Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
← Back to archive
2023 Michigan Counterplan

AT States and Devolution CP - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP

AT States and Devolution CP - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP.docx

Download Word file
Indexed text preview
Aff
States---Deficit---General
State Governments are terrible at fiscal redistribution.
Paul E. Peterson ’96, is the Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government and Director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Senior Editor of Education Next, a journal of opinion and research. “When to Devolve” October 1. https://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/pub_06.pdf Rxie
The Redistributive Capacity of States and Localities For the same reason that local governments are well-suited to providing economic development—to attract labor and capital—they are not effective at serving the needs of the poor, the sick, and the disabled. Programs that serve these needs may be characterized as primarily redistributive, because they shift resources from the “haves” to the “have nots.” Generally speaking, local governments shun such programs. For example, they avoid progressive income taxes. Only about 3 percent of local revenues comes from this source. Any locality making a serious attempt to tax high-income groups for programs targeting the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive away the most productive local contributors elsewhere. No amount of determination on the part of local political leaders can make redistributive efforts succeed. If no other force is able to stop their efforts, bankruptcy will. The smaller the territorial reach of a local government, the less its capacity for redistribution. Most small suburbs in metropolitan areas have almost no capacity to meet the special needs of low-income citizens, because the effects of such actions would be immediately felt in the suburb’s tax rate, property values, and attractiveness to business. The greater territorial reach of states makes them better at redistribution than most local governments. The costs of moving across state lines are more substantial than those of changing residence within a metropolitan area. In contrast to the 17 percent of the population who change residence every year, only 3 percent move across a state line. Even so, labor and capital can and do move, and states must take that possibility into account in their policymaking. Since 1962, state and local redistributive spending has edged up slightly, from a very low 2.2 percent of GNP in 1962 to 3.5 percent in 1990. Over the same period, national government redistributive spending has more than doubled, rising from 4.9 percent to 10.3 percent of GNP. Thus, as a share of the nation’s expenditures on the elderly, the poor, and the needy, state and local redistributive spending has declined. In 1962, states and localities contributed 31 percent of the nation’s redistributive expenditures; in 1990, they contributed only 25 percent. The trend is particularly striking, since it took place during the period when the civil rights movement awakened the country to problems of poverty, the government introduced the Great Society program, and entitlements became an entrenched part of American social policy. State and local reluctance to participate in the redistributive movement cannot be attributed to the political climate. Over most of the period between 1962 and 1990, Democrats controlled at least part of state government in most states and held unified control in many. Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. To understand these pressures, Kenneth Scheve, Jr., Mark Rom, and I estimated the effects of the benefit THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR No. 6 2 Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. States act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. levels of neighboring states on a state’s average cash welfare benefits and Medicaid expenditures per recipient. Our estimate, based on annual data for the years 1976 to 1989, took into account interstate differences in tax capacity, poverty rates, and partisan control. We found that a state cuts its average benefits per recipient by $30 for every $100 that benefits during the previous year exceeded those of the average contiguous state. Welfare benefits were further cut if a state’s poverty population was on the increase. We also found that Medicaid benefits were subject to similar downward pressures. These findings suggest that states act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. Current economic trends are further limiting state and local redistributive capacity. Capital, entrepreneurial activity, and skilled labor have become ever more mobile. State and local governments now face increasingly competitive relationships with each other and must attend ever more strictly to economic development. The result is that they are growing ever more reluctant to provide for the needy within their ranks.
