CP - GND FJG PIC - Michigan Classic 2023 JRY
CP - GND FJG PIC - Michigan Classic 2023 JRY.docx
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FJG GND PIC Acknowledgements Thank you to Lily Howard, Elliott Barringer, Xinyi Li, Beatrix Hopkins. Lilian Huang, Avery Hsia, Caleb Kim, Karen Chang, and Alexander Bobo for their work on this file. FJG PIC 1NC The United States federal government should enact the Green New Deal absent a job guarantee and fund it through a [insert their tax method]. FJG kills jobs and cannot solve the aff. Dolan’20 [Ed; PhD from Yale University; February 4. Can We Put Everyone to Work? — The Alternatives to a “Job Guarantee.” - Niskanen Center. Niskanen Center. https://www.niskanencenter.org/can-we-put-everyone-to-work-the-alternatives-to-a-job-guarantee/] Can we put everyone to work? In a way, it seems like an odd time to be asking the question. After all, the official unemployment rate is at a 50-year low and the U.S. economy has added jobs for a record 110 consecutive months. Still, broader indexes show much greater labor market slack. Those indexes include some 4.4 million people who are working part time but would like to work full time, and an additional 4.4 million who say they want a job, but are neither working nor looking. What is more, the labor force participation rate, even for prime-age workers, is not yet back to its prerecession level and is even farther below the rates of the 1990s. But how to do it? How to get more people to work – and better yet, at a living wage? In what follows I will discuss four proposals. The first two – guaranteed jobs, from the left, and work requirements, from the right – I view skeptically. The other two are wage subsidies and basic income. I see those as more promising, and more promising still if combined. Guaranteed Jobs A job guarantee (JG) is one of the three main pillars of the Green New Deal, along with clean energy and universal health care. Under a JG, anyone who wanted could get a full- or part-time job just by showing up. They would be directly employed by state or local governments and nonprofit organizations, while the cost would be borne by the federal government. The jobs would pay a living wage of something like $15 per hour, plus full benefits. Jobs would be created to match workers’ skills and places of residence, so they could start immediately without retraining or relocation. According to two detailed descriptions [1] [2], guaranteed jobs would be taken up by some 10 to 15 million workers, even with the job market as tight as it is now. Including wages, benefits, payroll taxes, and supplies, the total cost per job would be something like $45,000 to $56,000. The gross cost to the federal budget would be $409 billion to $543 billion per year, some 9 to 11 percent of current federal spending. The net cost could be substantially lower because of taxes paid by workers and budget savings on existing welfare programs, however. Nevertheless, although the cost of a full job guarantee, even with offsets, would make such a program a hard sell in Congress, cost is not the biggest reason I am skeptical. Three things particularly concern me. First, even though guaranteed jobs would be designed not to compete directly with the private sector, a JG would still be disruptive. Private employers would lose workers if they did not match a job-and-benefit package worth some $20 per hour. JG advocates are confident that private employers have enough slack to raise wages without cutting employment, but I am not so sure. JG jobs would not only offer good wages and benefits, but also, as advocates promise, they would be more accommodating than many private sector jobs to workers’ personal schedules, family needs, and disabilities. A large outflow from private employment to guaranteed jobs could raise the cost of the program sharply. Second, I think advocates overstate the ease of creating 10 to 15 million meaningful new public service jobs. To avoid competing with the private sector, they could not be jobs in hotels or factories. They could not require advanced skills or investments in heavy equipment, which would mean JG workers could play a limited role in projects like replacing aging bridges or building green energy infrastructure. When we read advocates’ descriptions of JG jobs, they talk about things like teachers’ aides, recycling, and planting trees on vacant lots. How many workers could be absorbed in such jobs before they became mere make-work? Third, many of those who remain out of work in today’s booming economy are, almost by definition, among the “hard to employ.” Those include people with criminal records, unstable housing, substance abuse issues, family situations that interfere with regular work schedules, and borderline mental and physical conditions that fall short of full disability but still create problems on the job. Programs that try to find work for the hard-to-employ are not a new idea. Many existing programs are well run. Still, their experience shows that lasting success requires intensive, one-on-one casework to help with things like soft job skills and support with personal issues. Even then, success rates are far from 100 percent. The leading JG proposals do not, in my view, come close to budgeting enough for administration, counseling, and support services. GND without a Job’s Guarantee is sufficient to solve the Aff. Stilwell, The University of Sydney, Australia, 2021(Frank, From green jobs to Green New Deal: What are the questions? