Dedev - UTNIF 2023
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UTNIF ’23 GRIPEs – DeDev Featuring pfox, Grace, Maya, Kate, Skyler (winner of the card cutting race), Spencer, Jackie, Arien, and Ari This file is organized a bit janky – don’t read everything under the headers that have like 20 cards, just pick best ones and read extra ev as necessary. Neg 1NC – Core 1NC – Degrowth CP The United States federal government should facilitate degrowth by: -Facilitating access to an expanded social safety net that makes labor unnecessary, -Lowering unnecessary consumption and energy throughput, -Adjusting to a non-growing GDP that decreases GHG emissions, and -Gearing economic activity towards fulfillment of human needs. Transition is smooth and doesn’t collapse the economy. Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 ==MJ This is known as ‘degrowth’. Degrowth is a planned reduction of energy and resource throughput designed to bring the economy back into balance with the living world in a way that reduces inequal- ity and improves human well-being (Kallis, 2018; Latouche, 2009). It is important to clarify that degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing throughput. From an ecological per- spective, that is what matters. Of course, it is important to accept that reducing throughput is likely to lead to a reduction in the rate of GDP growth, or even a decline in GDP itself, and we have to be prepared to manage that outcome in a safe and just way. This is what degrowth sets out to do. While degrowth theory is attracting increasing attention among academics and social movements, for people new to the idea it raises a number of questions. Here I address questions about language and terminology, questions about economic recession, and questions about international political economy and the North–South divide. The language of degrowth Many of the objections to degrowth have to do with the term itself. Some people worry that degrowth introduces confusion because it is not, in fact, the opposite of growth. When people say ‘growth’ they normally mean growth in GDP, so one might reasonably assume that degrowth is likewise focused on reducing GDP. Proponents of degrowth are therefore condemned to perpetually clarify that degrowth is not about reducing GDP, but rather about reducing material and energy throughput. It would seem that this creates unnecessary problems. But, in fact, the problem here arises from the word growth, not degrowth. In reality, people pursue growth not in order to increase an abstract number (GDP), but because they want to consume or do more, which of course requires using more materials and energy. So when economists and politicians talk about growth they really mean an increase in materials and energy (and specifically an increase in commodified materials and energy), even though this is not stated outright. The preoccupation with GDP is a fetish that obscures this fact; it makes it seem as though growth is immaterial when in reality it is not. If GDP growth did not come along with an increase in material consumption, people would not pursue it (what’s the point of having a higher income if it doesn’t enable you to expand military spending, buy bigger houses and faster cars, or pay people to do things for you?). In this sense, degrowth, with its focus on reducing material and energy use (and reducing patterns of commodification), is in fact an appropriate opposite to growth, and indeed clarifies what growth itself is actually about. Now, one might ask, why use the term degrowth at all, when you could just say ‘we want to reduce energy and material throughput’ and avoid the confusion? There are a few reasons for this. First, most economists would agree that reducing energy and material throughput is important, but they assume this can be accomplished while continuing to pursue economic growth at the same time (indeed, they may even believe that more growth will eventually lead to a reduction in throughput). We need some way of distinguishing the degrowth position from this standard ‘green growth’ assumption. If we accept the empirical evidence that green growth is unlikely to be achieved, then we have to accept that reducing throughput will impact on GDP itself, and we must focus on how to restructure the economy so that this can be managed in a safe and just way. For this, ‘degrowth’ is a simple, handy term that allows us to clarify what is at stake, and concentrates the mind on what is required. Proponents of degrowth often argue that the word degrowth is useful as a ‘missile’ word. For an increasing number of people, it is obvious that perpetual growth is a problem; for them, degrowth seems intuitively correct as a response to ecological crisis, and they can get on board immediately. Other people have a negative initial reaction to the word, but it is nonetheless useful in such cases to the extent that it challenges and disrupts people’s assumptions about how the economy should work, by questioning something that is generally taken for granted as natural and good. In many cases, negative initial reactions give way to contemplation (do high-income countries really need more growth?), and then curiosity (perhaps we can actually flourish with less throughput, and even less output?), and then investigation (what is the relevant empirical evidence?) that eventually leads people to change their views. This kind of intellectual transformation is enabled, not inhibited, by using a provocative term. Trying to avoid provocation, or trying to be agnostic about growth, creates a milieu where proble- matic assumptions remain unidentified and unexamined in favour of polite conversation and agreement. This is not an effective way to advance knowledge, especially when the stakes are so high. Some people worry about using degrowth because it is a ‘negative’ term, rather than positive. But it is only negative if we start from the assumption that more growth is good and desirable. If we want to challenge that assumption, and argue the opposite (that more growth is unnecessary and dama- ging, and that it would be better if we slowed down), then degrowth is a positive term. Take the words colonization and decolonization, for example. We know that those who engaged in coloniza- tion felt it was a good thing. From their perspective – which was the dominant perspective in Europe for most of the past 500 years – decolonization would therefore seem negative. But the point is pre- cisely to challenge the