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2023 DDI Negative

GND Neg - DDI 2023 LS

GND Neg - DDI 2023 LS.docx

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DDI LS Green New Deal Neg 23
Populism Adv CP
1NC
The United States federal government should implement a degrowth-based jobs guarantee.
A degrowth federal jobs guarantee is key to give people high-quality jobs and challenge the norms of productive work
Olk et al. ’22 [Christopher Olk: Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science, Center for International and Comparative Political Economy; Colleen Schneider: Institute for Ecological Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Jason Hickel: Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, Department of Anthropology, Autonomous University of Barcelona; International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science; “How to pay for saving the world: Modern Monetary Theory for a degrowth transition”; July 25, 2022; Pg. 20-22; https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4172005;]//LS
4.4. The job guarantee
As long as employment is necessary for people to meet their basic needs, it is necessary to mitigate chronic unemployment and to be able to achieve this in a low- or non-growing economy. Degrowth seeks to free people from the threat of unemployment, and thereby overcome the central role that wage work plays in society more generally (e.g. Parrique, 2019).
Mainstream economics assumes income distribution (among labor, and between labor and capital) is determined by technical aspects of production, and thus the only way to alleviate poverty is to grow GDP. If instead we realize, as degrowth scholarship argues, that the distribution between incomes is socially and institutionally conditioned, we can consider other methods to affect income distribution that are not predicated on growth (Minsky, 1973). The job guarantee is such a method.
MMTists have long laid the groundwork for a well-developed job guarantee - a “permanent, federally funded, and locally administered program that supplies voluntary employment opportunities on demand for all who are ready and willing to work at a living wage” (Wray et al., 2018, p. 35). Jobs follow national guidelines (around, for example, inclusion, labor standards and sustainability), while decisions on specific work are made at the local level through participative democratic processes. The federal government is the only institution that can divorce the profitability of hiring from the decision to hire. Social exclusion is addressed by providing a living wage for the “least employable” – those least likely to gain employment through top-down aggregate pump-priming of the economy (Tcherneva, 2018, 2020; Wray, 1986). As a backstop for guaranteed public employment, a job guarantee also sets a benchmark of labor standards for the private industry to match – including wages, benefits, working hours, and structures of participation and decision-making in the workplace. Providing a floor to wage rates and a guarantee of labor income creates a check on increasing inequality and can help to reduce private debt levels, both of which become even more important in a nongrowing economy. A job guarantee is a powerful fiscal policy tool that can provide a measure of stability and needs satisfaction, especially during economic contraction. In response to the economic crisis of 2001, Argentina ran a limited federal job guarantee program which provided necessary services to largely poor communities. The vast majority of workers came from the bottom 20% of income distribution and had at most a high school level education. Women accounted for nearly 75% of participants (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005). “The unemployed themselves initiated, organized, and staffed projects in their communities", including child or elderly care, health program support, community and school kitchens and recycling programs (Tcherneva, 2012, p. 15). The program challenged gendered stereotypes about what is productive and unproductive work, and who is employable or unemployable. A job guarantee program is often promoted as a driver of economic growth. Existing literature on the potential for a ‘green’ job guarantee has focused on the potential to shift labor away from extractive industries and toward renewables, and as a tool to increase worker and union support for a green transition. While these are important points, a 'Degrowth Job Guarantee' can and must go further (Parrique, 2018; Schneider, 2021; Unti, 2018). In its more expansive imaginary, a job guarantee focuses on social provisioning, rather than profit. Labor is operationalized as a public good to serve social and environmental aims through the build-out and maintenance of public provisioning systems. In addition to localizing systems of production and distribution, the job guarantee locally embeds value creation, as participants decide what to value, and then generate that value. This has the potential to drive structural change in the labor market away from material and energy intensive sectors, and toward labor-intensive sectors that are less “productive” (Hardt et al., 2020), particularly those oriented around care and repair (Last, 2021). For instance, a shift to organic agriculture, the retrofitting of buildings, or the restoring of ecosystems all tend to be labor-intensive. Further, work standards can be used to establish working time reductions, as promoted by degrowth advocates. Thus, shifting the orientation of work through a job guarantee can reduce biophysical throughput while increasing employment. This is a powerful counter to the false opposition of ‘jobs vs environment’ and provides a path for a genuinely ‘green’ job transition. The job guarantee outlined here is a paradigmatic “non-reformist reform”. It empowers marginalized groups, while demonstrating the feasibility of transcending a market-based organization of work. Critically for degrowth, the job guarantee eliminates one of the strongest growth imperatives, while being a relatively popular policy (Tcherneva, 2018) that has the capacity to change the social prestige now associated with wage work. At the same time, a job guarantee is clearly no panacea, and must be brought into operation with complimentary policies, including regulation on private sector production and labor.