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 32(2), 155–169. Sage Journals, Green jobs In popular discourse, ‘jobs versus the environment’ is a recurrent theme, implying that attempts to alleviate climate change and other environmental problems adversely affect employment prospects. Predictably, this framing makes many people wary of proposals for stronger environmental policies: indeed, one may infer that this is what motivates the relentless dissemination of ‘jobs versus environment’ ideology. However, an alternative ‘jobs and environment’ approach developed strong roots in Australia during the Green Bans of the 1970s, leading to Jack Munday’s formation of ‘Environmentalists for Full Employment’ (Burgmann and Burgmann, 1998; Munday, 1981). Although initially slow to influence the labour movement, the latter type of thinking had increasing impact during the next two decades. In 1994, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) cooperated with the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) to produce a Green Jobs in Industry research report, and the two bodies returned to the topic with the joint publication of Green Gold Rush (ACF/ACTU, 2008). Political economists began to focus on what could be done – through industry policies and skill development – to create additional ‘green’ or ‘green-collar’ jobs (Pearce and Stilwell, 2008: 120). However, the concept of green jobs, although influential, has always been contestable. The general inference is that work is ‘green’ if it does not add to, and preferably reduces, ecological stress. This implies less depletion of non-renewable resources and/or less waste products emitted into the air, water or on land. Any change in work towards those characteristics may therefore be regarded as ‘greening’. Seen in this light, it is the process of change that is more central than the categorisation of jobs as either green or not green. The latter is hard, if not impossible, because neither occupation nor industry are inadequate identifiers. Whether plumbers, for example, do ‘green jobs’ depends on the specific tasks they undertake, whether installing solar-heating panels or gas-fired heating systems, for example. Some social scientists, grappling with these issues of definition, have developed typologies of green jobs by distinguishing deep-, mid- and light-green categories (Crowley, 1999; Goods, 2011). Others have posited that, to qualify as green, the jobs also need to meet criteria such as providing secure employment, good wages and career prospects (Masterman-Smith, 2010; Pollin and Wicks-Lim, 2008). Although this adds to the difficulties of definition, such concerns have a strong bearing on workers’ responses to green jobs advocacy. The shift from ‘green jobs’ to advocacy of a more broadly based GND may be interpreted partly as a response to these concerns, reflecting the importance of greens jobs being both ecologically and economically sustainable. It also reflects a push for ‘just transition’ – rather than just a transition – to ensure that specific groups of workers do not bear disproportionate costs of change. More than that though, it has been driven by the changed macroeconomic conditions, particularly the problems of unemployment and instability that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Global Coronavirus Crisis (GCC) have accentuated. From an environmental perspective, the former provided some temporary breathing space because the sudden economic downturn caused carbon emissions to dip (Spies-Butcher and Stilwell, 2009). In Australia, the Rudd government’s home-insulation programme also gave a glimpse of how green jobs could contribute to economic recovery. However, the main effect of the GFC was to shift the dominant policy focus towards stabilising the financial institutions and monetary reform. Short-term economic considerations dominated over concerns about longer-term ecological sustainability. Some similar tendencies have been evident during the current GCC: a dip in emissions, some temporary ‘sandbagging’ of the economy and a dominant government policy emphasis on trying to ‘return to normal’. Meanwhile, warnings about the dire consequences of climate change have become increasingly strong, precipitating more vigorous policy commitments in many countries, although conspicuously not in Australia during the last decade. It is in this context that we can understand the advent of a GND as a more comprehensive approach to seeking harmonisation of economic and environmental goals. GND: Origins and characteristics The New Economics Foundation (NEF, 