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2023 SDI Affirmative

UBI Aff - MSDI 2023

UBI Aff - MSDI 2023.docx

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MSDI --- Universal Basic Income Aff
1AC --- MSDI
1AC --- China
United States hegemony is at a critical juncture – we need to start rebuilding ASAP.
Minqi Li 10-1-2022. (Minqi Li is a professor of political economy at the Department of Economics, University of Utah, USA, a Marxist and a representative of the New Left in China, . "The Collapse of American Hegemony and the Challenges of the 21st Century." Journal Luxembourg Web Accessed 5-10-2023 < https://zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/artikel/the-collapse-of-the-american-hegemony-and-the-challenges-of-the-21st-century/ > .)MSUCB
*** Original article was in German; it was translated by Google.
The Decline of the American Hegemonic Power
When the United States emerged from the Second World War as the indisputable new hegemony, it led to the restructuring of the capitalist world system.
The US-led restructuring contributed to the unprecedented boom of global capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s. However, by the late 1960s, the capitalist world system was confronted by a new wave of economic and political instabilities. The combination of long economic boom and welfare state institutions encouraged the western working classes to undertake militant struggles. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, the US and the other core capitalist countries (Western Europe and Japan) suffered from sustained decline in profit rate.
The US defeat in Vietnam revealed the limit of US military power. Revolutionary movements threatened to destabilize capitalists as well as socialist governments from Eastern to Western Europe, from China to Latin America, and from Portugal to its African colonies.
The oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 provided the initial indication that depleted resources and environmental space might impose insurmountable limits to future economic growth. As the US international balance of payment became increasingly unfavorable, the US had to abandon the nominal link between the US dollar and gold under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. Throughout the 1970s, the global economy struggled with “stagflation” (the combination of rising unemployment and rising inflation that traditional Keynesian policy was unable to deal with).
In response to what Giovanni Arrighi referred to as the “signal crisis” of the American hegemony (Arrighi 1994: 214-217), the American ruling elites shifted the focus of capital accumulation from material expansion towards financial expansion. The US Federal Reserve drastically raised interest rate to contain rising inflation. The policy of monetary austerity led to deep recessions at home and debt crises from Latin America to Eastern Europe. Recessions and the following economic stagnation helped to depress the working class bargaining power in the core countries of the capitalist world system. On the other hand, “structural adjustments” and “shock therapies” imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank impoverished peoples in Latin America, Eastern Europe,
By the mid-1990s, profit rates in the United States and Western Europe had returned to or exceeded the levels in the 1960s. Global capitalist economy enjoyed a period of relative boom from 1995 to 2007. At the turn of the century, the United States accounted for about two-fifths and the US and its allies together accounted for about three-quarters of the world's total military spending ( Council on Foreign Relations 2014). At the time, the US hegemony appeared to be beyond challenge.
However, unlike in the early postwar years when the US-led restructuring promoted not only the national interests of American capitalism but also the system's common interests, the transition from material expansion to financial expansion after the 1970s helped to restore the profit rate by intensifying inter -state conflicts and social conflicts that would eventually lead to hegemonic breakdown (Arrighi 2005).
The global neoliberal restructuring (that included policies of privatization, de-regulation, trade liberalization, and financialization) in the 1980s and 1990s depressed global effective demand and created conditions for frequent financial crises (Crotty 2000). As a result, stabilization of the global economy required the US acting as global “borrower of last resort” by running large trade deficits and the US domestic demand had to rely upon debt-financed consumption. When the US internal and external financial imbalances became no longer sustainable, the US and global economy were hit by the “Great Recession” of 2008-2009. The US hegemony entered into accelerated decline (Li 2008: 72-87).
A Universal Basic Income would strengthen American hegemony – specifically to compete with our top priority: China.
Scott Singer and Ben Silvian November 09, 2021. (Scott Singer Scott Singer is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford. Ben Silvian is pursuing his Masters degree in technology management at Georgetown University. Follow him on Twitter @BenSilvian.. "How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy." The Diplomat. Web. accessed 5-10-2023 https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/ >.)MSUCB
Earlier this summer, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined his foreign policy strategy of “domestic renewal,” aimed directly at arming the United States to compete with China. The strategy, articulated in an August 9 speech at the University of Maryland, focused predominantly on increasing infrastructure investment at home, reflecting the potential foreign policy benefits of the bipartisan infrastructure bill Congress passed last week.
In the weeks following the “domestic renewal” speech, we patiently awaited further elaboration of Blinken and President Joe Biden’s domestic policy-oriented China policy, some next steps to integrate the oft-segregated domestic and foreign policy worlds.
But no further elaboration came.
Perhaps the principle of domestic renewal served little more than a rhetorical function for the Democratic party leadership in the State Department, designed to push the infrastructure bill through Congress. But make no mistake: For the United States to compete with China – and address domestic concerns like economic inequality – it must embrace a broader policy that explores the synergies between local, domestic, and international policy. That means taking domestic renewal seriously, and expanding it beyond the realm of physical capital and into the realm of human capital.
