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2023 UTNIF Kritik

Capitalism K - UTNIF 2023

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Capitalism K – UTNIF – Starter Packet
1NC – Cap K
Shells
1NC – Cap K – Generic
Fiscal policy as a catch-all for resolving the contradictions of capitalism obliterates the global south. Market-based solution is reformist logic that only engenders a new neoliberal strategy.
Herrera 22 Herrera, R. (2022). Rémy Herrera is a French economist, researcher at the CNRS (Centre national de la Recherche scientifique, National Center of Scientific Research). He has worked in financial auditing and in international institutions, including the OECD and the World Bank. He is the author of numerous books and scientific articles on economics, and teaches in several universities, especially at the Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne. He regularly collaborates with the CETIM (Center Europe Third World), notably by supporting it in its advisory role with the United Nations. Overcoming Capitalism to Protect Humanity and the Environment: Revitalizing Marxism for Modern Socialist Transitions. In: Confronting Mainstream Economics for Overcoming Capitalism. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05851-6_9. pp. 260—265. **footnotes omitted ut-ac
9.4 Against Some False Alternatives
Faced with the extremely serious environmental threats of the present and the future, many proposals for “reformist” solutions have been formulated—without, however, ever calling into question the foundations of the capitalist system, or even, more often than not, the orientations of the neoliberal strategy. This is very generally the case with the conclusions of the major conferences on the environment (such as the “Earth Summits” of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, of 2002 in Johannesburg, and so on), as well as with the theoretical backgrounds of the major international treaties on the climate, first and foremost among which are the indispensable (but too limited) U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 and one of its direct extensions, the Kyoto Protocol. The latter was multilaterally negotiated in December 1997, opened for ratification in March 1998, and entered into force in February 2005. The stated aim is to achieve a schedule of preventive actions intended to predict, measure, and attempt to mitigate the anthropogenic disturbances whose effects are considered the most dangerous on climate change.
It seems a priori impossible not to adhere to the objectives of this agreement—unless one is an “expert of the Copenhagen Consensus.” How can one not be in favor of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, considered as the major cause of global warming—unless one is a member of the U.S. government? Nevertheless, it was difficult for a progressive, to be satisfied with the modest “target” set by this Protocol at—5.2% of global carbon dioxide reduction by 2012 (calculated from 1990) for industrialized countries, when a very large majority of scientific researchers of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) argued that an immediate decrease of at least 50% would have then been necessary to maintain pollution at current levels.20 Given the magnitude of the challenges facing humanity, the measures proposed by the Protocol were full of good will, but derisory.
All the more so since the so-called “flexibility” mechanisms that it promoted present quite worrying dangers, in particular that of the “rights to pollute” market. This scheme attempts to attribute a “price” to the negative externality (or external diseconomy) that pollution represents on a market that is administratively organized on behalf of transnational corporations, which are allocated “carbon credits.” Basically, these market mechanisms turn nature—starting with the earth’s atmosphere—into a merchandise and participates in the launch of a gigantic movement of modern “enclosures.” As a matter of fact, pollution becomes a “right,” as the expression “pollution right” proclaims it. Pollution will thus be the object of a trade, that is, “emission trading scheme.” This is, in our view, definitely a false and dangerous alternative. From the start, the direction that was taken was the wrong one.
The richest agents can buy tradable emission permits on the market that will allow them to remain the biggest polluters, without changing their environmentally destructive behavior. Conversely, the poorest agents are encouraged to sell their “rights,” without trying to implement development policies likely to improve their living conditions. In addition, there is a risk of “carbon sink versus water sink” crowding-out effects when “clean development” programs (in the South) replace official development assistance (from the North). The implementation by transnational firms of some of these projects, thanks to which they earn new credits, has sometimes led to the expulsion of peasant communities from their own land, in order to impose “anti-CO2 crops.” Countless fiscal-ecological scandals have been reported, where companies have been able to benefit from the scheme and receive public subsidies by increasing both their profits and… their greenhouse gas emissions.21
Without a regulatory and control body other than the transnational corporations themselves,22 multiple cases of fraud in the declaration of pollution levels or usurpation of the “carbon neutral” label—sometimes an ethical pretext for opening up new markets—will continue to be recorded. For the role of the State is not to submit to the power of the markets, in the name of “reformism” and the quest for an untraceable “capitalism with a human face”; it is to impose external limits on capital and its logic of expansion, in order to succeed in protecting humanity as well as the environment against capital’s destructive tendencies. Remaining within the framework of profit maximization and based on a State-supported commodification of natural resources, the strategy chosen by the Kyoto Protocol to achieve its objectives is the surest way… to never achieve them. It differs only in degree, not in kind, from the strategy advocated by the Copenhagen Consensus. Since the experimentation of the first local emission permit markets in the United States, the activity that has developed mainly on these new environmental exchanges,23 from the Chicago Climate Exchange to the European Powernext, is carbon speculation. And the latter remained very active even after the 2008 crisis.
