Oil DA - UTNIF 2023
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Oil DA – UTNIF – Starter Packet 1NC Shell Generic---1NC Oil investment remains strong. Worland ’23 [Justin. *reporter for Time. “BP’s Green U-Turn Shows Exactly Why the Energy Transition Is so Hard.” Time. February 10, 2023. https://time.com/6254378/bp-oil-profits-climate-energy-transition/.]perth Two and a half years ago, after BP announced perhaps the most aggressive plans of any major oil and gas company yet to move away from fossil fuels, I asked Bernard Looney, the company’s CEO, about the reality that his commitment did not move fast enough to match the urgent science of climate change. His answer surprised me. Instead of defending his plans as aligned with scientific reality, he flipped the script and said that he kept hearing a bigger concern that the plans might be “too ambitious”—that they might make the company’s sustainability efforts unsustainable. At the time, many industry insiders questioned whether aggressively pursuing the energy transition would result in lower profits. Looney told me that his vision was actually about generating more profit. “This isn’t some form of altruism or some form of charity… This is about creating sustainable value,” he said. “We can create value for our shareholders through this shift, and we would argue that we will create more value through this shift than we would if we keep doing what we’re doing.” It was a telling exchange that foreshadowed his move this week to backtrack on some of his company’s most ambitious climate commitments. In 2020, oil prices had plummeted and it remained unclear when they would recover. An aggressive approach to the energy transition offered the opportunity to turn a big profit. In today’s environment, with oil prices high and projected to remain high, rapidly shifting away from oil production leaves money on the table. And, like any publicly traded corporation, oil and gas companies exist to make a profit. On Tuesday, Looney told investors that BP’s new goal is to cut oil and gas production at least 20% by 2030 from 2019 levels. In 2020, the company had said it would aim to cut production by at least 35% in that same timeframe. And, if that weren’t a big enough signal that the company is doubling down on the medium-term future of oil, BP said that in 2025 alone it would target up to $11 billion in annual investment in the company’s oil and gas business. In 2021, BP spent just over $9 billion, and, last year, the company spent $13 billion. These investments will deliver big returns: the company says that in 2025 it aims to earn up to $42 billion from oil and gas. “Our oil and gas strategy is about value,” Looney said in the investor presentation. “And our focus remains on maximizing returns and cash flow.” The particulars of this decision come at a unique time. The decline in oil demand during COVID-19 led oil companies to slow their investments in production, so there was little slack in global oil markets when Russia invaded Ukraine last year. This lack of leeway in the markets compounded when the war began and countries scrambled to get off Russian oil. The result of the commotion: oil prices rose dramatically, which in turn has meant enormous profits for the sector. ExxonMobil, Shell, and Chevron alone made more than $130 billion in profits last year. And, as the conflict continues, it seems that oil prices will remain relatively high for a while. A report from Deloitte found that oil and gas companies stand to have a total of nearly $9 trillion in cash come in by the end of the decade. Considering those factors, it was an obvious choice to ramp up oil production. In the short time that’s followed, Wall Street has rewarded the move. BP stock has increased more than 16% since the announcement. (The company also reported strong 2022 profit on Tuesday). Other firms are moving in the same direction. A survey of energy oil and gas companies conducted by the Dallas Fed in December found that 64% of firms planned to increase spending, a good indicator that they see money to be made. What does this all mean for the energy transition and efforts to address climate change? The obvious answer is that more oil and gas means greater emissions, which means faster warming. But, beyond the obvious, BP’s highly publicized shift offers a good lesson about a core challenge facing efforts to decarbonize: so long as oil and gas remains hugely profitable, corporations will continue to produce it. Climate activists can tell oil executives their product is destroying the planet, but that won’t convince them so long as investing in oil represents the best return on investment. The plan’s green transition cedes oil production to petrostates---that spikes prices. Bordoff & O’Sullivan ’21 [Jason, and Meghan. *Dean of the Columbia Climate School. **Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. “Green Upheaval.” Foreign Affairs. November 30, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-30/geopolitics-energy-green-upheaval.]perth Traditional suppliers will benefit from the volatility in fossil fuel prices that will inevitably result from a rocky energy transition. The combination of pressure on investors to divest from fossil fuels and uncertainty about the future of oil is already raising concerns that investment levels may plummet in the coming years, leading oil supplies to decline faster than demand falls—or to decline even as demand continues to rise, as it is doing today. That outcome would produce periodic shortages and hence higher and more volatile oil prices. This situation would boost the power of the petrostates by increasing their revenue and giving extra clout to OPEC, whose members, including Saudi Arabia, control most of the world’s spare capacity and can ramp global oil production up or down in short order. In addition, the transition to clean energy will wind up augmenting the influence of some oil and gas exporters by concentrating global production in fewer hands. Eventually, the demand for oil will decline significantly, but it will remain substantial for decades to come. Many high-cost producers, such as those in Canada and Russia’s Arctic territory, could be priced out of the market as demand (and, presumably, the price of oil) falls. Other oil-producing countries that seek to be leaders when it comes to climate change—such as Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States—could in the future constrain their domestic output in response to rising public pressure and to hasten the transition away from fossil fuels. As a result, oil producers such as the Gulf states—which have very cheap, low-carbon oil, are less dependent on the financial institutions