2009) and its chief economist Ann Pettifor began to advocate a GND in the UK at the time of the GFC, developing from earlier work on ‘alternative futures’ (Henderson, 1978) and a ‘new economic agenda’ (Inglis and Kramer, 1985). A report by the Worldwatch Institute (2009) generated further international momentum for the idea. More recently, a GND was championed in the USA by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and embraced by Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren during their ultimately unsuccessful campaigns to be the Democratic Party’s Presidential candidate. Canadian author and public speaker Naomi Klein (2019) continues to be a vigorous international proponent, as does Jane Fonda (2020) whose Hollywood fame draws attention to her climate change activism. The case recently made for a GND by Noam Chomsky and Robert Pollin (2020) adds a powerful political economic perspective. Institutions are also beginning to respond. In December 2019, the European Union (EU) outlined a Green Deal that aims to make the EU as a whole climate neutral by 2050. In the same month, the Australian Greens committed to a GND (Di Natale, 2019). The GCC has given more recent impetus to the push for a GND. Unlike the GFC, there is no substantial debate about its immediate cause – the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic lockdowns that followed. So, the focus this time is almost exclusively on the appropriate policy responses for recovery. For many people, the post-pandemic ‘return to normal’ that conservative politicians promise seems to have a hollow – even pitiful – sound. This is because the pre-pandemic ‘normal’ was not impressive anyway, even by mainstream economic standards. Pervasive problems that are widely perceived in Australia have included growing inequality and stagnant wages (Quiggin, 2020; Rosewarne, 2020), alongside the impact of climate change on increasingly severe weather events, accentuating bushfires and coastal erosion. Not surprisingly therefore, the period of the pandemic has been productive of proposals for deeper economic, social and environmental reforms – exploring possibilities for ‘surging forward’ rather than ‘snapping back’ (e.g. Bennett, 2020; Chalmers, 2020; Denniss, 2020; Heenan and Sturman, 2020; Johnson, 2020; Macklin, 2020; Pennington and Stanford, 2020; Rudd, 2020). Most of these proposals point to scenarios in which improved health, ecological and economic outcomes result from significant structural changes, driven by comprehensive reforms of public policy. Could a GND become the leading contender for meeting these goals? Exploring this question requires clarity about its nature and purpose. While there is no single, universally accepted model – nor need there be – the introduction to the new book by Chomsky and Pollin (2020: ix) is helpful in identifying the four central ambitions, paraphrased as follows: • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to at least achieve the targets set in 2018 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – a 45% reduction in global emissions by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2050; • Making dramatic improvement in energy efficiency and expanding the supply of solar, wind and other renewable energy sources; • Creating a green transition that does not expose workers in the fossil fuel industry and other vulnerable groups to joblessness and the anxieties of economic insecurity; • Unifying climate stabilisation with the goals of expanding job opportunities and raising living standards for working people and the poor throughout the world. Couched in these terms, the GND is an essentially global project. To attain that goal, however, progress must come through policies enacted within individual state jurisdictions, taking account of local conditions and possibilities. In the Australian case, we therefore need to explore how a GND could deal concurrently with the problems of a faltering economy, adverse environment impacts, growing social inequality and the vulnerability of marginalised groups. These interconnected issues can be explored sequentially according to the ‘four Es’ of employment, environment, equity and empowerment. Employment Employment has always been central to the notion of a ‘new deal’. This reflects the term’s origin in the social struggles in the United States (USA) during the Great Depression of the 1930s when the official unemployment rate soared over 20%, as it also did in Australia. Responding to the swelling grass-roots social discontents and pressures for reform, President FD Roosevelt introduced an array of job-creation schemes known collectively as the New Deal. Public works projects were the principal focus for getting the millions of unemployed people back to work. Although not a consciously ‘Keynesian’ economic policy, it implemented the principal practical lesson from the theories being developed at the same time by JM Keynes – that the scourge of unemployment could be tackled effectively by government intervention. A simplified