Neoclassical Economics K - UTNIF 2023
Neoclassical Economics K - UTNIF 2023.docx
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UTNIF GRIPE File – Neoclassical Economics K – 2023 Authors’ Note Huge shout out to the following people: Ian, Ralph, Leroy, Soyam, Britney, Sreemanth, Alex, Grant, Shea, Isabel, Yichen, Atharv, Ayan, and Lily!!!! If you like this file, you should consider attending the UTNIF. FYI: Neoclassical economics rests on three axioms as normative foundations: 1) methodological individualism, 2) methodological instrumentalism, 3) methodological equilibrium Arnsperger and Varoufakisv 2006 - University of Louvain, Belgium and University of Athens, Greece Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis “What Is Neoclassical Economics? The three axioms responsible for its theoretical oeuvre, practical irrelevance and, thus, discursive power” Panoeconomicus, 2006, 1, pp. 5-18 In this chapter, we offer a definition of neoclassical economics which turns on three crucial axioms and which, in conjunction with one another, as we shall claim, underpin all (and only) neoclassical theory.1 Later, we argue that these very axioms are simultaneously responsible for: (a) the difficulty mainstream economics faces when it comes to illuminating economic and social reality, and (b) the discursive success of neoclassical economics which gives it an effective (politically driven) stranglehold over alternative modes of economic reasoning. We think our definition of neoclassical economics is important because critics are often caught off-guard by sophisticated neoclassicists (see Dasgupta, 2002) who take advantage of gaps in existing definitions in order to turn criti-cisms on their head. In short, the critique of neoclassical economics is bound to be as effective as sophisticated is its definition of the opposition. For instance, criticism that neoclassical economics necessarily posits hyper-rational bargain-hunters, never able to resist an act which brings them the tiniest increase in ex-pected net returns, is apt but not telling. There are plenty of neoclassical models featuring boundedly rational agents; even utterly irrational ones (e.g. evolutionary game theory; for a critical review in the spirit of this chapter, see Har-greaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004). Similarly with criticism focussed on ‘neo-classical features’ like market-clearing, selfish individualism or Pareto optimal-ity. None of these cut ice because, though these features are usually present in neoclassical modelling, they are not necessary features of some neoclassical model. Thus, as long as critics’ slings and arrows are directed against features of neoclassical economics that the latter can shed strategically, like a threatened lizard ‘loses’ its tail, they shall miss their target. Nevertheless, we do believe that there are at least three features of neoclassical economics that cannot be so shed; and, therefore, if the critics concentrate on them they shall, at the very least, force neoclassicists to engage in a fruitful dialogue. The single most promising prize from such a development ought to be the clarification of the origin and nature of the greatest paradox in social science: that mainstream economics is as dominant as it is unappetising (even to some of its own practitioners). In this sense, our axiomatic definition of neoclassicism, rather than being an idle methodological exercise, aims at exposing the root-cause of mainstream economics’ failure to say much that is helpful about the contemporary economic world. And it throws useful light on the reasons why such failure, instead of weakening neoclassicism, has reinforced its hold over the imagination of both the elites and the public at large. However, this is a longer argument which we shall only touch upon here (see Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2005, for more). Once upon a time, it could be argued that neoclassical economics is typified by a familiar melange of theoretical practices: positing an equilibrium in the labour market, the habitual recourse to Say’s Law, the assumption that the interest rate will adjust automatically so as to equalise investment and savings, the depiction of capitalist growth a la Robert Solow and company, the imposition of Cobb-Doublas or CES production and utility functions etc. Nowadays, any at-tempt to define neoclassicism by reference to these practices is music to the neo-classical ear: For there is an endless list of mainstream models which distance themselves from some, if not all, of the above. One of two conclusions appear in front of us: Either the mainstream has moved on from neoclassicism (as neoclas-sical economists claim) or the definition of neoclassicism needs to be re-thought and abstracted from a list of neoclassical practices like the one above. We choose and latter. So, the remainder of this chapter concentrates primarily on the three axioms which we think lie at the heart of neoclassical economic theory, old and new alike. 