dominant perspective, because the dominant perspective is wrong. Indeed, today we can agree that this stance – a stance against colonization – is correct and valuable: we stand against colonization, and believe that the world would be better without it. That is not a nega- tive vision, but positive; one that’s worth rallying around. Similarly, we can and should aspire to an economy without growth just as we aspire to a world without colonization. We can take this observation one step further. It is important to recognize that the word ‘growth’ has become a kind of propaganda term. In reality, what is going on is a process of elite accumulation, the commodification of commons, and the appropriation of human labour and natural resources – a process that is quite often colonial in character. This process, which is generally destructive to human commu- nities and to ecology, is glossed as growth. Growth sounds natural and positive (who could possibly be against growth?) so people are easily persuaded to buy into it, and to back policies that will generate more of it, when otherwise they might not. Growth is the ideology of capitalism, in the Gramscian sense. It is the core tenet of capitalism’s cultural hegemony. The word degrowth is powerful and effective because it identifies this trick, and rejects it. Degrowth calls for the reversal of the processes that lie behind growth: it calls for disaccumulation, decommodification, and decolonization. The CP creates opportunity for the next recession to spur a permanent shift towards degrowth. Kallis et al. 20 [Giorgos Kallis is an ICREA professor at ICTAUAB, where he teaches ecological economics and political ecology; Susan Paulson, based at the University of Florida, studies and teaches about gender, class, and ethnoracial systems interacting with bodies and environments; Giacomo D’Alisa is based at CES-UC in Coimbra, Portugal; Federico Demaria is a lecturer in ecological economics and political ecology at the University of Barcelona, part of the Environmental Justice Atlas team that studies and maps environmental conflicts and injustices around the world, “Making Changes on the Ground” through “Strategies for Mobilization,” The Case for Degrowth, Polity Press, 2020, pp. 44–109] rc/pfox Crises can catalyze personal changes, open cracks in dominant norms and expectations, and bring people together to reinvent themselves and their relationships. Angelos Varvarousis explains how, between 2009 and 2016, many Greeks disoriented by prolonged crisis found meaning in cooperative projects ranging from urban gardens, time-banks, and collective art centers to solidarity clinics and food banks.6 The collapse of mass consumption and the crisis of the welfare state destabilized identities that have long been experienced as natural. Ephemeral common experiences, such as mass occupation of public plazas or impromptu planting of gardens, acted as rites of passage for participants transitioning from a past no longer viable to a future yet to be defined. In the practical work of producing new commons, people experiment with new selves and relations. Likewise, Guardian journalist George Monbiot notes how, amid the coronavirus crisis, and despite measures of physical distancing, commons of mutual aid and care have exploded all over the world in projects that support the poor and vulnerable, care for doctors and care workers, or provide low-cost technological solutions to hospitals in need of specialized equipment.7 In Puerto Rico, as a result of self-governing processes developed over thirty-five years around an anti-mining movement, everyday performances in common projects have nurtured common senses around nature, community, and democracy that have changed participants in ways that counter prevalent common senses of growth.8 In sum, coevolution can happen when individuals innovate and connect with others, and together perform new kinds of relationships that prefigure political change on other scales. Thus, emerging networks become forces for institutional change, both modelling and advocating different structures of governance. Commons That are Already Here The money economy is the tip of an iceberg sustained by immense activity organized in voluntary, reciprocal, and not-for-profit forms.9 Time-use studies in Australia and elsewhere reveal that as many hours are devoted to household and care work (performed largely by women) as to paid employment.10 In 2010 in Catalonia, sociologists Joana Conill, Manuel Castells and their colleagues found that the significant portions of time people dedicated to activities not involving monetary exchange included mutual favors, fixing their own or their friends’ houses or cars, growing or preparing food, or engaging in voluntary organizations.11 What happens if governments counterbalance the enormous investments made to bolster money economies with an increasing appreciation of and support for the skills, values, and strategies exercised in the arrangement of childcare, the sharing of home-grown produce or baked goods, continual attention to ill and elderly members, and the clean up of neighborhood streets and parks? These unheralded commons provide foundations for reconstructing economies oriented toward goals other than growth. The globalization of one monoculture based on selfish competition seems to have undermined myriad forms of mutual aid that have propelled social evolution throughout history. Yet, a plurality of embodied common senses, some contradicting others, always allow human individuals and communities to adapt their values and views of the world around them. The good news is that enduring ethics and systems of community and environmental care that have been undervalued and exploited by market growth are giving rise to new forms of collaboration. Not isolated sanctuaries or exit utopias, these arrangements intertwine with existing economies in various ways. Community Economies in Coevolution The city of Barcelona, where three of us live, abounds with commoning arrangements. The Catalan Integral Cooperative (CIC), for example, interconnects diverse productive ventures and hundreds of self-employed people, with an annual budget of around $480,000.12 Through its Catalan Supply Centre, small producers deliver some 4,500 pounds of food each month to twenty-one spaces self-managed by consumers. CIC issues its own currency, Faircoin, provided as a basic income to members, and funds new cooperative ventures through its self-financing interest-free bank with 