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2023 TDI Affirmative

Sovereignty Aff Neg - TDI 2023

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Sovereignty Kant AFF
Notes
External freedom: The independence from being constrained by another’s choice
Autonomy: Capacity to reflect upon, and to endorse or revise, one’s own life-commitments for what one authentically judges to be good reasons, and to carry out these commitments in action.
State: A public-law making authority with the power of enforcement. To qualify as a “state,” an institution must feature (i) binding collective rule setting and (ii) the ability to enforce its determinations in case of disputes. But traditional indigenous decision-making procedures, operating by compromise and consensus, would count as “states” on this definition. So too would local self-organized schemes that typically operate on a much smaller scale than nation-states.
Unilateralism: A public scheme of rights that is imposed unilaterally. That is, coercively implemented by an agent who demands that everyone else conform to her own judgment of what justice requires, and who privately enforces this demand.
Omnilateralism: For its imposition to be legitimate, a public scheme of rights must reflect an omnilateral will, that is, a set of judgments about the enforcement of justice that are shared.
Categorical imperative: The backbone of Kant’s theory of right action. It states that I should only act on those maxims (principles) that can simultaneously be acted on by everyone, or that could be willed as a universal law.
Good will: Someone possesses a good will when they perform the right action for the right reasons, namely, out of a recognition that it is my duty to do X. For example, I possess a good will if I give to charity because I realize that it is my duty to give to charity. I would not possess a good will if I gave to charity because I thought it would be in my best interest to do so or if I did so out of guilt or sympathy. It is humans’ capacity to possess good will that enables our actions to have moral worth.
Perfect duty vs. Imperfect duty: A perfect duty is one that must be followed in every instance, while an imperfect duty allows some latitude as to when an agent fulfills it. An example of a perfect duty is our duty not to murder. I must always adhere to this duty. An example of an imperfect duty is our duty to give to charity. I ought to fulfill this duty but there is flexibility in how and when I do. Perfect duties can be coerced, whereas imperfect duties cannot. This is because the moral worth of my action performing an imperfect duty depends on the motives with which I perform it. If I am coerced to give to charity, then I am not giving to charity simply because I recognize that it is the right thing to do. Because I lack good will, in this case, my act lacks moral worth. In contrast, if I am coerced not to murder, my action is still right, even if my act lacks moral worth (because I did not refrain from murder for the right reasons).
AC
Thesis
The thesis of the framework is that our right to external freedom creates an obligation to leave the state of nature and establish states with omnilateral governance. Respecting the sovereignty of omnilateral states is morally required for two reasons. First, imposing unilateral governance violates equality and autonomy by disregarding a states’ constituents right to self-determination. Second, violating state sovereignty undermines our right to occupancy, a right that is grounded in our fundamental interest in having located-life plans (personal projects, commitments and relationships that are place dependent). The contention is that United States military presence in West Asia and North Africa violates state sovereignty – military presence is an example of the US imposing unliteral governance and threatens constituents’ right to occupancy.
AC – Framework
The standard is consistency with state sovereignty.
Our innate right to external freedom requires that we exit the state of nature and establish a state under which competing rights claims can be arbitrated and enforced.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
I begin by briefly recapitulating some main elements of Kant’s theory of legitimate state authority. I will pass over this quickly, since Kant’s political philosophy is by now relatively familiar, simply isolating the main claims that are of interest for my argument.
Natural Duty: We have a natural duty of justice to respect others’ innate right to freedom as independence.
State: We cannot fulfill this natural duty without coordinating in a state that can define and enforce one unitary scheme of substantive rights (especially property and contract rights) that binds us all amid disagree- ment. Our duties to do justice to others are therefore mediated by the state.
Omnilateralism: This public scheme of rights ought not to be imposed uni- laterally. That is, it ought not to be coercively implemented by an agent who demands that everyone else conform to her own judgment of what justice requires, and who privately enforces this demand. Instead, for its imposition to be legitimate, a public scheme of rights must reflect an omnilateral will, that is, a set of judgments about the enforcement of justice that are shared.
Kant begins from the idea that everyone has an innate right to independence. A necessary condition for autonomous, self-directed action is being free from the will of others, who might otherwise interfere with one’s capacity to set and pursue one’s goals. Everyone has a fundamental, coercible natural duty of justice to respect others’ independence (Natural Duty).
