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2023 DDI Negative

Bataille UBI Neg - DDI 2023 TT

Bataille UBI Neg - DDI 2023 TT.docx

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Bataille Case Answers
Notes
2NR Options
Fem K
Guarantee unproductive jobs + productivity turn
Abbreviations
UE = unproductive expenditure
RE = restricted economy
Productivity Turn
1NC – Gift Economy Productive
Gift economies are productive – “instrument rationality” within gift economies is still observed in modern market production.
James R. Rogers, 10-1-2019, Rogers teaches graduate courses in political institutions and public administration at Texas A&M, “Gift Economies Aren’t So Giving”, Theopolis, https://theopolisinstitute.com/gift-economies-arent-so-giving/ //VDR
The question itself assumes a lot. There is, for example, vigorous debate over just how scarce market exchange was in the ancient world relative to gift exchange. Some scholars argue that robust markets systems existed along side gift systems almost from the dawn of history. (See for example Hejeebu and McCloskey’s “The Reproving of Karl Polyani,” and Henaff’s The Price of Truth.
In this essay I do not rehearse the historical argument. Rather I want to take up the substantive comparison, arguing that the social distance between economic distribution by reciprocal gift and distribution by market is less than we often recognize. The irony is that despite the modern re-discovery of the necessarily reciprocal nature of economic distribution in ancient gift economies, moderns still import, even if implicitly, the ideal of pure, unilateral gift into their understanding of gift economies. As a result, modern market production and exchange appears uniquely to treat people instrumentally relative to non-market economic production and exchange in pre-modern times.
In setting up the claim, let me add immediately that I am not saying that there is little difference between economic distribution by gift exchange and economic distribution by market exchange. There are many significant differences. These differences reflect themselves in fundamentally different ways peoples and societies experience the distribution of physical goods and in the ways they interact with each other.
I am arguing, however, that “instrumental rationality” was just as much a part of exchange in ancient gift economies as it is in market exchange, even as that instrumentalism is reflected and experienced differently in the different economies.
Let me start by taking a step back. Radical and postliberal criticisms of “neoliberalism” feature both an economic dimension and a social dimension. The economic dimension of the criticism is well-known: wage stagnation and growing inequality, at least in the West.
The social criticism of neoliberalism, while flowing out of what critics style as market rationality, highlights its impact on human solidarity and dignity. The social criticism contrasts the instrumental valuation of people induced by the market with the ostensibly more humane and personal relationships fostered by non-market economic distribution. Importantly, while initiated in and by market relationships, according to the criticism, market rationality is exported analogically into other domains of modern life, structuring and dehumanizing relationships in those domains as well.
The standard by which to compare social relationships in market systems with those of non-market systems is usually not taken to be modern forms of bureaucratic socialism. Rather, comparison is more often made with pre-modern economic systems in which the distribution of goods and services ostensibly occurred largely on the basis of “gift.” This is the hallmark, for example, of the much-cited and repeated argument of Karl Polyani’s highly influential book, The Great Transformation. It also is important in Karl Marx’s history of pre-market systems. And much of the burgeoning modern scholarship on “gift” draws the same comparison.
Hence, the significance of the modern scholarship on ancient gift economies for modern policy debates on economics.
Yet as modern scholarship on gift underscores, reciprocity stood as a fundamental aspect of gifting in the pre-modern world. This central facet of ancient gift economies is hugely consequential for understanding and comparing human relationships in gift economies with those in market economies. To the extent that gifts in gift economies are intrinsically reciprocal then they are also necessarily instrumentally rational. While the objects and ends over which instrumental rationality plays may change dramatically in the transition from gift to market, if reciprocity was inherent in pre-modern gift economies, then instrumental rationality in itself did not result of the rise market economies.
Barclay notes in his extended survey of modern scholarship on gift:
the universal significance of gift-reciprocity, despite large variations in the types and contexts of gifts between human partners . . . the importance of the ties established by gifts, and the expectations of return, explain why it is important for donors to be selective in their distribution of gifts, using some criterion of “worth” to give discriminately and well.