155 members and $250,000 in deposits. CIC’s most audacious project is the post-industrial colony of Calafou: a 28,000 msq abandoned factory 60 km outside Barcelona, that twenty-two members rented and developed into twenty-seven units including a hacklab and a soap production lab, carpentry and mechanical workshops, and a professional music studio. Interconnecting some 110,000 people, supporting 6,000 to earn money and 300 enterprises in the Solidarity Economy Network,13 Barcelona’s cooperative ecosystem allows residents with different political and personal sensibilities to dedicate some of their energies to constructing worlds they desire. You can become a member of Som Energia, which will deliver 100 percent renewable electricity to your home at affordable cost; share an electric car through Som Mobilitat; connect to the internet through Som Connexio; receive primary care through the COS health cooperative; live in a cohousing unit built by the architect cooperative Sostre Civic; take turns in a parent-run childcare group; grow vegetables in a community garden; buy produce from a local farmer through membership in a consumer cooperative; or listen to new bands in citizen-run social centers called Ateneus. Barcelona’s history of cooperativism is unique, yet resonates with community economies worldwide. In Mississippi, Cooperation Jackson has developed similarly to CIC. In the Phoenix Commons self-managed co-housing community for over-55s in Oakland, California, residents share communal areas, including a kitchen where rotating committees prepare shared meals.14 Worldwide, hundreds of eco-communes, transition towns, co-living and co-housing communities are learning together and gaining strength in national and global associations. People practicing less damaging and wasteful ways of producing and accessing food are also banding together at various scales. The international peasants’ network Via Campesina represents 182 small farmer organizations in eighty-one countries around a mission to facilitate collaborative learning, exchange, and organizing among individuals and groups exercising and experimenting with healthy and sustainable forms of agriculture. Limits and Doubts Are we proposing to feed nine billion people with urban gardens, lodge everyone in co-housing, and raise the world’s children in neighborhood circles? Indeed not: we encourage support for cooperative modes of production, consumption, and caring in order to complement and renew large-scale public arrangements and forms of private use or ownership. The goal is not to replace one monoculture with another. It is to create conditions that support the development of more vibrant realms of possibility with different rhythms, purposes, and scales. Today’s political systems promote and subsidize a growth-driven model based on private property, paid labor, and market consumption, leaving other arrangements underappreciated, undernourished, and overexploited. Our strategy is to re-order values and resources to support the development of diverse life-making processes operating with different logics. That diversity will be key to resilience and adaptation in the face of historical-environmental challenges. Does the case for degrowth reject technological advancements, marking a retrogression to the grueling labor of earlier times? On the contrary, we recognize the role that large-scale high-tech production will continue to play, and observe that many smaller processes, including those oriented toward purposes other than growth, are also strengthened by technological innovations. Across Latin America, small farmers in agroecology organizations combine traditional practices with cutting-edge scientific knowledge.15 Timebankers in New Zealand use computer programs to record and calculate in-kind contributions.16 Vassilis Kostakis points to initiatives at the interface of digital and physical production, and of local manufacture and global design and distribution: L’Atelier Paysan (France) and Farmhack (US and UK) build open-source agricultural machines for small-scale farming; Wikihouse democratizes the construction of sustainable, resource-light dwellings; OpenBionics produces open-source designs for robotic and bionic devices; and the RepRap community creates replicable designs for 3D printers.17 These examples integrate recent innovations in science and engineering with longstanding modes of human organization in small-scale, decentralized, and locally controlled production arrangements that strive to minimize hierarchy and exploitation. Will collective forms of provisioning and care be exploited to subsidize growth economies? Yes, sharing activities that generate value can be captured and coopted by the market, as new commons open up opportunities for new enclosures. In the meteoric rise of networks for sharing rides, homes, tools, skills, food, and favors, for example, models supporting equitable sharing coexist with forprofit exploitation. Both can contribute to reducing material use, while enacting quite different power relations. There is also the danger that corporations and states will seek to buffer losses by shifting even more welfare costs on to uncommodified family and social life. In some contexts, the model of women performing unpaid reproductive labor to subsidize men’s wage work is already being replaced by one in which the underpaid work of women and men is subsidized by collaborative efforts to supply nourishment, healthcare, childcare, and elder-care. Temptations to romanticize communities and idealize social movements should not blind us to instances in which community-driven action is exclusionary toward outsiders and tyrannical toward its members. Communal projects must negotiate inclusion and exclusion, horizontal and vertical relations, as they address tensions and contradictions in the consolidation of common values and meanings. The model unfolded here across several chapters bolsters this journey by articulating ongoing community-building with changes in state institutions and in personal practices and values. In today’s world, pre-growth and post-growth forms of organization inevitably coexist with enterprises and social systems developed to support growth, promising conflict and contradiction, as well as complementarity. Power dynamics engineered in the growth era, including racism, sexism, and classism, will continue to shadow journeys toward more equitable lifeways. It takes time, c
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