Horsetrading DA - DDI 2023
Horsetrading DA - DDI 2023.docx
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Horsetrading DA---DDI 23 Note There is no “generic 1NC.” Construct the 1NC according to the AFF and the impact scenario you want to read. Areas for additional work by labs Shoring up uniqueness for each impact area Building out Social Security DA Impact work 1NCs---Need Impacts Horsetrading 1NC---UBI The only way to enact universal UBI is to horse-trade it for destroying the rest of the welfare state---specifically Social Security, Pell Grants, and Medicaid Robert Greenstein 19, founder and President Emeritus of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, considered an expert on the federal budget and a range of domestic policy issues, including anti-poverty programs and various aspects of tax and health care policy, was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship for making ‘the Center a model for a non-partisan research and policy organization,’ “Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 6/13/19, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it At first blush, universal basic income (UBI) seems a very attractive idea, especially to a progressive. Yet it suffers from two serious problems. First, the odds are very high that an effort to secure UBI would prove quixotic. Second, and more disconcerting, any possibility of overcoming the formidable obstacles to UBI will almost certainly require a left-right coalition that has significant conservative support — and conservative support for UBI rests on an approach that would increase poverty, rather than reduce it. The key issues related to UBI include what it would cost, how it would be paid for, and the risks it poses. Let’s take these one at a time. The Cost There are over 300 million Americans today. Suppose UBI provided everyone with $10,000 a year. That would cost more than $3 trillion a year — and $30 trillion to $40 trillion over ten years. This single-year figure equals more than three-fourths of the entire yearly federal budget — and double the entire budget outside Social Security, Medicare, defense, and interest payments. It’s also equal to close to 100 percent of all tax revenue the federal government collects. Or, consider UBI that gives everyone $5,000 a year. That would provide income equal to about two-fifths of the poverty line for an individual (which is a projected $12,700 in 2016) and less than the poverty line for a family of four ($24,800). But it would cost as much as the entire federal budget outside Social Security, Medicare, defense, and interest payments. Some UBI proponents respond that policymakers could make the UBI payments taxable. But the savings from doing so would be relatively modest, because the vast bulk of Americans either owe no federal income tax or are in the 10% or 15% tax brackets. For example, if you gave all 328 million Americans a $10,000 UBI and the cost was $3.28 trillion a year (about $33 trillion over ten years) before taxes, then making the UBI payments taxable would reduce that cost only to something like $2.5 trillion or $2.75 trillion (or $25 trillion to $27.5 trillion over ten years). Paying For It Where would the money to finance such a large expenditure come from? That it would come mainly or entirely from new taxes isn’t plausible. We’ll already need substantial new revenues in the coming decades to help keep Social Security and Medicare solvent and avoid large benefit cuts in them. We’ll need further tax increases to help repair a crumbling infrastructure that will otherwise impede economic growth. And if we want to create more opportunity and reduce racial and other barriers and inequities, we’ll also need to raise new revenues to invest more in areas like pre-school education, child care, college affordability, and revitalizing segregated inner-city communities. A UBI that’s financed primarily by tax increases would require the American people to accept a level of taxation that vastly exceeds anything in U.S. history. It’s hard to imagine that such a UBI would advance very far, especially given the tax increases we’ll already need for Social Security, Medicare, infrastructure, and other needs. The Risk UBI’s daunting financing challenges raise fundamental questions about its political feasibility, both now and in coming decades. Proponents often speak of an emerging left-right coalition to support it. But consider what UBI’s supporters on the right advocate. They generally propose UBI as a replacement for the current “welfare state.” That is, they would finance UBI by eliminating all or most programs for people with low or modest incomes. Consider what that would mean. If you take the dollars targeted on people in the bottom fifth or two-fifths of the population and convert them to universal payments to people all the way up the income scale, you’re redistributing income upward. That would increase poverty and inequality rather than reduce them. Yet that’s the platform on which the (limited) support for UBI on the right largely rests. It entails abolishing programs from SNAP (food stamps) — which largely eliminated the severe child malnutrition found in parts of the Southern “black belt” and Appalachia in the late 1960s — to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Section 8 rental vouchers, Medicaid, Head Start, child care assistance, and many others. These programs lift tens of millions of people, including millions of children, out of poverty each year and make tens of millions more less poor. Some UBI proponents may argue that by ending current programs, we’d reap large administrative savings that we could convert into UBI payments. But that’s mistaken. For the major means-tested programs — SNAP, Medicaid, the EITC, housing vouchers, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and school meals — administrative costs consume only 1 to 9 percent of program resources, as a CBPP analysis explains.[1] Their funding goes overwhelmingly to boost the incomes and purchasing power of low-income families. Moreover, as the Roosevelt Institute’s Mike Konczal has noted, eliminating Medicaid, SNAP, the EITC, housing vouchers, and the like would still leave you far short of what’s needed to finance a meaningful UBI.[2] Would we also end Pell Grants that help low-income students afford college? Would we terminate support for children in foster care, for mental health services, and for job training? Ed Dolan, who favors UBI, has calculated that we could finance it by using the proceeds from eliminating all means-tested programs outside health care — including Pell Grants, job training, Head Start, free school lunches, and the like, as well as refundable tax credits, SNAP, SSI, low-income housing programs, etc. The result, Dolan found, would be an annual UBI of $1,582 per person, well below the level of support most low-income families (especially working-poor families with children) now receive. The increase in poverty and hardship would be very large.