2. The first axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological individualism Unsophisticated critics often identify economic neoclassicism with models in which all agents are perfectly informed. Or fully instrumentally rational. Or ex-cruciatingly selfish. Defining neoclassicism in this manner would perhaps be apt in the 1950s but, nowadays, it leaves almost all of modern neoclassical theory out of the definition, therefore strengthening the mainstream’s rejoinders. In-deed, the last thirty years of neoclassical economics have been marked by an explosion of models in which economic actors are imperfectly informed, some times other-regarding, frequently irrational (or boundedly rational, as the current jargon would have it) etc. In short, Homo Economicus has evolved to resemble us more. None of these brilliant theoretical advances have, however, dislodged the neoclassical vessel from its methodological anchorage. Neoclassical theory retains its roots firmly within liberal individualist social science. The method is still unbendingly of the analytic-synthetic type: the socio-economic phenomenon under scrutiny is to be analysed by focusing on the individuals whose actions brought it about; understanding fully their ‘workings’ at the individual level; and, finally, synthesising the knowledge derived at the individual level in order to understand the complex social phenomenon at hand. In short, neoclassical theory follows the watchmaker’s method who, faced with a strange watch, stud-ies its function by focusing on understanding, initially, the function of each of its cogs and wheels. To the neoclassical economist, the latter are the individual agents who are to be studied, like the watchmaker’ cogs and wheels, independ-ently of the social whole their actions help bring about. So, the first feature of the ‘body of theory’ we think of as neoclassical is its methodological individualism: the idea that socio-economic explanation must be sought at the level of the individual agent. Note two things: First, this was not the method of classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Or, indeed, of Keynes. Or Hayek. Secondly, this proclivity is fully in tune with the mid-19th Century angloceltic liberal individualism (though the opposite does not hold) as it imposes axiomatically a strict separation of structure from agency, insisting that socio-economic explanation, at any point in time, must move from agency to structure, with the latter being understood as the crystallisation of agents’ past acts. We shall argue later that this strict separation is central in not only defining but also undermining the most recent claims of neoclassicism. It is, we think, indisputable that all the new manifestations of what we term neoclassicism still subscribe to methodological individualism. While it is true that mainstream economists have, during the last few decades, acknowledged that the agent is a creature of her social context, and thus that social structure and individual agency are messily intertwined, their models retain the distinction and place the burden of explanation on the individual. Individual worker effort is nowadays often modelled as a function of sectoral unemployment (e.g. effi-ciency wage models), and the firms’ micro-strategies reflect the macroeconomic environment. Nevertheless, and despite these interesting linkages between the micro-agent and the macro-phenomenon, the explanatory trajectory remains one that begins from the agent and maps, unidirectionally, onto the social structure. 3. The second axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological instrumentalism We label the second feature of neoclassical economics methodological instru-mentalism: all behaviour is preference-driven or, more precisely, it is to be un-derstood as a means for maximising preference-satisfaction.2 Preference is given, current, fully determining, and strictly separate from both belief (which simply helps the agent predict uncertain future outcomes) and from the means employed. Everything we do and say is instrumental to preference-satisfaction so much so that there is no longer any philosophical room for questioning whether the agent will act on her preferences. In effect, neoclassical theory is a narrow version of consequentialism in which the only consequence that matters is the extent to which an homogeneous index of preference-satisfaction is maximised.3 Methodological instrumentalism’s roots are traceable in David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40) in which the Scottish philosopher famously divided the human decision making process in three distinct modules: Passions, Belief and Reason. Passions provide the destination, Reason slavishly steers a course that attempts to get us there, drawing upon a given set of Beliefs regard-ing the external constraints and the likely consequences of alternative actions. It is not difficult to see the lineage with standard microeconomics: the person is defined as a bundle of preferences, her beliefs reduce to a set of subjective prob-ability density functions, which help convert her preferences into