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2023 Michigan Kritik

K - Psychoanalysis - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP

K - Psychoanalysis - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP.docx

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K – Psycho – BLP
Thank you to Sid Kohli, Josh Lim, Mustafa Khan, Sajad Beg, Varsheeth Nimmagadda, Jimmy Li, Cephas Liu, & Aarush Gupta for their work in producing this file. I am very proud of these rising sophomores for what they have accomplished here.
--Sarah Lee
Neg
1nc shells
1nc – policy – generic
The 1AC is a narcissistic fantasy machine, producing the ideological construction of development against inequality and poverty through its efforts for fiscal redistribution. That reproduces unconscious desires for individualism, which conceal the neoliberal production of poverty and precarity. The alt is the reorientation of desires against and away from contradictory spectacle economies of entrepreneurship.
Kapoor 14 (PhD Political Science , University of Toronto. MA International Affairs , Carleton University. BA (Honours) Economics and Political Science , University of Waterloo Professor of Critical Development Studies. “Psychoanalysis and development: an introduction” 10/2/14, Third World Quarterly Volume 35, 2014 - Issue 7 pg 2-5) //Sajad
International development has tended to ignore – or, tellingly, repress – human/ social passions. Yet the theory and practice of development is replete with disavowed memories (racism, (neo)colonialism, gender discrimination) and traumatic prohibitions (economic recession, poverty), which show up in dreams and fantasies (the exoticised Third World, structural adjustment as universal pan- acea), obsessions (economic growth, ‘wars’ against poverty or terror), or stereo- types (denigration, infantilisation, sexualisation or feminisation of the Third World Other). Psychoanalysis aims precisely at helping tease out these passions, that is, the unconscious fantasies and desires embedded in development. It helps explain the gap between development’s scientific commitments (eg belief in pro- gress, neutrality, objectivity, rationality) and its irrational practices (eg the seductive draw of narrow capitalistic growth, the fatal pull to aggressive racism, or the blind conformity to bureaucratic procedures or ethnic/religious identities). It helps us understand that development is not only a socioeconomic construction, but also an ideological construction intent on effacing its various internal traumas and contradictions – for example, the way in which development is “naturally” equated with neoliberal growth and liberal democracy, concealing the reality of rapacious capitalism, growing global inequalities and unevenness, and diminishing avenues for political contestation. The five articles in this sub-theme for Third World Quarterly aim to examine the intersection of psychoanalysis and development, applying in particular (although not exclu- sively), a Lacanian/Žižekian lens to a range of development issues. It is not just mainstream development that tends to ignore the domain of social passions; it is also critical thinking within the field, including political economy and post-development. Yet, as all the articles in this issue highlight, political-economic issues are imbricated with human desires. Thus, for example, Maureen Sioh links ‘libidinal economy’ to ‘political economy’ by examining how the anxiety of humiliation and the desire for dignity are acted out in the practices of a large East Asian government-linked corporation. She sees such anxieties reflected more broadly in East Asian emerging economies, whose striving for economic growth is at the same time a straining to be recognised as more ‘fully human’, as wanting to command the same degree of respect globally as does the West. In a similar vein, Japhy Wilson’s and my article both argue that one of the main reasons explaining the tremendous success of neoliberal capitalism worldwide is jouissance (a Lacanian term, loosely translated as ‘enjoyment’). That is to say, late capitalism seduces; it binds people to it libidinally by selling them not just ‘cool stuff’ such as iPhones or TVs, but also alluring fantasies about the ‘good life’. This issue of fantasy (or ideological fantasy) is an important one in Lacanian psychoanalysis and, not surprisingly, is taken up by many of the contributors, several of whom once again underscore the links between political economy and libidinal economy. Gavin Fridell shows how the discourse on fair trade is emotionally and fantasmatically loaded. The discourse includes romanticised beliefs and unconscious desires about individualism, local democracy and empower- ment, and affirms an exaggerated role for the Northern consumer, who is con- structed as saviour in being able to change the world through individualised purchases of fair trade coffee. Fridell contrasts this with the case of state-led Vietnamese coffee production: despite being a comparatively more successful example involving collective Southern agency, it is generally ignored in the Western imaginary because it offers no central or empowering role to the Northern consumer. Similarly, Fletcher et al. discuss how the fantasy of overpopulation portrays Third World ‘barbarian hordes’ as threatening the security and jouissance of the West. They argue that this overpopulation bogeyman is an ideological construction that diverts attention away from the impossibility of ‘sustainable development’, which is founded on a neoliberal capitalist system that is the very source of the inequality and ecological degradation that sustainability purports to address. This same kind of ideological diversion is at the heart of Wilson’s article. He maintains that a ‘cause marketing’ campaign such as Jeffrey Sach’s Millennium Villages Project in sub-Saharan Africa, which proposes to transform subsistence farmers into entrepreneurs, is more accurately a narcissistic fantasy: it enables Westerners to enjoy their privileged socioeconomic position in relation to abject Africans, while at the same time admiring a thriving capitalism cleansed of its social contradictions. But it is not just political economy that tends to ignore human emotions; it is also post-development. Indeed, of late, much attention has gone into Foucauldian-inspired post-development analyses, with a particular focus on the production of discourses about the Third World and their attendant disciplinary mechanisms. The problem is that such analyses fail to confront the psychic inclinations that support development discourses. In my article I argue that