The modern focus or understanding of “gift” as unreciprocated invites anachronism when moderns apply this exceptional, distinctly modern conception of gift to the premodern world. “[T]he anthropology of the gift has raised the possibility that the notion of the ‘pure’ gift, a gift without return, is a historically and culturally specific Western invention.” Barclay adds, “Once we understand the ‘pure’ gift as a cultural product, we can resist the modern tendency to take it as a natural or necessary configuration of the paradigmatic gift.”
Indeed, creating reciprocal obligations was the essential purpose of the gift in the premodern world. “[Gifts] could fulfill their function as gifts only if they were not unilateral” (emphasis in original).
[I]n antiquity it was taken for granted that gifts are accompanied by obligations and should elicit some form of return; even philosophers who disavowed a material return (Aristotle) or scorned utilitas (Seneca) considered gifts/benefactions to be necessarily embedded in reciprocal relations.
This does not mean nothing distinguishes gift economies from market economies. But it does mean that instrumental rationality is not an invention of the market.
Non-pecuniary objectives in ancient gift economies such as “honor” or “status” are not objectives inconsistent with instrumental rationality. The objectives pursued may have been different in gift economies than objectives pursued by many moderns in market economies, but instrumental rationality structured the decisions just as surely.
Part of the problem arises because many scholars who study gift in the ancient world have caricatured understandings of modern economics and modern economic analysis. They often seem to think economic analysis is limited to the consideration of cash and market exchanges. Yet this has not been true for at least seventy years. Economists, and rational choice scholars more generally, include numerous non-monetary, non-corporeal items in their “utility functions,” including many of the things or ends that people sought in ancient gift economies. Nor is behavior limited to market exchange. The asynchronicity of exchange, the absence of guaranteed return, the creation of social and political ties, and more, are all easily subsumed within instrumental forms of rationality. Nobel prize winning economist Elenor Ostorm published scores of studies in which different social forms in different cultures nonetheless reflected instrumental rationality. (She summarizes many of these studies in her classic book, Governing the Commons.)
While Barclay recognizes that “’gifts’ and ‘commodities’ are not mutually exclusive: the two modes of interaction can overlap or interpenetrate . . . and the same items can move from one form of transaction to another,” he nonetheless occasionally draws the distinction between gift exchange and market exchange too sharply. For example, he writes
While the boundary between gifts and market sales was not watertight, a distinction between the two models of transaction was normally clear: remuneration for sales was immediate, certain, and calculable, while gifts fostered enduring relations in which the return was uncertain and often not commensurable with the gift.
To be sure, “remuneration for sales” at modern grocery stores and gas stations may be “immediate, certain, and calculable,” but this is hardly a ubiquitous feature of market exchange. Consider the significance of contracts over employment, or purchasing a house, or buying stocks and bonds, and much, much more. These market exchanges, while significant both at the individual level as well as the aggregate level, are nonetheless not exchanges that are “immediate, certain, and calculable.”
Further, at least in modern society, the domain of non-market transactions cannot be identified as a domain of “enduring [personal] relations.” To be sure, gifts continue to play a significant role in relationships within families, and between friends and tightknit social groups. Yet in other domains, non-market distribution of goods and services is often the epitome of impersonalism in modern life. Think of the bureaucratic impersonalism of the welfare office, let alone in the licensing bureaus of state Departments of Public Safety. The sheer scale of need, along with social commitments to treating all “clients” alike, almost certainly requires these bureaucracies and their impersonalism. Perhaps gift economies of the premodern world could take care of people in need as analysts such as Polanyi claim it did, but modern bureaucratic distribution does not, and cannot, create the “enduring relations” reflected in ancient gift economies.
Even the “personalism” of the ancient gift economy’s exchange system does not guarantee more humane, and human, outcomes. There are fewer relationships more dehumanizing than the ancient relationships between masters and slaves or lords and serfs. Yet all of this is included within the domain of the gift exchange, at least at the local level of manor or plantation.
