UBI Neg - MSDI 2023
UBI Neg - MSDI 2023.docx
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Case Neg vs UBI 1NC --- China Advantage Notes You can not read china is neo revisionist and china is not revisionist together; they are a double turn to one another. 1NC --- China Not Revisionist China’s not revisionist – Only reacting to US interference in Taiwan Peter Symonds 8-21-2022. (Peter Symonds is is a member of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, and the national editor of the WSWS in Australia. Symonds joined the Socialist Labour League, the predecessor of the Socialist Equality Party of Australia, in 1984. In 1987, he joined the staff of the SLL’s newspaper, Workers News. Since the launch of the WSWS in 1998, he has played a leading role in its analysis of political and social developments in Asia, Australia and the South Pacific. Symonds has written and lectured extensively on the history of Trotskyism in Asia and the Chinese revolutions of the 20th century. "In wake of Pelosi visit, US announces trade talks with Taiwan." World Socialist Web Site. Web. 8-21-2022. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2022/08/22/ptwk-a22.html >)MSUCB The rapid expansion of official ties with Taiwan undercuts the One China policy adhered to by virtually every country in the world as the basis for diplomatic relations with China. While de facto recognising Beijing as the legitimate government of all China, including Taiwan, various governments are following the US in overturning longstanding diplomatic protocols, undermining the One China policy and raising tensions with Beijing. The US-Taiwan talks on a pact, known as the US-Taiwan Initiative for 21stCentury Trade, first mooted in June, are due to take place in the northern autumn. Taiwan, as of last year, was the eighth largest trading partner of the United States, while the US is Taiwan’s second largest trading partner after China. A broad range of American corporations are heavily dependent on Taiwan for the supply of semiconductors. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company produces more than half the world’s computer chips and has a virtual monopoly—over 90 percent—on the manufacture of the most advanced semiconductors. Taiwan relies on American agricultural imports as well as the purchase of American military hardware. The announcement last Wednesday by the Office of the US Trade Representative stated that the talks will cover 11 trade areas, but will particularly focus on agriculture and digital industries. The US Commerce Department is also preparing to hold talks, including on measures to secure semiconductor supply chains, underscoring the vital strategic importance of Taiwan’s chip manufacturing. The talks will take place under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which functions as Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei. During the Trump administration, the AIT moved to new premises in June 2018 on a site covering 6.5 hectares, more than twice the size of the previous compound, and has a staff of more than 450. Shu Jueting, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce, criticised the US-Taiwan trade talks, saying China opposed any form of official exchanges with Taiwan, including on “agreements with sovereign connotations or an official nature.” Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province which it will forcibly reunify if Taipei ever declares formal independence from China. The pace of delegations arriving in Taipei is accelerating. A third US group headed by Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb landed in Taiwan yesterday for trade talks—just three weeks after Pelosi’s visit and a week after a US congressional delegation headed by Senator Ed Markey. The Financial Times reported that a group of Japanese lawmakers led by Keiji Furuya of the ruling Liberal Democratic party is due to arrive today in Taipei. Next week a Lithuanian delegation is expected to be present when the country opens its representative office in Taipei—a move that provoked economic retaliation by Beijing. Canadian parliamentarians and two German delegations plan to visit in October. The US announcement of trade talks last week was clearly not just a routine matter. Also present was Daniel Kritenbrink, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, who praised what he called “an ambitious road map for trade negotiations” with Taiwan. At the same time, he declared the US would continue “to deepen our ties with Taiwan” and, in particular, to support “Taiwan’s self-defence” and maintain “our own capacity.” In reality, the US, under Trump and now Biden, has greatly increased the sale of arms to Taiwan, including offensive weaponry. Moreover, under Biden, Washington is pursuing a strategy—as it has already done in provoking its proxy war with Russia—of goading Beijing into attacking Taiwan in a war aimed at weakening and destabilising the Chinese regime. Drawing on the Ukraine war, US is pressing Taiwan to pursue a “porcupine” military strategy, featuring the stockpiling of weaponry such as shoulder-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and attack drones, to inflict maximum damage on Chinese forces. A Wall Street Journal video on August 12 reported that Taiwan was considering expanding training in the use of such weaponry, with President Tsai Ing-wen pictured holding a Taiwanese-made Kestrel anti-armour rocket. The US is also selling Taiwan the more sophisticated mobile HIMARS missile system that has a far greater range and has agreed to sell MQ-9 Reaper drones. The flurry of diplomatic activity is taking place amid heightened military tensions across the narrow Taiwan Strait separating the island from the Chinese mainland. While the Chinese military has wound back the extensive live-fire drills staged in the immediate aftermath of Pelosi’s visit, it continues to mobilise its forces, with the Taiwanese defence ministry reporting 17 Chinese aircraft and five Chinese ships operating around Taiwan on Saturday. Last Thursday the Taiwanese military staged its own drills at the Hualien Air Base on the country’s east coast to simulate a response to a Chinese missile attack, using Taiwanese-made Sky Bow 3 anti-aircraft missiles and 35-millimetre anti-aircraft cannon. Defence ministry spokesperson Sun Li-fang condemned Chinese military exercises, then added that they “provide us with the opportunity for combat-readiness training.” Though not immediately related, China announced last week that it is sending military forces to take part in large-scale “Vostok” exercises being staged by Russia from August 30 to September 5. The joint military exercises, which