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2023 Michigan Kritik

AT SemioCap K - Michigan Classic 2023 CGO

AT SemioCap K - Michigan Classic 2023 CGO.docx

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AFF
2AC Semiocapitalism Core
[1] Framework – must rejoin the plan – best for fairness and clash
Fairness forces the neg to engage with 8 minutes of the 1ac
Clash – there are infinitely minute reps that they can negate
[2] Perm do the plan then the alt
[3] Private actor fiat, floating PIKs, vague, AND utopian ALTs are a VI for clash---makes AFF offense unpredictable and forgoes nuanced analysis---turns their offense.
[4] Perf con -- they engage with the hyperreality of debate – they follow debate rules, win trophies, use wikis, and engage with debate customs. And it dilutes the alt – their engagement with the hyperreality reproduces the same ressentiment that they claim to solve for.
[5] The alt fails --- the neg’s radical movement reproduces the K’s impacts – breeds authoritarian takeover and counter-violence
Higonnet 2012 [Patrice Higonnet is a French author and historian who currently serves as a Robert Walton Goelet Research Professor of French History at Harvard University. Foreign Affairs , JULY/AUGUST 2012, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 140-145. “Robespierre’s Rules for Radicals: How to Save Your Revolution Without Losing Your Head.” https://www.jstor.org/stable/23218048]//AS
THE REVOLUTION MADE ME DO IT To understand Robespierre, one must see the French Revolution in tragic terms. The revolution did not devolve into the Terror owing to the revolutionaries' zealous pursuit of liberté., égalité, and fraternité. To the contrary: it devolved because by July 1794, the overwhelming majority of the revolutionaries no longer wanted to reach those goals, whose immediate effects for them, they feared, might be the confiscation of their property, or the guillotine, or both. Indeed, once in power, the Jacobins proved completely incapable of resolving the contradictions of their own revolutionary program. But it is also true that the revolution was influenced by Robespierre's intern conflicts. Robespierre detested violence and was opposed to capital punishment. Yet he persisted, against all evidence, believing that smashing invisible (and usually imagined) conspiracies and executing his opponents would solve his problems and those of the revolution. McPhee concedes that Robespierre was ultimately paranoid and madegravev errors of judgment. He was not, however, "the emotionally stunted, rigidly puritanical and icily cruel monster of history and literature." For McPhee, it wasn't Robespierre who ruined the French Revolution: it was the revolution that brought a decent, sincere, and hard working democrat to his doom. But McPhee has little to say about why there was a French Revolution in the first place, or about why it proceeded so relentlessly. Most historians have relied on deterministic explanations of the revolution's deeper causes to explain its trajectory. For some on the left, such as the writer Jean Jaurès and the historian Albert Mathiez, 1789 was a critical step in a proletarian advance that would build strength in the European revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune of 1871, and the Russian revolts of 1905, before finally coming to fruition in 1917, when the East was Red and the West was ready. For others, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, the nature of the French Revolution was revealed more by its continuity with the past, rather than its discontinuity. In 1789, the Old Regime died, never to be reborn. But the revolution that destroyed it nonetheless failed miserably because the French were incapable of self-government, corrupted as they were by bad habits born of centuries of absolutist monarchy. In this debate, McPhee's softly stated preference is to see the revolution—and, by extension, Robespierre—as an enduring model for all those who yearn for civic republicanism. To this effect, McPhee quotes the French historian Georges Lefebvre, who wrote that "Robespierre should be described as the first who defended democracy and universal suffrage . . . the intrepid defender of the Revolution of 1789 which destroyed in France the domination of the aristocracy." Subscribing to this view, McPhee claims that the revolution shifted from the fraternal celebration after the fall of the Bastille in 1789-90 to the murderous terror and civil war of 1793-94 because Robespierre's dedication to the principles of republican democracy were unfortunately unshared. "Throughout the Revolution," McPhee writes, Robespierre "had seen those whom he had trusted betray that trust by compromise or treachery" Thus, to save the revolution from itself, Robespierre had to act as he did. FOR IT BEFORE HE WAS AGAINST IT But McPhee has frustratingly little about Robespierre's moral responsibility for the executions and bloodshed of the Terror. It might be true, of course, that if Robespierre wanted to retain his authority, he had no choice but to embrace violent repression. That, however, does not explain why he did it so brutally. Prior biographers have proposed all sorts of psychological explanations. But McPhee finds these unconvincing. "There is nothing in the evidence we have of Robespierre's actions and beliefs before May 1789 that would enable one to predict that, in particular circumstances, he would find repression and capital punishment the answer to dissent," he writes. McPhee does nevertheless delve into Robespierre's troubled childhood, the signal events of which were the death of his beloved mother when he was seven years old and his derelict and shameful father's abandonment of the family soon after, which left young Maximilien, his