form of Keynesian economics subsequently became part of the new policy orthodoxy during the long boom that followed the Second World War – in tandem with, but never replacing, the still-dominant microeconomic theory of market efficiency. Notwithstanding the subsequent neoliberal interregnum, a similar view resounded strongly in 2020 as the responses to the Coronavirus pandemic jolted the economy into recession. Even right-wing politicians normally espousing ‘free market’ rhetoric and promising budget surpluses had to recognise the need for massive state-initiated fiscal deficits to stimulate economic activity and prevent unemployment reaching levels that could threaten the reproduction of social order. The pertinent question is whether the stimulatory policy approach should be just a short-term response to economic crisis or become more deeply embedded. The Australian government clearly took the former view at an early stage of the GCC in 2020, offering a mix of temporary supports, business incentives and regressive tax changes. The financial supports included the JobKeeper programme that provided payments to businesses to keep previously employed people on their payrolls, but only for the initial year of the crisis. The new JobSeeker payment for people out of work was set initially at double the previous Newstart payment, but it was already being pared back before the end of 2020. Among the various business incentives announced in the 2020–2021 budget, the most substantial was the investment allowance for spending on capital equipment. Although accompanied by government rhetoric about how it would encourage firms to create jobs, significantly, the subsidy was not made conditional on hiring additional workers. The rate of job creation could even decline over time if the investment allowance encourages firms to use less labour intensive technologies, as capital subsidies tend to do. The cuts to income tax rates announced in the 2020–2021 federal budget are similarly problematic because they gave most benefit to people on high incomes and are unlikely to substantially boost consumer spending. At a time of such pervasive uncertainty, the propensity to save is predictably strong, as shown by the reported AUD 100 billion increase in bank deposits in Australia during the first 8 months after the pandemic began (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) cited in Wright, 2020). The tax cuts, while certain to increase post-tax inequality, were never likely to generate substantial macroeconomic stimulus nor produce a jobs surge. The more certain effect is further deepening of Federal budget deficits, already ratcheted up sharply by the government spending that the GCC triggered. Accordingly, the long-standing ambition of the major political parties to get the budget into surplus has had to be indefinitely postponed, if not abandoned. That at least is overdue. However, the current policy settings do nothing to create structural economic changes that would be necessary for more employment and income growth in the longer term. Would a GND provide a more effective means of creating sustainable employment opportunities? If so, that would give it strong appeal not only to the labour movement but to all who are worried about the consequences of continuing economic stagnation, unemployment and the other social consequences of the temporary fiscal stimulus being wound back. So, how might that job-creation occur? Expanding public employment is the most direct route, especially focused on sectors like public health, education, child-care and elderly care that have been stress points for workers during the pandemic. While some might regard jobs like these as less explicitly ‘green’ than, say, jobs in solar energy, their emphasis on nurturing and care is thoroughly consistent with refocusing the economy onto socially useful work and long-term sustainability rather than short-term profitability (as argued by Heenan and Sturman, 2020). The version of the GND being advanced by the Australian Greens also includes embrace of the job-guarantee (JG) model, a long-standing post-Keynesian proposal (as advocated, for example, by Mitchell, 2000). This policy evidently appeals to those who think that government should be employer-of-last-resort in a capitalist economy that is otherwise incapable of ensuring full employment. Other reform proponents have been pushing for the introduction of Basic Income (BI), sometimes in conjunction with JG, as a means of reducing poverty and expanding social choice while partially decoupling receipt of income from people’s availability for formal paid work (FitzRoy and Gin, 2018; Spies-Butcher et al., 2020; Stilwell, 2019: 200–205). However, the GND does not depend crucially on either having a JG or BI: its minimum requirement is a ‘green jobs’ element in the job-creation process. Thus, the central task remains to shift economic activity into forms of production, consumption and transportation that use less environmental
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