expected utili-ties, and, lastly, her Reason is the cold-hearted optimiser whose authority does not extend beyond maximising these uilities. However, it is a mistake to think that Hume would have approved. For his Passions are too unruly to fit neatly in some ordinal or expected utility function. It took the combined efforts of Jeremy Bentham and the late 19th Century neoclassicists to tame the Passions suffi-ciently before they could initially be reduced to a unidimensional index of pleas-ure before turning into smooth, double differentiable utility functions. During the tumultuous 20th Century, neoclassicists invested greatly in bleaching all psychology out of the rational agent’s decision making process. All hints of a philosophical discussion regarding the rationality of homo economicus were thus removed. People could, and ‘should’, be modelled as if they possessed consistent preferences which guide their behaviour automatically. The question of whether all rational women and men are condemned to maximise some utility function all the time became…nonsensical. Thus, instrumentalism lost its con-nection to the philosophies of Hume, Bentham or Mill and became a technical move that economists made instinctively with the same nonchalance as that of an accomplished artist preparing his oils and canvass before getting down to business. However, it is false to claim that this state of affairs, even though ubiqui-tous in economics departments the world over, is essential for neoclassical eco-nomics. The first signs that it need not be came with the literature on endoge-nous preferences. Neoclassical economists increasingly sought to distance them-selves from the assumption that preferences are fixed and exogenous. During the past twenty five years or so, homo economicus has developed a capacity to adapt his preferences in response to past outcomes (see Bowles, 1998). However, while the assumption that current preferences are exogenous was dropped, they remained fully determining. Thus, instrumentalism was preserved albeit in a dy-namic context. A more recent development has taken neoclassicism, and homo economicus, onto higher levels of sophistication. The advent of psychological game theory (see Rabin, 1993, and Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Ch. 7) has brought on a reconsideration of the standard assumption that agents’ cur-rent preferences are separate from the structure of the interaction in which they are involved. Suddenly, what one wants hinged on what she thought others expected she would do. And when these second order beliefs (her beliefs about the expectations of others) came to depend on the social structure in which the decision is embedded, the agent’s very preferences could not be linked just with out-comes: they depended on the structure and history of the interaction as well. In view of the above, there is no future in criticisms of neoclassicism based on the charge that the latter must take for granted preferences which are either exogenous or independent of the agents’ socio-economic relationships. Critics toeing that line will be met with the scornful rejoinder that they criticise out of ignorance. However, our point that neoclassicism is still rooted in methodological instrumentalism cannot be so dismissed. For even in the latest reincarnation provided by endogenous preferences and psychological game theory, homo economicus is still exclusively motivated by a fierce means-ends instrumentalism. He may have difficulty defining his ends, without firm beliefs of what means others expect him to deploy, but he remains irreversibly ends-driven. 4. The third axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological equilibration The third feature of neoclassical economics is, on our account, the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium. The point here is that, even after methodological individualism turned into methodological instrumentalism, prediction at the macro (or social) level was seldom forthcoming. Determinacy required something more: it required that agents’ instrumental behaviour is coordinated in a manner that aggregate behaviour becomes sufficiently regular to give rise to solid pre-dictions. Thus, neoclassical theoretical exercises begin by postulating the agents’ utility functions, specifying their constraints, and stating their ‘information’ or ‘belief’. Then, and here is the crux, they pose the standard question: “What be-haviour should we expect in equilibrium?” The question of whether an equilibrium is likely, let alone probable, or how it might materialise, is treated as an optional extra; one that is never central to the neoclassical project. The reason for the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium is simple: it could not be otherwise! By this we mean that neoclassicism cannot demonstrate that equilibrium would emerge as a natural consequence of agents’ instrumentally rational choices. Thus, the second best methodological alternative for the neo-classical theorist is to presume that behaviour hovers around some analytically-discovered