younger brother, and their sister to be raised by various relatives. Although McPhee does not do so, it is possible to conclude that this childhood turmoil helped turn Robespierre into a man who both loved and hated bourgeois life and authority and tended to resolve his personal and professional problems by abstracting them as best he could, raising them from an insoluble, quotidian, and material context to a higher plane, on which he was never wrong. Politically, the most obvious instance of this psychological habit was his unvarying insistence that something that might at first have looked like the criminal act of a faction—for example, the Jacobins' seizure of power— was in fact a national and universalistic movement. The reverse was the case, of course, when it came to the actions of his enemies. In practice, this kind of self-deception allowed Robespierre u to oppose authorities of all kinds until it became necessary to transform himself into a murderous authoritarian. But the revolution posed a number of contradictions that he could not resolve through mental abstraction. In the spring of 1794, leading the Jacobin revolution required Robespierre to be for the rule of law and for its suspension, to defend and attack private property, to support and reject nationalism, to embrace feminism and antifeminism, and to promote religion and irreligion. Likewise, although McPhee makes a persuasive case that Robespierre was totally dedicated to the ideal of fraternité, there is no denying that he was often viscerally opposed to applications of that ideal. In February 1793, when the Parisian sans-culottes rioted for food and soap, Robespierre scolded these cold, hungry, desperate foot soldiers of the revolution. "I am not saying that the people are guilty," he complained, "but when people rise, must they not have a goal worthy of them? Must paltry goods be of concern to them? ... The people must rise up, not to collect sugar, but to bring down the tyrants." In late July 1794, some of "the people" did just that, and Robespierre's failure to determine where bourgeois democracy might find its true limits finally led him to the guillotine. Afraid that they would be the next ones to be purged and sentenced to death, a number of Robespierre's former allies on the Committee of Public Safety and in the National Convention, the legislative assembly, ordered him to be arrested. Captured some hours later, and after having probably tried to shoot himself, he was guillotined the next day.
[6] Alt fails – double bind – either the alt occurs in the real world and fails or the alt occurs within the debate space, and therefore is still engaging in the hyperreal
[7] Reality exists and is knowable. Saying it doesn’t is ethical relativism that licenses mass violence.
Every 2007 (Peter, Principal Lecturer and an Associate Head of Department for Computing at Coventry University “The Fascination Payload: Cultural Studies and the first Gulf War” initially written in ’96, edited in ’07, and edited for potentially abelist language http://www.academia.edu/6175231/The_Fascination_Payload_Cultural_Studies_and_the_First_Gulf_War)
Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: "Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war-games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real-world, factual possibility" (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: "Exchanging war for the signs of war" (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail-safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard's eyes, such a claim would be "banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy" (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) - offering a delusory refuge from the "knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood" (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty's position in "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity" in which: "To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there", (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty's position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving 'eye witnesses' to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber's existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real -Virilio's 'interruptions' - such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye-witness survivors. Baudrillard's take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: "There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive 'simulacrum' of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation" (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post-modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard's "(un)truth claim" lost its own persuasive appeal - breaking the bounds of virtually ever)' consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled "La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas en lieu" (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation - An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that "this 'simulated' war has not been entirely a product of mass-media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country's infrastructure" (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the 'facts' had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: "If we have no practical knowledge of this war - and such knowledge is out of the question - then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more 'virtual' than the events themselves, not to re-establish some criterion of truth - for this we lack the means" (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox - that in the same article he can admit the 'facts' as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error - both cannot be true.
