Politics DA - DDI 2023 TT
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Politics DA—TT Lab Notes Notes Biggest thing is that this DA’s burden for winning the link is incredibly low, which means there could potentially be a ton of thumpers—the link is excessive spending/something that pisses the FC off. Too bad literally everything pisses off the freedom caucus. Research this on a truth level we are very much screwed. That being said, the timeframe for this DA is critical. The way it compensates for the weaknesses above is that these are all bills that are the priority now and are the only things being passed now. That takes out a lot of thumpers because the evidence on it being the only priority is really good. As of right now, there are 12 bills that need to be passed. The deadline is September 30th, and since congress is going on recess, almost no one thinks they will be able to pass the bills by then. After the deadline, congress will pass an ‘extension’ which will keep with current spending levels. The tough part is that if the bills aren’t all passed by Jan 1st, then the budget will default to levels that will result in huge cuts everywhere. So what does the FC want? They don’t necessarily want to see the budget to default. What they do want is massive cuts everywhere. They’re willing to stall until the budget gets cut itself, but they’d rather control McCarthy like a puppet until they get what they want. 1NC 1NC Passing appropriations bills as quickly as possible is critical. Otherwise, they’ll become derailed, the FC will shut down the process, and there will be ubiquitous spending cuts. Payne, 7/23 [Russell, political reporter at the New York Sun, ‘Senate Vote on Budget Bill Puts Upper Chamber on a Collision Course With House Republicans’, New York Sun, https://www.nysun.com/article/senate-vote-on-budget-bill-puts-higher-chamber-on-a-collision-course-with-house-republicans //alundy] Putting itself at odds with the House’s spending plans, the Senate Appropriations Committee has added $13.7 billion to the spending limits agreed on in the debt ceiling deal in its markup of its plan for next year’s budget. The chairwoman of the committee, Senator Murray, struck an agreement with the vice chairwoman, Senator Collins, adding $8 billion in defense spending and $5.7 billion in non-defense spending. “Members on both sides of the aisle — on and off committee — have voiced serious, bipartisan concerns about the cuts in the debt ceiling deal to vital non-defense programs and the caps it imposes on defense spending,” Ms. Murray said in a statement. “We have agreed to make use of additional emergency appropriations — just as we do every year and is fully allowed under the debt ceiling deal.” This deal in the Senate puts the higher chamber on a collision course with House Republicans, who are aiming to cut $119 billion from the budget in addition to cuts made in the debt ceiling deal, meaning there is about a $133 billion difference between the two spending plans. “Because of years of out-of-control spending, it has been and will continue to be my priority to pass conservative bills that focus our limited resources on the core responsibilities of the federal government, including national defense, our veterans, and our border,” House Appropriations Chairwoman Kay Granger said in a statement. The two legislative bodies will need to reconcile the differences between their two plans before the end of the federal fiscal year on September 30. Another provision of the debt ceiling deal also stipulates that, if lawmakers fail to pass all 12 annual appropriations bills ahead of January 1, 2024, there will be a one percent across-the-board cut to the budget. This once again puts Speaker McCarthy at odds with members of his own party. He will need to balance the interests of vulnerable House Republicans and the influential House Freedom Caucus while negotiating with members of the Senate. It’s clear that, in negotiations with the Senate, Mr. McCarthy will be working with a bipartisan group of Senators that support higher spending caps. Politico reports that the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, has been blocking the transfer of nuclear submarines to Australia, demanding the executive branch request additional funding for the Pentagon. Punchbowl News reports that Senator Collins, the top Appropriations Committee Republican, is pleased with the higher spending caps, and she has indicated that she’s not alone. “Many of us have been very concerned that defense was under-funded [in the debt-limit bill], and that it was really important that we start in the appropriations process to remedy the problem,” Ms. Collins said. Although members in both the House and the Senate appear confident that they will reconcile their differences on spending ahead of September 30, it’s clear that at least one of these bills is going to have to change. Whether Mr. McCarthy pushes to meet the Senate at the higher spending levels, which are closer to