Democratic constraint, the idea that countries have a limited policy arsenal due to pressure from public opinion and other electoral constraints, has profoundly influenced American foreign policy for decades, such as during the end of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Experimental evidence conducted on Israeli parliamentarians showed they were more willing to use force when public opinion concurred. The key takeaway of this research is that in order to optimize its foreign policy, the U.S. must align its domestic policy so that its citizens – and voters – support “strategically optimal” foreign policy objectives.
Consider the area of artificial intelligence (AI), a crucial point of contestation between the United States in China. As Graham Allison and Eric Schmidt at the Belfer Center have argued, the AI arms race is much more competitive than most Americans realize. Despite the importance of encouraging AI development, most Americans are techno-pessimists. Much of this apprehension toward technology stems from concerns that automation will fuel job loss, with a 2017 Pew Research Center study showing 72 percent of Americans are concerned about a future where computers can do many human jobs. The United States’ ability to develop a foreign policy to compete with China in AI is thus directly hindered by domestic policy constraints: The American public is afraid of the economic consequences of automation.
How can the United States overcome the democratic constraint problem that is inhibiting progress in developing an optimal foreign policy response toward China? The answer lies partly in modifying domestic incentives such that the American public supports strategically optimal foreign policies. If U.S. domestic policy can harness technological advancement to improve the lives of average Americans, it can unlock advantageous foreign policy approaches from their domestic constraints. The only way to turn Luddites into technophiles is to recalibrate the system so that the economic gains of advanced technology start flowing to them. Relevant human infrastructure investment could manifest in a range of forms, but here we consider one of the most prominent ideas from the 2020 U.S. presidential elections: Universal Basic Income (UBI).
At its core, UBI is a direct investment in American human capital, distributing the immense economic gains of technology advancements throughout the populace. The policy, popularized by Andrew Yang as a “Freedom Dividend,” would guarantee direct cash payments every month. Cash is highly flexible and fungible, meaning it can be used to overcome the recipient’s most pressing financial pain points.
The domestic benefits of UBI are well-documented. Although UBI wouldn’t bring the mining and manufacturing jobs back, experts estimate it would lead to 13-percent GDP growth and help revive pandemic-ravaged industries like retail and hospitality, providing them the funds to pay employees reasonable wages. Simultaneously, it would offer workers bargaining power and psychological security. While gross cost calculations for the program run into the trillions, the net cost, or “real cost” is calculated to be just a sixth of the oft-mentioned price tag, landing at about $540 billion. With the potential to eradicate absolute poverty, it is a compelling investment at a lower net price than the defense budget.
However, UBI would operate as more than an inward-facing policy. Rather, it would strengthen American competitiveness on the world stage by unlocking support for technological progress and AI development. As such, it would help the United States maintain its hegemonic advantage over China. UBI reframes the story of automation. Instead of replacing us, robots would now be working for us, and their progress would deliver us financial freedom. As their productivity grows in the coming decades, so could monthly checks – aka the dividends we are paid for being stakeholders in the United States. In this context, rapid technological progress that allows America to stay nationally competitive is not only digestible, but beneficial.
Fortunately, the implementation of Universal Basic Income would improve foreign policy outcomes in other ways as well.
For one, UBI can inspire Americans to work in the national interest, as it shows citizens that their leaders believe in their abilities and that their nation is willing to fight for them. There is strong empirical evidence that direct cash payments from the government increase social trust in both lawmakers and peers. When Finland conducted its landmark basic income experiment, providing direct cash transfers to 2,000 of its citizens, trust in legislators and fellow citizens both markedly improved.
Robert Cialdini’s psychological research surrounding reciprocity is highly relevant here: People feel naturally obliged to return favors done for them. This new wave of UBI-inspired patriotism would be instrumental in helping the United States accomplish its foreign policy objectives.
Additionally, UBI provides Americans the material resources to innovate by uplifting them financially. It offers citizens the seed funding they need to innovate without the risk of financial ruin, helping them turn their product ideas into realities. It provides the financial resources to take a chance.
All three of these outcomes – acceptance of technological progress, patriotic fervor, and rising innovation and entrepreneurship – would go a long way in improving our national competitiveness. They would serve as a strong foundation for America’s post-pandemic domestic renewal.
Factionalization in Washington has brought extensive infighting, leading to segregated domestic policy and foreign policy discourses. The United States would be well-served by a policy approach that can make progress on alleviating domestic suffering while furthering foreign policy priorities, and can be pitched as a multifront strategic initiative. Human infrastructure investments, through UBI or policies like it, have the potential to tackle these domestic and foreign challenges simultaneously.
China is a revisionist power devoted to a “post-Western” world.
