UBI VAT Neg - DDI 2023 KM
UBI VAT Neg - DDI 2023 KM.docx
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NEG---KM vs KM UBI VAT Cap K 1NC---Cap K Positing UBI as the necessary and sufficient solution to automation depoliticizes what is fundamentally a political choice. Instead, vote Neg to interrogate and grapple with the real issues that are giving rise to automation anxiety in the first place. Kelly 22 [Lauren Kelly is a PhD candidate located within the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society at RMIT University, Melbourne Australia. Her research investigates automation in Australia's supermarket warehouses and considers what technological change means for workers, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism,” Journal of Sociology, 0(0), 10-9-2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833221128999, accessed 7-19-2023, HKR-SWY] Automation anxiety is cyclical and has a long history reaching back centuries (Berg, of the 1960s (Bassett & Roberts, 2019; Wiener, 1948), computerisation (Noble, 1984) and automated decision-making (Andrejevic, 2020) – has given rise to recurring anxieties and utopian fantasies alike. The more recent convergence of advancements in big data, robotics, and artificial intelligence underpins much of contemporary automation anxiety. It is often argued that these advances now seem capable of fundamentally reorganising the relationship between workers and the labour process, giving rise to ‘confident predictions that the expansion of automation will impact new job categories, terminate the logics of a wage economy, and disrupt life, leisure, and markets’ (Bassett & Roberts, 2019, p. 20). This marks a shift from considering automation to be merely ‘labour-substituting’ to potentially ‘labour-augmenting’. Here the anxiety becomes not simply of job loss, but that automation now ‘performs a series of dialectical reversals, transforming processes into their opposite: sociality into hermetic isolation, politics into technics, autonomy into automatism’ (Andrejevic, 2020, p. 10). In this context, ‘Rise of the Robots’, the ‘Second Machine Age’ and ‘This Time it’s Different’ are some of the sweeping headlines that frame contemporary popular narratives of the future of work (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015). The cyclicality of automation anxiety suggests these debates are not purely technological, but reflect latent, historically embedded cultural anxieties. The latest wave of automation anxiety coincides with a period of significant uncertainty for many of the world’s workers. While trends of increasing precarity, de-unionisation, and hostile neoliberal state and managerial practices have been in motion for years, the Covid-19 pandemic further exposed fault lines of inequality in the landscape of work. There is little doubt that declining working conditions are widely and unevenly experienced by workers across lines of gender, race, migration status and class. The understandable anxiety felt by workers during this time is often attributed to deterministic narratives of technological change and the destruction of jobs. Automation, in particular, captures the public imaginary with sweeping headlines declaring human labour’s impending obsolescence. Trade press celebrates Elon Musk’s deferential humanoid factory robots that ‘won’t fight back’ (Siddiqui, 2021); McDonald’s executives threaten to replace workers with machines if they demand $15 per hour (Rensi, 2016); and supermarket delivery drones appear ready to replace precarious gig workers (Terzon, 2022). The fact that many of these technologies remain speculative fantasies of the billionaire class is beside the point – they could become reality. Automation theorists from both ends of the political spectrum tend to reproduce these claims by treating automation as an inexorable and accelerating force. This has generated renewed discussion of impending technological unemployment and the necessity of a universal basic income (UBI) as human labour becomes increasingly redundant. The aff reproduces capitalist narratives - by ignoring the political economy of automation, the aff masks the social forces underlying automation - that undermines humanity's ability to shape and respond to the negative impacts of automation on workers Kelly 22 [Lauren Kelly is a PhD candidate located within the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society at RMIT University, Melbourne Australia. Her research investigates automation in Australia's supermarket warehouses and considers what technological change means for workers, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism,” Journal of Sociology, 0(0), 10-9-2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833221128999, accessed 7-19-2023, HKR-SWY] Technological change does not however spring into being, driven by its own endogenous force of inevitability. As Fleming (2019) shows, technology is bounded by social-organisational forces which mediate whether a job or task is automated or not. Considerations such as the price of labour; power relations within the firm, including levels of unionisation; and the nature of the task are important factors that outweigh intrinsic qualities of the technology itself. This is not necessarily a good thing for 4 Journal of Sociology 0(0) workers, as it results in an unwillingness on the part of capital to invest in new technology and machinery, particularly when wages are low (Stanford, 2020). Through an economic historical approach to automation, Benanav (2020a) shows that automation is not accelerating but has in fact slowed down in recent decades. The persistent low demand for labour is not the result of productivity gains from new technology but rather decades of secular stagnation attributable to low growth and manufacturing overcapacity in industrialised countries. Benanav (2020b) writes: Our collective sense that the pace of labor-saving technological change is accelerating is an illusion. It’s like the feeling you get when looking out of the window of a train car as it slows down at a station: passing cars on the other side of the tracks appear to speed up. Labor-saving technical change appears to be happening at a faster pace than before only when viewed from across the tracks – that is, from the standpoint of our ever more slow-growing economies. In this context, low-wage, low-growth, and low-productivity jobs have proliferated, particularly in the service economy (Smith, 2020). Reflecting on key innovations of the 21st century, Smith highlights how these technologies are far from ground-breaking. The smartphone, for instance, may have reorganised social life and consumption, but it does not