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2023 Michigan Kritik

AT Psychoanalysis K - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP

AT Psychoanalysis K - Michigan Classic 2023 BLP.docx

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Psychoanalysis can’t solve or understand anything when it comes to politics, economics, and inequality AND they link back to themselves. But the perm solves---the AFF’s political stance is necessary.
Petriglieri, 17 – associate professor of organizational behavior at INSEAD (Gianpiero Petriglieri, “Psychoanalyzing the World’s Problems Won’t Help Us Solve Them,” 1-24-2017, Available Online: https://hbr.org/2017/01/psychoanalyzing-the-worlds-problems-wont-help-us-solve-them, Accessed: 7-20-2023)//ILake-JL
A century past its formulation as a treatment for neurosis, psychoanalysis has become popular again as a method for explaining all kinds of social torments. Not just among psychologists and artistic types, who have always had their ear to the unconscious — lately, CEOs, politicians, and economists all sound as though they have brushed up on their Freud.
At last week’s annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, the spirit of the Viennese forefather of psychology infused the Davos air. One could not attend a panel or have a conversation without encountering classic psychoanalytic ideas. Global elites? In denial. Social divisions? A product of anxiety. Human behavior? Ultimately irrational. Politics? A triumph of identity narratives over economic principles. All in the shadow of a new world leader who seems bent on providing evidence for Freud’s theory of defensive projection, which argues that we blame others most for what we know and like in ourselves least.
A roundup of quotes from various sessions read like the transcript of a psychoanalytic seminar. Anthony Scaramucci, who stopped by the Alpine gathering on his way to taking over the White House’s Office of Public Engagement, said, “People in the U.S. and Europe are feeling a common struggle that maybe many of us here in Davos do not feel.” (Take “maybe” as a marker of the ambivalence that often accompanies emerging insight.)
UK Prime Minister Theresa May, perhaps unconsciously, articulated a classic Freudian analysis of how that struggle leads to the rise of a divisive kind of leader: “Those parties that embrace the politics of division and despair, that offer easy answers, that claim to understand people’s problems, and that always know what and who to blame feed off the sense among the public that mainstream political and business leaders have failed to comprehend their legitimate concerns for too long.”
Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel made a plea for awareness, urging leaders to leave the insulated skyboxes from which they look down on society and to take the kind of compassionate and curious stance on disturbing emotions that psychoanalysis has long advocated: “Leaders need to do a better job of listening to the anger, the discontent, the frustrations, the resentment — even when they take sometimes ugly, odious forms — because there is something to learn. There are, embedded in those frustrations, legitimate grievances and aspirations that we have not successfully addressed for quite some time.”
As someone whose work has long been informed by these ideas, it was astounding to see them erupt into the mainstream. It was disconcerting, too. As I have written here before, when we reach for psychoanalysis to understand the news, it is rarely because the news is good. But it was not surprising. For the past year these concepts have found their way into newspaper columns, management magazines, corporate boardrooms, and politicians’ speeches.
Psychoanalysis is all the rage because we resort to its principles to explain others’ anger as much as we do to express our fears. Freud had a term for such moments, when troubling ideas and emotions can no longer be swept under the carpet. He called it the “return of the repressed.” Those moments, he suggested, are a mixed blessing: They reveal our worst impulses and can bring forth our best insights.
Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund chief, seemed to agree. She recalled the resistance that her warnings about inequality had encountered in Davos years before, and concluded: “If policy makers don’t get it now, I don’t know when they will.” And many of her fellow economists and business leaders seemed intent on “getting it” at last.
But is “getting it” enough? Is insight all it is cracked up to be? Not quite.
Don’t get me wrong. I find psychoanalytic theories very useful for making sense of current affairs and showing that big ideas are often strong emotions in disguise. I wish those theories were even more popular and better understood. At the same time, taking a psychoanalytic stance — heavy on compassion and interpretation, and light on dialogue and intervention — strikes me as defensive on the side of those who aspire to lead.
Social problems like the appeal of populism or the anxiety about job loss brought about by automation are not just neuroses writ large. Putting them “on the couch” is useful, but it can be defensive if interpreting them is all that one does. That intuition moved scholars and professionals who established “systems psychodynamics” half a century ago. Leaders might find their ideas about the unconscious leaders even more useful and contemporary, if more demanding, than those of Sigmund Freud.