now shying away from oil, and will face little pressure to limit production—could see their market shares increase. Providing more or nearly all of the oil the world consumes would imbue them with outsize geopolitical clout, at least until oil use declines more markedly. Other countries whose oil industries might endure are those whose resources can be brought online quickly—such as Argentina and the United States, which boast large deposits of shale oil—and that can thereby attract investors who seek faster payback periods and may shy away from longer-cycle oil investments given the uncertainties about oil’s long-term outlook. High prices spark miscalc, arms racing, and war. Bunzel ’18 [Theodore. *worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and in international economics at the U.S. Treasury. “Do High Oil Prices Mean More International Conflict?” The American Interest. May 30, 2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/30/do-high-oil-prices-mean-more-international-conflict/.]perth Does the relationship between oil prices and Russian behavior to which Bush alluded hold true? The higher the price of oil, the more aggressive Russia becomes? And what about other petrostates? Might it be true for those as well? We may soon have more evidence for the proposition. Oil prices are brushing off 2016 lows and hitting three-year highs. Brent crude has been hovering above $70 a barrel since April, up from lows of around $30 in early 2016, fueled by OPEC production cuts and rising geopolitical tensions (over issues like the Iran deal). Though nuances, complications, and exceptions abound, the academic and historical evidence on balance tells us that, as we transition from a lower to a higher oil price regime, we can generally expect a darker geopolitical outlook. As rising oil revenues gives Russia, Saudi, Iran, and other oil-exporters an added sense of confidence, it may at least selectively inflame interstate tensions and lead to more aggressive behavior. That possibility, alongside an increasingly hawkish U.S. national security team and a President who appears to feel rather “unchained” of late, points to a potentially combustible mix just ahead. It is generally taken for granted that aspects of geopolitics can function as a key input into oil prices. Trump’s mere threat of a U.S. strike in Syria, for example, caused oil to spike by 2 percent on April 11. In addition to short-term effects, geopolitical competition can influence prices in other ways. To give just one general example, as Soviet power spread into parts of the Third World after the independence era, some states felt safer nationalizing their oil industries to escape Western company control (Iraq in 1961, for example), and prices rose as a consequence. But the relationship may also work the other way around: Oil prices can also be a key input into geopolitics. Many studies have demonstrated that oil prices have a direct effect on the domestic stability of petrostates. This makes ample intuitive sense: Higher prices fill public coffers, allowing governments to palliate needy populations and potential elite opposition groups by dispensing more largesse. Some regime elites may reason that a firmer grip on power may free them to carry out more assertive foreign policies without fear of being undermined at home. There are, however, several complications to this general intuition. Some states already have sufficiently buoyant revenues relative to their small populations to satisfy their publics and feed clientelistic networks. Providing largesse can also backfire if prices drop; taking away something valuable that people have grown used to is a dangerous game, especially when elites aren’t ready to play it. And then of course there is the famed “oil curse”: For all sorts of reasons, from “Dutch disease” economic distortions to the derangement of normal citizen-state relationships, oil riches can in time undermine regimes, weakening and even destroying them. That said, a more recent body of research has empirically demonstrated the intuitive twin of this conclusion: Higher prices cause greater interstate aggression by oil-producing countries. Why would this be the case? Greater oil revenue flushes petrostates with confidence and also cash that they can put toward military spending or foreign adventures. To take one obvious example, we need only look to Iran’s using its oil revenue to fund proxy groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, military spending by one regional oil producer can beget spending by others, fueling regional arms races that can make aggression and conflict by miscalculation more likely. The onset of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 may be a prime example of that dynamic. Most prominent among the empirical studies is Cullen S. Hendrix’s 2014 paper, which shows a statistically significant relationship between higher oil prices and “dispute behavior” (military actions short of actual war) by oil-exporters. (Hendrix also summed it up nicely in this Washington Post piece.) He found that “all things being equal, a one standard deviation ($18.60) increase in the price per barrel of oil from the sample mean ($33.81) is associated with a 13 percent increase in the frequency of [dispute behavior]” in oil-exporting states. He also found that, above $77 a barrel, oil-exporters are significantly more dispute prone than non-oil exporters. Hendrix also explores the potential complication of reverse causality: Could dispute behavior by oil-exporting countries be driving prices higher, rather than the other way around? A key analytical consideration here is timing. We can all agree that geopolitical activity affects prices in the short-term (such as the Syria example mentioned above), but is this reverse causality true on a sustained basis? Parsing out long-term signal from short-term noise, Hendrix examines whether elevated aggregate dispute behavior affects oil prices at the yearly—rather than daily or weekly—level, and finds that this relationship does not hold. His explanation here is that other players typically step in to redress markets: “While dispute behavior may drive prices changes in the short term . . . the strategic significance of oil prices and oil-exporting states encourages major powers to act in ways that stabilize markets, either through market intervention . . . or direct, armed intervention.” Jeff Colgan of Brown University has also touched on this topic, finding through his research that oil has fueled—in some way—one quarter to one half of interstate wars since 1973. He also notes that oil-producers are 50 percent more likely to engage in conflict than non-oil producers. Colgan identifies