Accelerating tech development is catalyzing a populist wave – continued innovation and growth accelerates populism
Hiebert '22 [Kyle; MA in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights @ University of Nottingham, B.A. in Sociology & Political Economy @ University of Manitoba;"Tech-Fuelled Inequality Could Catalyze Populism 2.0"; 10-19-2022; published Centre for International Governance Innovation; accessed 7-15-2023; https://www.cigionline.org/articles/tech-fuelled-inequality-could-catalyze-populism-20/;]//LS
Geopolitical crises, looming climate chaos and the relentless expansion of surveillance capitalism are driving the development of the technologies of tomorrow — artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, green energy, big data, advanced robotics, virtual and augmented reality, nanotechnology, quantum computing, the Internet of Things and more. Each of these tools holds tremendous potential to improve lives and help solve the world’s biggest problems. But technological change always produces winners and losers by giving rise to new concentrations of power and novel forms of inequality. For example, a study by the US National Bureau of Economic Research found that between 50 and 70 percent of lost wages in America from 1980 to 2016 stemmed from automation — far more than from aggressive offshoring or the withering of labour unions. However, automation has brought about new occupations as well, evidenced by the absence of mass joblessness in the United States over the same period. Despite the lost wages, the US unemployment rate from 1993 to 2019 stayed around or below seven percent when excluding a four-year recovery following the exogenous shock of the 2008 financial crisis. Productivity has also increased by nearly 62 percent since 1979. But the wages of American workers have failed to keep pace, rising only 17.5 percent, signalling a deep disconnect in recent history between new technologies being adopted and the average worker being better off as a result. Similar circumstances across the democratic world have provoked severe political consequences over the past decade. Disaffected populations caught on the wrong side of economic transformations and alienated by the accompanying social changes spurred by globalization have aligned themselves with populists pitching simplistic solutions to complex problems. Polarization has skyrocketed; international cooperation has frayed. As the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution accelerates in coming years, upending how economies and societies operate, a new form of populism rooted in tech-fuelled disparities may eventually consume democratic nations. To avoid this outcome, governments must get serious about harnessing new technologies to make the democratic process more agile and responsive to voters’ frustrations. The Coming Age of Disruptive Automation Since researchers at Oxford University published a landmark study in 2013 estimating that some 47 percent of total US employment was at risk of automation, fears over the prospect of mass displacements of human labour by new technologies have grown. They have also become more urgent in the wake of the pandemic. According to one assessment, the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 fast-tracked four years’ worth of digital adoption in business operations and supply chains, and seven years’ worth of investment into digital-based products. American academic Erik Brynjolfsson has noted that when it comes to technology’s job-creating potential, past trends are not necessarily guaranteed to play out in the future. “Improvements in technology can improve productivity. For most of the 20th century, those productivity increases were associated with job growth and growing wages. But there is no economic law saying that always has to be the case.” That seems to hold true when looking at the six largest tech companies in the world — Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Tesla and Meta. As of early October, with a combined market valuation of nearly $8 trillion — a bit less than half the GDP of China, the world’s second-largest economy — they collectively employed just 2.25 million people, significantly less than the US federal government. And at least 1.5 million of that total comes from Amazon, which launched an ill-fated pandemic hiring binge and has routinely come under fire for poor working conditions for its staff. When it comes to digital products being created by tech companies, Beijing-based venture capitalist Kai-Fu Lee predicted in 2017 that AI would replace half of all human labour before 2030. That same year, a report by the McKinsey Global Institute appeared to corroborate Lee’s ominous forecast. After analyzing 2,000 different work responsibilities across 800 different job roles, McKinsey suggested “about half the activities people are paid almost US$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting currently demonstrated technology.” While only five percent of the occupations analyzed by McKinsey could, in theory, disappear entirely, technological progress has accelerated. Clearly, some jobs are in greater jeopardy than others. The positions most susceptible to automation are based on physical activities in highly structured and predictable environments, or the collection and processing of data, say the report’s authors. Among those most vulnerable are low-skilled positions in manufacturing, hospitality and retail commerce. The report claims that “technical, economic and social factors will determine the pace and extent of automation,” but that half of contemporary work activity could be automated by 2055, possibly even as soon as 2035. Others offer a more upbeat assessment, saying AI and automation will create more jobs than they threaten by producing future occupations yet to be imagined. Analysis published in October 2020 by the World Economic Forum — several months after the pandemic was declared, once companies had had time to evaluate the need and opportunities for increased automation — predicted that by 2025, “a shift in the division of labour between humans and machines” might eliminate 85 million jobs, while also creating 97 million new ones. Such positions would see work functions split more evenly between humans, machines and algorithms; machines would handle more physical tasks while algorithms could simplify and augment human-based inputs and decision-making processes. However, while 12 million net new jobs sounds positive, context is important. Ensuring that workers displaced by technology can avoid joblessness by transitioning to new roles will require re-skilling on an enormous scale, at a considerable cost and in an ever-shrinking window of time. For comparison, governments have so far mostly failed in producing credible plans for a “just