significantly impact productivity, particularly when compared to 20th-century discoveries such as petroleum and electricity. He writes: ‘The technologies characteristic of the past two decades – since the dotcom crash of 2000 – have been concentrated in entertainment and leisure: toys, not tools’ (Smith, 2020, p. 43). Mason’s (2015) prediction of an ‘exponential’ take-off in productive technologies is yet to be seen and, as argued by Moody (2017), productivity gains are more often extracted through work intensification rather than productivity technologies per se. Both Benanav and Smith seek to reorient Marxist thinking on automation through a political economic lens attuned to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The almost simultaneous appearance of these two books in late 2020 during the pandemic signals another shift in automation discourse. The timing reflects an historical moment during which the working conditions of essential industries, and other workplaces typically overlooked by academic literature were in the spotlight. An analysis of work as it really exists became crucial as many discovered how working conditions were of consequence for collective public health. Placing workplace automation in its political economic context shows that the introduction of labour-saving technologies is far from inevitable. In the current age of stagnation, firms are more likely to redistribute profit to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks rather than towards investment in productive technologies (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). Many firms are risk averse and favour extractive rent-seeking strategies rather than expensive innovation (Mazzucato, 2018). In some contexts, low-cost and informalised labour is actually displacing technology, particularly when the exploitation of migrant labour and regulatory grey areas is more profitable than investing in automation (Clark, 2018). As Spencer highlights, automation theorists often overlook: the scope for capitalism to reproduce work and prevent the move to a future of less work. The other problem is that they ignore or understate the threat to the quality of work posed by technology and the capacity for low-quality work to persist and even multiply alongside technological progress. The rhetoric of the ‘rise of the robots’ in this respect can become a distraction from other pressing problems created by technology as it evolves within capitalist society. (2018, p. 8) Capitalism is unsustainable and plunging the world into a global civil war – ramping up tensions with Russia and China to distract from crises accelerates the tendency to over-accumulate, causing extinction through nuclear war, ecological destruction, super-viruses, the rise of fascism, and rampant inequality. Robinson, ’21 [William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara, “What are the real reasons behind the New Cold War?” published May 6, 2021, https://mronline.org/2021/05/10/what-are-the-real-reasons-behind-the-new-cold-war/]//AD The US is launching a New Cold War against Russia and China in an attempt to deflect our attention from the escalating crisis of global capitalism. The announcement on April 15 by President Biden that this administration was expelling 10 Kremlin diplomats and imposing new sanctions for alleged Russian interference in the 2020 U.S. elections–to which Russia replied with a tit for tat–came just days after the Pentagon conducted military drills in the South China Sea. These actions were but the latest escalation of aggressive posturing as Washington ramps up its “New Cold War” against Russia and China, pushing the world dangerously towards international political and military conflagration. Most observers attribute this US-instigated war to rivalry and competition over hegemony and international economic control. These factors are important, but there is a bigger picture that has been largely overlooked of what is driving this process: the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is economic, or structural. One of chronic stagnation in the global economy. But it is also political: a crisis of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony. The system is moving towards what we call “a general crisis of capitalist rule” as billions of people around the world face uncertain struggles for survival and question a system they no longer see as legitimate. In the United States, the ruling groups must channel fear over tenuous survival away from the system and towards scapegoated communities, such as immigrants or Asians blamed for the pandemic, and towards external enemies such as China and Russia. At the same time, rising international tensions legitimate expanding military and security budgets and open up new opportunities for profit making through war, political conflict and repression in the face of stagnation in the civilian economy. All around the world a “people’s spring” has taken off. From Chile to Lebanon, Iraq to India, France to the United States, Haiti to Nigeria and South Africa to Colombia, waves of strikes and mass protests have proliferated and, in many instances, appear to be acquiring a radical anti-capitalist character. The ruling groups cannot but be frightened by the rumbling from below. If left unchallenged, the New Cold War will become a cornerstone in the arsenal of U.S. rulers and transnational elites to maintain a grip on power as the crisis deepens. THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM Economically, global capitalism faces what is known in technical language as “overaccumulation”: a situation in which the economy has produced–or has the capacity to produce–great quantities of wealth but the market cannot absorb this wealth because of escalating inequality. Capitalism by its very nature will produce abundant wealth yet polarize that wealth and generate ever greater levels of social inequality unless offset by redistributive policies. The level of global social polarization and inequality now experienced is without precedent. In 2018, the richest one percent of humanity controlled more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just five percent. Such inequalities end up undermining the stability of the system as the gap grows between what is–or could be–produced and what the market can absorb. The extreme concentration of the planet’s wealth in the hands of the few and the accelerated impoverishment and dispossession of the majority means that the transnational capitalist class, or TCC, has increasing difficulty in finding productive outlets to unload enormous amounts of surplus it accumulated. The more global inequalities expand, the more constricted