Liberal Militarism K - TDI 2023
Liberal Militarism K - TDI 2023.docx
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K --- Liberal Militarism 1NC—Persian Gulf The 1AC is a normalization of militarism – it’s a cold world politics that normalizes that war is always already occurring and the affs reduction of presence in the gulf is a means to securitize global supply chains that have yet to be militarized for the sanctity and the survivability of the empire Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics. You should be skeptical of their internal link claims Persian Gulf presence is not the end all be all of Iranian fear of US military presence – after Iraq the US shifted engagement where hard power resources of boots on the ground become obsolete and instead soft power resources or drone strikes and arm sales maintains the violence of US militarism Fawcett 2023 [Louise, Professor of International Relations and Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics. The Iraq War 20 years on: towards a new regional architecture. International Affairs, 99(2), 567-585.] CSUF JmB TDI The first level examined here is the international one, from which arguably all other changes flowed. IR scholarship is frequently criticized for its top-down, overly ‘systemic’ perspective, focusing on the agency of major states, which can occlude the effects of local influences and actors, but in this case such a perspective is inescapable. In contrast with other major regional events which had strong local as well as international origins (the Arab–Israel wars, Lebanon’s wars, the Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War, for example), this was a top-down decision: a war that ‘did not need to happen and certainly not when it did’,39 and one opposed by multiple regional and international actors. The US decision to go to war and remake the Iraqi state, and to refashion the Middle East, was critical in facilitating new international alignments, changing perceptions of US power, and opening the way to a new regional balance of power and institutions. The effects were greater because the Iraq War occurred at a time when US unipolarity was still at its height; the Middle East constituted one of the most important testing grounds of the ‘new world order’ articulated by President George W. Bush following the Gulf War of 1991, and the ‘Asia pivot’ was still a project in the making. If that new world order had been bruised by the events of the later 1990s, including the demise of the MEPP and the rise of anti-western Islamic extremism, it had not been broken, and in some ways the Iraq War decision was further confirmation of that. But the protracted nature, cost and ultimate failure of that war to achieve its stated goals had a significant impact on US influence in the region and the wider world, lessening its diplomatic reputation.40 In the words of Joseph Nye, it at once marked the end of the ‘unipolar moment’, the ‘fall of US hegemony’ and the failure of ‘democratic enlargement’41—large claims, but the message was not lost on either allies or rivals. None of this was intended. President Obama spoke of the war as one that should not have been authorized and waged, but he also spoke of moving ‘beyond Iraq’ and ‘renewing American leadership’.42 Any renewal of leadership, however, would not take place in the Middle East theatre, and not on the same terms. The Iraq War heralded a distinctive change in the nature of US involvement in the region, from high to low intensity—highlighted by the withdrawal from Iraq itself, and later Afghanistan, and its taking more measured roles in Libya and Syria. Lynch notes how three consecutive presidents effectively downgraded their security commitments to the region.43 True, this was not disengagement, but ‘shifting engagement’.44 In terms of military bases and arms exports, the US footprint in the region remains far larger than that of any other power, notwithstanding withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.45 In this regard, the path dependence of US military commitment and overseas presence is striking.46 Still, after Iraq, the willingness to use traditional hard power resources has declined, with a preference for a light military presence, air power or ‘surrogate’ warfare, using proxy actors, drones and sanctions regimes with consequences that are unpredictable in terms of reputation and results.47 The assassination, in January 2020, of Iran’s General Soleimani by a US-ordered drone strike was illustrative of such a strategy, one designed to downgrade Iran as a regional power, visible also in the renewed sanctions regime after US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Alongside this reduced appetite for direct intervention, the soft power resources of the United States were evidently eroded, including its credibility and status as a leading regional power, with consequences for allies and enemies alike. This was not the ‘new beginning’ that Obama promised in his Cairo speech.48 Some of this could have happened anyway, or happened elsewhere, in the light of new global challenges and growing multipolarity, but events in Iraq were decisive in determining the new character of US involvement. Approving a new arms deal in