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2023 DDI Negative

Bataille Neg - DDI 2023 LS

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DDI LS Bataille Neg 23
Case
Bataille Wrong
Bataille’s theory doesn’t apply to postmodern consumer capitalism, which is based on massive amounts of consumption and waste – exactly what Bataille advocates.
Yang 2000 (Mayfair Mei-hui, Professor of Anthropology at the University of California Santa Barbara, has held fellowships at the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan, the Chicago Humanities Institute, University of Chicago, and the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, “Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual Expenditure,” Current Anthropology, University of Chicago Journals)
Scholars such as Jean‐Joseph Goux (1998) have pointed to a troubling overlap between Bataille’s views on luxury and sacrificial expenditure and postmodern consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is also predicated on massive consumption and waste rather than on the thrift, asceticism, and accumulation against which Bataille directed his theory of expenditure. It exhibits potlatch features in the tendency for businesses to give goods away in the hope that “supply creates its own demand”; it collapses the distinction between luxury and useful goods and between need and desire (Goux 1998). Unlike modernist capitalism, postmodern consumer capitalism is driven by consumption rather than production. Thus, Bataille’s vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism does not address this different phase of consumer capitalism, whose contours have only become clear since his death in 1962. It seems to me that despite their overt similarities, the principles of ritual consumption and those of consumer capitalism are basically incompatible. If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the service of production and productive accumulation, since every act of consumption in the world of leisure, entertainment, media, fashion, and home décor merely feeds back into the growth of the economy rather than leading to the finality and loss of truly nonproductive expenditure. Even much of modern warfare is no longer truly destructive but tied into the furthering of military‐industrial production. Nor, despite its economic excesses, does our consumer culture today challenge the basic economic logic of rational private accumulation as a self‐depleting archaic sacrificial economy does.15 Furthermore, capitalist consumption is very much an individual consumption rather than one involving the whole community or social order.
Expenditure is not transgressive- limitless consumption is useless theory
Mann 99 [Paul Mann, 1999, “The Exquisite Corpse of Georges Bataille” in Masocriticism, p. 67-9]
I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.14 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take and even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, of the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or depensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of the theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.
Their McGoey card talks about why Mauss is irrelevant today and why gifts shouldn’t be economic—we read blue
McGoey ‘18 – Linsey McGoey is a Canadian sociologist and academic based in England. She is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. “Bataille and the Sociology of Abundance: Reassessing Gifts, Debt and Economic Excess” in Theory, Culture & Society: Special Issue: Bataille and Heterology, Vol. 35(4–5), 07/28/2017, pg. 81-84; DOI: 10.1177/0263276416637905 | RN *Modified for problematic language **4pt text is just a critique of certain readings of Mauss—no Neg cards hidden
What is less known today is that Mauss, like Keynes, was preoccupied with challenging the imposition of war reparations. He published numerous financial journalism articles underscoring the negative economic repercussions of debt repayment efforts. A recent body of scholarship has even suggested that Mauss may have written The Gift in order in part to emphasize the importance of debt forgiveness by sovereign states (see, in particular, Mallard, 2011).
Why is Mauss’s writing on debt relief largely overlooked today? The problem rests partly with Mauss. During his career, he endeavoured to keep his political and financial journalism separate from his anthropological writing. Keith Hart suggests that this separation has been entrenched and exaggerated by his followers since then, many of whom treat The Gift as a masterful synthesis of earlier ethnographic studies (Mauss himself did not conduct primary research for it), with much to say about the social implications of reciprocity as a means of exchange, but with less relevance for understanding the geopolitics of sovereign states (Hart, 2014: 34).
In line with Hart, I suggest that reconciling Mauss’s writing on sovereign debts with his writing on gifts is vital for understanding the contribution that both Mauss and Bataille make to theories of economic surplus. So, what were Mauss’s views on war reparations? And how integral are they to understanding gift-giving and sacrifice, in both Mauss’s and Bataille’s work?