Kant further argues that we cannot fulfill our natural duty of justice without entering a civil condition (State). At least some of our general, coercible duties of justice (particularly the duty to respect other people’s property and contractual rights) are mediated by legitimate state institutions. We have a duty to comply with and support a legitimate state’s system of law because this is necessary to treat other people justly.
Why might duties of justice be institutionally mediated in the way Kant suggests? The main problem is that people disagree about which scheme of rules ought to guide their attempts to do justice to one another, and these disagreements require legitimate authority for their resolution:
[B]efore a public lawful condition is established, individual human beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this. (6:312)
Kant argues that these problems of disagreement mean that rights (including the occupancy rights explored in Part I) are not legitimately enforceable outside the state. When two individuals, each acting to implement a set of rights that they believe, in good faith, protects the independence of all, disagree in their interpret- ations of justice, neither is required to submit to the other’s judgments. No one can claim the exclusive standing to interpret and enforce justice for others, in a way that would put those others under an obligation not to interfere with, compete with, or resist his efforts.16 As Kant puts it, “rights are in dispute (ius controversum)” in the state of nature, since in cases of conflict, there is “no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force” (6:312). As I argued in Chapter 3, we should not take this to mean that there are no valid moral claims (including rights to noninterference with the use of land) in the state of nature. But it does mean that in the absence of a state, each individual is the sole judge of what these moral claims are. Where individuals’ interpretations diverge, no single person has the standing to resolve the conflict by using force to overrule others’ judgments.
The state must be governed by an omnilateral will – only an omnilateral will is reflective of the interests of a state’s occupants and can thus be legislative.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Kant’s reflections on private right in the state of nature lead him to two con- clusions. First, he argues that people living side-by-side have a derivative duty grounded in their more fundamental natural duty of justice to coordinate under public authority (State). If they are to discharge their duty to treat others justly, they need to settle on some common public interpretation of rights, because without clearly shared rules, their independence will become precarious indeed. A world in which there is no commonly accepted scheme of rights but only a set of competing and conflicting private interpretations is a world in which no one’s independence is fully secure. The natural duty of justice therefore grounds a derivative duty to coordinate, through the state, on a scheme of rights that can be enforced in a unitary way amid disagreement.17
Much more could be said about Kant’s argument for the duty to enter the state. But I propose to take this background argument largely for granted here and instead to focus on a less-noticed aspect of his view: Kant holds not only that we ought to coordinate in a state, but also that we ought to coordinate in a particular way: omnilaterally, not unilaterally. The required common scheme of rights ought not to be imposed unilaterally, since “a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone” (6:356).
To bring out Kant’s position, imagine a private individual whose interpretation of justice is substantively correct (i.e., she holds justified, true beliefs about everyone’s moral rights) and who is endowed with sufficient power to successfully bring other people to coordinate around her view. Perhaps she has access to a new weapon no one else possesses. Though she could successfully impose a per- fectly just scheme by acting unilaterally, Kant claims that she has some reason not to do that. The fact that her judgment is correct is not sufficient to give her the right to force others to comply with her decisions. The question of legitimacy, in other words, is not settled by the truth of her views about justice: it requires an independent justification.
Kant’s basic complaint about unilateralism can be expressed by analogy to international relations. Suppose Country A proposes to undertake a war that, objectively speaking, is perfectly justified: Country A has a just cause, the war has a reasonable prospect of success, it is a last resort (Country A has already tried all other methods to resolve the injustice), and the means it proposes to use to prosecute the war are proportionate to the wrong. Still, many people believe that this war is defective unless it receives multilateral authorization: it is not Country A’s right to make this decision all on its own and without submitting to an appropriate procedure, such as perhaps (though this is controversial) seeking authorization from the United Nations.18 Kant holds that the enforcement of rules about private rights is subject to a multilateral authorization requirement of a broadly similar kind.
