal “information collections” (with an additional 95 pending). Other federal programs involve 351 mandatory information collections encompassing 1,328 forms (and 53 pending requests for an additional 169 forms). In 2019, the federal government allotted $721 billion in aid to state and local governments for a wide range of programs, including health care, transportation, income security, education, job training, social services, community development, and environmental protection.56 Such spending has increased as a percentage of federal outlays from 10.7 percent in 1989 to 16.2 percent in 2019.57 Even more troubling, federal grants-in-aid comprised 32.4 percent of total state spending in FY 2020 (an estimated $2.3 trillion), according to the National Association of State Budget Officers.58
Federalism is key to democracy
Donald F. Kettl, 1-18-2022, columnist for Governing, is a professor emeritus and the former dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. "Can Federalism Save American Democracy? Maybe …," Governing, https://www.governing.com/now/can-federalism-save-american-democracy-maybe -- MoState JG
“Canada is like a nice family living over a biker bar,” Dustin Hoffman once quipped. “They keep telling the downstairs neighbors to keep down the noise, people are trying to sleep.” But our Canadian friends are increasingly worried that things downstairs are moving from disorder to danger. In the country’s leading newspaper, Toronto’s Globe and Mail, political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon wrote recently, “By 2025, American democracy could collapse, causing extreme domestic political instability, including widespread civil violence. By 2030, if not sooner, the country could be governed by a right-wing dictatorship.” The United States “is becoming increasingly ungovernable,” he wrote, and wondered, “How should Canada prepare?” It’s not just the Canadians who are worried. An NPR/Ipsos poll published in early January found that 64 percent of Americans agreed that “American democracy is in crisis and at risk of failing.” One in four believed that it was sometimes OK to use violence to protect American democracy, although of course it’s their own version of democracy they’d want to take up arms to protect. In a few short years, we’ve moved from the world’s very model of democracy to a government that, in the eyes of other nations, is anything but. A European think tank’s 2021 report classified the U.S. as a “backsliding” democracy, with “the sustained and deliberate process of subversion of basic democratic tenets by political actors and governments.” Commentary around the anniversary of the Jan. 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection was united in the conclusion that “American democracy is tottering,” as a Vox headline put it. Even biker bars have rules that aim to keep at least a semblance of order. Critics are pointedly wondering if the same can be said for American democracy. The federal government is a mess. So it’s worth asking: Can state and local governments, closer to the people, provide a lifeline to the nation’s grand traditions of governance? Can federalism save American democracy? There’s a strong case that the answer is yes. After all, the biggest fear of some of the founders was that so much power would accumulate in Washington that liberty would erode. They believed that preserving the power of states, as the new nation’s building blocks, would prevent tyranny.
Worrisome Battles So if the United States is backsliding, can its state and local building blocks stop the skid? There’s certainly hope. Congress is the Hells Angels of biker bars, with Gallup finding public trust in the federal government to handle domestic problems at 39 percent, near the historic low. (And that may be an optimistic number: The Pew Research Center found that only 24 percent trust Washington “to do what is right just about always or most of the time.”) But while Americans’ confidence in state and local governments has been slipping in recent years, those levels of government still enjoy much higher levels of public trust: 57 percent and 66 percent, respectively, according to Gallup. A Deloitte study put it simply: “the more local, the more trusted.” Yet despite the headlines about Washington’s dysfunction, some of the more worrisome battles are raging at the state and local levels. In 2021, at least 34 laws were passed in 19 states that restricted voting, the Brennan Center for Justice tallied, with more such legislation teed up for 2022. Brennan called this an “alarming and unprecedented attack on our democracy.” Meanwhile, record amounts of money are cascading into once-sleepy races for state secretaries of state, from groups trying to set up the next round of vote challenges. Just as alarming are the full-blooded battles that have erupted at school board meetings around the country. In many communities, these meetings used to be downright boring affairs, mostly poring over the details of school budgets. But COVID-19 and the culture wars have changed all that. In Rapid City, S.D., and Kalispell, Mont., for example, conservatives who were furious about mask mandates ran to gain control of local school boards. In a suburban school district near Col

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