are held every four years, have in the past involved hundreds of thousands of troops. Other countries taking part include India, Belarus, Mongolia and Tajikistan. While Beijing declared that China’s participation was “unrelated to the current international and regional situation,” the US-NATO proxy war against Russia and Washington’s menacing confrontation with China are driving the two countries together. A year ago, Russia and China held joint military exercises in north-central China involving more than 10,000 troops. Last October, the two countries held joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan, then engaged in their first joint patrols in the western Pacific. The US, which mobilised the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and its battle group in waters off Taiwan during Pelosi’s visit, has indicated that it is preparing another provocation against China by sending a warship through the Taiwan Strait. Such an operation can only further heighten tensions with China and raise the danger of an incident that becomes the starting point for a far wider and more dangerous conflict. And Biden’s policies Steven Lee Myers and Amy Qin 7-20-2021. (Steven Lee Myers is a veteran foreign and national security correspondent for The New York Times, currently based in California covering misinformation at home and abroad. From China, he contributed to the articles on the coronavirus pandemic that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. Amy Qin is an international correspondent for The New York Times covering the intersection of culture, politics and society in China. "Biden Has Angered China, and Beijing Is Pushing Back (Published 2021)." No Publication. Web. 7-20-2021. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/world/asia/china-biden.html >) MSUCB From China’s perspective, the blows from the United States just keep coming. Sanctions and export controls over the crackdown in Xinjiang. A warning to international businesses about the deteriorating climate in Hong Kong. The rejection of visas for students and researchers suspected of having links to the People’s Liberation Army. Now the United States has rallied a broad array of nations to accuse the Chinese Ministry of State Security not only of cyberespionage but also of hacking for profit and political intrigue. The torrent of attacks has infuriated Beijing, but six months into the tenure of President Biden, the Communist Party leadership has yet to find an effective strategy to counter the American moves. In Beijing’s view, Mr. Biden has taken a more strategic approach than his predecessor, enlisting allies to join his campaign against Chinese behavior in ways that appear to have frustrated officials. China has resorted to its usual instinct for tit-for-tat measures, while lashing out with a heavy dose of vitriol and sarcasm. Although both sides have said that they want to avoid a new Cold War, they are plunging into an increasingly ideological conflict that shows little sign of easing. The result has been a deterioration of relations that, to the surprise of many in Beijing, has surpassed even the four tumultuous years of dealing with President Donald J. Trump. “The United States has declared its comeback, but the world has changed,” Le Yucheng, a vice minister of foreign affairs, said in a recent interview with the nationalistic news site Guancha.cn, echoing a Biden administration catchphrase. “The United States needs to see these changes, adapt to them, and reflect upon and correct its mistakes in the past.” It is not clear whether the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has formally signaled a change in foreign policy strategy, but judging from public statements and actions in recent weeks, patience with the Biden administration has worn thin. China has retaliated against American and European sanctions over China’s political repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang with sanctions of its own. It has reined in the public offerings of Chinese companies on American stock exchanges. And it has stepped up military activity in the South China Sea and in the water and air around Taiwan in response to a more visceral American policy of support for the island democracy under Mr. Biden. The quickening tempo of military operations increases the chances of armed confrontation — even if accidental. The incendiary language emanating from some officials and state media in China would make climbing down even more difficult, given a nationalistic mood at home. Mr. Xi used a speech on July 1 celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China to warn that anyone who challenged the country’s sovereignty would “crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people.” Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said, “The Chinese government realizes very clearly up until now the pressure and unprecedented challenges that China faces in the world.” “The problem is they know that to change this means that China has to change its fundamental policy, which is firmly deemed by the Chinese leaders as not possible, or at least not worth it,” he added. Tensions have been mounting since the top diplomats from the two sides met in Alaska in March. Those meetings opened with an extraordinarily rancorous exchange about the issues that divide them. Mr. Biden’s special envoy on climate change, John Kerry, followed up with a visit to Shanghai in April, but a joint statement pledging to reduce emissions included no new efforts to work together. Since then, cooperation on any issue has been scarce. Instead, there has been an almost daily exchange of recriminations. The animosity has become so intense that even a visit by the new deputy secretary of state, Wendy R. Sherman, has become a diplomatic dispute, with officials on both sides wrestling over who would attend any meetings, tentatively scheduled for next week. Mr. Biden, who has already met with another obstreperous American adversary, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, has not yet announced a face-to-face with Mr. Xi. Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi, who met many times as their countries’ vice presidents, have not spoken since their two-hour-plus telephone call in February during the American president’s first month in office. Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dismissed the newest American-led accusations as “made up out of thin air.” He said the United States was the world leader in cyberattacks. Wu Qiang, an independent political analyst in Beijing, said mutual suspicion was blocking a return to more stable relations. “There is a lack of political trust,” he said. “This is the biggest obstacle.” In Beijing, there is no question who is to blame. The view is that Mr. Biden’s moves reflect an American intention to undercut China’s growing economic and military might. The strategy to recruit allies in the effort seems to have particularly rankled. “Biden’s administration is isolating China with a multilateral club strategy,” Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, wrote in a response to questions. “This strategy has brought about much more difficulties to China’s economic development and pressure on China’s diplomatic relations than Trump’s unilateral strategy.” China has treated the deterioration of relations, in part, as a propaganda problem. In public statements and on social media, it has sought to discredit the United States as an arbiter of international behavior and values. When a condominium collapsed in Surfside, Fla., Chinese state media castigated what it called a “sluggish” response, glossing over similar tragedies at home. Mr. Zhao, the foreign affairs ministry spokesman, recently called the 1921 Tulsa race massacre an example of “genocide” by the United States. While Mr. Zhao’s “wolf warrior” persona plays well among nationalists, others in China have raised concerns about such an aggressive strategy. At a seminar in Beijing last week organized by the Center for China and Globalization, a research group based in the Chinese capital, some scholars were stark about the country’s global image. A recent poll by the Pew Research Service, for example, found that overwhelming majorities of people in 15 major countries had a negative perception of China. Chu Yin, a professor at the University of International Relations in Beijing, called on China’s diplomats to be more flexible and creative in telling the country’s story abroad. “I often say that our diplomatic personnel have made great strides in their foreign language skills, but their ability to tell stories and find emotional resonance has been regressing in great strides,” Mr. Chu said at the seminar. “Now, China’s national image is not going over well, and this is directly related.” But China’s hard-line approach seems unlikely to change soon. Within the Chinese political and diplomatic establishment, there is an understanding that this tough approach comes from the top. Mr. Xi seems undaunted. Even before Mr. Biden won the election, Mr. Xi was reported to have reprised a theme that has since appeared much more frequently in public discussions. “The East is rising, while the West is declining,” he was said to have told a party meeting last year. Deng Yuwen, a former editor of a Communist Party newspaper who now lives in the United States, said many in China believed the coming five years would be the most tense period in relations so far. “China’s view now is that ‘We are so strong that it’s no problem for us to confront you. We can confront you for as long as is necessary,’” he said. 1NC --- China = Neo revisionist China is neo revisionist – their behavior is consistent with competitive status quo powers – creating ADIZs, island disputes, and offshore resources Robert Farley 8-29-2014. (Robert Farley is an assistant professor and senior lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, as well as a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College. "China Might Just Be an Assertive Status Quo Power." The Diplomat. Web. 8-29-2014. accessed 8-24-2022. < https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-might-just-be-an-assertive-status-quo-power/ >) MSUCB Is China a status quo or a revisionist power? This question dominated 20th century geopolitics. Attempts to discern whether competitors intended to adjust the existing international order in their favor, or to overthrow that order and install something new, sat at the heart of statecraft and diplomacy at the openings of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The question goes to the heart of the willingness of people and statesmen to make the sacrifices necessary to defend national interests. World War I might have been worth fighting against a revolutionary power, rather less so against states that merely desired a reshuffling of the deck. Unsurprisingly, this question has animated (if often implicitly), U.S. discussion of the problems created by the rise of China. We can agree on certain things. Chinese pilots are not going rogue; there is a logic behind these intercepts, and it’s worthwhile to expose Chinese provocations. All of this tells us less about China’s long-range aims than we might think, however. Sometimes it’s hard to see whether a state is pro-status quo or revisionist. Russia appears only recently to have determined, after 15 years of struggle, that it simply cannot live within the international order created and maintained by the United States. For a very long time Imperial Japan sought to understand its own foreign policy as part of the broader colonial project that the European powers had created, before rejecting even that as insufficient. On the converse, in the Cold War the United States determined, eventually, that Soviet Russia was basically an ornery status quo power, different in character from either Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany. Thus far, there is precious little to indicate that China genuinely seeks to overturn the existing international order of East Asia, rather than carve out a larger (and more unique) place within that order. Competitive status quo powers do things like creating ADIZs, throwing their weight behind squabble over islands, and playing hardball with respect to contested offshore resources. Similarly, launching increasingly aggressive interceptions of recon aircraft in the vicinity of China is something that we could expect of a mildly competitive status quo power, especially one enjoying growth in economic and military power. The best, most robust, longest enduring international orders carve out a space for legitimate competition, while also delegitimating certain actions (the annexation of a neighbor’s province, for example). But the experience of the last couple of years also reaffirms that there’s nothing necessarily pleasant about how a status quo power jockeys for position under an existing rule set. Moreover, simply granting that China does not seek revolution hardly means that the United States, Vietnam, the Philippines, or Japan need to view Chinese moves with complacency. 1NC --- Heg Bad Heg is dead and attempts to revive it wreck the international order Larison 20 (Daniel Larison, senior editor at The American Conservative. He has been published in the New York Times
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