Fed Key - Empirically, states have done a terrible job at solving inequality through welfare programs
Taneisha Fair ’20, The Center for Community Solutions in January 2020 as a Research Assistant/Contract Manager, previously worked at United Way of Greater Cleveland in the 211 program for more than three years, starting as a Community Resource Specialist, has a BA from Kent State University in interpersonal communication, with a minor in nonprofit management, “Unequal under the law: State control of social services perpetuates inequality,” https://www.communitysolutions.com/unequal-law-state-control-social-services-perpetuates-inequality/ Rxie
Black Americans have been excluded from receiving benefits many times since the United States started offering social services decades ago. When the nation’s first federal health care program was created by the Freedman’s Bureau, Black Americans affected by a post-Civil War smallpox outbreak were largely ignored and given minimal assistance, which caused high mortality rates.[1] In the 1930s, New Deal antipoverty efforts sought to bring relief to Americans during and after the Great Depression, but southern states had enough congressional power to ensure that Black people were excluded from benefits like Social Security, minimum wage, and the G.I. Bill through selective work restrictions.[2] While many laws that fueled more explicit racial discrimination were repealed after the civil rights movement and other welfare rights efforts, current rules and processes often still perpetuate racial bias. A more recent example is the social welfare reform of the 1990s. During this time, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program was established as a block grant to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and states were given more discretion to decide who receives benefits and how funds are spent. Cash assistance was no longer an entitlement available to anyone who met eligibility requirements. With no standard federal definition for what makes a family “needy,” states had broad freedom to choose eligibility criteria and income thresholds, mandate work requirements, and impose time limits for how long families can receive assistance. One study examined the level of inequality in the provision of safety-net programs across states from 1994 through 2014, measuring “generosity of benefits and inclusiveness of receipt.”[3] The authors found that the level of inequality in how generous or inclusive a state’s program was were highest in TANF-related programs and lowest in food assistance and health insurance, as the latter two programs have more oversight from the federal government. TANF policies for eligibility requirements and sanctions are harsher in states with a larger Black population. More than 25 years after welfare reform, states with the smallest maximum TANF monthly benefit are concentrated in the Southern U.S., and those with the highest are found in states in the Northeast.[4] According to the Urban Institute,[5] TANF policies for eligibility requirements and sanctions are harsher in states with a larger Black population, and the maximum benefits provided are lower with shorter time limits. For instance, as of July 2019, the highest amount for a single-parent family of three, $1,066 per month, is found in the more homogenous state of New Hampshire,[6] where 93 percent of the population is white and less than 2 percent is Black.[7] Comparatively, Mississippi, has a population that is 59 percent white and 38 percent Black, and offers a maximum benefit of just $170 per month. A Midwestern state like Ohio, falls in between with a maximum benefit of $497 for a population that is 81 percent white and 13 percent Black. Moving forward, we can help to prevent this inequality by monitoring policy outcomes and practices at the federal, state and local levels more closely using a racial equity lens While the welfare reform of the ‘90s did not explicitly discriminate based on race, public perception of welfare became more negative as recipients became more diverse. This saw new stereotypes of Black beneficiaries like the infamous “welfare queen” emerge. In the case of TANF, state discretion aided the reinforcement of these racial biases and resulted in inequal provision of social benefits across the country. Moving forward, we can help to prevent this inequality by monitoring policy outcomes and practices at the federal, state and local levels more closely using a racial equity lens. Community Solutions is committed to doing so. A new proposal to convert Medicaid into a block grant, much like TANF policies, would exclude certain populations and cause increased inaccessibility.[8] Given the results of TANF, there is the danger that any move to give more “flexibility” to states’ could deepen racial disparities and increase geographic variations in benefits. It’s important not to ignore the truth that there is an interplay of historical, economic and social factors in racial bias that have been built into the structure of the social welfare system. Leaders at all levels of government must recognize this, use this knowledge to assess current policies and inform future decisions in service delivery to ensure everyone has equal access to the social safety net.
The recent debate on health care reform has occurred mostly at the national level. The Affordable Care Act, or ACA, was a momentous change for the U.S. health care system. So far, 20 million people have gained health insurance coverage due to the ACA—a historic reduction in the number of uninsured people in the United States.
The ACA also contained several tools designed to control health care costs. It created the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, or CMMI, which is authorized to test new payment and delivery methods in order to lower costs and improve quality for individuals who receive benefits from Medicare; Medicaid; or the Children’s Health Insurance Program, or CHIP. CMMI is currently testing and evaluating many different models, including accountable care organizations, bundled payments for hip and knee replacements, and primary care medical homes. The ACA also reduced Medicare payments to Medicare Advantage plans; to hospitals with poor quality measures; and to medical providers, which has had a spillover effect on private insurance.
Partly due to the ACA, health care cost spending growth has slowed in recent years. Before 2014, there were five years of historically low growth, and 2011 was the first time in a decade that spending on health care grew slower than the U.S. economy. Health care costs are still projected to grow faster than the overall economy, however, and health care spending already puts tremendous pressure on state and federal budgets and limits spending on other important services. More needs to be done to sustain this slowdown in growth.
The current political environment makes it unlikely that reforms to control systemwide health care costs will be achieved at the federal level in the near future. States, however, are well-positioned to take the lead on implementing cost control and quality improvement reforms. Indeed, many states are already innovating and seeing positive results.
There are several advantages to implementing reforms at the state level. State-level reforms can be tailored to work best for each state, depending on the structure of its insurance markets, the size of the state, and its demographics. States also have considerable authority over the regulation of health insurance and the provision of health care within their borders. States control their own insurance markets: They run their Medicaid and CHIP programs and state employee plans, and certain states run the exchanges for individual health insurance. States also control the rate review process, scope-of-practice regulations, physician licensing, antitrust laws, and provider and insurer regulations. Lastly, states and governors have considerable convening power to bring together diverse stakeholders, making reform efforts more politically feasible.