eight, non-mutually exclusive causal mechanisms for how oil fuels international conflict, most of which are implicitly exacerbated by higher prices. They are: “(1) resource wars, in which states try to acquire oil reserves by force; (2) petro-aggression, whereby oil insulates aggressive leaders such as Saddam Hussein or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from domestic opposition and therefore makes them more willing to engage in risky foreign policy adventurism; (3) the externalization of civil wars in oil-producing states (“petrostates”); (4) financing for insurgencies—for instance, Iran funneling oil money to Hezbollah; (5) conflicts triggered by the prospect of oil-market domination, such as the U.S. war with Iraq over Kuwait in 1991; (6) clashes over control of oil transit routes, such as shipping lanes and pipelines; (7) oil-related grievances, whereby the presence of foreign workers in petrostates helps extremist groups such as al-Qaeda recruit locals; and (8) oil-related obstacles to multilateral cooperation, such as when an importer’s attempt to curry favor with a petrostate prevents multilateral cooperation on security issues.” Scenarios Middle East---1NC High profits ensure rapid Middle Eastern arms racing and escalation. El-Gamal & Jaffe ’18 [Mahmoud, and Amy. *professor in the Department of Economics at Rice University **Research Professor and Managing Director of the Climate Policy Lab at Tufts University. "The coupled cycles of geopolitics and oil prices." Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 7, no. 2 (2018): 1-14.]perth Authors have introduced the idea that the oil boom and bust cycle is coupled not only with the secular global business cycle but also endogenously with geopolitical cycles in military spending followed by military adventurism. Once again, high oil prices from 2011 to 2014 were accompanied by sharp increases in military expenditure in oil producing countries across the Middle East, which eventually has translated into escalating conflicts once oil prices receded (2014–2016). At the end of 2017, markets were caught between upward oil price momentum, driven by risk premiums related to these escalating conflicts, and the potential for higher competition among oil producers as technology advances has driven new oil supplies. As in past cycles, rising oil prices invite efficiency gains and wider adoption of alternative fuels. In light of rising geopolitical risks across the Middle East, including key populations that are restive in Iran and Saudi Arabia, we revisit our prior work on regime change and oil supply disruptions. We survey our findings on potential medium-term production disruptions that would affect global supply adversely over periods of three to five years. We suggest that a longer lasting structural shift back to upward cycles could be expected if the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen and the Levant intensify into overt war similar in magnitude to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, wherein oil-production facilities were intentionally targeted and bombarded. That causes great power war. Klare ’18 [Michael. *Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. “Gearing up for the Third Gulf War.” Common Dreams. May 14, 2018. https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/05/14/gearing-third-gulf-war.]perth Like the first two Gulf wars, the third could involve high-intensity clashes between an array of American forces and those of Iran, another well-armed state. While the United States has been fighting ISIS and other terrorist entities in the Middle East and elsewhere in recent years, such warfare bears little relation to engaging a modern state determined to defend its sovereign territory with professional armed forces that have the will, if not necessarily the wherewithal, to counter major U.S. weapons systems. A Third Gulf War would distinguish itself from recent Middle Eastern conflicts by the geographic span of the fighting and the number of major actors that might become involved. In all likelihood, the field of battle would stretch from the shores of the Mediterranean, where Lebanon abuts Israel, to the Strait of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf empties into the Indian Ocean. Participants could include, on one side, Iran, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and assorted Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen; and, on the other, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the fighting in Syria were to get out of hand, Russian forces could even become involved. All of these forces have been equipping themselves with massive arrays of modern weaponry in recent years, ensuring that any fighting will be intense, bloody, and horrifically destructive. Iran has been acquiring an assortment of modern weapons from Russia and possesses its own substantial arms industry. It, in turn, has been supplying the Assad regime with modern arms and is suspected of shipping an array of missiles and other munitions to Hezbollah. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have long been major recipients of tens of billions of dollars of sophisticated American weaponry and President Trump has promised to supply them with so much more. This means that, once ignited, a Third Gulf War could quickly escalate and would undoubtedly generate large numbers of civilian and military casualties, and new flows of refugees. The United States and its allies would try to quickly cripple [weaken] Iran's war-making capabilities, a task that would require multiple waves of air and missile strikes, some surely directed at facilities in densely populated areas. Iran and its allies would seek to respond by attacking high-value targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, including cities and oil facilities. Iran's Shia allies in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere could be expected to launch attacks of their own on the U.S.-led alliance. Where all this would lead, once such fighting began, is of course impossible to predict, but the history of the twenty-first century suggests that, whatever happens, it won't follow the carefully laid plans of commanding generals (or their civilian overseers) and won't end either expectably or well. Precisely what kind of incident or series of events would ignite a war of this sort is similarly unpredictable. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the world is moving ever closer to a moment when the right (or perhaps the better word is wrong) spark could set off a chain of events leading to full-scale hostilities in the Middle East in the
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