the levels he negotiated with President Biden, or he pushes for concessions from the Senate, he will, as with every action he’s taken so far this Congress, need to appease his members or face the risk of being ousted from his speakership. [INSERT LINK] Failure to pass appropriation bills in time crushes key military capabilities---it’s an almost 10% across the board cut to defense. Dayen 23 [David, staff at the American Prospect, “The Auto-CR Dilemma,” The American Prospect, 5/30/23, https://prospect.org/economy/2023-05-30-auto-cr-dilemma-debt-ceiling/] Since my initial rundown of the debt ceiling deal was published, we got the actual text of the agreement. Let’s go through a few particulars that are new: TANF changes are really a five-state pilot. Most states are not going to be affected. There is a “small checks” scheme where states get families eligible for TANF using their own expenditures. That faces a crackdown, but not until 2025. SNAP work requirements have a phase-in. It’s a very odd phase-in. Able-bodied, childless adults must work to avoid time limits on nutrition assistance. The cutoff moves from 49 years old to 50 within 90 days of passage (approximately September 1), and then to 52 at the beginning of fiscal year 2024 (October 1). One month for a phase-in? That won’t cause trouble! The full change to 54 kicks in on October 1 of 2024, and then sunsets October 1, 2030. Permitting really is a nothingburger. The BUILDER Act, which mostly writes down things the White House has already implemented, like a single agency lead, better coordination, and a handful of page limits and timelines for environmental reviews (though they can be extended), is the main thing in here. A provision on interregional transmission lines is not only a study, it’s an extended study that can take a year and a half to write and another year to finalize after public comment. It’s very clear that the monopoly utilities lobbied that provision into dust. There is an addition of energy storage projects to the FAST Act, an old infrastructure streamlining bill from 2008. More from David Dayen They added Joe Manchin’s Mountain Valley Pipeline approval. The Pipeline Payoff (a new term I’ve coined, how do you like it?) is in the deal, confirming outstanding approvals and stripping jurisdiction from all courts except the D.C. Circuit, which is thought to be friendly. Some have taken this to mean that progressives were wrong to oppose last year’s permitting bill, since Manchin got what he wanted anyway without any trade-offs. This neglects that it was Mitch McConnell who torpedoed permitting because he thought he could get something better in the next Congress. He was right. Plus, the Pipeline Payoff is going to drain Manchin’s support for a permitting deal that gives something to both sides. See Dave Roberts on this. AI environmental reviews? There’s a study commissioned on the potential of “online and digital technologies to address delays in reviews.” This is mainly about online portals as repositories of information and better tools to track progress, but it explicitly says the study is not limited to that. I immediately thought about AI. One way to accelerate the review process is to have ChatGPT write it, I guess. That will probably go as well as AI legal briefs. This bears watching. I’m no longer worried about administrative PAYGO. This was the provision that codified an executive order that forces federal agencies to offset any mandatory spending created by their regulations by cutting other regulations. If it had teeth, it would be very bad, essentially baking in deregulation. But the agency can exempt rules from this requirement, the Office of Management and Budget can waive it entirely, there’s no judicial review for any OMB finding, and it sunsets at the end of 2024. This may slow down a couple of rules, but I don’t expect it to do much. The unobligated COVID aid rescissions come to $29 billion. That’s the approximation given by negotiators. In addition … There’s potentially $21.4 billion in cuts to IRS funds coming. Officially in the bill, the cut is $1.4 billion. But according to numerous reports, budget appropriators plan to steal $10 billion from the $80 billion in IRS funding in the Inflation Reduction Act in fiscal year 2024, plus another $10 billion in FY2025, and use that to fill in gaps in nondefense discretionary spending. (It’s possible those losses get replenished later.) The COVID rescissions also backfill that nondefense discretionary budget in FY2024. That brings us to … The automatic continuing resolution creates an interesting dilemma. As I explained over the weekend, the deal only creates topline numbers, baselines for future budget appropriations that have yet to be written. If those bills aren’t passed by January 1, 2024, an automatic continuing resolution snaps in at the level of fiscal year 2023, reduced by 1 percent. (This “penny plan” is the brainchild of libertarian Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), who sits