The anachronism of reading the modern notion of gift, with its emphasis on unilateral donation, often causes even modern scholars to understate, even sanitize, the instrumentalism of the gift economy. Barclay could hardly put it more strikingly:
Gift-giving is thus by no means always an innocent or even a friendly enterprise [in the pre-modern world], but is easily manipulated by those in a position of power: as Sahlins cynically remarks, “everywhere in the world the indigenous category for exploitation is ‘reciprocity.’”
Consistent with this, we may grant the language of “gift” as between equals or near-equals. Yet this presses the language of “gift,” even with reciprocity inhering in the word in the ancient world, to make a dualism of “gift” and “market,” and in so doing to include all forms of hierarchical production and distribution as species of gift economies. Significant segments of these “gift economies” were simply non-market “command economies.”
Ignoring this, critics of neoliberalism on both the left and the right have a tendency to romanticize pre-modern, non-market economies. As if humans treating other humans as means rather than as ends in themselves began in the Nineteenth Century. But while perhaps lamentable, instrumental rationality has been a ubiquitous facet of human interaction over the millennia. If in fact markets cause problems in social relations in the modern world, we need to make sure whatever the solution is does not merely reproduce the same problems in a different guise.
1NC – UBI Productive
Studies prove a UBI would increase productivity and economic growth
RAJWANSHI 20 [2/25/20, Yash was an Associate Consult Intern for Bain & Co plus a Qualitative Writer for the Berkeley Economic Review, “Unboxing Universal Basic Income”, Berkeley Economic Review, https://econreview.berkeley.edu/unboxing-universal-basic-income/] RVP
Background
Andrew Yang, a former 2020 Democratic presidential candidate, started his campaign with the proposal of “the Freedom Dividend.” This policy, which guaranteed every American adult a basic income of $1,000 every month, gained traction with the general public quickly. Yang’s flagship proposal is more commonly referred to as universal basic income (UBI), or just basic income. As Yang describes it, UBI is a “type of social security that guarantees a certain amount of money to every citizen within a given governed population, without having to pass a test or fulfill a work requirement.” The key difference between UBI and other welfare programs is the final descriptor—that the money is given with no strings attached. Traditional non-cash income programs tend to have work requirements, and, as recently as 2018, there has been a new push by Republicans for even more. The lack of these requirements differentiates UBI, and is a key reason why Yang believes it will have a revolutionary impact on the US economy. To thoroughly understand the Freedom Dividend proposal and the effects of UBIs in general, it is crucial to look at arguments on each side of the discussion, and analyze their applicability the context of past economic experiments.
The Argument for UBI
Yang’s campaign website provides a concise list of reasons to support UBI. The most convincing argument relies on the predicted effects of automation on US jobs within the coming decades. As Yang claims, “since 2000, technology has replaced the jobs of four million American manufacturing workers and decimated communities throughout the Midwest.” Even more surprisingly, experts predict that, within the next 12 years, one out of four Americans will lose their job to technology. Yang’s go-to example for the adverse effect of automation is truck driving, the most common job in 29 out of the 50 states. Drivers alone account for 3.5 million jobs, and the supporting infrastructure, which includes truck stops and motels, accounts for an even higher number. These jobs are predicted to soon be replaced with fewer, high-skill programming positions as the push for autonomous driving grows in the US. Yang argues that the Freedom Dividend will become a necessary and crucial part of society throughout this period of automation and transformation.
