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2023 TDI Disadvantage

Assurance DA - TDI 2023

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DA---Assurances
Assurances---West Asia
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Afghan withdrawal sent mixed signals to US allies, but reassurance through maintaining regional troop deployments is vital to maintain credibility.
Montgomery 21 [Evan; 2021; director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; “CREDIBILITY CONTROVERSIES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC”; https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/credibility-controversies-the-implications-of-afghanistan-for-the-indo-pacific/] brett TDI
In the end, Washington’s involvement in Afghanistan might not influence the credibility of its other security commitments nearly as much, or as adversely, as many pessimists maintain. But any influence the Afghanistan experience does have might not be as negligible, or as beneficial, as more optimistic assessments suggest. Rather, it could turn out to be a case of mixed signals and missed opportunities. Policymakers have incentives, therefore, to take steps that mitigate potential credibility damage, leverage the withdrawal to realize credibility gains, and avoid a situation where Washington fails to meet the expectations it has set for itself.
What would that look like?
When policymakers fear that a state’s credibility is in doubt, they usually turn to a standard playbook of corrective actions: making public statements that reaffirm existing security commitments, offering quiet assurances to allies and private warnings to adversaries, launching high-profile diplomatic engagements with strategically important partners, ramping up arms sales to keep those partners close, and deploying military forces to show the flag near potential flashpoints. The problem, though, is that these measures are often designed to combat skepticism about interests and questions about resolve, not questions about capabilities and skepticism about strength. Addressing the latter set of concerns requires a very different set of actions: successfully employing forces in operations that are relevant to the commitments in question, holding exercises that simulate those operations, conducting experiments that showcase emerging technologies or the novel application of existing technologies, and deliberately releasing information about new or sensitive systems through exhibitions of various sorts.
After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, there are likely to be fewer questions about what the United States is willing to do in other theaters when push comes to shove and more questions about what it can accomplish against its rivals when put to the test. If so, policymakers should not expect measures that are aimed at improving perceptions of U.S. interests and resolve to repair or improve American credibility, at least not on their own. Instead, they should focus their attention on practical steps to create and communicate military power — two closely related but distinct objectives.
The plan decks allied confidence. Unilateral withdrawal sparks fear of general decline, AND undermines regional diplomacy.
Wechsler 21 [William F.; 5-24-21; director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council; “No, the US shouldn’t withdraw from the Middle East”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/no-the-us-shouldnt-withdraw-from-the-middle-east/] brett TDI
Rather than argue for a return to pre-2003 policies, which often involved restraint but also typically required consistent US presence and leadership, the authors advocate instead for a radical military withdrawal that would inevitably have much wider implications. They state that their proposals “might strike some as dramatic.” In this case, it can be argued, “some” would include all long-standing US regional partners and the vast majority of US national security professionals, both Democratic and Republican, who have worked on the region for decades.
My colleagues’ specific recommendations include the following (I have bolded some parts for emphasis):
“substantially reduce the number of US forces permanently stationed in the region,” including a call to “end or reduce the permanent deployment of forces to Kuwait . . . as well as in other major bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman”
“scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments” including the “anachronistic requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group”
“terminate routine overflights in the region” and “close many of the associated bases that support these operations”
Make no mistake: this is a call to repeal the Carter Doctrine, shut down the US Fifth Fleet (headquartered in Bahrain), and eliminate much of the infrastructure, built over more than half a century, that allows the United States the placement and access required to protect US national security interests. This would be no mere redeployment or retrenchment. It’s an argument for ending the routine projection of US power into the region through the air and over the seas, and removing all US military personnel stationed within key partner nations, regardless of the preferences of their leaders. No matter how artfully described, such a policy would be immediately and correctly recognized by all regional leaders as a general US withdrawal.
At that point, the biggest flaw in this plan would become immediately evident. The authors assert that, in order to protect US interests, the United States should then make “greater investments in intelligence and early warning,” seek “close coordination with regional states,” and engage in “robust diplomacy.” While these are worthy goals, in the context of a general withdrawal they are entirely unrealistic.
My colleagues assume that our relationships with host country policymakers and security-sector officials would freeze in place and remain after departure. They assign zero value to the day-to-day interactions between US forces and intelligence professionals, the influence this allows the United States to wield, and the atmospherics that can be gathered as a result. They ignore the criticality of military relationship building and how the strength of those relationships transfers into improved interoperability and common strategic perspectives. They ascribe limited agency to US partners, assuming that these partners will not feel abandoned by the United States and seek out alternative arrangements to meet their security needs. You can surge a lot of things, but as Admiral William McRaven has said, “you can’t surge trust.”