Angela Stent 2-1-2020. (Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, . "Russia and China: Axis of revisionists?." Brookings. Web. accessed 5-16-2023 < https://www.brookings.edu/research/russia-and-china-axis-of-revisionists/ >.)MSUCB
The China-Russia relationship has become an increasingly robust, pragmatic strategic partnership since 2014, in part because the United States is pursuing policies that have driven the two countries closer together. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are both authoritarian leaders whose primary preoccupation is regime survival and who are allergic to Western criticisms of their domestic systems and the repressive policies of their respective governments. China and Russia are revisionist powers in as much as they share a commitment to creating a “post-West” global order which takes their interests into account and is conducive to authoritarian rule.
Since Russia’s 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the West’s subsequent attempts to isolate Russia, Putin has increasingly turned to China, which has enabled Russia to surmount the isolation and flourish on the world stage. Sino-Russian economic and energy ties are expanding. China is economically more important to Russia than vice versa and is Russia’s number one trading partner and the secondlargest purchaser of Russian military hardware. The new Power of Siberia gas pipeline will increase their energy interdependence. Sino-Russian cooperation in the military and high-tech fields is also growing. Their joint military exercises and air patrols, as well as joint work on artificial intelligence and biotechnology pose challenges to the United States.
There are significant asymmetries in the relationship, and mutual mistrust remains, especially in Russia’s rapidly depopulating Far East, where Chinese traders and entrepreneurs are abundant. Nevertheless, Russia appears to have accepted its role as a junior partner to China. This is in part because China, unlike the United States, is not perceived to represent a threat to Putin’s rule. Those who believe that Russia would be willing to distance itself from China and align itself with Washington against Beijing underestimate the extent to which China’s unequivocal support of Russia’s domestic system is an existential issue for the Putin regime. Moreover, the twin U.S. policies of sanctioning Russia and pursuing a trade war with China have pushed the two countries closer together. Washington could promote closer ties to Russia by lifting sanctions, extending the New START treaty and even modifying its stance on the Ukraine conflict. But it is unlikely that this would lead Russia to distance itself from China.
INTRODUCTION
Asked about Russia’s relationship with China at the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the two countries “enjoy an unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation. This is an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.” Then he revealed, “We are now helping our Chinese partners create a missile attack warning system. This is very important and will drastically increase China’s defense capability. Only the United States and Russia have such a system now.”1 Shortly thereafter, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov clarified that “neither Russia nor China are planning to create a military alliance.”2
Is the burgeoning Sino-Russian partnership still an “axis of convenience” and a “wary embrace” of unequals, or is it developing into a more full-fledged alliance that will represent an ongoing challenge to U.S. interests and could further undermine the post-Cold War international order?3 The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy warned that:
The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model — gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”4
Certainly both the Russian and Chinese leaders go out of their way to stress how close their ties are. During a visit to Moscow in June 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping was extravagant in his praise: “Russia is the country I have visited the most times, and President Putin is my best friend and colleague.”5 Putin has reciprocated, telling the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, with Xi at his side:
“President Xi Jinping and I have established very positive personal relations. Yesterday, we spent a lot of time together and discussed a wide variety of matters. We parted at midnight Moscow Time or 4 am Beijing Time. We had a lot to discuss. Later, I said: ‘I have to apologize to you, I should let you go. Hosts should not treat their guests this way.’ But this indicates that our agenda is very extensive.”6
Russia and China are revisionist powers today in as much as they both seek to create a “post-West” world order — one of which the United States can no longer determine the financial and political contours.7 Even though the visions of Moscow and Beijing may differ, both aim for a world order more supportive of authoritarian regimes that prize sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. Thus, those who believe that Russia would be willing to distance itself from China and align itself with Washington against Beijing underestimate the extent to which China’s unequivocal support of Russia’s domestic system is an existential issue for the Putin regime. Moreover, the twin U.S. policies of sanctioning Russia and pursuing a trade war with China have pushed the two countries closer together. Peeling Russia away from China, as some in the United States suggest, would involve a significant modification of current U.S. policy toward Russia in an age in which Russia has become a toxic subject in U.S. politics following Moscow’s interference in the 2016 presidential election.
It's a common consensus amongst experts that China is a revisionist threat.
Nichole Ballawar 4-1-2020. (Author is a Senior Visiting Faculty member at Nagpur's Government Law College. He has also served as a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) as a Defence Analyst for Janes. He has also worked as a China Research Assistant for the Ministry of External Affairs and as an Intern for the United Nations Development Program., . "China – A Revisionist Power?." Diplomatist. Web. accessed 5-16-2023 < https://diplomatist.com/2020/04/06/china-a-revisionist-power/ >.)MSUCB
PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA’S RISE
There are different viewpoints about China’s Rise:
Prof. Srikant Kondapalli from the School of International Studies, JNU, iterates that Chinas soft hand hard hand techniques are formidable. If the Chinese think that their soft power to influence is not working they would try to switch to hard power advancements, this will continue till they reach a pinnacle. This explains assertive behaviour in the Indian Ocean region. Professor also explains that China’s Comprehensively Deeping reforms under which explain China’s revisionist behaviour.
John Mershe

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