Unlike the clinical psychoanalysts of the early 20th century, who worked with individuals and were concerned with the effects of childhood caregivers on adults’ inner life, these scholars worked primarily with groups, organizations, and various social systems. They followed Kurt Lewin’s admonition that the only way to truly understand social systems is to try to change them. They gained their insights from personally engaging with such systems, not from maintaining a scholarly or clinical remove. They proudly called this “action research” to distinguish it from the more contemplative kind.
Systems psychodynamic theories pay less attention to how early attachments shape people’s experience and behavior, and more to how we are affected by the organization and circumstances of our lives and work. What follows is the realization that insight about our history cannot release us from our unconscious captors. Neither can it diffuse the feelings of anger, anxiety, or despair that captivity usually comes with. Only social and organizational changes can — the kind that usually upset power structures.
Systems psychodynamic theories are as subversive in intent as clinical psychoanalysis, in that they seek to free up human potential by upending a constricting status quo. But they suggest that social activism, not just compassionate interpretation, is called for when the source of our torment is the social systems around us, rather than those in our past.
In short, getting it, or even voicing it, is not enough if you can’t or aren’t willing to change “it.” Getting it will make you look useless at best, and complicit at worst.
As “I get it but my opponents don’t” infuses aspiring leaders’ rhetoric worldwide, that is the kind of contemporary psychoanalytic insight that they might do well not to repress.
Psycho not scientific
Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience with no scientific backing -- turns the K
Zepf 18 (Siegfried Zepf, MD, is a Training analyst (DPG, DGPT) and the former director of the Institute of Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatic Medicine, University of Saarland Germany. He is the author of numerous publications on epistemological, psychosomatic, socio-psychological, and psychoanalytical topics. “Psychoanalysis Today—A Pseudoscience? A Critique of the Arbitrary Nature of Psychoanalytic Theories and Practice” 2/26/18 https://doi.org/10.1521/pdps.2018.46.1.115) //Sajad
Neuroses are the outcome of unfavorable and socially determined measures, corresponding to a given historical milieu and necessary in this milieu ... The contradictions of a society are reflected in its education, and later in the neuroses of the educated individuals. (p. 586)
This indicates that the essential conditions of neurotic disturbances are not situated in individuals but inherent in the social system they grow up and live in. If this holds true, then by neglecting that societal critique the crucial etiological conditions of neurotic diseases remain a blind spot in the field of clinical vision.
As a consequence, psychoanalytic assertions about neurotic disorders become insignificant statements of equal validity in the sense that one is as abbreviated as the other. Since science does not primarily focus on its object’s manifestations but on its essential determinants, the current state of knowledge unfolds psychoanalysis as a science obliged merely to outward appearances. Moreover, if none of the conflicting theoretical and technical treatment concepts are considered to be untrue, none of them can be considered as being true. If we go along with Freud and understand truth as a “correspondence [of knowledge] with the real external world...with what exists outside us and independently of us”2 (Freud, 1933, p. 170), “the aim of scientific work...to arrive at correspondence with reality” (p. 170) is suspended.
Thus, psychoanalysis has become an insubstantial science, and, as concepts of a truth-less science can no longer be falsified, psychoanalysis also meets the criterion by which Popper (1962, pp. 34–36; see also Cioffi, 1970, p. 471; Craib, 2000, p. 2; Spence, 1987, p. 211) qualifies psychoanalysis as a pseudoscience.
Tolerating inconsistent concepts standing side by side without conflict not only indicates the “[p]roliferation of versions of a theory,” which is “a very usual symptom of a crisis” (Kuhn, 1972, p. 71), but also that a substantial development of the informational content of psychoanalytic concepts is at a standstill. If all existing theories and technical concepts are declared to be equally valid, the scientific status of any of them is lost. In Holt’s (1981, p. 136) concise formulation: “When anything goes, nothing goes anywhere.”
Nonfasifiability, lack of prediction, lack of rules and regulations, being impossible to test all ensure psychoanalysis will inevitably fail, and reinforces the idea that psychoanalysis is illegit.
Beystehner 98 (Kristen M. Beystehner graduated from University of Georgia School of Law, and Northwestern University, BA, with honors "Psychoanalysis: Freud's revolutionary approach to human personality." 1998 http://www.personalityresearch.org/papers/beystehner.) //Sajad
Finally, many people feel that a major flaw of psychoanalysis is that, according to Farrell (1981), "it appears to encourage analytic and psychodynamic practitioners to overlook the place and great importance of ordinary common sense" (p. 216). Because psychoanalysis deals chiefly with unconscious motives and repressed emotions, common sense no longer seems to be applicable. Farrell (1981) and other critics believe that it is increasingly important for analysts to be aware of common sense and the role that it can, should, and does play in psychoanalysis (p. 216). Criticisms of the Principles of Psychoanalysis
Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise," and that, "...to understand persons cannot be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). Although many psychoanalysts themselves would undoubtedly consider psychoanalysis to be a science, many critics would disagree.
