Bataille UBI Neg - DDI 2023 KM
Bataille UBI Neg - DDI 2023 KM.docx
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NEG---KM vs KM Bataille Work CP 1NC Text: the USFG should continuously shred money equal to the cost of maintaining a basic income program. Work is good. Deranty 21 [Jean-Philippe Deranty works at Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away, April 27, 2021, European Journal of Social Theory, 25(3), 422–439. https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310211012169] EAY --the constraints of work allow it to be an activity of personal growth --creates social approval --very difficult --allows worker to figure out how to do it themselves Despite the many differences between work activities, a key aspect shared by all of them is that they are performed under several constraints. The first constraint relates to the success of the working activity. That success is defined not by the worker but by the addressee: whether the particular need (the part needed further down the production line, the care for a sick person, a legal or a cultural act) has been fulfilled (Hegel, 1991, § 192, p. 229). This judgement is to a large extent out of the hands of the worker. The need is fulfilled or not, well or not well, for the addressee of work. This dependence upon others for the meaning of the activity is one of the main reasons why work has traditionally been viewed as inherently servile (typically Aristotle, 1996, Book VIII, chapter 2–3). A second constraint is that this fulfilment of a need takes place within the general frame of social reproduction and thus involves more than just an interpersonal relationship. It is also a contribution to social reproduction at large (Hegel, 1991, § 199, p. 233). This means that there is a general expectation that the duty will be discharged. Not doing this work means failing to contribute to the cooperative scheme. Rawls’ ‘principle of reciprocity’, which places demands on each citizen as a member of this scheme, can be read as adumbrating this aspect of social contribution (Rawls, 1999, pp. xv, 88). A third type of constraint stems from the fact that the success of a working act is also defined internally, depending on whether it conformed to the norms defining an efficient act within a particular sector of the overall cooperative order. No work act occurs in isolation, as if the worker were facing the task for the first time and on their own. As a technical gesture, all work mobilises established knowledges, skills and ways to use these skills, which are more or less explicitly prescribed. These features define an occupational culture that can become a formal tradition, a public history of doing things in a particular way (Dejours, 2018, pp. 34–35). Even work performed in the intimate sphere has to abide by external norms, if only the cultural norms that define good caring. Another constraining frame is the external authority exerting command and control. In waged work, this is obviously the different levels of management. But even in non-waged work, the activity often remains under external controlling authorities, if only the anonymous gaze of society’s expectations. There are thus several types of constraining forces overdetermining working activities: functional, social, some stemming from an occupational culture, constraints stemming from controlling authorities, if only the cooperative scheme at large. These factors make work a singular type of activity, for better or for worse, and the goods attached to work difficult to access via other types of activity. These constraining factors make work activities intrinsically heteronomous: neither the satisfaction drawn from the work’s output, nor the norms by which the work gestures are to be performed and are evaluated, nor the significance of the work in the cooperative scheme, are determined by the subject all by herself. Indeed, as we saw, this is one of the issues raised by post-work theorists, that work is antithetical with autonomy, not just in its capitalistic organisation but intrinsically as a type of activity. To cite a well-known passage from Marx (1991, pp. 759–761), or Hegel (1991, p. 221), human beings, inasmuch as they have to contribute to the cooperative scheme, are under the sway of manifold ‘necessity’. And yet, just as Marx said, and Hegel before him, there can be ‘freedom in this field’. It is precisely in dealing with the heteronomy of work, having to face manifold ‘necessity’, that individuals draw specific goods from it. This is true first of all from the point of view of personal development. Rather than being only limitations on free will, the external constraints the subject faces in work are also parameters that enable action by defining its goals and the means to achieve them. External constraints, of course, can reduce autonomy to such an extent that the experience of work becomes one of domination and alienation. But in other cases, heteronomous determinations are an opportunity for action. They provide specifications regarding the type of output that is needed, the techniques to use, the deadline to operate under and so on. The subject remains the agent who has to operationalise all these elements. In cases where heteronomy is not overwhelming, the strong ‘necessity’ that the constraints represent become a chance for self-development. The subject has to mobilise all her capacities, physical, emotional, psychological, cognitive, to achieve the task. It is then precisely because of all its surrounding constraints that work can be the type of activity that promotes self-development. The subject is forced to grow, as it were. As Dejours argues, working on the world always involves also working on the self (Dejours, 2009, vol. 1, pp. 165–169; see Marx already, 1973, p. 611). This conception of self-realisation through work qualifies philosophical accounts that make full autonomy a necessary condition of meaningfulness (Bowie, 1998; Schwartz, 1982). Apart from the fact that these accounts often propound unrealistically maximalist views of autonomy, they also overlook the potentially educating aspects of engaging in heteronomous activities. As Elster claimed (1986, p. 100), self-realisation through work is made possible if the activity represents ‘a challenge that must be met’. This is especially so if the challenge is not self-defined but is an external, objective challenge, deriving from the imperative to fulfil some need. This paradoxical developmental power inherent in the heteronomy of work appears clearly in contrast to activities that an individual engages in outside the demands of social reproduction. These rarely provide the rigid frame within