Many other false alternatives exist, which do not place politics at the heart of ecology, nor the structures of capitalism at the center of the problems of the climate crisis. One of them is the thesis of “degrowth.” It has had some success among the “alterglobalist” movements of recent times. We should rather speak of degrowth theses, in the plural, since the heterogeneity of these works—and their quality—is extreme24 ; to the point of often being able to rally the approval of activists sincerely devoted to the struggle for a more livable world on this or that specific suggestion presenting a real relevance.
Such is the case, for example, of the call to save resources and to avoid waste, but also to control the passions of consumer society. The rejection of consumerist delusions is no longer only highly desirable; it has simply become indispensable—provided that we do not fall into the opposite excess, i.e., the “praise of poverty.” The latter, advocated by some Northern activists, is indeed undoubtedly difficult to hear by the one billion human beings of the South currently living in slums of the urban areas, not to mention the poor peasants in the rural zones.
But the criticisms that can be formulated against these theses must be made taking into account this fact: many of the proponents of degrowth are authentic progressives, who should be brought together with the other militants who fight for a better world, rather than divided. Everyone should agree on the fact that it is up to the ultra-rich, who are also the biggest polluters and wasters, with the most powerful transnational corporations they own, to make the most substantial efforts; and not to the poorest—whether in terms of classes or nations.25
This temporary infatuation linked to “degrowth,” in the air of time, can be explained to a large extent by the disarray caused by a double failure: on the one hand, the proven impotence or extreme difficulty of the party and trade union organizations of the traditional left to integrate the now absolute imperative of environmental protection into the heart of their programs, and on the other hand, the inability of the huge majority of the “green” movements to admit that, if ecology is indeed political, their salvation will not come through an ever more docile submission to the power of neoliberalized social-democracy. They must realize that democracy—including in the “management” of the planet’s natural resources—is inseparable from social progress, which itself is totally irreconcilable with the pursuit of neoliberal capitalism.
Nonetheless, a certain number of supporters of degrowth get lost in confusions that harm the credibility of the project they intend to promote. This is the case when they tend to confuse “growth”—a quantitative indicator (admittedly questionable) of increased production—with “development”—a concept with a qualitative and above all strategic dimension, which makes it much more complex to define.26 The authors of degrowth also often slip from the criticism of economism, justified and sometimes very relevant, to that of economics in general, and therefore of economic policy—that is, one of the essential instruments of any project of social transformation. Given the asymmetries and inequalities that characterize the capitalist world system, “degrowing” would very probably run the risk of accentuating the most worrying current problems at the social level (imbalances in the labor markets, dismantling of social protection, etc.) as well as at the environmental level (worsening of pollution due to a decrease in energy efficiency, for example).
The heart of the problem resides in the fact that, in their vast majority, the partisans of degrowth do not consider that the very responsible for the environmental catastrophe that is looming is the capitalist system, which they do not call into question as such. Unacceptably there still remains in their speeches, as in those of many ecological activists, a frequently tolerated equivalence between the term “capitalism”—obviously still taboo for some—and those of “progress” or “modernity.” In this way, as soon as the alterglobalism of degrowth evacuates from its discussions the inescapable question of the structure of ownership of capital and that of democratic popular participation in economic decisions, it will condemn itself to being only the illusion of “another” capitalism. But such other capitalism than the one that today threatens all of humanity with death is not possible. Definitively. And it should be understood as soon as possible. Before it is too late.
As long as no consistent solutions to the global problems which are those of the capitalist world system are envisaged, implying a real alternative to capitalism itself that allows for a decrease in the energy intensity of production—and not of this production—the good intentions of economic Malthusianism, based on beliefs more than on science, will remain wishful thinking. As long as the means of technological progress are not found to reduce energy consumption in a more equitable way and to carry out the difficult transition from a waste of fossil energies to a much more balanced management of these energies and of clean renewable resources, while simultaneously building a solidarity, united project of social emancipation of the workers of the North and effective reinforcement of the sovereignty of the peoples of the South, the empty hopes of a fundamentalist and/or a-political ecology will postpone sine die the reality of a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.
Without breaking with this capitalist mode of production and consumption, the arguments will always be deployed, despite nuances and subtleties, within the framework of a representation of a State and economic agents, or citizens, subjected to the forces of globally dominant capital. So, in the absence of substitutes for fossil fuels and of sufficiently dynamic technical progress, the shortage of energy resources, first and foremost oil, is likely to lead the whole system into a “forced degrowth” that would probably not take the path that alterglobalists want to take. And the machinery of capitalism, by depriving the poorest masses of the satisfaction of their most essential needs, in the silence of market price adjustments, would continue to manage their genocide.27
Green infrastructure conflates the problem with the solution. The metaphor of the New Deal demonstrates the desire for the state to reestablish legitimacy and initiate a new cycle of accumulation.