the world market becomes and the more the system faces a structural crisis of overaccumulation. If left unchecked, expanding social polarization results in crisis–in stagnation, recessions, depressions, social upheavals and war–just what we are experiencing right now. Contrary to mainstream accounts, the coronavirus pandemic did not cause the crisis of global capitalism, for this was already upon us. On the eve of the pandemic, growth in the EU countries had already shrunk to zero, much of Latin America and sub-Sahara Africa was in recession, growth rates in Asia were steadily declining, and North America faced a slowdown. The writing was on the wall. The contagion was but the spark that ignited the combustible of a global economy that never fully recovered from the 2008 financial collapse and had been teetering on the brink of renewed crisis ever since. Even if there is a momentary recovery as the world slowly emerges from the pandemic, global capitalism will remain mired in this structural crisis of overaccumulation. In the years leading up to the pandemic there was a steady rise in underutilized capacity and a slowdown in industrial production around the world. The surplus of accumulated capital with nowhere to go expanded rapidly. Transnational corporations recorded record profits during the 2010s at the same time that corporate investment declined. The total cash held in reserves of the world’s 2,000 biggest non-financial corporations increased from $6.6 trillion in 2010 to $14.2 trillion in 2020–considerably more than the foreign exchange reserves of the world’s central governments–as the global economy stagnated. Wild financial speculation and mounting government corporate, and consumer debt drove growth in the first two decades of the 21st century, but these are temporary and unsustainable solutions to long-term stagnation. THE GLOBAL WAR ECONOMY As I showed in my 2020 book, The Global Police State, the global economy has become ever more dependent on the development and deployment of systems of warfare, social control and repression simply as a means of making profit and continuing to accumulate capital in the face of chronic stagnation and saturation of global markets. This is known as “militarized accumulation” and refers to a situation in which a global war economy relies on perpetual state organized war making, social control and repression–driven now by new digital technologies–in order to sustain the process of capital accumulation. The events of September 11, 2001 marked the start of an era of a permanent global war in which logistics, warfare, intelligence, repression, surveillance and even military personnel are more and more the privatized domain of transnational capital. The Pentagon budget increased 91 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, while worldwide, total state military budgets outlays grew by 50 percent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to more than $2 trillion, although this figure did not take into account the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on intelligence, contingency operations, policing, bogus wars against immigrants, terrorism and drugs, and “homeland security.” During this time, military-industrial complex profits quadrupled. But focusing just on state military budgets only gives us a part of the picture of the global war economy. The various wars, conflicts and campaigns of social control and repression around the world involve the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization. In this relationship, the state facilitates the expansion of opportunities for private capital to accumulate through militarization, such as by facilitating global weapons sales by military-industrial-security firms, the amounts of which have reached unprecedented levels. Global weapons sales by the top 100 weapons manufacturers and military service companies increased by 38 percent between 2002 and 2016. By 2018, private for-profit military companies employed some 15 million people around the world, while another 20 million people worked in private security worldwide. The private security (policing) business is one of the fastest growing economic sectors in many countries and has come to dwarf public security around the world. The amount spent on private security in 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, was 73 percent higher than that spent in the public sphere, and three times as many persons were employed in private forces as in official law enforcement agencies. In half of the world’s countries, private security agents outnumber police officers. These corporate soldiers and police were deployed to guard corporate property, provide personal security for TCC executives and their families, collect data, conduct police, paramilitary, counterinsurgency and surveillance operations, carry out mass crowd control and repression of protesters, run private detention and interrogation facilities, manage prisons and participate in outright warfare. In 2018, President Trump announced with much fanfare the creation of a sixth military service, the “space force.” The corporate media duly towed the official line that this force was needed to face expanding threats to the United States. What went less reported is that a small group of former government officials with deep ties to the aerospace industry had pushed behind the scenes for its creation as a way to hype military spending on satellites and other space systems. In February of this year, the Federation of American Scientists reported that military-industrial complex lobbying is responsible for the decision by the U.S. government to invest at least $100 billion to beef up its nuclear stockpile. The Biden administration announced in early April to much acclaim that it would pull all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. While U.S. service troops in that country number 2,500, these pale in comparison with the more than 18,000 contractors that U.S. government has hired to do its bidding in the country, including at least 5,000 corporate soldiers that will remain. The so-called wars on drugs and terrorism, the undeclared wars on immigrants, refugees and gangs–and poor, dark-skinned and working-class youth more generally–the construction of border walls, immigrant detention centers, prison-industrial complexes, systems of mass surveillance and the spread of private security guard and mercenary companies, have all become major sources of profit-making and they will become more important to the system as stagnation becomes the new normal. In sum, the global police state is big business at a time when other opport
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