on the House Rules Committee and presumably will advance the bill through the committee for that reason.) But that auto-CR treats defense, veterans, and nondefense spending far differently. Specifically, it’s much harsher on the defense and veterans side. Those buckets of spending were increased significantly in the debt ceiling deal. So if they go all the way back to FY2023 levels, it’s a much deeper cut from where they would have been. Adjusted for inflation, the cut to defense is nearly 10 percent. Let me show my work. Skip this if you don’t like math; my sources include the CBO baselines and the bill text. Per Bloomberg’s Erik Wasson, FY2023 discretionary spending was $1.602 trillion; the new baseline in the deal for FY2024 is $1.590 trillion. If the spending bills don’t get done, the auto-CR trigger for FY2024 is $1.602 trillion minus 1 percent, which comes to $1.585 trillion. So, a $12 billion cut if the spending bills pass, a $17 billion cut if they don’t. But under the spending bills passing scenario, defense spending increases by $28 billion, while nondefense is cut by $40 billion. The $29 billion in COVID rescissions and $10 billion from IRS funding (in the first year) mostly fills that nondefense gap. If the spending bills don’t pass, you get a nominal cut to defense of $9.12 billion, and a cut to nondefense of $7.88 billion. However, the IRS fund transfer, which is not in the deal and is just presumed as part of the appropriation, would not happen under this scenario. (I don’t know what happens to the COVID aid in this scenario; I guess it would just go to deficit reduction.) OK, you can come back now. The upshot is this: If Congress doesn’t pass the spending bills, the military loses about $37 billion from what they’d otherwise get, a 4 percent nominal cut and adjusted for inflation almost a 10 percent real cut. And, the IRS would keep almost all of its funding boost. The trade-off is that nondefense discretionary would lose around $7 billion more, a little less than 1 percent, in this scenario. Plus, veterans funding would lose a significant amount, probably around 5 to 7 percent. For additional context, nondefense spending got a major boost in FY2023, which became the new baseline. An inflation-adjusted cut from that is certainly not good, but we’re getting one either way; the difference is less than 1 percent. In the no-spending-bills-pass scenario, you trade a slightly larger cut—off a high baseline—for serious cuts to defense and preservation of the ability to go after rich tax cheats in future years. Isn’t that something requiring serious consideration? It’s not like a major newsmagazine didn’t just release a blockbuster report on how badly the Pentagon is getting ripped off. Just curtailing routine price-gouging would easily cover this cut, which we should be doing anyway. And even more important, the auto-CR would retain the relationship between defense and nondefense spending that has been severed by this deal. In the future, it’ll be fine to increase military spending without increasing non-military spending concurrently, unless this deal collapses. The whole thing depends on Congress not being able to pass its 12 appropriations bills. Doesn’t that seem like a good bet? Congress is famously not good at such things. The House canceled a bunch of votes on the easiest spending bills last week because they couldn’t find consensus. The point of this auto-CR is to concentrate minds and get them moving to pass the bills. But if you’re a Democrat who talks about how we have a bloated military budget, and that rich people get away with murder from an imbalanced tax system, isn’t this your big chance? And all you have to do is just not vote for spending bills! Every Democrat who does this makes it that much harder to get those bills passed, and that much closer to kicking in the auto-CR. If you asked me point-blank, I’d say that Congress will somehow get those bills done. The military has contractors in practically every congressional district, making military pork barrel spending a jobs program for almost all politicians. And the fact that veterans programs would be clobbered too makes this a heavy lift. But to be clear, all that’s needed here to trigger the auto-CR is congressional incompetence. That’s not exactly out of the realm of possibility. Key to contain rising revisionist powers---extinction. Kroenig & Trotti 20 [Matthew Kroenig & Christian Trotti, “Modernization as a Promoter of International Security,” Nuclear Modernization in the 21st Century, edited by Aiden Warren and Philip M. Baxter, 1st ed., Routledge, 02/17/2020, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.4324/9780429435829] Does nuclear modernization promote international security? All the major powers are currently modernizing their strategic nuclear arsenals, and scholars and policymakers are debating the effect of such modernization on international politics. Some argue that nuclear weapons deter a great power war and, therefore, nuclear