[8] Permutation do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt
[9] Pragmatic policy reforms can be successful, but require specific goal-oriented approaches---role playing strategy development and normative value is key
Hill 1983 [Lewis E. Hill is the recipient of the 1998 Veblen-Commons award and a professor of economics at Texas Tech. “The Pragmatic Alternative to Positive Economics.” Review of Social Economy, Vol. 41, No. 1 (April, 1983), pp. 1-11 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. https://www.jstor.org/stable/29769142]//AS
Pragmatism is a philosophy which holds that all reality has practical consequences and that, therefore, the best way to know and to understand reality is through the consideration of practical consequences. Most pragmatists believe that the meaning of a proposition, idea, or event is to be found only in its practical consequences, and that the sum of the practical consequences is the whole of the meaning. Pragmatists tend to be antirationalistic in that they reject the intellectual power of human reason as the inherent source of truth and question deductive logic as a method of defining the truth. Most major philosophies had their genesis in Europe or Asia, but pragmatism originated in the United States and grew out of American historical experience. Life on the American frontier was a constant struggle which forced hard choices among alternatives that had to be judged according to their practical consequences. Americans learned to analyze and to evaluate reality on the basis of practical consequences and to use this knowledge and understanding of reality to solve practical problems. [Kallen] The first scholar to systematize pragmatism into a philosophy was Charles Sanders Peirce, who summarized his basic idea in his pragmatic imperative: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." [Peirce, p. 124] Peirce saw no contradiction between pragmatic thought and metaphysical thought. His philosophy of religion seems to be based on metaphysics. Peirce believed that the essence of Christianity is the distinction between the Way of Life, which is based on love, and the Way of Death, which was based on hatred. [Peirce, pp. 354-355] William James continued the pragmatic tradition in philosophy, but he moved pragmatism away from metaphysics and toward radical empiricism. James believed that pragmatism is both a philosophical method and a theory of truth. As a philosophical method, pragmatism involves the analysis and evaluation of practical consequences. As a theory of truth, pragmatism holds that ideas are true only to the extent that they effectively help us to relate one part of our experience to the other parts of our experience and to integrate the past with the future. James pioneered in the development of pragmatic instrumental ism by emphasizing the functional nature of mental activity and the instrumental character of knowledge. [James, pp. 43-81] It was John Dewey, however, who perfected instrumentalism as the highest form of the pragmatic philosophy. Instrumentalism is based on the presumption that effects imply causes and that both causes and effects imply solutions to problems. The instrumental process is the process of solving problems; it always integrates thought with action, theory with practice, means with ends, and factual judgments with value judgments. Most instrumentalists conceive life as an infinite series of problems to be solved, and the life process as problem-solving. The process begins with a sensing of the difficulty as a set of undesirable consequences. It then proceeds to an analysis of the cause-and-effect relationships involved in the problem. Next, various solutions are considered and analyzed according to the interpretation of the causal relationship. Finally, one solution is accepted and implemented, while the others are rejected. If the remedy effectively solves the problem, it is verified pragmatically. If the remedy proves to be ineffective, the problem will remain and other solutions will be attempted. [Dewey, pp. 223-239] Perhaps the greatest contribution of the instrumentalists to economics and the other social sciences is their theory of normative value. Dewey believed that normative value judgments are instrumental and corrigible. People have the ability to learn how to derive values from experience and how to use these values in the instrumental process of making normative value judgments and solving practical problems. Moreover, people also have the ability to test and to verify the truth of values and value judgments by drawing from experience to evaluate their practical consequences. You should accept a value as true only if it effectively relates the various parts of your experience into an authentic whole and successfully integrates your past with your future. You should accept a value judgment as true only if it is based on a true value and only if it contributes significantly to the instrumental process of solving problems. This process of instrumental verification can result in the revision and improvement of both values and value judgments. [Dewey, pp.575-598] Thus normative values and value judgments are induced from previous experience and verified by reference to subsequent experience. The instrumental philosophy of science has been applied to economics by Clarence Edwin Ayres, who was strongly influenced not only by John Dewey, but also by Thorstein Veblen. [Veblen] Veblen had developed his dichotomy to distinguish between the creative, supportive, and productive patterns of instrumental or technological behavior and the destructive, exploitative, and wasteful patterns of institutional or ceremonial behavior. Ayres accepted the Veblenian dichotomy and believed that these creative patterns of instrumental behavior are symbolized by the technological life process, which becomes the most basic and the most important value that can be induced from experience. This technological life process is the fundamental value upon which most other true values are based. [Ayres, pp. 205-230] The Dewey-Ayres instrumental theory of nor

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