The innovations that some states are implementing to reduce costs while maintaining or improving quality can and should be replicated by other states. This report lays out a comprehensive summary of options, as outlined in the following table, that states can choose from to improve the quality and sustainability of their health care systems. Generally, these options relate to implementing new payment models, increasing accountability and transparency, collecting more data, increasing the use of high-value services and practices, and removing barriers to effective practices.
We have included examples from some of the most pioneering states and other examples where states are instituting similar reforms, as well as details from these states’ experiences and their strategies to make the reforms successful. These examples are not an exhaustive list of all the states that may be undertaking these reforms. Other ideas and strategies have not been used before. Importantly, these reforms are not mutually exclusive; in fact, states should adopt as many as possible.
All of these reform options would help states slow the growth of health care costs, improve the quality of their health care systems, and protect their residents.
Solving through the federal government avoids administrative burdens that unfairly affect marginalized groups
Justin Schweitzer, 5-5-2022, Senior Research Analyst at Teamsters; VP of Organizing at Nonprofit Professional Employees Union"How To Address the Administrative Burdens of Accessing the Safety Net," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-to-address-the-administrative-burdens-of-accessing-the-safety-net/
As elements of program design, administrative burdens are typically sold as measures to weed out ineligible people and prevent fraud. Yet by focusing more on preventing so-called undeserving people from accessing benefits than on simply delivering vital services, policymakers have created so many hoops that participants must jump through that those who need help most are far too frequently denied it. Worst of all, administrative burdens perpetuate inequity because they tend to be most heavily placed on supports for low-income people, rather than those that serve the population as a whole. As a result, more often than not, administrative burdens fall hardest on people of color, people with disabilities, women, LGBTQ people, and the elderly. Consequently, they come with significant economic costs, not savings: The economy is weaker when those who are eligible for support are prevented from receiving it, excluding people and communities from spending, safety, and stability.
Without significant and sustained progress on easing administrative burdens in the safety net, many of the people most in need of help will continue to be cruelly excluded because of needless barriers completely unrelated to their eligibility, with themselves, their families, and the entire economy suffering as a result.
States---Deficit---Private Capture
State officials will be captured by corporate interests and transfer welfare funds to the private sphere.
Bulfone et al. 5-17-2022, (PhD, Assistant Professor at Leiden University) "No strings attached: Corporate welfare, state intervention, and the issue of conditionality," Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10245294221101145
The work of Alice Amsden on performance standards provides particularly important insights in this regard (Amsden, 2001; Amsden and Hikino, 2000). Amsden argues that the successful industrial upgrading in countries like South Korea, Malaysia, or China depends on the capacity by domestic state elites to create control mechanisms to discipline corporate behavior. These control mechanisms revolve around the idea that subsidies or other forms of monetary advantages to corporate recipients need to be subject to monitorable, redistributive, and results-oriented performance standards (Amsden, 2001, 8). If corporate recipients failed to meet these performance standards, state actors would withdraw their financial support, and eventually take more radical measures like ownership repossessions. Performance standards could relate to a wide variety of goals including firm-level managerial practices, sectoral industrial policy goals, or broader national policy goals. Concretely, corporate recipients could be asked to meet “export targets, local content requirements, debt-equity ratio ceilings, national ownership floors, operating scale minima, investment time-table obligations, regional location criteria, and eventually product quality specifications and environmental rules” (Amsden, 2001, 25).
When performance standards were not established, or enforced, state officials ended up being captured by corporate interests. This in turn led to a massive transfer of financial resources from the public to the private sphere with negligible developmental and industrial outcomes (Chibber, 2009). We urge the CPE literature to share this concern for conditionality, as there is no reason to believe that it is only state actors in developing countries that face the risk of a socialization of losses and a privatization of risks when engaging in industrial or innovation policies (Block, 2008; Maggor, 2021; Mazzucato, 2013).
States---Deficit---Taxes
Taxes on a state level fail and increase inequality, federal government is key to stop political conflict.
Daron Acemoglu 2010, Daron Acemoglu is an Institute Professor at MIT and an elected fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, American Philosophical Society, the British Academy of Sciences, the Turkish Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the European Economic Association, and the Society of Labor Economists. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27804974.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab5b481a0f2fc818d3b5502878621973a&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1
While in a few societies economic institutions are designed to provide property rights protection, a level playing field, and basic public goods necessary for economic growth, in many they are structured to maximize the rents captured by the "elite," the individuals or social groups monopolizing political power (e.g., Douglass C. North 1981; Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson 2005. The elite often choose entry barriers, regulations and inefficient contracting institutions that retard economic growth and create resource misallocations in order to protect their economic rents and redistribute resources to themselves (e.g., Mancur Olson 1982; Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Rios Rull 19

Preview shortened. Download the file for the full document.