July 2022, President Biden sought to reassure regional allies, but the wider lessons of US policy have not been lost on Arab states as they seek greater autonomy and new partners. Nor were those lessons lost on America’s competitors or allies further afield. Both Russia and China, which opposed the war, and helped to block the possibility of any favourable UN Security Council resolution, were ultimately beneficiaries, though in different ways. They shared US concerns about Iraqi pretensions and stability in the Gulf, and were not inclined, at that time, to mount a robust opposition to the US intervention, for reasons that had to do with domestic politics and their international standing. However, they stood to gain materially and strategically in distancing themselves from the conflict and its subsequent fallout. New opportunities arose for these two powers and their aspirations to global influence: in supporting a sovereignty-first and pro-UN position, they were on the ‘right side’ in the Iraq War. For China the opportunities in MENA were mostly economic— the region became central to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled in 2013. By 2020 China had become a major trading partner of regional states and importer of Middle East oil, but was also at the forefront of nuclear energy cooperation.49 However, scholars have also noted that the war had another effect on China, encouraging it to ‘think globally’; to move away from isolationism and enjoy the benefits of membership in an expanded international society.50 For Russia, the opportunities were economic, strategic and political, hastening the opportunity, effectively seized by President Putin, to re-establish a regional foothold—one lost since the 1960s.51 After the Libyan intervention, which Putin opposed, that opportunity was provided decisively by the Syrian civil war, which also aligned with Russia’s more activist ‘counter-revolutionary’ foreign policy as reflected in the colour revolutions: ‘Russia’s response to the Arab Spring, most notably the diplomatic, political, and military support it provided for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, represented a major return of Russian power and influence in the region.’52 Russia’s growing influence in Syria was made possible not only by changes in its own foreign policy orientation, but also by the reduced US appetite for intervention after Iraq. For both Russia and China, therefore, the Iraq War helped to erode the myth of western omnipotence and open the Middle East as a competitive space for economic and strategic opportunity. Rightsizing is the software update for American imperialism – offshoring is the new liberal metric to redefine territoriality through extrajudicial means that justifies targeted killings – this is a self-fulfilling prophecy where under the threat of terrorist attack caused by the US drone program, the US can manipulate the real and the imaginary to expand the American drone program and justify interventionism Slaven 19 [James T. Department of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia Pseudoisolationism: the Neoimperialism of the State(s) June 27, 2019 https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v7i4.4353 Accessed 2-23-21] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI In Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's New War (2003), Simon Dalby outlined American imperialism after 9/11 and how it became the standard for a new kind of imperial warfare. He argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States struggled to understand that classical European geopolitics, where "mutually exclusive spatial entities" conflicted with one another, were no longer predominant (Dalby, 2003, p. 74, 82). In other words, without a clearly defined (i.e. territorially defined) enemy to confront, the American military reaction was left searching for a target (Dalby, 2003, p. 72). Subsequently, the United States used its military to invade and occupy, or otherwise simply to garrison, foreign territory in an attempt to neutralize threats to its national security (i.e. under the guise of self-defence; Dalby, 2003, p. 80). As this essay will later argue and as Dalby argued, despite the United States neglecting to "conquer, annex, or fundamentally remake" these territories (as would be expected of true classical imperialism), it has and continues to colonize these territories via new technologies, and thus its anti-imperial national identity is only surface level deep (Dalby, 2003, p. 82). In From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern Warfare (2011), Derek Gregory described how modem warfare, conducted virtually through drones, has changed the very conception of battlespace, itself (p. 190). He argued that from the viewpoint of the American drone program modem battlespace has expanded across the world. This virtual, globalized battlespace results in a new version of (American) imperialism that can be remotely enforced (Gregory, 2011, pp. 189-90). In other words, the virtual application of violent force has caused "time-space compression" which means that the American military can theoretically exercise violence everywhere and
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