post-development authors such as Escobar and Ferguson provide no explanation of how power is mediated at the level of the subject, and why people so often acquiesce in, say, neoliberal discourse. In maintaining that development politics and power is produced discursively in an impersonal way (like an ‘anti-politics machine’), post-development ignores the fact that such power is only able to take hold, expand and crucially, persist through libidinal attach- ments (eg jouissance). In a similar vein Wilson concludes that philanthrocapitalism is not so much an anti-politics machine that socially engineers entrepreneurial subjects, but a ‘fantasy machine’ that helps sustain the social fantasy of neoliberalism, while disavowing capitalism’s obscene spectacle of global inequality. Yet, if the contributors to this collection are correct in pointing to the social passions that undergird development, thereby issuing a rejoinder to political economy and post-development, they are also posing a challenge to those on the Left who rely on critical pedagogies for effective sociopolitical transforma- tion. Indeed, the implication of a psychoanalytic approach (underlined in both Fletcher et al.’s and my pieces) is that it is not enough to critically deconstruct discourses, to point out their gaps, discontinuities and contradictions; it is also vital to identify and come to terms with our libidinal attachments to, and unconscious investments in, these discourses. In other words, knowledge and critical rationality must be complemented by a reorientation of our desires.
Their life-affirmation culminates in fundamentalist violence – only the death drive makes life worth living
McGowan 13 [Todd, Associate Professor of Film and Television Studies at the University of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, Symploke, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, NE): 2013, p. 224-7]
On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. 3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value. 5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death- the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are - is a mode of avowing one's allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.• This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modem inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its own most potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being·in·the-world."" Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.• We can see this in the two great systems of modernity- science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.• Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough- crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one - but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity." Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility." The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite - an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite - the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real." 15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.
1nc – race – necropolitics – short (1 card)
Racism is a necropolitical technology of governance, reproduced through unconscious processes which subsume the logic of capital. Traditional theories of Black resistance internalize Eurocentric neuroses and constrain their political imaginaries – turns the case and re-entrenches the intergenerational colonial trauma of anti-blackness. Only psychoanalytic socio-diagnosis mobilizes black reason against the phantom of colonialism.
Naicker 21 (Veeran Naicker recently obtained his doctorate in Sociology from the University of Cape Town, Dr Naicker’s current research into the Necropolitical structure of the Township, racialized trauma and the black body is supported by a prestigious postdoctoral fellowship from the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, at Stellenbosch University. His research interests include postcolonial studies, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, critical theory and the intersections between histories of the Anthropocene, racism, patriarchy and capitalism. “The Necropolitical Crisis of Racial Subjectivity in the South African Postcolony: Black Consciousness as a Technology of the Self and the limits to Transformation” 12/15/21. 136-139) //Sajad
I argue that race is not as an anachronistic remnant of a pre-modern worldview, but a necropolitical ‘technology of governance’ (Mbembe: 2017, p.35) that establishes a racial logic and racism as unconscious processes that constitute modern social reality, (Goldberg: 2001, p.108). Unlike classical Marxism, the racial, colonial and consequently postcolonial state is not bound to the logic of capital but, under the terms of colonial governmentality, both capital and the state enjoy a relationship of reciprocal autonomy. In the case of the Apartheid state, the logic of capital was subordinated to the logic of racial purity (Goldberg: 2002, p.106). It was the conception of the racial state that rendered possible the colonial project, and inversely, the materiality of the racial state is testament to the racializing success of colonial discourse despite the formal demise of colonialism (Goldberg: 2002, p.108). The European colonial state was characterized by governmental policies that ‘manufactured homogeneity,’ while the colonial state outside Europe concerned itself with ‘managing difference, regulating the threat of heterogeneity, or anarchy (or statelessness)’ (Goldberg: 2002, p.120). Although both types of colonial governance gave birth to racial subjects that outlived the end of colonialism, these formations not only differ in form and content but, in their racial mode of subjection, represent different modes of governance.
My claim is therefore that the ideologies of resistance and otherness in the twentieth century, ‘negritude, the black personality and African philosophy’ are not the expression of an innate creativity or an intrinsic will to resistance, but rather evidence that African anticolonial discourses on the self-have come to internalise and invert the Western depiction of the African subject as ‘the other of history’ and therefore become the speaking subjects that have reified master/slave positions in nativist and Pan African discourse as regimes of truth in African anticolonial nationalist discourse in the colonial library or episteme (Diawarra: 1990, p.81). Mbembe designates this nativist/Africanist discourse as the second narrative of black reason (Mbembe: 2017, p.30). African scholars have transposed a Foucauldian analytic 

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