[3] That’s why the risk is high that under any UBI that could conceivably gain traction politically, tens of millions of poor people would likely end up worse off. To further understand the risks, consider how working-age adults who aren’t working would fare. In our political culture, there are formidable political obstacles to providing cash to working-age people who aren’t employed, and it’s unlikely that UBI could surmount them. The nation’s social insurance programs — Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance — all go only to people with significant work records. It’s highly unlikely that policymakers would agree to make UBI cash payments of several thousand dollars to people who aren’t elderly or disabled and aren’t working. (By contrast, there is political support for providing poor families that have no earnings with non-cash assistance such as SNAP, Medicaid, rental vouchers, Head Start, and the WIC nutrition program.) <<Insert desired impact 1NC to Medicaid, Pell Grants, or Social Security>> Horsetrading 1NC---Jobs Guarantee Passing a jobs guarantee requires welfare trade-offs---tanks healthcare, Social Security, and higher ed Palley 18 — [Thomas Palley is an independent economist living in Washington DC. He founded Economics for Democratic & Open Societies. The goal of the project is to stimulate public discussion about what kinds of economic arrangements and conditions are needed to promote democracy and open society, “Job Guarantee Programs: Careful What You Wish For,” Social Europe, 09-14-2018, https://www.socialeurope.eu/job-guarantee-programs-careful-what-you-wish-for, accessed 7-11-2023] - PG Some progressive economists are now arguing for the idea of a Job Guarantee Program (JGP), and their advocacy has begun to gain political traction. For instance, in the US, Bernie Sanders and some other leading Democrats have recently signaled a willingness to embrace the idea. In recent research paper I have examined the macroeconomics of such a program. Whereas a JGP would deliver real macroeconomic benefits, it also raises some significant troubling economic and political economy concerns. Those concerns should be fully digested before a JGP is politically embraced. The starting point for discussion should be recognition that a JGP delivers multiple benefits. First, it ensures full employment by making available a job to all who want one on the terms specified by the program. Second, it substitutes wages for welfare benefits to workers who accept such jobs and would otherwise be on welfare. Third, it may deliver supply-side benefits to the extent that it helps unemployed workers retain job skills and avoid becoming detached from the labor force during periods of unemployment. Fourth, society benefits from the services produced by workers holding guaranteed employment jobs. Fifth, it has significant desirable counter-cyclical stabilisation properties. That said, a JGP generates some policy conflicts and it also has some drawbacks. Those conflicts and drawbacks concern macroeconomics, microeconomics, and political economy. A first macroeconomic concern is the putative cost of a JGP. This is a complex multifaceted concern. The immediate cost of a JGP will depend on the state of the economy and the state of the aggregate demand (AD) generation process. An economy with a deteriorated AD generation process, marked by a reduced wage share and increased inequality, will be prone to higher unemployment that raises the program’s cost. That speaks to the need to pair a JGP with other conventional structural Keynesian policies that remedy the causes of AD weakness. A second macroeconomic issue concerns financing and policy trade-offs. If government is financially constrained, policy must operate in a realm of trade-offs. Consequently, adopting a JGP may require giving up other desirable policy proposals such as increased public infrastructure investment, expanded subsidized healthcare, covering the shortfall in Social Security via general revenues, free tertiary education at public universities, elimination of student debt, or a universal basic income (UBI). This effect of financial constraints on government explains why discussion of a JGP tends to quickly spill over into a broader discussion about the macroeconomics of public finance. JGP proponents tend to believe government is financially unconstrained and can pay for everything by printing money. After the fact, government can then readily withdraw the money it has printed by raising taxes. All of this can be done without causing financial, economic, or political disruptions or distortions. That view is identified with modern money theory (MMT), which dismisses financial constraints on policy and argues the only constraint is availability of real resources (i.e. unemployed workers or under-utilised capital). In contrast, more conventional public finance macroeconomics argues that history, economic situation, markets, and political process impose financial, economic, and political constraints on governments that are difficult to thread. Though government has the technical ability to pay for everything owing to its power to issue money, doing so in excessive fashion will provoke disruptive and distorting financial, economic, and political reactions. The possibility of such reactions renders government’s technical ability to pay for everything an economic will-o-the-wisp. A government with a short time horizon can use its printing power to finance all its policy desires, but subsequent market reactions to budget excess will impose costs and may make the policies unsustainable. Alternatively, a government with a longer time horizon takes such future reactions into account when setting current policy, making it de facto financially constrained despite the appearance of being unconstrained. A third macroeconomic concern is inflation. The JGP wage is a real wage, which means the JGP nominal wage must be tied to inflation. Private sector nominal wages may then likely be tied to the JGP nominal wage to maintain an appropriate wage differential. Consequently, the JGP nominal wage could start to act as a form of economy-wide nominal wage indexation. Such indexation could potentially generate an unstable wage – price spiral, particularly if the existence of a JGP aggravates distributional