McCollum 22 McCollum, J. (2022). John McCollum is an assistant professor of sociology at Minot State University. Avoiding the pitfalls of capitalism in the Green New Deal. In Routledge Handbook on the Green New Deal (pp. 78-83). Routledge. ut-ac
State capitalism and the problem of entrenched political power
Our next important area for critiquing the GND in Marxist perspective is the state. The question of whether the working class can advance its interests through the state remains a heated debate in Marxist political thought. Marxist political theorist Ralph Miliband held that the state could be turned toward working-class interests through parliamentary means. The state reflected capital’s interests because of the capitalist class’s occupation of decision-making power and influence over the parliamentary process. Miliband believed that the working class could capture some degree of political power in national politics and affect change in that manner. A case in point was the rise to power of the Labour Party after World War II in Miliband’s native United Kingdom. The social-democratic nature of the GND highlights the hopes of its supporters to advance the GND through national parliaments and congresses, rather than, say, through revolutionary means. Given that the state will remain intact, we should look further into what this means for the class nature of the GND and the problems this may create, socially and environmentally.
Capitalism has some political contradictions that the GND may exacerbate, particularly in terms of environmental sustainability. Capital wants free markets to produce and sell, and it requires a state to do this. However, that same state also constrains capital in ways that prevent the endless accumulation of capital. This gives an outward appearance of tension between the state and capital. However, the state’s longer-term provision of stability to the entire system is in the benefit of capital. Despite some of the limitations on the worst environmental abuses, the state also facilitates access to new markets for natural resources, labor pools, and market rules that favor capitalist interests at the expense of the environment and human well-being. State efforts to mitigate pollution have not superseded the pace of resource consumption or built a sustainable economy. Although the GND has and will continue to provoke serious political opposition, the political issues around the GND go deeper to the nature of the state in capitalist society. For the GND to be successful in the long run, it will need to overcome many of these issues, even in a state in which the GND is an overarching political, economic, and social policy set.
One intractable problem is the question of material provision of the GND and the benefits that this could provide in boosting capitalism, despite the GND’s radical demands in the present conjuncture of political and economic forces. The GND is in an embryonic stage, but for it to make a rapid dent in environmental issues like CO2 emissions, the projects will need to begin rather quickly. To do so, it will require a high number of private suppliers to appropriate and provide materials, land, maintenance, and services for the infrastructural projects. In normal federal building practices, private contractors bid to perform services on infrastructure. As the GND develops, the appropriation of materials, land, and machinery to perform the labor will boost a new “green fraction of capital” to the forefront of the program. The influx of public funds to private ends will secure profits for this social class. For some time, the inherent opposition between workers and capital will be mediated by state support to both capital and labor, likely creating a corporatist state.
The environmental problems of capitalism are threatening the long-term economic viability of capitalism, necessitating new state forms to manage these problems. In times of great threat to the system, the state may take on new roles to reestablish legitimacy and initiate a new cycle of accumulation, exemplified by many states’ reactions to the Great Depression. In the US context, the New Deal encountered a great deal of opposition from capitalists, but the loss of political legitimacy gave President Roosevelt an unusually wide berth in implementing policy (Piven and Cloward 1971: 84–88). The extension of new welfare benefits, including unemployment protections, reduced the political threat of mass insurgency and civil unrest. In this same sense, the GND may bolster state legitimacy while also alleviating some of the worst environmental problems. Unlike the original New Deal, the GND’s dual focus on environmental issues and social equality means that new contradictions must also be considered.
In economic terms, the state may bolster both aggregate demand and political legitimacy through a centralized wealth redistribution mechanism. The Scandinavian welfare states are an example of this dynamic. After many decades of struggle, the powerful labor movements in the Scandinavian countries settled into a long period of peace in industrial relations. The healthcare, education, and welfare systems of these countries act to maintain a high level of social equality and a decent living standard for most citizens in these countries. However, these states are still capitalist in their economic framework. These states invest capital, both foreign and domestic, and wage labor remains the dominant form of labor relations. The same export of capital from a Scandinavian state drives the same forms of environmental damage as capital exported by the United States, though the per capita damage is lower. While many Americans admire their political and economic system (exemplified by Bernie Sanders’ 2016 and 2020 presidential nomination campaigns’ vision of “socialism”), it is important to remember that this same system is facing serious political pressure to undergo neoliberal reforms of the social welfare system and labor market, most notably in Sweden (Harvey 2005: 112–115). A need to remain “globally competitive” for investment drives much of the political argument in favor of reducing the welfare state and the bargaining power of unions in the region.
A GND might not go far enough as a state form capable of preventing catastrophic climate change in the necessary timeframe. The Scandinavian countries exemplify many of the goals of a GND in the US context already. They typically have a high level of regulation of pollution, state investment in green technology, and public transit systems. However, they are not totally sustainable. Sweden, a noted environmental reformer, has made considerable strides in environmental efficiency, but net sustainability is lagging (Lidscog and Elander 2012; Vail 2008). Norway remains a “petrostate” whose generous welfare measures depend on its oil production. The cold climates of these states necessitate burning a considerable amount of fuel to keep citizens warm in its long winters. Under their pre

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