Popper, by far one of psychoanalysis' most well-known critics and a strong critic of Grünbaum, insists that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science because it is not falsifiable. He claims that psychoanalysis' "so-called predictions are not predictions of overt behavior but of hidden psychological states. This is why they are so untestable" (Popper, 1986, p. 254). Popper (1986) claims that only when individuals are not neurotic is it possible to empirically determine if prospective patients are currently neurotic (p. 254). Popper (1986) asserts that psychoanalysis has often maintained that every individual is neurotic to some degree due to the fact that everyone has suffered and repressed a trauma at one point or another in his or her life (p. 255). However, this concept of ubiquitous repression is impossible to test because there is no overt behavioral method of doing so (p. 254).
Other critics claim that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science due to its lack of predictions. Psychoanalysts, critics maintain, state that certain childhood experiences, such as abuse or molestation, produce certain outcomes or states of neurosis. To take this idea one step further, one should be able to predict that if children experience abuse, for instance, they will become characterized by certain personality traits. In addition, this concept would theoretically work in reverse. For instance, if individuals are observed in a particular neurotic state, one should be able to predict that they had this or that childhood experience. However, neither of these predictions can be made with any accuracy (Colby, 1960, p. 55).
Additional critics insist that psychoanalysis is not a science because of the lack of interpretive rules or regulations. Colby (1960) contends that critics of psychoanalysis have difficulties with the idea that "there are no clear, intersubjectively shared lines of reasoning between theories and observations" (p. 54). For instance, one psychoanalyst will observe one phenomenon and interpret it one way, whereas another psychoanalyst will observe the same phenomenon and interpret it in a completely different way that is contradictory to the first psychoanalyst's interpretation (Colby, 1960, p. 54). Colby (1960) concludes that if analysts themselves cannot concur that a certain observation is an example of a certain theory, then the regulations that govern psychoanalytic interpretation are undependable (p. 55).
Psychoanalysis does not function like a scientific method, recent evidence proves that psychoanalysis does not give any coherent response to any criticism.
Paris 17 (Joel Paris obtained his psychiatric training at McGill. His current research interests include a project carrying out a controlled study of the outcome of stepped care treatment for BPD. HE is a Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University. He is also a Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital, and an Associate Psychiatrist at the McGill University Health Center. “Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?” 1/31/17 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0706743717692306) //Sajad
Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities. This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism. One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power. Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history. Conclusions In 2009, the British Journal of Psychiatry published a debate about whether the journal should accept psychoanalytic case reports.54 The debate pitted a biologist, Lewis Wolpert, against a psychoanalyst-researcher, Peter Fonagy. Wolpert argued that psychoanalytic case reports should be excluded because they are in no way scientific. Fonagy, while conceding some of his opponent’s points, defended analysis by pointing out that research is possible and is now beginning to be conducted. But while Fonagy himself is committed to empiricism, he represents a very small minority in a field that lacks that commitment. Unfortunately, the modern revisions of psychoanalysis do not offer a coherent response to critics. It is difficult to see how any of the current responses to criticism can save psychoanalysis from a continued and lingering decline. Analysis has separated itself from psychiatry and psychology by teaching its method in stand-alone institutes. The field may only survive if it is prepared to dismantle its structure as a separate discipline and rejoin academia and clinical science. Whatever its limitations, psychoanalysis left an important legacy to psychiatry. It taught a generation of psychiatrists how to understand life histories and to listen attentively to what patients say. In an era dominated by neuroscience, diagnostic checklists, and psychopharmacology, we need to find a way to retain psychotherapy, whose basic concepts can be traced back to the work of Freud, as part of psychiatry.55
The “Lack” is a lie—critics are silenced and threatened
Robinson 5’ [Andrew Robinson is a associate professor at University of Guelph. Runs an L&D consulting company in Charlottesville, VA. “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique.” 2005 https://philpapers.org/rec/ROBTPT-3]!VAR*
More precisely, I would maintain that “constitutive lack” is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is, after all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. ‘Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact’ (2000, 143, my emphasis). This is precisely the status of “constitutive lack”: a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation, on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they are “received” rather than “read” (1984, 232), and open only to a “readerly” and not a “writerly” interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski’s sense, intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexity. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes’s words an ‘order not to think’ (1997, 59). They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and

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