To date, scholarship on Mauss has often rested in polar camps. In one camp, there are, to summarize them crudely, the economic reductionists who read The Gift as evidence of the universality of homo economicus. Pierre Bourdieu and Mary Douglas are two exemplars of this group. However much Mauss tried to distance himself from what he saw as the narrow utilitarian precepts of neoclassical economics, The Gift is littered with examples of the personal and communal rewards that stem from gift-giving. These examples provide ample ammunition for the reductionists. Bourdieu takes the line that gifts are simply self-maximizing economic transactions by another name. Gifts, he suggests, can be even more financially crippling for recipients than economic loans, as the latter carry explicit interest rates, re-payment criteria and so on, while the former engender unspoken expectations. A gift’s power lies in the wordlessness it evokes, its establishment of a debt that has not been voiced and may, therefore, be harder to dispel (Bourdieu, 1997).
In many ways, Douglas is even more reductionist than Bourdieu. Though she takes pains to detail Mauss’s opposition to British utilitarian thought, she also manages to bring him into that camp, suggesting compatibility between Mauss and Adam Smith that betrays the nuance in Mauss’s analysis. ‘The gift cycle echoes Adam Smith’s invisible hand’, Douglas writes. ‘Gift complements market in so far as it operates where the latter is absent’ (Douglas, 1990: xiv).
Mauss would likely have resented the comparison. Smith is not mentioned by name in the essay, but the legacy of the invisible hand metaphor is clearly one that Mauss wishes to overturn. He laments the all-pervasive influence of self-interest as an explanatory device for human action, an ascension that he traces to the early 18th century: ‘One can almost date – since Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees – the triumph of the notion of individual interest’ (Mauss, 1990: 76). For Mauss, this triumph is clearly a destructive one, obscuring attention to the fact that individual interest is always interspersed with communal constraints and goals. What often drives economic decision-making, he argues, is not narrow calculation, but ‘other, purer sentiments: charity, social service, and solidarity. The themes of the gift, of generosity and self-interest that are linked in giving, are reappearing in French society, as a dominant motif too long forgotten’ (Mauss, 1990: 87).
David Graeber is, perhaps, the best exemplar of the second camp: those who, contra Bourdieu and Douglas, stress Mauss’s emphasis on the social rather than self-interested nature of gift-giving (see Graeber, 2001, 2011). Graeber’s reading of Mauss is likely the most faithful to Mauss’s intended meaning, capturing Mauss’s inheritance from Durkheim and their joint efforts to challenge the conventional opposition of the social and the individual. Mauss criticized that opposition: the meta-separation of society and subject that begets numerous sub-separations: economy and politics; freedom and constraint; change and continuation. As Mauss writes: ‘These concepts of law and economics that it pleases us to contrast: liberty and obligation; liberality, generosity, and luxury, as against savings, interest, and utility – it would be good to put them into the melting pot once more’ (1990: 93).
The problem is, how can one describe the melting pot except with reference to its constituent parts? The challenge that Mauss faces is almost identical to the terminological difficulties that Bataille describes in his introduction to The Accursed Share and in earlier writings on heterology. Both Mauss and Bataille sought to subvert the opposition of gifts and debt, of excess and parsimony. Today, the parallel between gifts and modern debts is better recognized, in large degree thanks to Graeber’s recent work on debt. But what of the second pairing: excess and parsimony?
Since the 1940s, when Keynes and Bataille advanced separate proposals for the deliberate dissipation of surplus wealth, their injunctions to states and populaces have been mostly ignored. Today, the idea that states should wilfully restrain their trade surpluses strikes most as absurd and even blasphemous. Certainly the suggestion that Germany should be compelled to invest in debtor nations in order to salvage a poorer neighbour’s economy strikes many as an unfair imposition at best, and an inexcusable affront to German independence at worst. This is not dissimilar to the climate post-First World War, when popular sentiment in Britain, the US and France sided with retribution rather than debt forgiveness.
It was in this climate that Mauss first developed his theories on sovereign debt forgiveness. A compelling analysis by Grégoire Mallard is particularly instructive here. Initially, as Mallard writes, Mauss was less critical of the terms of the Versailles Treaty than Keynes. Along with other influential ‘solidarist’ intellectuals, including Charles Gide, a leader of the cooperatist movement and professor of political economy, Mauss believed that Europe as whole, both allied and axis powers, owed a debt to the civilian victims of the catastrophic war, including Belgians and Frenchmen who lost private wealth. In Mallard’s words, the solidarists ‘saw in the principle of reparations a formidable advance for civilization precisely because the Treaty clearly distinguished reparations from indemnities’. In the words of one solidarist, Le ́ on Blum, the payments ‘where neither a punitive sanction, nor a war bounty, but a reparations for damages caused . . . this notion of reparation is a new right, a rule of collective solidarity, a principle of national insurance’ (Mallard, 2011: 230).