Furthermore, the calls for greater reliance on diplomacy in the region would come as a surprise to almost every modern US president—with Trump, perhaps, the sole exception—and their secretaries of state, each of whom dedicated disproportionate time to exactly that. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton became the personal action officers for diplomacy at Camp David between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and the Palestinians, respectively. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first made an art of “shuttle diplomacy” in the region, and Secretaries James Baker and John Kerry proudly boasted of the number of trips they had taken there. President George H. W. Bush spent countless hours on the personal diplomacy necessary to build a coalition to liberate Kuwait, and thus restore the status quo, while his son, who upended that status quo, had regular personal calls with the leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan.
This diplomacy was possible only in the wider context of American military strength, a self-evident linkage of hard power and diplomatic prowess. Now that Russia has reentered the region militarily, it too has successfully leveraged its newfound position for its diplomatic ends. At the same time, former regional powers that have long since withdrawn militarily do not tend to find themselves at the center of regional diplomacy. A simple trade-off seeking to replace military power with diplomatic power is wishful thinking, at best.
This approach is particularly infeasible when applied to US counterterrorism objectives. The authors argue that “adequate counterterrorism capacity can be maintained primarily with more robust access agreements and cooperation from local partners,” without explaining how access agreements are supposed to improve in the context of US withdrawal—or how the United States is supposed to maintain cooperation with people who feel it is in the process of deserting them. The approach assumes, as my colleagues write, that the “threat is mostly local and manageable with only a small, residual US military presence, if that” (emphasis added). In reality, Salafi jihadists have a near-perfect record of shifting to external attacks once they have attained a local sanctuary, and successful indirect action requires the United States to take on more risk, not less.
Similarly, as recent events clearly demonstrate, a requirement for “over the horizon” counterterrorism and “offshore balancing” requires more regional naval presence rather than less. With no shortage of irony, the US departure from Afghanistan has recently necessitated the deployment of the only aircraft carrier based in Asia toward the Middle East. Moreover, since the new policy is to support Afghan national security forces from afar—exactly as my colleagues prefer—it will require the United States to keep more ships and aircraft in the Gulf region, operating out of many of the same bases that the authors want to close.
In the end, there is no win-win scenario when it comes to withdrawal: no way to protect US interests without taking on the necessary costs or risks, and certainly no way to do so and still maintain (or improve!) regional partnerships and US diplomacy.
Which brings us to the last of my colleagues’ recommendations. When the United Kingdom announced its general withdrawal from the area by 1971, it could do so with confidence that the United States would be willing and able to protect freedom of navigation and other common interests. Looking ahead, only China is likely to be in a similar position in the coming decades. Unfortunately, recent Chinese actions strongly suggest that rather than signaling continuity in strategic approach—as the shift from the United Kingdom to the United States did—a reliance on China would represent a more fundamental discontinuity: from free trade to mercantilism.
My colleagues discount this concern, either by dismissing the possibility altogether (by quoting others who refer to this as a “red herring”) or by implying that Asian countries that are otherwise circling each other warily in their own region will decide to work together harmoniously in this theater, since they all have “a strategic interest in the security of the sea lanes through which oil supplies flow.” One of the authors was more explicit back in 2014 (again, cited in the more recent publication), when he wrote that “the administration should explore burden-sharing with… China on sea-lane security.”
Perhaps China would not seek a unilateral capacity to secure its energy resources as it continues to build a modern blue-water navy. Perhaps China would not apply to the Gulf any lessons from its aggressive and norm-breaking approach to the South China Sea. At best, acting on such assumptions would be a tremendous risk to take, but my colleagues unfortunately do not explore the potential downsides. Moreover, if the United States were to withdraw, as the authors propose, we would be left with few options should China later prove to be less benevolent than they seem to anticipate.
Specifically – European allies. Plan signals broad retrenchment that saps credibility
McGee 21 [Luke; Aug 25, 2021; UK and European Policy and Politics Editor for CNN Digital; “Afghan withdrawal leaves allies to face harsh reality of US's departure from world stage”; https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2021/08/24/politics/biden-afghanistan-weakens-the-west-globally-intl-cmd/index.html] brett TDI
London(CNN)The sudden fall of Kabul and the Taliban's near-total takeover of Afghanistan has left many of America's long-standing partners wondering what will become of the values-based, US-led international order.
While President Joe Biden's withdrawal of troops by August 31 is inevitable, the speed at which the situation descended into chaos, and the White House's lack of contrition and flexibility has left allies spinning.
On Tuesday, Biden's fellow G7 leaders, led by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, pressed the US President to extend that deadline in order to get foreign citizens, Afghan people who have aided allied troops and other vulnerable groups out of the country. But Biden stood firm.
As America's allies -- most notably in Europe -- see it the United States is walking away, washing its hands of a crisis it played a large part in creating, and with scant regard for the problems that doing so creates elsewhere.
As one senior European official told CNN: "When America reversed course on Syria, it sparked a crisis in Europe -- not the US."
Refugees from Afghanistan wait to board a bus after arriving and being processed at Dulles International Airport in Dulles, Virginia on August 23, 2021. Around 16,000 people were evacuated over the past 24 hours from Afghanistan through the Kabul airport, the Pentagon said on August 23, 2021, as the US speeds toward completing its airlift by an August 31 deadline.