transition” for a much smaller and more predictable number of fossil fuel workers poised to lose out as the world shifts to alternative energy sources. A decrease in human labour’s share of work responsibilities could also suppress wage growth. Another sector ripe for disruption by automation is transportation, which accounts for approximately 29 workers per 1,000 people in the European Union. Trucking could be hit particularly hard, affecting more than 2.2 million drivers in the United States and hundreds of thousands of workers in Canada. Self-driving vehicles in the freight industry are already being road-tested, with proponents saying autonomous trucks will not only be safer but also reduce shipping operator costs by 40 percent due to not having to hire a human driver. The vast majority of those human drivers, according to labour market research company Zippia, are white males over 48 years old with lower levels of education. Truck-driving is also the highest-paid “low-skilled” large labour segment remaining in the North American economy. Elsewhere, large AI language models, systems that understand and generate text, will eventually compete for millions of low-skilled jobs involving a range of customer support services. Existing models can already provide strikingly accurate and original responses to human interaction — so much so that Google researcher Blake Lemoine caused widespread alarm this past June by claiming that a chatbot based on Google’s LaMDA model had become sentient. Lemoine was later let go by the company. The capabilities of LaMDA and its rivals, such as OpenAI’s GPT-3 — which wrote an op-ed for The Guardian in September 2020 — and Meta’s free version, OPT-175B, will expand exponentially as they incorporate audiovisual material into their data training sets. Right now, these training sets consist only of huge troves of text scoured from across the internet. Moreover, user-friendly machine-learning models such as OpenAI’s Dall-E and those from Midjourney AI are producing increasingly sophisticated computer-generated art and illustrations, while others are generating music. Both will likely eliminate career opportunities in the creative industries. The impacts of technology will also upset social relations in other ways that can exacerbate culture wars and grievance politics. For example, cloud computing and better virtual reality for use in business meetings will provide white-collar workers with ever-greater job flexibility, just as climate change renders blue-collar jobs much more dangerous. This may entrench the sort of contentious digital divide and risk imbalance experienced between office staff and front-line workers during the pandemic. Meanwhile, consumer biotechnology will enable the well-educated and wealthy to live longer, healthier lives that will extend their working careers, possibly narrowing opportunities for young people and new graduates. At the same time, wider adoption of pre-crime and predictive policing tools could aggravate the discrimination and stigmatization already felt within disadvantaged communities. Policies that successfully attract tens of thousands of skilled immigrants to plug labour gaps in the tech sector could inflate local housing prices. Many thinkers are also already confronting questions about when and how — not if — intelligent machines could be granted some equivalent to human rights. In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari extrapolates even further. He posits that if this century’s technological advances — and the quasi-religious zeal attached to those gains — mean citizens in liberal democracies eventually cede much of their military and economic usefulness to robots and algorithms, the political system “will stop attaching much value to them.” The result, according to Harari, would be an erosion of the core liberal belief that each human, as an individual, holds intrinsic value and deserves to exercise choice through democratic elections and free markets. Should these scenarios come true, they are likely to worsen the already growing bifurcation within democratic politics — a split between those who believe in open economies and societies, and those seeking primacy for their chosen social and political tribes. The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Populism Reinvented The prolonged, uneven fallout of the 2008 financial crisis has already catapulted populist leaders with zero-sum ideologies to various levels of office in democratic nations across the world. Everywhere, their base of support is comprised of voters demanding retribution against an undefined set of “elites” perceived as clinging unfairly to the top of the socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, the meritocracy and promise of social mobility that have historically underpinned liberal democracies seem to be faltering. In 2017, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Peter Temin laid out an argument that escaping poverty in America takes 20 years of effort combined with uninterrupted good luck. Income inequality among member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development prior to the pandemic was already at its highest levels in five decades, much of it due to the disappearance of middle-class job opportunities. More recently, a report from the UN Development Programme released in September warned that “in a stunning first,” cascading global crises had so impacted life expectancies, education levels and quality of life worldwide that its Human Development Index — a broad country-by-country measurement of human progress — had declined for two years in a row, a change equivalent to “erasing the gains of the preceding five years.” The latest annual World Inequality Report, produced by the Paris-based World Inequality Lab, sheds light on where these losses are being felt (and perceived) the most — the middle and working classes of wealthy nations. The past two decades of globalization have narrowed inequality between rich countries and the developing nations, while simultaneously increasing inequality within countries themselves. “This sharp rise in within country inequalities has meant that despite economic catch-up and strong growth in emerging countries, the world remains particularly unequal today. It also means that inequalities within countries are now even greater than the significant inequalities observed between countries.” The resulting angst is being channelled into democratic societies in visible and distressing ways — from online conspiracies and extremism to the embrace of political violence and victimhood as a source of identity and personal meaning. In short, many people in the Western world in particular are increasingly unable to deal with the dissonance betwe

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