Emerging evidence suggests that a UBI program would have positive effects on the workforce and help soften the adverse effects of automation. There are multiple interesting shifts in human capital that may follow a basic income being implemented in the US. First, research shows that financial insurance tends to have a significant impact on the decision-making of individuals. UBI would ensure that taking a financial risk, such as attending night classes or buying a more expensive computer, will not lead to immediate poverty. This “income floor,” funded by the government, can lead to more people taking these developmental, calculated risks. Through this method, former members of the now automated labor force may be able to pivot from their past careers into more advanced technological fields, and grow in interdisciplinary ways that will ensure high employability. Essentially, the financial security provided by an UBI would enable and motivate members of the workforce to retrain and join emerging labor markets. Furthermore, under UBI framework, individuals may be incentivized to find jobs they actually find interesting– a rare scenario within work requirement-based welfare programs. Rather than finding a job just for the sake of receiving welfare benefits, citizens have the financial backing to explore more rewarding careers. This may lead to higher employee happiness and, consequently, an increase in overall company productivity. As a result, some argue that UBI is projected to help workers with automated jobs to reenter the workforce in a productive manner. Yang argues that automation will marginalize these people from the next economic era; the “Freedom Dividend” would involve them in the 21st century economy.
Another key argument for UBI is the effect it will have on the growth of the economy. Proponents of UBI claim that putting money in the hands of every American will create an economic multiplier, and permanently grow the economy. Evidence from past case studies and economic predictions seems to support this assertion. A 2017 report by the Roosevelt Foundation used the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to demonstrate that an unconditional cash assistance program of $1,000 for all adults annually would expand the economy by 12.56 percent over the baseline after eight years. The study shows that, in addition to a rise in aggregate demand, a $1,000 UBI would likely cause an increase in output, employment, labor force participation, prices, and wages. Various studies of cash transfer programs in other countries demonstrate that economic growth ultimately also trickles up? to other aspects of welfare programs. The “Mincome” Experiment in Manitoba, Canada, where an experimental basic income project was tested almost 40 years ago, showed that the population receiving a basic income had an 8.5 percent reduction in hospital visits, with fewer incidents of work-related injuries, and fewer emergency room visits from accidents and injuries. Additionally, the population experienced lower psychiatric hospitalization, which is an indicator of higher overall mental health. Another example, the GiveDirectly™ program, created cash transfer methods for poor households in Kenya, and showed positive effects in nutrition-based spending and overall assets for these households. This also correlated to overall healthier lifestyles and less hospital visitation. With this information, the benefits of UBI seems to be substantiated by strong empirical evidence and a number of logical macroeconomic predictions. That being said, the studies are smaller-scale than anything that would be implemented in the United States. They also are focused primarily in under-developed markets with lower wage floors. For that reason, many critics maintain that UBI in the US may not be a foolproof idea or work in a similar manner as the smaller scale sample in Kenya.
2NC – UBI Productive
UBI fosters economic growth and productivity
RAJWANSHI 20 [2/25/20, Yash was an Associate Consult Intern for Bain & Co plus a Qualitative Writer for the Berkeley Economic Review, “Unboxing Universal Basic Income”, Berkeley Economic Review, https://econreview.berkeley.edu/unboxing-universal-basic-income/] RVP
So, is it a Good Idea?
Here’s the bottom line: evidence indicates that UBI will foster job creation and economic development. Andrew Yang suggests that it is the economic policy of the future. But a program of this scale has never been implemented before, and especially in a country as economically developed in the US. There is still not enough research to conclusively understand whether the idea would be beneficial for the country, but the potential does seem promising. If it works as intended, UBI would lift dozens of millions of individuals out of poverty, and simultaneously foster economic growth for the United States. A post-automation society will likely require a drastic transformation of the US economy. Despite Yang’s campaign officially being suspended, the questions he raised about a post-automation economy are legitimate. Bringing universal basic income into the discourse of mainstream politics will be valuable for years to come.
UBI increases productivity in different facets of society --- disproves Bataille
Dodge 16 [8/25/16, Joel is an attorney and writer in New York City. His work has appeared at The Week, The Washington Monthly, The American Constitution Society, and his own blog: https://jdodgeblog.wordpress.com/., “Universal basic income wouldn’t make people lazy–it would change the nature of work”, QUARTZ, https://qz.com/765902/ubi-wouldnt-mean-everyone-quits-working] RVP
Americans believe in the importan

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