which the subject needs to mobilise all her powers to achieve tasks. It is through such mobilisation, however, that she will find the greatest chance of transforming herself in the process. This explains why even in playful activity, say learning to play tennis or chess well as a hobby, if a person is truly serious about it, she generally puts herself willingly in the heteronomous situation of heeding the advice and commands of a technical or moral authority, a tutor, a mentor, a teacher. Mastering any complex task is difficult, involves renouncing comfort and habits, one’s entrenched physical, emotional and cognitive patterns. The constraints of work provide remarkable opportunities for this. Another paradoxical constraint of work comes from the output. In work, the subject is under the sway of the work’s outcome, so to speak. The telos of the activity drives their actions and thoughts. Once again, however, what is a constraint from one angle is an opportunity for development from another. Acting in order to produce an outcome, one that will fulfil a need, is a typical case of a meaningful activity. If there is pressure to produce that outcome because it responds to a social purpose, according to norms that are publicly acknowledged, then the successful delivery is all the more meaningful, as it receives a public stamp of approval, both in the delivery of the output and in the worker abiding by normative expectations. Compare this with the achievement of a goal that a subject has given to herself on her own, in the privacy of her intimate life. The fact that this second type of outcome is not public, abides by no external norms, surely means that it has less meaning for the subject. This conception of meaningfulness in work mitigates accounts that deny it to menial activities, typically those that Hannah Arendt called labour as opposed to work, that produce no enduring trace in the world (Veltman, 2016, pp. 128–129). On the present account, individuals can find at least some meaning in their activity if it is clear how it contributes concretely to social reproduction. Another structural dimension of work activities is that, however detailed the prescriptions framing the productive act, such a framework can never pre-empt what it will take for a human agent to achieve the tasks (Dejours, 2006). There are just too many factors in complex reality for external prescriptions to anticipate every possible contingency. The subject as a result needs some room to accomplish the work in her own way. The work culture has to be adapted, notably to suit idiosyncratic ways of doing things, and to adapt to the situation. Technical aspects of the work process have to be discussed with the supervising authorities, and hopefully amended, both to suit the agents and to take into account the specific features of the situation. More responsibility and agency can be granted to the workers, notably where some form of workplace democracy exists. All these points signal that the intrinsic heteronomy of working in fact has to be mitigated for work to be performed well enough (Marx already, 1991, p. 612). And since the multidimensional necessity that confronts the worker remains mute regarding how she will actually perform the task, work activities can therefore promote not just the development of subjective capacities but also the development of creativity. Cosmo K 1NC – Links Implementation of a UBI relies on exploitative labor to improve the Global North Sticker '23 [Martin; 03/15/23; Department of Philosophy, Cotham House, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK, " A merely national ‘universal’ basic income and global justice," Political Philosophy, Vol. 31, Issue/No. 2, p. 159-163//JJB] The problem I raise in this section is a more pressing version of the already well-known exploitation or free-rider objection to UBI. My problem is concerned with the exploitation specifically of non-nationals or non-residents, who contribute to but do not benefit from a merely national UBI. The literature pays surprisingly little attention to injustices between different nations that a merely national UBI might amplify. In fact, discussions of exploitation and unfairness within the UBI literature take place almost exclusively on an intranational level.13 The original exploitation objection is inspired by Rawls's claim that Malibu surfers are not entitled to public funds.14 The (in)famous surfer is someone who could contribute to society either via paid work or in other socially beneficial ways, but, instead, spends all his time surfing. While the surfer potentially poses a problem for all government schemes founded on cooperation between citizens, the objection is particularly pressing for a UBI, as here benefits are explicitly not conditional upon willingness to cooperate, for example by seeking paid employment. UBI advocates see this unconditionality as a feature, not a bug.15 Nonetheless, in the case of the surfer, a UBI seems to clash with ‘a widely accepted notion of justice: it is unfair for able bodied people to live off the labour of others’.16 This objection is sometimes phrased in terms of unfairness, sometimes in terms of exploitation or parasitism, since the surfer lives off the labour of others who (supposedly) do not receive adequate compensation for the services they perform. I take it that the underlying intuition is that it is unjust if one person's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of other persons and there is no reciprocity in this subsidy, even though the first person could reciprocate. There is a straightforward response to the surfer problem. Take Lazy (the surfer) and Crazy, who works hard and whose income and other taxes help fund a UBI that allows Lazy to spend all of his time surfing. Crazy cannot reasonably complain about this, since, if he finds the lifestyle of Lazy more appealing than his own, he could give up his job and become a surfer himself. After all, an effective UBI affords him the real freedom to live this way. If Crazy does not give up his job, then this is because he chooses the life of work and higher income—in which case both Lazy and Crazy live the life they chose, and the UBI is working out well for both. Thus, Lazy is not exploiting Crazy, since Crazy can withdraw his labour and is afforded the same economic security and freedom to live the life of his choosing as Lazy. I find this response to the original surfer problem persuasive.17 Things would be different, however, if someone in Crazy's position could not choose to give up their job and become a (financially adequately supported) surfer, because they (I'll call them ‘Exploited’) are neither citizen