modernization will contribute to international stability.1 Others claim that modernization programs are fundamentally destabilizing; nuclear weapons are the deadliest weapons ever invented and their continued possession will eventually result in a catastrophic nuclear attack.2 This chapter introduces a third answer to the above question: it depends. The modernization programs of the United States and its democratic allies at the core of the international system tend to promote international security. On the other hand, the nuclear modernization programs of revisionist autocratic powers intent on challenging the international system tend to threaten global peace and stability. Thus, not all modernization programs are created equal. It is ultimately the underlying geopolitical conditions, and not solely the capabilities themselves, which determine the extent to which modernization programs promote or diminish international security. Since 1945, the United States has been the leader of a rules-based international order that has brought the world unprecedented levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom.3 U.S. nuclear weapons have provided the security backbone of that order by deterring major power conflict in Europe and Asia.4 Additionally, U.S. extended nuclear security guarantees have protected the entire free world and dissuaded many capable states from developing independent nuclear capabilities. The modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons will therefore continue to reinforce these major sources of geopolitical peace and stability. Alternatively, Russia, China, and North Korea are opposed to major elements of the existing international system and seek in varying ways to disrupt or displace it. Given their revisionist geopolitical objectives, nuclear modernization in these countries tends to threaten international peace and stability. Geopolitical intentions guide nuclear strategy, which in turn informs modernization programs. It is therefore essential to account for a state’s position within the international system when evaluating the likely effects of nuclear modernization on international stability. The rest of this essay proceeds in four parts. First, it explains why U.S. nuclear weapons serve as unique guarantor of international security in the postwar world order. Second, it argues that the United States must modernize its aging nuclear capabilities in order to sustain its longstanding role in promoting global security. Third, it addresses the ways in which revisionist powers seek to use their nuclear modernization programs for destabilizing ends. Fourth, it briefly considers the role of other nations’ nuclear forces, including: Britain, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan. Finally, it concludes with implications for scholarship and for policy. The U.S.-led, rules-based international order Following the end of World War II, the United States and its victorious allies built the international system in which we reside today.5 Like past hegemons, the United States ordered an international system to suit its interests. Unlike past hegemons, however, Washington did not seek to rule through formal empire. Rather, it sought to reproduce a variant of its rules-based domestic political system for the global system. This rules-based international order possesses multiple components. First, Washington and its allies established a wide range of international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage multilateral solutions to a wide variety of challenges. Second, it sought to correct the protectionism of the interwar years by creating an open economic system defined by the free flow of trade and capital across borders. Third, the United States and its democratic allies have promoted freedom, human rights, and good governance abroad. Lastly, Washington employed its unmatched military might to provide the underlying stability and security which has allowed the overall system to function. While the system is imperfect and the United States has sometimes disobeyed the rules it helped to write, the rules-based order has nevertheless produced remarkable results. Humanity has been blessed by the absence of great power war for over seventy years. Global standards of living are much higher today than seven decades ago.6 And by the mid-2000s, more people were living under democratic governments than at any time in world history.7 As the world’s most powerful state and the architect of this system, the United States advanced and defended this order through a variety of economic, diplomatic, and military means. An underappreciated but central pillar of this rules-based order, however, has been the U.S. nuclear arsenal. U.S. nuclear weapons have provided the backbone for the underlying security element of the global system. U.S. nuclear weapons and great power peace U.S. nuclear weapons contribute to global stability by deterring grea
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