To understand this account fully, we need to understand the pro tanto wrong involved in unilateral enforcement. We also need to understand how this wrong might be overcome, that is, how an agent could be in a position to enforce a scheme of rules about rights omnilaterally. Here Kant argues that:
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right is to proceed from it, it cannot do anyone wrong by its law. Now when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria). Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative. (6:314)
What would it mean to form a “concurring and united will of all” under conditions where individuals have differing views about what justice requires? Individuals who are committed to respecting one another’s independence, while at the same time differing about which specific rights and duties this entails, may come to a second-order agreement to associate together in institutions that they collectively accept as a legitimate way to specify and enforce their rights. A state will thus represent the “general united will of the people” insofar as it is authorized by a significant majority of cooperators on a territory who form a joint intention to act together to establish justice through specific institutions. Cooperators are those individuals who are willing to acknowledge the basic natural duty of justice, respecting one another as bearers of a claim to freedom as independence (Natural Duty), and who adhere to the requirement of political coordination under law that flows from this commitment (State). Cooperators who share a will constitute a collectively self-determining people.
Unilateral governance is morally wrong – it undermines equality by setting up a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved and supplants everyone’s rational autonomy by disregarding occupants’ right to self-determination.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Unilateral imposition of governance, even if the governance is just, is wrong insofar as it violates the occupants right to self-determination
A shared will thus helps to overcome the wrong of unilateral enforcement. But what exactly is wrong with unilateral enforcement? I believe there are two problems, both usually present, but one more fundamental than the other. The first—in my view less fundamental—problem concerns inequality: unilateral enforcement sets up a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved. Suppose your state- of-nature neighbor goes ahead and uses her powerful weapon to enforce her objectively correct interpretation of private rights. Even though she implements a substantively just scheme, she wields unequal power over us. This might lead the rest of us to see and treat her as our superior. If so, then our social relations might fail to exhibit certain intrinsically valuable features, such as parity of respect and status, that relations among equals ought to have. The basic thought is that unilat- eral enforcement sets up two classes of people: the powerful rulers, on the one hand, and the others, who must obey the decisions that the rulers make.
If equal social relations are of intrinsic value, then your neighbor has some reason to refrain from acting unilaterally: i.e., to refrain from using her superior private power to implement the substantively correct decision. Recent arguments for the authority of democracy have appealed to this inequality worry about unilateralism, and to the role that democratic procedures play in overcoming it.19 On these accounts, since social equality is intrinsically important, we have reason to make decisions democratically and to treat those decisions as authoritative, even if, in doing so, we settle on a distribution of rights, opportunities, and resources that is less substantively just than we might have achieved through the imposition of one particular agent’s view. This pro tanto reason in favor of egalitarian authority might sometimes be outweighed by countervailing concerns (e.g., for the quality of political decisions), but it is an important reason nonetheless.
This offers an account of the wrong of unilateralism (i.e., it threatens social equality) and an accompanying interpretation of how a decision-maker might enforce a scheme of rights omnilaterally: such an agent must be authorized through an egalitarian political procedure in which each person subject to the scheme has equal opportunity for influence.
Though social equality is important, I doubt it is our most fundamental worry about unilateralism. Note too that when our state-of-nature neighbor enforces her interpretation of justice, she does so in a way that ignores and supplants everyone else’s rational autonomy. An important part of treating others as independent persons involves respecting them as autonomous deliberators, who can reason for themselves how to act.20 Yet our imagined neighbor is insensitive to the need to engage her fellows in this way. She does not offer them any reasons that might lead them to share her point of view about what justice requires, nor does she inquire into, or respond to, their reasons for not sharing it. Instead, she imposes her judgments by force, leaving others powerless to do anything but go along. This seems a disrespectful method for organizing a society. It also fails to acknowledge others’ claim to live in a social world that makes sense to them, that in some way reflects their own convictions about how society should be arranged.21 Of course, before coercing her fellows, the neighbor could offer them reasons, hoping to bring them to endorse her rule. Still, this may not suffice to respect their rational autonomy. Consider three scenarios. In the first case, reflecting on her reasons, her fellows come to see her rule as justified, and they form the intention to cooperate in carrying out her directives. Here, there is no disrespect to their autonomy. In the second case, while her fellows see the substance of her decisions as justified, they do not see it as equally justified that she be the one to make and impose these decisions. Why not instead act together to establish a just scheme of rights, rather than b

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