equilibrium and then ask questions on the likelihood that, once at that equilibrium, the ‘system’ has a propensity to stick around or drift away (what is known as ‘stability analysis’). It is quite remarkable that the above has been with us since the very begin-ning. When A.A. Cournot constructed the first model of (oligopolistic) competi-tion in 1838, he immediately noticed a lacuna in his explanation regarding the emergence of an equilibrium. Rather cunningly, instead of discussing this diffi-culty, he studied what happens when we begin from that equilibrium. Would the system have a tendency to move away from it or was the equilibrium stable? The proof of its stability secured his place in the pantheon of economic theory. Moreover, it established this interesting practice: First, one discovers an equilib-rium. Second, one assumes (axiomatically) that agents (or their behaviour) will find themselves at that equilibrium. Lastly, one demonstrates that, once at that equilibrium, any small perturbations are incapable of creating centrifugal forces able to dislodge self-interested behaviour from the discovered equilibrium. This three-step theoretical move is tantamount to what we, here, describe as methodo-logical equilibration. Note that methodological equilibration is equivalent to avoiding (axiomati-cally) what ought to be the behaviourist’s central question: Will rational agents behave according to the theory’s equilibrium prediction? Instead, the question becomes: If rational agents are behaving according to the theory’s equilibrium prediction, will they have cause to stop doing so? Note also that methodological equilibration has remained intact since 1838 and Cournot’s first use of it. To see this, consider the two great success stories to have come out of neoclassical eco-nomics since WW2: General Equilibrium Theory and Game Theory. In neither case does the equilibrium solution spring naturally from the models’ assump-tions. In General Equilibrium Theory its best practitioners state it quite categori-cally: convergence to some general equilibrium can only be proven in highly restrictive special cases. More generally, it is not just difficult to demonstrate that a system of theoretical markets will generate an equilibrium in each market, on the basis of rational acts on behalf of buyers and sellers; rather, it is impossible! (See Mantel, 1973, and Sonnenschein, 1973,1974.) In Game Theory the same result obtains: in the most interesting socio-economic interactions (or games) common knowledge that all players are instrumentally rational seldom yields one of the interaction’s Nash equilibria. Something more is required to bring on an equilibrium. That something comes in the form of an axiom that the beliefs of all players are consistently aligned at each stage of every game (see Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Chapters 2&3). This assumption is, of course, yet another reincarnation of methodological equilibration: for once we assume that agents’ beliefs are systematically and consistently aligned, they are assumed to be in a state of (Nash) equilibrium. Yet again, equilibrium is im-posed axiomatically before stability analysis can test its susceptibility to pertur-bations. Cournot’s spirit lives on. Key: NE = Neoclassical Economics; CE = Circular Economics; DSGE Model = Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium; RCT = Rational Choice Theory Negative 1NCs 1NC Econ/Generic Neoclassical economics’ reliance on financialization and shareholder capitalism plunders the working class, guarantees economic, ideological, and analytic collapse. Marszalek and Scarzec 22 – Pawel Marszalek is professor and Head of Department at Poznan University of Economics; Katarzyna Szarzec is a researcher and professor at Poznan University, [“The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Financialization Through Heterodox and Mainstream Lenses”, Bank I Kredyt 54(3), 2023, 239-258, https://bankikredyt.nbp.pl/content/2023/03/BIK_03_2023_01.pdf]RA The causes of financialization Bearing in mind this polarization of research methods and approaches, it is not surprising that no single determinant of financialization was identified and accepted as being the most important. Nor is it surprising that heterodox economists were those who paid more attention to financialization issues. They argued that when analysing the determinants of financialization it is necessary to consider a combination of many, mutually stimulating factors, both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. The former refers to enterprises, households and specific markets, while the latter refers to the state’s decisions (i.e. those of governments and central banks) made in the area of social and economic policy, and regulations. The determinants of financialization identified by heterodox economists have often been divided into micro and macroeconomic ones (see e.g. Bhaduri 2011; Palley 2007). The micro causes of financialization can be further divided into chang
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