The reason this is so hard for allies to swallow is because so much of the world's foreign policy, especially in Europe, is based on the assumption that the US's commitments to the values-based Western order, through the UN and NATO, are iron-clad.
Europe's reliance on the US in terms of international affairs is nothing new. Throughout the Trump presidency, European diplomats and officials repeatedly spoke with CNN about the need for something they call strategic autonomy. However, a lack of any coherent policy has slowed these efforts -- and in the context of Afghanistan, that means when the US withdraws, everyone withdraws.
NATO's treaty opens with the pledge that: "The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments."
The UN charter it references reads: "The purposes of the United Nations are ... To maintain international peace and security, and to that end ... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."
Critics are struggling to see just how Biden's recent behavior squares with these commitments -- and worry that it confirms America's retreat from the world stage. Biden has argued however that his country's anti-terror mission in Afghanistan was achieved a decade ago -- when American troops killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden -- and that the US is still a leader elsewhere on the global stage, including in humanitarian efforts.
Speaking on Tuesday about his meeting with the G7, Biden told press: "We talked about our mutual obligation to support refugees and evacuees currently fleeing Afghanistan. The United States will be a leader in these efforts and we'll look to the international community and to our partners to do the same."
"All of us agree that we're going to stand shoulder to shoulder with our closest partners to meet the current challenges we face in Afghanistan, just as we have for the past 20 years," he also said.
But many have doubts about what that means in practice.
"To me, this shows is the end of one geopolitical era, which was about creating a liberal international order, and the beginning of a new one, which is about the competition between China and America," said Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, ealier on Tuesday.
A Taliban fighter stands guard at a checkpoint in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in the city of Kabul, Afghanistan, Sunday, Aug. 22, 2021.
America's exit from a key strategic area has also created opportunities for its international enemies to increase their influence in Afghanistan on very different terms to those required from the West.
Historically, American -- and by extension Western -- support for countries like Afghanistan was given on a quid pro quo basis.
"What made support from the West so attractive to countries around the world was the underpinned commitment to helping countries build liberal, open democracies and a society grounded in the rule of law," says David Lidington, chair of the Royal United Services Institute and a former deputy Prime Minister of the UK.
"One of the consequences of the defeat in Afghanistan is the lack of confidence in the West, which can only be a good thing for China and Russia who can offer their support with zero regard for rule of law or human rights," he adds.
China's new relationship with the Taliban was already in the works back in July, before the militant group took control of the country. China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, met a Taliban delegation in northern China, where the two sides reached an agreement: China would help with Afghanistan's reconstruction, and in exchange the Taliban would ensure regional stability.
As CNN has reported, the fall of a stable Afghan government and subsequent triumph of the Taliban is not necessarily a good thing for China and, in some respects, presents more of a headache that anything else.
However, the early stage at which China met with Taliban leaders confirmed the perception, at least in the eyes of America's European allies, that China is ready to capitalize on the void left by the US -- if unlikely to fill it militarily. Based on current reports from Afghanistan, how the Taliban achieves stability now is unlikely to meet the Western human rights standards -- but might not pose an obstacle to Beijing's support, given China's own poor record on human rights.
Russia has also made overtures to the Taliban in recent days, with its foreign ministry saying it would not evacuate its embassy as Kabul fell. Though the Taliban is -- at least on paper -- officially proscribed by Moscow, the Kremlin does have working contacts with the Taliban, who, it claimed, have "started to restore public order" since seizing power.
This is the same Russia that supported stability in Syria by providing its brutal president, Bashar al-Assad, with firepower and aiding in airstrikes against rebel groups. Russia has denied this, saying it was exclusively targeting ISIS.
It is also the same Russia in which opponents of the Kremlin are poisoned and imprisoned.
TOPSHOT - Afghans gather on a roadside near the military part of the airport in Kabul on August 20, 2021, hoping to flee from the country after the Taliban's military takeover of Afghanistan.
China and Russia have in recent years acted in tandem, using international institutions to poke the West in the eye.
According to Velina Tchakarova, director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, China and Russia are already "operating within the existing global order with the clear goal of disrupting it, dismantling its multilateral structures" to further competing views of multilateralism that contradict the West's.
"Coordinated efforts by China and Russia in the UN Security Council (e.g., Iran and now likely Afghanistan) and other international organizations will continue to grow as both states seek to improve their international image as norm-setters in a rapidly changing rules-based world order," she adds.
The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and the subsequent race to evacuate vulnerable people, fits into this narrative.
Rightly or wrongly, the US's commitment to withdraw by such a hard deadline will be seen as the catalyst for the Taliban taking control of the country. How it handles the consequences of that will likely color how both its allies and its enemies view the US's legacy in Afghanistan.
Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House, says people will "judge the US in Afghanistan based on how it manage

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