conflict by increasing private sector wage demands. Raising the private sector wage share may be a desirable feature, but it points to the need for additional macroeconomic stabilisation policy tools. That requirement is either ignored or denied by JGP proponents. As regards microeconomics, there is concern related to the minimum wage aspect of a JGP. A necessary condition for the program to work is workers be willing to move from guaranteed jobs to private sector jobs when the latter become available. That requires the utility derived from a private sector job to exceed that of a guaranteed employment job. The utility depends on the job package consisting of wage, benefits, and work conditions. In effect, a JGP would set a floor for employment conditions in the private sector, akin to a minimum wage, only broader. If the guaranteed employment job package is more attractive than the private sector job package, that will attract workers out of the private sector, lowering private sector output and employment. In that case, private sector employers may respond by improving their job package, which could have effects akin to a high minimum wage that prices low productivity workers out of employment. Lastly, there are significant political economy concerns. A first such concern is the impact of a JGP on public sector unions. The distinction between government sector employment and guaranteed employment is artefactual, and both contribute to national income at cost. Consequently, there would likely be considerable pressure to lower public sector wages and benefits to the level of the guaranteed job on grounds that the work is similar. In effect, there is a high risk that a JGP could be used to open a new front for undermining public sector unions and public sector remuneration. A second political economy concern is workfare. Not only may the JGP be used to undermine the character of public sector employment, it can also be used to undermine the right to welfare. Thus, the right to welfare can be made conditional on accepting a guaranteed employment job. In this fashion, a JGP can become a double-edged sword, cutting upward against the public sector and downward against the welfare system. That is not an outlandish speculation in the context of US political economy, where the large prison population is already being exploited to work for near-free for the benefit of politically connected labor-intensive private industry. A third political economy concern is the productivity of guaranteed employment jobs. A JGP will be sold politically to the public on grounds that JGP workers are productive. However, delivering productivity requires organisational and managerial capacity that the public sector may not have. In that case, there is a risk that such jobs become perceived as “make work”. That would play into the political economy of animus to government, and it could boomerang back in the form of politics opposed to government provision of public goods and services and opposed to macroeconomic stabilisation policy. Careful what you wish for In sum, the debate over JGPs is fraught. Even those who support the aims of a JGP, and are favourably inclined to activist public policy, may still be wary of a JGP for economic and political economy reasons. Implementing a JGP will require political capital and the right political conditions. It might be better to use that favorable moment to introduce new policies (e.g. a UBI) and upgrade a collection of existing different policy modalities that together deliver the same or more benefits without the political economy risks. <<Insert desired impact 1NC to Medicaid, Pell Grants, or Social Security>> Horsetrading 1NC---Social Security The plan gets horse-traded for privatizing Social Security James G. Chappel 2-13 (James G. Chappel is Gilhuly Family Associate Professor of History at Duke University; “The Frozen Politics of Social Security”; Boston Review; https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/the-frozen-politics-of-social-security/)//TMS-Isir Despite this dire situation, there has not been a congressional vote, even in committee, on major reforms to Social Security since 1983. This has not been for lack of trying, at least among Democrats. In both the House and the Senate, there are serious bills, with significant support, to salvage the program. The most well-developed, known as Social Security 2100, has more than 200 cosponsors in the House. It’s an audacious bill, planning to expand Social Security benefits for the first time since the 1970s, focusing especially on the caregiving workforce. And in the Senate, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren have put forth an even more ambitious plan, which would raise taxes and benefits while expanding the program’s solvency for decades. Still, the odds of anything happening with these bills are low, at least for now. In addition to the expected Republican intransigence, Democrats themselves are not united. The relevant division is between a politics of incrementalism and a politics of bold reform and expansion. Social Security 2100 is on the less ambitious end of the spectrum, especially as it has recently been rewritten to keep Biden’s promise of not raising taxes on people making less than $400,000 per year. As such, the bill does little to address the solvency issue. The Social Security Expansion Act in the Senate is bolder and does more to address both equity and solvency—but few Democratic senators have cosponsored the bill, leaving it oceans away from the required votes. For all their differences, these bills in the aggregate show that Social Security is perfectly capable of providing a vehicle for progressive welfare reform: any of them would do wonders, most obviously for seniors and disabled workers. But all of us, too, would benefit from knowing that something like a livable income was headed our way at the tail end of a serpentine labor market that has almost completely stopped providing traditional pensions. Despite all this, the enormous energy in recent years around expanding Medicare and Medicaid has not been matched by attention to Social Security: the politics around it have languished. Why? One major reason is that Social Security has a marketing problem. It seems like a boring, wonky program, and one that is in any case unlikely to survive much longer. (A 2015 Gallup poll showed that more than half of Americans did not expect to receive benefits when they retired.) This situation has left the door open for conservatives, who have been baying to privatize Social Security, or at least cut benefits, si
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