Mallard points out that there was strong tension between how the solidarists conceived of reparations and how the French government perceived them. Mauss and his colleagues saw the payments as a shared responsibility, one that necessitated sacrifice among both German and French taxpayers. The government and their nationalist supporters, on the other hand, wanted Germany punished. As cash-strapped Germany struggled to meet its reparation debts, the British government suggested postponing repayments to a later date. France refused to back a moratorium. ‘The main cause of the deadlock’, Mallard suggests, ‘was temporal: prefiguring Mauss’s reflection in The Gift, no nation wanted to be the first to give, as a gift would be perceived as a sign of weakness, not strength’ (2011: 236).
Theorizing the gift radically reconceptualizes the idea of debt: the Aff, by enacting deficit spending—buying credit by taking out a debt it has no intention of returning in service of its gift-giving—rethinks economics outside of restrictive frames and frees the gift from the implicit expectation of reciprocity as an act of deliberate waste.
McGoey ‘18 – Linsey McGoey is a Canadian sociologist and academic based in England. She is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. “Bataille and the Sociology of Abundance: Reassessing Gifts, Debt and Economic Excess” in Theory, Culture & Society: Special Issue: Bataille and Heterology, Vol. 35(4–5), 07/28/2017, pg. 81-84; DOI: 10.1177/0263276416637905 | RN *Modified for problematic language **4pt text is just a critique of certain readings of Mauss—no Neg cards hidden
What is less known today is that Mauss, like Keynes, was preoccupied with challenging the imposition of war reparations. He published numerous financial journalism articles underscoring the negative economic repercussions of debt repayment efforts. A recent body of scholarship has even suggested that Mauss may have written The Gift in order in part to emphasize the importance of debt forgiveness by sovereign states (see, in particular, Mallard, 2011).
Why is Mauss’s writing on debt relief largely overlooked today? The problem rests partly with Mauss. During his career, he endeavoured to keep his political and financial journalism separate from his anthropological writing. Keith Hart suggests that this separation has been entrenched and exaggerated by his followers since then, many of whom treat The Gift as a masterful synthesis of earlier ethnographic studies (Mauss himself did not conduct primary research for it), with much to say about the social implications of reciprocity as a means of exchange, but with less relevance for understanding the geopolitics of sovereign states (Hart, 2014: 34).
In line with Hart, I suggest that reconciling Mauss’s writing on sovereign debts with his writing on gifts is vital for understanding the contribution that both Mauss and Bataille make to theories of economic surplus. So, what were Mauss’s views on war reparations? And how integral are they to understanding gift-giving and sacrifice, in both Mauss’s and Bataille’s work?
To date, scholarship on Mauss has often rested in polar camps. In one camp, there are, to summarize them crudely, the economic reductionists who read The Gift as evidence of the universality of homo economicus. Pierre Bourdieu and Mary Douglas are two exemplars of this group. However much Mauss tried to distance himself from what he saw as the narrow utilitarian precepts of neoclassical economics, The Gift is littered with examples of the personal and communal rewards that stem from gift-giving. These examples provide ample ammunition for the reductionists. Bourdieu takes the line that gifts are simply self-maximizing economic transactions by another name. Gifts, he suggests, can be even more financially crippling for recipients than economic loans, as the latter carry explicit interest rates, re-payment criteria and so on, while the former engender unspoken expectations. A gift’s power lies in the wordlessness it evokes, its establishment of a debt that has not been voiced and may, therefore, be harder to dispel (Bourdieu, 1997).
In many ways, Douglas is even more reductionist than Bourdieu. Though she takes pains to detail Mauss’s opposition to British utilitarian thought, she also manages to bring him into that camp, suggesting compatibility between Mauss and Adam Smith that betrays the nuance in Mauss’s analysis. ‘The gift cycle echoes Adam Smith’s invisible hand’, Douglas writes. ‘Gift complements market in so far as it operates where the latter is absent’ (Douglas, 1990: xiv).
Mauss would likely have resented the comparison. Smith is not mentioned by name in the essay, but the legacy of the invisible hand metaphor is clearly one that Mauss wishes to overturn. He laments the all-pervasive influence of self-interest as an explanatory device for human action, an ascension that he traces to the early 18th century: ‘One can almost date – since Mandeville’s The Fable

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