nor resident18 of a country that pays a UBI. Given the globalized world that we live in, Exploited might well perform work that benefits Lazy as well as Crazy. Such work can be a subsidy of their lifestyles if Exploited's labour is cheaper than the labour of those in the same strong bargaining position as Lazy and Crazy to demand higher pay or better working conditions. After all, Lazy and Crazy have the freedom and security to opt out of work altogether. If it is unjust that someone's lifestyle is subsidized by the labour of another person and there is no adequate reciprocity in this subsidy, then a merely national UBI suffers from a justice problem with regard to the subsidies Lazy and Crazy receive from Exploited and the lack of reciprocity. In the debate about the fairness of a UBI there is much concern about noncontributors, such as the Malibu surfer, receiving benefits. There is much less concern about people who do contribute, but do not receive benefits because they are of a different nationality or live in a different country.19 The latter, it seems to me, constitutes the most pressing justice problem. Let me spell this out in more detail. A merely national UBI excludes certain people as recipients, even if they contribute to the effectiveness of the UBI in that country. They can make such a contribution by subsidizing UBI recipients with their cheap labour, which increases the relative value of the UBI for recipients, as it makes products and services more affordable than they would be if everyone received a UBI. This impacts what and how much those living off a UBI can afford, the opportunities open to them, and how attractive it is for them to exit jobs (or to reduce hours), and thus whether the UBI realizes the goods that it promises, and to what extent it does so. These subsidies for UBI recipients would be, in one sense, not dissimilar from currently existing conditions. After all, the citizens of developed countries already benefit from global inequalities, poor working conditions, and low pay in developing countries where people are forced to work to meet their basic needs. However, there currently exists a work requirement even in wealthy countries, whereas there would be no such requirement for those enjoying an effective UBI. It is reasonable to assume that if non-recipient contributors were not forced to work for their subsistence, because they also enjoyed a UBI that frees them of the need to work for their subsistence, then some services and goods that are currently offered or produced cheaply would become more expensive. The subsidies would likely (at least in part) disappear, and the UBI thus become less effective for recipients. A prime example for exploitation, that subsidizes the citizens of wealthy countries and that many individuals in developing countries would be unlikely to put up with if they were in a position to opt out, is so-called sweatshop labour. 20 I take it that sweatshop labour is a relatively uncontroversial example of exploitation.21 The low pay and bad conditions in sweatshops are (part of) the reason why this work is profitable for their owners and why this mode of production can benefit end-consumers. Even after the introduction of a global UBI (or a merely national UBI in countries with sweatshops), there may be people willing to manufacture the type of products formerly produced in sweatshops, but they would presumably need stronger financial incentives and would be able to demand better working conditions that would make these products more expensive. Now, imagine that Exploited works in a factory that builds surf equipment and, due to poor working conditions and low pay for her and her colleagues, this equipment is significantly cheaper than equipment produced by Lazy's fellow citizens who enjoy a UBI and lack strong financial incentives to work in a surfboard factory for low pay. In an extreme case, the only surf equipment Lazy can afford from his UBI is equipment produced by Exploited. Without this cheap supply of equipment, it would not be possible for Lazy to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer and he would have to take up (part-time) employment to afford his equipment. A UBI then allows Lazy to live the way he wants only because of the labour of Exploited, who, unlike Crazy, does not have the option to withdraw her labour and live off a UBI. Even if Exploited does not manufacture the specific products that Lazy needs to live the pure lifestyle of a surfer, as long as she does manufacture products or render services that Lazy or Crazy want or need, and does so more cheaply than if she were able to opt out of work, the UBI that Lazy and Crazy enjoy goes further in terms of purchasing power than it otherwise would. Part of the value of a merely national UBI for recipients thus stems from the fact that this UBI is merely national and that it still leaves in place sources of cheap labour elsewhere. Monetary sovereignty assumes atomized, competitive nation-states Kotilainen 21 — Konsta Kotilainen, a SYLFF fellow at the University of Helsinki in politics, economics, and philosophy, doctoral researcher, holds a M.A. and B.A in world politics with specializations in Global Political Economy and Global Governance and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki, 2021 (“A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory,” Taylor and Francis Online, March 19th, available online at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343, accessed 07-14-2023) //CD My third MMT-inspired argument against leaving the exercise of monetary sovereignty solely to the nation-states relates to the wider political economy in which these states operate. As the neochartalists often stress, numerous institutional, judicial, and ideological factors, as distinct from “purely economic” ones, undermine the ability of monetarily sovereign states to take the full advantage of their currency privileges (Armstrong Citation2019; Sardoni and Wray Citation2007). Many such barriers are supranational by nature. Contemporary nation-states are rarely politically strong enough to coordinate sufficiently effective economic, social, and regulatory policies despite their in principle considerable capacities as monetary sovereigns. Few individual states acting alone are fit to fight the global institutional and ideological forces that constrain their exercise of monetary sovereignty. While even the smallest and poorest of nation-states are not always incapable of benefitting from their sovereign privileges to some limited extent, it is especially hard for them to bact alone against the prevailing
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